The Politics of Terrorism: Power, Legitimacy, and Violence

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Abstract: This paper examines and juxtaposes discourses about terrorism, violence, and political leadership. It presents generalizations about terrorism—a form of political violence by, for, and against the state—and politics and violence based on the theories of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt. The stark contrasts drawn from these theories include power as non-violent strength (Arendt) versus power as violence-dependent (Weber) and the struggle for legitimacy between different agents (states and individuals) as well as terrorism by, for, and against the state. This reframing of power leads to judging a lack of power where there is violence, and the presence of power where one observes non-violence. An examination of political and criminal violence leads to questions about deliberate and purposeful violence, indirect and structural violence that has political consequences, and their relationship to terrorism.

It expands the application of terrorism to include indirect structural violence by indicating its relationship to direct violence, not only in traditionally-viewed terrorist action but in the ignored terror of, for example, inner cities. Terrorism has many forms by many actors. To synthesize the results of these lines of reasoning leads to a conclusion with considerable implications for politics and for political leadership. The politics of terrorism suggest a central counter-terrorist approach: de-politicizing the violence of terrorists whenever possible and using the authority and power of the state to institutionalize it as criminal violence. This, in turn, also means politicizing other forms of violence, such as capital punishment, and their indirect and structural forms, such as the inner city.

Keywords: Arendt, criminalize, political leadership, political terrorism, political violence, politics, state violence, structural violence, terrorism, war on terror, Weber.

Introduction

This paper develops the thesis that through an understanding of power as authentic leadership by legitimate authority, and violence as a sign of a breakdown of power, leadership, and legitimacy, we may begin to create more integral political narratives. When such narratives inform political leadership, authentic leadership is more likely to formulate other choices to
violence and its attendant terror. There can be no question that terrorism and violence and the state's reaction to them play an overwhelming role in politics today—in terms of who gets elected, on what platform, the over-arching global politics, and how that is driven currently by terrorism and the actions of the states and terrorists. While terrorists have gotten the attention of nation states around the globe, the emphasis on the psychology of terrorists obscures the political preconditions and precipitants—the indirect and direct political causes of terrorism and their political transformation—that are the focus of this paper. Thus, conceptions of terrorism, criminality, and violence, the nature of agents engaged in the politics of terror, how states react both internally and externally, all need to be examined. An examination of political and criminal violence leads to questions about deliberate and purposeful violence, indirect and structural violence that has political consequences, and their relationship to terrorism. It expands the application of terrorism to include indirect structural violence by indicating its relationship to direct violence, not only in traditionally-viewed terrorist action but in the ignored terrorism of, for example, inner cities. In so doing, this paper develops different realms of discourse about terrorism, violence, and political leadership to inform new political narratives and the development of political leadership.

The examination presents generalizations about terrorism—a form of political violence by, for, and against the state—and politics and violence. These generalizations are based on the theories of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt, and we begin the examination by juxtaposing their definitions and arguments to highlight fundamental contrasts developed throughout the paper. With those insights as a foundation for an analytical framework of political terrorism, the next part of the paper distinguishes deliberate and purposeful violence from unintended violence and political violence from the apolitical appearance of indirect (or structural) political violence. This offers a starting point for understanding political terrorism as a unique form of political violence. On that basis, in the next part we examine the scholarship on terrorism that will enable us to explain one aspect of political terrorism—the nature and role of political leadership within political terrorism. The final part is an examination of terrorism by, for, and against the state, including discussion of terrorism against the state as a reflection of terrorism by the state.

As an orientation to the interrelationships of concepts, arguments, and systems presented here, Figure 1 below supplies a mapping of the politics of terrorism elaborated in this paper.

**Legitimate Authority / Justified Violence**

**Weber**

Max Weber’s reflections on politics offer us a starting point to understand an analytical framework of political terrorism. In his profound essay, *Politics as a Vocation*, (1958), Weber explains that the general questions of politics as a vocation (political leadership) are not limited to the policies and questions of the day. In its broadest sense, politics comprises any *independent* leadership in action regardless of context. Thus we may have labor politics, family politics, and workplace politics. In its narrower terms, political leadership comprises the leadership, or attempts to influence the leadership, of a political association, a state (Weber, 1958, p. 77).
Weber defines the state by its distinctive means—physical force—not its purpose, which may be common to any number of other associations. The relationship of the state and violence is an “intimate” one, just as Tilly described, that defines the state for Weber as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (p. 78). The power of the state adheres to its right to permit groups and individuals to use physical force and to its claim as the sole source of the right to use violence. Politics, at root, “means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.” Part of the power of the state comes from establishing the legitimacy of its power so that it does not have to use the violence and physical force upon which it rests. Weber combines these definitional elements in sociological and powerful terms. “The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of a legitimate (i.e., considered to be legitimate) violence” (p. 78).

At this point, in his essay, Weber examines the sources of legitimate authority, which are familiar to students of politics.
- The eternal yesterday of tradition—traditional;
- Extraordinary and personal gifts of grace—charismatic;
- Legality premised on the validity of legal statute and functional competence premised on
  rationally created rules—legal (pp. 78-79).

One who is active in politics seeks legitimate authority through one of these avenues rather
than justifying violence by invoking one or more of these forms of authority. The state’s use of
violence is not terror when it appears as justified by legitimate authority; a contestable terrain. It
appears more clearly as unjustified violence and terror as groups understand legitimate authority
as cultural and social subordination or when it attempts to eliminate legitimate opposition.

Weber spends considerable space outlining the preeminent qualities of a leader with a
vocation for politics, that is someone who seeks power as a means to serve other ends and not
merely self-gratification—passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion (pp. 115-
116). These qualities, like all human qualities, are held together in paradoxical if not
contradictory fashion. Weber identifies the puzzle as “how can warm passion and a cool sense of
proportion be forged together in one and the same soul” (p. 116). The passion that Weber has in
mind is a “matter-of-factness” passionate devotion to a cause. The cause, however, tempers the
passion with a sense of proportion, which comes with an ability to keep some distance from
things and people related to the cause, that is, the ability to remain objective and responsible.
Weber does not quite solve the puzzle he put forward but he does make clear that solving this
puzzle requires that power remains a means to serving some cause but that the cause does not
become an end itself and the end is certainly not the vanity of the powerful.

Taken alone, the emphasis on passion, ideals, and cause in politics could support extremism.
In his own time, Weber was concerned with the extremism of pacifism and a Christian ethic
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. Weber checks the possibility of passion, ideals, and
cause becoming extremism by balancing the ethos of politics as a cause with an ethos of politics
as responsible compromise and proportionate action. He contrasts an ethic of absolute or ultimate
ends with an ethic of responsibility. The decisive distinction between them is consideration of
consequences of action. The ethic of ultimate ends focuses on intention while the ethic of
responsibility focuses on the foreseeable consequences of one’s actions (pp. 119-20). “The
believer in an ethic of ultimate ends feels “responsible” only for seeing to it that the flame of
pure intentions is not squelched; for example, the flame of protesting against the injustice of the
social order” (p. 121). Thus, suicide bombers may see their action as a means to protest injustice
and to inspire others to similar protest with no attention to the real and human consequences of
that action to others. The ethic of responsibility focuses on consequences. It examines all
foreseeable consequences of an action and assumes responsibility for them. In balance then, the
ethics of absolutes and responsibility require political leadership to cling to a cause—the purpose
to which politics, power, and violence are a means—but to act responsibly—to examine
foreseeable consequences, forego absolute and ultimate goals, and remain in touch with the
consequences of violence—in pursuit of a cause.

The dilemma is not over for us or Weber, however. The nature of the state, a relationship of
legitimate violence, may require pursuing good ends through “morally dubious means or at least
dangerous ones” with evil consequences. Sadly, Weber observes, “From no ethics in the world
can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose ‘justifies’ the ethically dangerous means and ramifications’ (p. 121). This brings Weber back to his premise that “the decisive means for politics is violence” (p. 121) to which he adds that in the experience of the irrationality of the world good consequences may come from evil means and evil consequences from good means. “The world is governed by demons and … he who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers” precisely because of this irrationality of the world (p. 123). Later he adds, “He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence…” (p. 126).

After all of this, have we come full circle? Do we return to a position that the emphasis on passion, ideals, and cause justifies extremism in political leadership, including the use of terrorism? It seems that the ethic of ultimate ends trumps an ethic of responsibility as long as political leaders are steadfast enough not to crumble in the face of a world too stupid and base for what they have to offer. Clearly, Weber did not mean to provide a justification of terrorism or pacifism. Mandela’s careful reasoning and distinctions, as we shall see below, also suggest that there is indeed a path for politics without terrorism and violent protest of authority and violence that he and others consider illegitimate.

Arendt

Hannah Arendt helps us to move beyond Weber to resolve the confusion of political terrorism and to separate the state from legitimate violence. She approaches the issue of legitimate authority and violence in a different manner. She is not concerned with the authority to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of the violence but with distinguishing legitimate authority from violence. Arendt insists that the authority, strength, and power of the state rest upon its legitimacy, which gives it the power to foster collective action among its citizens. State violence, which may be justified, suggests that the state lacks sufficient legitimacy to gain citizen compliance through non-coercive power. Legitimacy, it would seem, resides in the second and third dimensions of power (Lukes, 1975) not in the first dimension of nonviolent and violent coercion.

Arendt discusses a range of human relationships in the realm of public affairs—“power,” “strength,” “force,” “authority,” and “violence” and uses the lack of clarity among them as a measure of the paucity of political science at the time (Arendt, 1969, p. 43). Moving from the most legitimate to the least—authority demands respect for and unquestioning recognition of the right to ask compliance without coercion or persuasion. Strength is a property inherent in a person or object and belonging to its character, separate from other things or persons. Its hallmark is independence. It contributes to the respect and recognition of authority; for example, the strength of the Constitution, a monarchy, or a particular person. Power is the human ability to act in concert. Force is the energy released by social movements and other concerted efforts in the environment of the state. Violence entails the reliance on implements of coercion, including physical force, to acquire obedience or compliance and to deny the power of others to challenge authority. It marks, actively or reactively, a recognition that some groups and individuals deny the authority and hence legitimacy of the state. In such a circumstance, the greater the use of violence against those who question its legitimacy, the more the government expresses its own
doubt about the effectiveness and efficiency of its legitimate forms of authority, strength, and power. Pushed to an extreme, this violence becomes state terror. “Terror is not the same as violence; it is rather, the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control” (p. 55).

Arendt brings us to the central point of a theory of politics and political terrorism. Power may have legitimacy if rooted in authority but violence may have only justification. When a state resorts to violence against its own citizens, it admits that it no longer has the strength and power of legitimate authority to command the compliance without coercion. Justification of this violence may appeal to the need to assert legitimate authority that needs less justification of its forms of nonviolent coercion. Paradoxically, the less violence the state uses, the less justification it requires and the fewer challenges it constructs to its legitimacy. The state’s power and authority are enhanced by treating political violence and terrorism as criminal violence and using the ordinary means of coercion and the least violence possible.

When a group resorts to terror against its own citizens or another state, it admits it does not have power or strength to use other forms of violence, such as guerrilla or conventional warfare, to challenge the legitimacy of the state. Its violence challenges the state’s authority over a monopoly of justified or, in Weber’s terms legitimate, violence. It justifies its own violence, terrorism, in the illegitimate authority or actions of the state which may include a disproportionate use of violence, which is an unjustifiable scale of it. In other words, the state use of violence, like the use of political terrorism against it, should be tactical, not strategic, and designed to demonstrate its power as legitimate authority not violence.

Thus, the essential part of the political leadership of counter-terrorism is to conflict successfully over the political nature of the violence used against it; over the justification of counter-terrorist violence; and the legitimate authority of the state, and, by implication, the purpose of politics. By separating violence from other aspects of political leadership, Arendt reaches a radical formulation of the relationship of power and violence.

Power and violence are opposites: where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as non-violence; to speak about non-violent power is actually redundant. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it (p. 56).

As this examination of Weber and Arendt indicates, our challenge becomes being able to “read” this relationship between power and violence—direct violence and indirect structural violence—into real-life situations we confront at home and in the world, examples of which are discussed in the following sections as this paper’s examination continues.

The Politics of Terrorism

On the morning of September 11, 2001, my students and I were learning the unimaginable from a totally unfamiliar text. The policy and leadership class started shortly after the second plane hit the World Trade Center. I turned on the classroom television, and for 75 minutes, my
22 students and I alternately watched reports of the terrorist destruction of the World Trade Center and shared our ties with the people under attack and other background and personal information. News arrived of a crash into the Pentagon and of another airliner reportedly heading towards Washington, DC. Televised rumors flew around the globe, and our classroom, concerning car bombs at the state department. Who was behind this violence, we wondered. Fortunately, three out of four students could explain Al-Qaeda, its relationship with the Taliban, the nature of the Taliban, and their limited diplomatic recognition by other states.

We stared in disbelief as the South Tower collapsed. A student noted with reluctant recognition, “This is the defining event for my generation, just as the assassination of President Kennedy was for yours.” But how will it define this generation? Students and curricula face this important question. Clearly, we are at a crossroads for today’s generation of students. What markers do we give them for defining the nature of terrorism and for deciding what route to take in dealing with it?

**Political and Criminal Violence**

I began to formulate some answers to these and other, new questions several weeks later after reading a student’s journal about his community service. He described the inner-city middle school student he was tutoring and the different worlds they shared. The uncle of his young charge had been shot and killed the year before. My student reflected about parallel universes; one had violence-filled streets and one had child-centered, secure and safe neighborhoods. He lived in the latter and his student lived in the former. After September 11th, however, he and all of us knew that we live in one world with a shared vulnerability to terror and violence.

Will we make connections with the children of inner city Richmond and places like it? Will we wonder at and about the world of terror in which they and we live, just like my student’s student and my student? Will we reduce our newly discovered world of terror to individual extremists with psychological shortcomings, religious zeal, or misplaced national aspirations? Will we assume that terror grows from hatred of a people for their virtues, such as freedom and hard work, and jealousy of the fruits of their virtues, such as prosperity and strength? Will our search for security lead to a repression of civil liberties in this country and an imperialistic new world order abroad? Will we defend our democratic institutions with democratic processes and replicate the Marshall Plan to build nations with economic security and peaceful intentions?

Amid this host of questions, I had a solid starting point to analyze the terror that we now knew, firsthand: the root of terror is violence—actual or threatened, real or implied, physical and mental. In October 2002, random shootings in the Washington, D.C. area filled millions of Americans with terror. Fatal violence could enter the everyday chores of shopping, working, eating out, or pumping gas. We may also find forms of everyday and frequent violence, which approximate terror, outside of the attention-getting dramatic episodes. Juveniles detained by courts, for example, leave no doubt that the children of our inner cities are no strangers to violence. Detained juveniles in Richmond, Virginia, for example, recounted their direct experiences with homicide victims and the sound of gunfire in their neighborhoods at least twice monthly. The boys described a world in which being the target of gunfire is part of life’s uncertainty. Just as most people know that the next time they cross the street they may be hit by a
car, these boys believed that the next corner they turned might be their last. The girls’ stories described a world in which violence in the home occurred all too often. The detention center offered some of them the most security they had ever known. Americans, especially the children of our inner cities, know violence-related terror.

Statistics suggest that our inner-city children know more violence-related terror than areas of the world often cited as vortexes of terrorism. The annual number of homicide victims in Richmond in the 1990s, for example, exceeded the number of victims in all of Northern Ireland’s terror for every year since 1972. In 1998, the number of juvenile homicides alone in Richmond (11) surpassed the number of total homicides in Belfast (10). James Gabarino (1999) terms the neighborhoods where these children live “war zones.” Poverty, unemployment, poor schools, low educational attainment, and fractured families have shockingly high rates of occurrence. Every year, the children living in war zone neighborhoods across our country experience violence in an up close and personal way when someone they know becomes a murder victim. The aggregate figure of inner-city murder victims in the United States exceeds the shocking toll of September 11th, annually.

Why is the carnage of September 11th terror and the carnage of our inner cities not? Because of the singular nature of that day and its many victims? Perhaps. But why then are the protracted incidents of violence with few victims in Northern Ireland acts of terror but the killings of inner city Richmond not? Clearly, there are similarities. They all entail violence, actual or threatened, real or implied, physical and mental. In all these cases, some people, without provocation, had their lives taken or faced life-threatening circumstances; for example, the child, sitting on her front steps, fatally wounded by a stray bullet. Still, we do not call such tragic occurrences terrorism. even though terrorism seems to involve violence towards people innocent of any direct provocation or of any direct responsibility for injury to the perpetrators of the violence. Why are victims of terror the workers of the World Trade Center and the people who lost their lives trying to rescue victims, but not the little girl on her front steps?

The answer may lie in the motives of the perpetrators of violence. Perpetrators of terrorism are deliberate in their use of violence against innocent victims. Unlike the young gunman of the inner city whose errant gunshot hits a young girl he does not know, terrorists intend to kill or injury people whom they do not know. Unlike the young gunman, again, the terrorists’ injurious and murderous act has a public purpose and not just a private or personal purpose. When the first plane hit the World Trade Center, for example, it was not clearly an act of terrorism. It could have been an accident or a deranged pilot intending a suicide/ mass murder. Only when the second plane hit the World Trade Center was it immediately clear that these acts were purposeful as well as deliberate acts of violence although what purpose they served was not clear.

We need to distinguish among unseen, public, and political forms of deliberate acts of violence. Violence may be used deliberately for the purpose of robbery or within a family to punish or hurt a person for submission. Rape is another form of deliberate violence. The snipers of the Washington area also had a deliberate public purpose—to extort a fortune to get them to stop their killings. In contrast, the people of the World Trade Center were the victims of deliberate and purposeful violence by men with a political purpose.
Thus, the discussion of political terrorism must begin with the recognition that some forms of violence are deliberate and purposeful and others are not. Some deliberate and purposeful acts of violence are directly political and some are not—robbery and extortion, for example. Acts that may be terrorism in one context, presidential assassination attempts, become apolitical crimes of violence when they spring from a deranged mind—John W. Hinckley, Jr.’s attempt to take the life of President Ronald Reagan and the later attempt on Gerald Ford’s life by Charles Manson’s devotee Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme. Some forms of violence, such as U.S. “war zone” neighborhoods, may be political in an indirect deep sense of public morality and hidden dimensions of power. They are the logical consequences rather than the intentional and deliberate purpose of the state. Pierre Bourdieu refers to these forms as indirect and structural violence of the state (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 192).

This examination of political and criminal violence leads us to questions about deliberate and purposeful violence, indirect and structural violence that has political consequences, and their relationship to terrorism.

**Political Violence and Terrorism**

There are several forms of directly and explicitly political violence. When one state undertakes deliberate and purposeful political violence against another state we may call it war and a just act (Stern, 1998, pp. 17-19) even though its purpose, and certainly its consequence, may include terrorizing a civilian population and its military and political leaders into submission; the much vaunted “shock and awe” strategy of the second U.S./Iraq war fits here. Within war some forms of violence are more legitimate than others (Carpenter, 2002). In general, for example, civilian populations are to be spared from military violence. However, since at least Sherman’s March through the South and certainly in the era of total militarization, achieving civilian protection has become more and more difficult as civilians become part of the infrastructure of the military. In the era of total war that marked most of the twentieth century, Saddam Hussein could find ample precedent for his attack on the Kurds in Northern Iraq during the Iran-Iraqi war and in the aftermath of his defeat against allied forces in the Gulf War. The expanded vulnerability of civilian populations in the war efforts of their governments may explain why the civilian casualties in Iraq, including increased infant mortality—an estimated 500,000 children—resulting from the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, do not cross the political terror threshold.

Some forms of wartime political violence do cross over into terror, however. Rape was an instrument of terror in Serbia. The United States used nuclear weapons on two Japanese cities just as Germany bombed civilian populations of the United Kingdom in World War II, and the allied forces firebombed Dresden. How do we distinguish these acts of war from other acts of war and from other forms of political violence? How do we justify one and not the other since both take and risk the lives of noncombatants? It seems clear that the purpose of war is to determine who will set the conditions for the cessation of armed conflict, the resolution of the conflicting states’ aims and policies that provoked armed conflict, and the terms of the relationship of the warring parties after the war.
Distinguishing deliberate and purposeful violence from unintended violence and political violence from apolitical and indirect (or structural) political violence, offers us a starting point for understanding political terrorism as a unique form of political violence. Next, we examine the scholarship on terrorism that will enable us to explain one aspect of political terrorism—the nature and role of political leadership within political terrorism.

**Terrorism by, for, and against the State**

Whether conducted by or against the state, terrorism entails the intentional targeting of civilian populations (Laqueur in White, 2002, p. 75) with real or threatened violence (Jenkins in White, 2002, p. 8) to bring about a climate of fear, emotional exhaustion, and a lack of will to continue to resist demands placed upon the public (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 101). Political terrorism may be used by the state—Stalin’s purges of the 1930s (Moore, 2002, p. 65; Arendt, 2002, pp. 33-34) or against the state—the Irish Republican Army (Crenshaw, 2002). Paramilitary groups, such as the armed wings of the Unionist parties of Northern Ireland or the death squads of Central America, may also use violence for the state. Al-Qaeda represented a new form of terrorist group, an international terrorist group with the support of a state but not conducting violence directly for it. The Bush administration responded by including host countries as targets in a war on terrorism. We will deal with terrorism by and against the state primarily. Before taking up their distinction, we will explore what both forms of terrorism have in common.

Political terrorism, whether by or against the state, is inversely related to power. Ted Gurr explains terrorism as a tactic used by the weak to intimidate the strong and by the strong to intimidate the weak (Gurr in White, 2002, p. 205). Terrorism as a tactic against the state indicates a lack of the power to conflict with the state in “higher” levels of violence such as guerrilla or direct warfare. When a state resorts to tactics of terror against its own citizens, it undermines the power and legitimacy of its own civil and criminal processes or their waning power to enforce order without resort to violence. Stalin’s show trials, Saddam Hussein’s elimination of political opponents in and outside of the Baath Party, and his attacks on the Kurds illustrate a lack of legitimate authority to achieve a political purpose. Similarly, when vigilante groups or “death squads” undertake political terror for the state, that is to root out political opposition to the state, they too express the inadequacy of the power of the state, albeit frustration with the cumbersome nature of legitimate forms of authority, power, and coercion.

Gurr explains terrorism as a tactic but it may also be a strategy. Rather than an order of armed violence lower than guerilla and open warfare, terrorism may be a new level of protest, that is violent protest, to demonstrate the vulnerability of the state and its citizens and publicize a group’s or individual’s new or continued opposition to the state. State terrorism, unlike the terror of sub-state groups, may eliminate political opposition and not just express resistance to them. In either case, terrorism separated from power takes on the character of a strategy more than a tactic, becomes more clandestine, and requires less organization and leadership. As a strategy, terrorism risks losing sight of its political purpose, however, and losing sight of any strategy to achieve it.

Political terror is much more likely to be successful as a tactic in a larger strategy and when its consequences for strategic goals are thought out and apparent. Political terror, when adopted
as a strategy, suggests that the connection of means and ends are not well thought out or apparent (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 107). Political terror against the state may even bring on popularly supported repressive measures when the terror seems without purpose, a strategy not a tactic, or when the tactical goals lack significant support in the general population. The state may safely deal with the violence of strategic noninstrumental terrorism, especially by its own nationals, as criminal violence rather than political terror. Examples are the violence against clinics and individual providers of abortion services, the Symbionese Liberation Army, or Aum Shinrikyo’s release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. When the state escalates the nature of a criminal threat to a political threat by moving from nonviolent to violent coercion, for example the siege at the Weaver property at Ruby Ridge and the assault on David Koresh’s Branch Davidian sect, it justifies the use of strategic terror against the state in the minds of chiliastic and infeasible revolutionaries. Repressive measures by the state that exceed proportionality, such as the British repression of the Easter 1916 Rebellion in Dublin by artillery, the execution of IRA leaders, and the imprisonment of thousands of followers and its later use of Black and Tans forces, may permit tactical terrorists to increase their violence to guerrilla warfare because of increased popular support and justification (White, 2002, pp. 84-85).

Terrorism, whether as a tactic or a strategy, entails a rational choice that may have a wide range of political goals: revolution, right and left; counter-revolution; nationalist; separatist; millenarian or reactionary; gaining or retaining political power; anarchy and totalitarianism; etc. (White, 2002, p. xviii). The connection of terror to a broader political goal may be well-thought out but tactically unsound or poorly conceived and a strategy in itself (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 107). However well developed its political goal may be, if it has little feasibility of being understood, shared, or achieved, then the tactical political value of terrorism decreases. However rational, terrorism is a “cultural performance with intense symbols and historical references” that intends a “culturally embedded, absorbing and transforming symbolic constructs of reality, morality, and truth” (Besteman, 2002, p. 2, 6). Victims of political terrorism have little intrinsic political value (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 99). Their death and injury are more important to express symbolically the danger to random and ordinary citizens (White, 2002, p. 21), the power of the terrorist group to inflict harm; the sophistication and cunning of their methods; and the revenge they seek to exact or purpose to achieve (White, 2002, p. 198). Beyond inflicting or threatening physical harm, the tactic of terrorism is a calculated rational choice of dramatic episodes to achieve particular political goals (Besteman, 2002, p. 2; Crenshaw, 2002, p. 100) by “the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population” (Crenshaw, 2002, pp. 100-101). The World Trade Center and its destruction was a symbol for the terrorists who attacked it and for subsequent U.S. counter-terrorism against them. Bob Woodward closes his panegyric on President Bush’s leadership in the Afghanistan war with a scene of 25 men from Special Forces units and CIA paramilitary teams in Afghanistan. They “dedicated” this spot with an American flag and a pile of rocks assembled as a tombstone over a piece of World Trade Center debris.

One of the men read a prayer. Then he said, “We consecrate this spot as an everlasting memorial to the brave Americans who died on September 11, so that all who would seek to do her harm will know that America will not stand by and watch terror prevail. We will export death and violence to the four corners of the earth in defense of our great nation.” (Woodward, 2002, pp. 351-352).
Political terrorism, especially as a tactic, whether by or against the state, draws from a deep well of preconditions (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 101; White, 2002) such as historical events and conditions, the interpretation of which legitimate political violence as counter-terrorism or revenge. The preconditions of political terrorism—hunger, poverty, illness, illiteracy, large-scale unemployment, cultural subversion—will have conflicting meaning and interpretations of their origins. For some, these preconditions represent indirect and structural forms of political violence of the state; for others, they represent direct forms; political violence by the state may take on direct and indirect forms (Besteman, 2002, pp. 303-304). Colonialism, for example, provides a form of indirect political violence that the state attempts to obscure behind justifications that assert superiority and inferiority of some groups (Orwell, 1936). When a group feels unjustly deprived by indirect, legal violence, elites within that group may act in violent and nonviolent ways to resist the laws and the states (Crenshaw, 2002, pp. 103-104).

Advocates of political violence against the state, at least in the case of colonialism, such as Frantz Fanon (1963) and Albert Memmi (1991), explained the colonized and the colonizer as reflections of the same violence. Explaining the difference between them explains the indirect and structural violence, of which Bourdieu speaks; the misery of the colonized is justified by some attribute of the colonized, for example cultural superiority or good intentions. Fanon and Memmi understand state violence to extend to the attribution of the conditions of stark inequality and privilege to the psychological nature and abilities of the different groups. They suggest that the psychological explanations of terrorism have political origins and are part of the resistance to the power of the privileged to oppress others. That power extends to the second and third dimensions of power and their capacity to shape the self-consciousness of the less powerful, the feasibility of change, and the efficacy of protest (Lukes, 1975; Scott, 1990). Fanon cites a World Health Organization scientist who, after examining Africans in the Center and East of Africa described them as “lobotomized Europeans” (Fanon, 1963, p. 302). Sartre took from Fanon’s writing insight into the violence of the colonizer, including rationalizations of the privilege of the European in their superiority over the colonized and the need of continued suppressive violence (Sartre in Fanon, 1963). In Fanon and Memmi, and others (Orwell, 1936), we find a political origin, in the precondition of oppressive violence, of some of the psychological generalizations of the terror of the powerless. As Sartre rhetorically argued, “You say they understand nothing but violence? Of course; first, the only violence is the settler’s, but soon they will make it their own; that is to say, the same violence is thrown back upon us as when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go toward a mirror” (Sartre in Fanon, 1963, p. 17).

Often a spark ignites a round of political terrorism by the state. On October 23, 1989, a white couple was shot in the racially mixed area of Mission Hill in Boston. Carol Stuart, pregnant, died on the scene and her baby died several weeks later. Her husband Charles claimed a black man with a raspy voice shot them. His charge set off a police search that terrorized the black community. Charles Stuart later committed suicide when it became clear that he had shot his pregnant wife in the head in an attempt to collect insurance. He wounded himself, as part of a cover up, and had selected the location of the murder and the false description to play on the underlying racist assumptions of the Boston police and others according to the wounded husband (Kasiecki, 2000).
The spark that ignites terror may have very indirect ties to preconditions such as racism and sexism. A precipitating event may have roots in conflict for support among competing political groups or in the internal needs of a group for control, discipline, or morale building (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 108). The African National Congress, for example, had pressure to adopt some form of political violence because of the Pan African Congress. Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, in part, to demonstrate the harder line of his Lihkud Party towards the Palestinians than that of Ehud Barak and the Labour Party, then in power. His visit was both a matter of Israeli internal politics and a provokeation of militant Palestinian groups (Mitchell, 2001, p. 5).

**Terrorism against the State**

Tactical and strategic terror against the state have correlates with the size of terrorist groups, the nature of their leadership, and the feasibility of their political goals. Ted Gurr points out most terrorism against the state comes from small, short-lived groups that do not pose a serious threat to the state (White, 2002, p. 33). Extreme terrorists who portray their crusades as a cataclysmic clash of civilizations and in some form of eschatological drama (White, 2002, pp. 49-50) are least likely to provide a convincing link between terrorism and some achievable political goal. Terrorism becomes more “legitimate” the stronger its leadership forges links to connect its political violence and broadly shared political goals such as nationalism, separatism, democratic participation, anti-colonialism, self-determination, or even theocracy (White, 2002, pp. 49-50). The possibility of a group’s successful political terrorism against the state hinges on the potential acceptance of its legitimacy and its claims that there are no alternatives to violence (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 114). A small terrorist group with little chance of bringing about a political or social change, such as the Weathermen of the 1960s, will more often use terror as a strategy. An inchoate goal for the strategy of terrorism reduces its adherents. This in turn reduces the need for organization and thus leadership; Ted Kaczynski, the “Unabomber” conducted a one-person campaign of political terror. In contrast, a larger group with hope in achieving broad political and social change, such as the Irish Republican Army under Michael Collins, is more likely to use political terror as a tactic (White, 2002, pp. 78ff).

The rational choice of terror against the state incorporates the weakness and intentions of terrorist leadership. It falls on a spectrum between disorders and riots on the one hand, and on the other guerilla war, low-level war, limited conventional warfare, and unlimited conventional warfare (White, 2002, p. 13). Its premeditation and symbolic nature separate terrorism from riots and its relatively low-level of violence separates it from forms of war (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 99). Small extremist terrorist groups may express leaderless resistance to some part of state policy, such as the conduct of legal abortions (White, 2002, p. 43). These terrorist groups require less organization (White, 2002, p. 43) because the strategy of terrorism more resembles violent disorder and riots. The strategy of terrorism, however, also indicates the relative weakness of a group and its incapacity to conduct violence by traditional military means. The state may ordinarily use this weakness to depoliticize the violence of small extremist groups and to portray it as criminal rather than political violence (White, 2002, pp. 269-271).

As a tactic, rather than a strategy, terrorism resembles more the conduct of warfare and thus requires more leadership and organization. It is likely to be a calculated choice and imply the inefficacy of legal redress and the unlikelihood of successful violent revolution (Crenshaw, 2002,
pp. 103-105). Michael Collins and the IRA provided a model for later terrorists by following state officials, police, and intelligence officers, to their homes and murdering them there. He thus sought to demonstrate the vulnerability of the state and its agents. Collins’s actions in the Irish Rebellion would inspire the later actions of Jewish terrorists—Irgun Zvai Leumi—to hasten the partition of Palestine (White, 2002, p. 100). As a tactic, terrorism seeks to build power so that its armed and violent resistance may move on to the next level of guerrilla warfare. Political terrorism against the state may gain power by an attrition that saps the will of the state to continue resisting the political and social changes sought. The success of the Ku Klux Klan from 1869 to 1876 in the American South (Couto, 1991, pp. 222-228) and the Irgun Zvai Leumi’s terrorism against the British in Palestine (White, 2002, p. 100) offer good examples of success by attrition. Its success as a strategy depends upon its ability to win adherents to the belief that there is no legal redress available (Moore, 2002, p. 63) and that the group’s terror is a temporary tactic until there is sufficient strength to wage guerrilla and then perhaps conventional warfare, and then to establish legitimate government. The success of terror as a strategy depends in great measure upon the use of violence by the state.

**Terrorism by the State**

Terrorism by the state indicates its own relative powerlessness, specifically the inadequacy of the state’s civil power to maintain order (White, 2002, p. 277) or the inadequacy of the civil power to curb violence that is waged against it without criminalizing and restricting some previously legal and permitted conduct. Legal and extralegal repression of a group by the state or its agents may inculcate terror—feelings of fear and vulnerability—and measure the preexisting indirect and structural violence of the state. The South African government’s laws banishing the ANC and increasing criminal acts for their seeming political intent, Sabotage Act (1962) and General Law Amendment Act (1963), illustrated the underlying violence for Africans and the international community (Johns & Davis, 2002, p. 91). Lynching, the war on drugs, and the police rampage in Roxbury all remind African-Americans and other racial minorities of preexisting indirect and structural violence of the state.

Too much state violence undermines a minimal framework of regularity and legality (Moore, 2002, p. 66). Even nonviolent actions of public officials that remind a group of its claims of the oppressive preconditions of violence may precipitate new terrorism against the state, as when Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2001, sparked a renewed intifada (Mitchell, 2001).

One enabling condition of the terrorist violence against the state is its own practice of violence. The death penalty, for example, sanctions the taking of life. In the case of DC snipers, the Wall Street Journal editorialized that capital punishment struck the balance of justice. Capital punishment provides a legal justification for a cultural and social value of holding grudges and an underdeveloped sense of justice as retribution. Both of these factors provide an environment of the social acceptance of violence that may influence terrorists. Violence as an instrument of justified vengeance was also the choice made by Timothy McVeigh in the aftermath of United States’ government action against unlawful but nonviolent conditions at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho. These latter actions still provide “ammo” for the “revolution” of “freedom fighters” (Revolution, 2007), a group that may range from libertarians to violent opponents of the
U.S. government. The state’s use of violence is endemic in the formation of nation states of the modern era. The state develops the capacity to use violence “on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject populations, and with readier collaboration from neighboring authorities” than other groups within the same territory (Tilly, 2002, p. 38). The greater its success in monopolizing violence, the more clandestine and apparently criminal, not political, will violence against it appear. The small and clandestine nature of terrorist groups enables them to function (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 103) but also limits their threat to the state (Gurr in White, 2002, p. 33).

These links of state actions, social acceptance of violence, and terrorism against the state have particular and ironic application at the present time. Al-Qaeda and the leadership of Osama bin Laden have direct links to the support that the United States government gave to the Mujahadin during their resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1970s (White, 2002, pp. 162-163). Similarly, the threat that Saddam Hussein posed to the United States and its allies had direct bearing on the support that he received from the British and United States governments during Iraq’s war with Iran (Pelletiere, Johnson, & Rosenberger, 1990). The deposition of Saddam Hussein’s regime did less to inspire terrorism against occupation forces than the inability of the provisional authority to provide security against criminal violence (Couto, 2003, pp. 22-24).

Other state action may stimulate or increase political terrorism. For example, if countermeasures of the state to forms of resistance, violent and nonviolent, exceed existing legal measures or appear disproportionate to the threat of violence against the state, they may serve as indirect or direct forms of state terrorism and engender sympathy and support for violent and nonviolent resistance. Unexpected and unusual violence by the state to quell protest and dissent may be a precipitating cause of terrorism against the state (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 105). The South African government’s excessive violent responses to demonstrations in Sharpsville and later in Soweto illustrate this possibility. The policies of the state greatly influence the growth in numbers and popular acceptance of terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 2002, p. 114) and may help move them from terrorists to guerrilla forces.

The state may enable its own terrorism as well as terrorism against it. For example, the repression of legal avenues to address grievances of a large portion of the population permits state violence against a portion of it. As Barrington Moore points out in his assessment of the terrorism of the Soviet Union, “Whatever destroys the play of interest groups within the society and permits a single group to dominate inevitably destroys the only realistic guarantee that organized violence will not be used against dissenting persons or groups in the society” (Moore, 2002, p. 63). Moore uses Stalin’s purges and the forced collectivization of the farmlands of the kulaks to illustrate this point (Moore, 2002, p. 62).

States may embrace organized terror from a crusading spirit that comes from “the fanatical conviction in the justice and universal applicability of some ideal about the way life should be organized along with a lack of serious concern about the consequences of the methods used to pursue this ideal (Moore, 2002, p. 64). In practice this organized terror of the state represents the effort “to alter the structure of society at a rapid rate and from above through forceful administrative devices” (Moore, 2002, p. 64) Moore uses Stalin as an example and is generally
concerned with the question of terror and socialism (Moore, 2002). Pol Pot’s Cambodia suggests another form of state terror on behalf of socialism, albeit inchoate. Pinochet’s terror in Chile makes clear that state terror may be linked to capitalism as well as socialism. Mao Tse-tung used state apparatus from above to mobilize the masses below to renew revolutionary fervor. Saddam Hussein used violence to eliminate political opponents and the Baath Party to consolidate and maintain his power by terror. Ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Serbia, and other nations suggest another purpose of organized state terror. Terror is a necessary counterpart to a cult of infallible leadership that prevents alternative appraisals of a situation (Moore, 2002, p. 66). We will have more to say on this later as we discuss the role of folly in political leadership. The excesses of crusading terrorism have far more devastating consequences when conducted as organized state terrorism compared with the efforts of fringe and clandestine groups opposed to the state.

**Terrorism against the State as a Reflection of Terrorism by the State**

Perhaps the clearest statement of terrorism against the state and as a reflection of the violence by the state comes from political leaders who embraced violence reluctantly and disavowed terrorism deliberately. In his April 20, 1964 trial, Nelson Mandela explained the role of violence in the African National Congress strategy of resistance and distinguished it from terrorism. He explained that a month after Sharpeville, the ANC formed Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). At Sharpeville on March 21, 1960, the Pan African Congress organized a nonviolent demonstration against the passbooks that controlled the movement of Africans within their own country. Police fired into the crowd and killed 69 people. Mandela explained that this violent repression of nonviolent protest gave the ANC no choice but to respond to violence with violence. After decades of nonviolent protest of laws seen as unjust, the government had legislated against such protest defining them as a particular form of criminal activity with additional penalties, and then, at Sharpeville, “resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies.” “…Only then did we (ANC) decide to answer violence with violence” (Mandela, 1964; Johns & Davis, 1991, p. 117).

Mandela then painstakingly distinguished among forms of political violence, explained the strategy of political violence, and maintained that although ANC embraced violence as a political tactic, it disavowed terrorism.

Four forms of violence were possible. There is sabotage, there is guerrilla warfare, there is terrorism, and there is open revolution. We chose to adopt the first method and to exhaust it before taking any other decision.

In the light of our political background the choice was a logical one. Sabotage did not involve loss of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations. Bitterness would be kept to a minimum and, if the policy bore fruit, democratic government could become a reality. This is what we felt at the time, and this is what we said in our Manifesto (Exhibit A, D):

"We of Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We
hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both the Government and its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate state of civil war."

The initial plan was based on a careful analysis of the political and economic situation of our country. We believed that South Africa depended to a large extent on foreign capital and foreign trade. We felt that planned destruction of power plants, and interference with rail and telephone communications, would tend to scare away capital from the country, make it more difficult for goods from the industrial areas to reach the seaports on schedule, and would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position.

Attacks on the economic life lines of the country were to be linked with sabotage on Government buildings and other symbols of apartheid. These attacks would serve as a source of inspiration to our people. In addition, they would provide an outlet for those people who were urging the adoption of violent methods and would enable us to give concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and were fighting back against Government violence.

In addition, if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken, we felt that sympathy for our cause would be roused in other countries, and that greater pressure would be brought to bear on the South African Government.

This then was the plan. Umkhonto was to perform sabotage, and strict instructions were given to its members right from the start, that on no account were they to injure or kill people in planning or carrying out operations. These instructions have been referred to in the evidence of 'Mr. X' and 'Mr. Z'. (Mandela, 1964, n.p.).

Oliver Tambo, Mandela’s law partner and leader of the exiled ANC, also clearly explained violence as a tactic of resistance while clearly distinguishing ANC’s policy of “controlled violence” from terrorism. Even in the 1980s, when the ANC encouraged intensified violence, it explained this policy as guerrilla warfare and maintained an emphasis on violence as sabotage, while admitting that the threat of death and injury to innocent people and agents of the state existed in any form of violence (Tambo, 1983). The ANC eventually, in 1988, repeated its disavowal of terrorism and the intentional targeting of civilians by more radical element of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Johns & Davis, 1991, p. 312).

The strategic outlook we project and encourage is one which focuses on mass struggle against the apartheid regime for the liberation of our people. There can be no question of agreements with anybody outside of this framework. As we said before, our activists, whether functioning at the legal or the illegal level - and we have to function at both these levels - adhere to our strategic concept of drawing the masses of the people into conscious, organised, and united action. Functioning at both these levels, it is their task to win into one common front of united action all organisations that are opposed to the apartheid system and are fighting for genuine national and social liberation (Johns & Davis, 1991, p. 240; Tambo, 1983).
Although regarded by many to be the epitome of an international standard for peace and reconciliation, Mandela’s use of violence raised the specter of terrorism for others. In Northern Ireland, for example, peace advocates, in the 1998 campaign on the referendum on the Good Friday Accord, sought a headliner to attract attention and supporters for a yes vote on the referendum. Campaign organizers considered Nelson Mandela for that role but decided against pursuing the invitation very far because of their efforts to win over moderate Protestant voters, middle-Unionists. That group’s largest fear was that the new political arrangements of the peace accord would release the terrorists of the IRA from prison and that they would come to power. For the middle-Unionists, Mandela had a paramilitary history and was now in power; exactly what they feared Sinn Fein leaders might do in Northern Ireland. The labyrinth of political violence and the state brings us back to the question of political leadership and the justification of political violence with which we began.

**Conclusion**

Through an understanding of power as authentic leadership by legitimate authority, and violence as a sign of a breakdown of power, leadership, and legitimacy, we begin to create narratives that formulate other choices to violence and its attendant terror. In addition to historical examples of political violence, our inner-city children also teach us how to end a spiral of terror and violence. That narrative begins with the insistence that there are other choices to violence and its attendant terror to gain what we want. They tell us that those who turn to violence think that “Once you got a gun, you’re on top of the world” (Couto & Stutts, 2000, p. 3). To this assessment, we make a counter call “…Out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in instant and perfect obedience. What can never grow out of it is power” (Arendt, 1969, p. 53).

The politics of terrorism suggest a central counter-terrorist approach: de-politicizing the violence of terrorists whenever possible and using the authority and power of the state to treat it as criminal violence. It also means politicizing the justifications of violence, such as capital punishment, and their indirect and structural forms, such as the inner city. The implications for political leadership could not be greater.

**References**


