

# Integral Re-views Postmodernism: The Way Out Is Through

Gary P. Hampson

**Abstract:** In this article I re-evaluate the potential contribution of postmodernism to integral theory via integrally-derived perspectives. I identify a premature foreclosure: the underappreciation of postformal modes of thinking (cognitive development beyond Piaget's *formal operations*). I then enact certain forms of postformal reasoning in relation to integral theory. This includes an engagement with such perspectives as complexity theory, conceptual ecology, vision-logic, dialectics, genealogy, critical theory, and construct-awareness. A major theme concerns the dialectical relationship between reconstruction and deconstruction—partly explored through a developmental assessment of contra-indicative discourse by both Wilber and Derrida. Although the territory is complex, the relationship between current Wilberian theory and postmodernism is clearly problematised. I posit that a deeper engagement with postmodernism can lead to an autopoietic deepening of integral theory.

**Keywords:** autopoiesis, construct-awareness, Derrida, dialectics, Gebser, Green vMeme, integral theory, postformal, postmodernism, recursion, vision-logic, Wilber

## Table of Contents

	PAGE LINKS
Introduction	<a href="#">110</a>
The Logic of Integral Vision	<a href="#">111</a>
Revisioning Integral Logic	<a href="#">112</a>
Postformal Thinking	<a href="#">114</a>
Reviewing Postformal Thinking	<a href="#">114</a>
Developing Postformal Thinking	<a href="#">115</a>
Applying Postformal Thinking	<a href="#">116</a>
Thinking Contextually About Integral Theory	<a href="#">118</a>
Sharing Schelling: A Genealogy of Postmodernisms	<a href="#">119</a>
An Ecology of Integrals	<a href="#">120</a>
Thinking Dialectically About Integral Theory	<a href="#">125</a>
Deepening Vision-Logic	<a href="#">125</a>
Contra-Indications of Construction	<a href="#">128</a>
Destructive Reconstruction	<a href="#">129</a>
Constructive Deconstruction	<a href="#">131</a>
Thinking Critically About Integral Theory	<a href="#">135</a>

Boomeritis: An (un)Critical Americanitis?	<u>136</u>
American and Other Interpretations	<u>137</u>
Thinking Complexly About Integral Theory	<u>139</u>
Nanotextology (A Recursion of Content)	<u>140</u>
Holonomic Nonduality (A Dialectical Recursion)	<u>143</u>
Conclusion—Ends-in-View	<u>148</u>
Identification of Problems	<u>148</u>
Summary of Re-view	<u>149</u>
A Forward View	<u>149</u>
Toward an Explicitly Linguistically-Aware Integral Theory	<u>149</u>
Toward an Explicitly Ecological (Dialogic-Critical-Contextual) Integral Theory	<u>150</u>
Toward an Explicitly Dialectical Integral Theory	<u>151</u>
Toward an Explicitly Complex-Aware Integral Theory	<u>151</u>
Toward an Explicitly, Dynamically Creative Integral Theory	<u>152</u>
References	<u>152</u>
Appendix A: The Green vMeme Attractor—Big Mind, Kind Heart, Healthy Hierarchy	<u>160</u>
Is the <i>Mean Green Meme</i> Construction a Mythic Meme?	<u>160</u>
A Discourse Analysis	<u>163</u>
Green vMeme Features Identified	<u>164</u>
A Contrasting Perspective on the Green vMeme	<u>165</u>
Referencing	<u>167</u>
Comments Regarding Mode of Participation	<u>167</u>
An End-in-View	<u>168</u>
Appendix B: The Seduction of Formal Academic Expectations	<u>169</u>
Appendix C: An AQAL Contextualisation	<u>171</u>
Eight Native Perspectives (in Quadrants)	<u>171</u>
Levels	<u>172</u>
Lines	<u>172</u>
States	<u>173</u>
Types	<u>173</u>

## Introduction

*You could not discover the limits of soul, even if you travelled by every path  
in order to do so; such is the depth of its meaning (Heraclitus, 42).*

Integral theory<sup>1</sup> has the potential to be a valuable conceptual tool for a host of purposes. Its potential would be thwarted or skewed, however, if it is found lacking in sufficient rigour or coherence. Ken Wilber's integral theory, AQAL, has popular appeal, and is panoramic in scope with a firm sense of order. As such, AQAL is a powerful player in the *integral* terrain, and Wilber's theoretic contributions need to be duly considered to advance integral theory in general. In part, this means they need to be brought into adequate dialogue with other pertinent contributions (whether they be termed *integral* or not). Further, the conceptual terrain AQAL broadly *maps* needs to be *explored* in careful detail (Roy, 2006a). From an integral background,<sup>2</sup> I have been exploring such terrain. What follows is a pertinent bricolage<sup>3</sup> chronicling a journey from *viewing* postmodernism—as given—to *re-viewing* postmodernism afresh. Notably, it would seem that certain sections of the integral community hold ideas concerning postmodernism that may well be partial truths at best. I hope this exploration can help dispel any falsity in such pertinacious myths.

In terms of the terminology I am using here, I note that *postmodernism* is a highly contested term, such that it can even be seen to have contradictory meanings. I will not be using the term to infer certain features that might elsewhere be attributed to “late capitalism,” for instance. (Late capitalism is still capitalism and should therefore remain mapped within AQAL's Orange vMeme—*modernism*.) Instead, my use of the term in this article is intended at the outset to signify AQAL's Green vMeme, thus including both collective and individual dimensions. The collective dimension is sometimes referred to simply as *postmodernism* in certain contexts and *poststructuralism* in others,<sup>4</sup> whilst the individual dimension refers to *postformal* thought: cognitive development beyond<sup>5</sup> Jean Piaget's *formal operations*<sup>6</sup> (formal operational thought uses if-then linear logics and evidence-citing to make its *arguments*). The potential area is vast and a comprehensive review could not be adequately accomplished in one article. Nevertheless, sufficient openings can be offered to identify and further this liminal terrain. Specifically, the

---

<sup>1</sup> I am using the term *theory* broadly to connote *theoretic narrative*.

<sup>2</sup> Including (a) familiarisation with Wilber's corpus (1995-present), (b) being a member of two face-to-face Wilber discussion groups (2000-2005; London & Sydney) and originator of a third (2001-2002, London) (c) completing a postgraduate course in integral futures (Swinburne University, Melbourne, 2003) (d) core involvement with the Integral Education Forum (2004-2005), (e) participating in an Integral Transformative Practice seminar (2005, Colorado), (f) consulting for the Integral Institute (2005, Boulder)

<sup>3</sup> I am using the term, *bricolage*, as inspired by Kincheloe and Steinberg (1993).

<sup>4</sup> It is sometimes taken as the *philosophical* expression of postmodernism, for instance. Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault are often called poststructuralists, although it is important to note that this is not an identification which they themselves adopted.

<sup>5</sup> The term, *beyond*, can infer a number of possibilities. My default interpretation of the term in this article is in reference to Wilber's “transcend and include.”

<sup>6</sup> For an important historical marker in the development of this field, see Commons, Richards, & Armon (1984); for a salient contemporary review, Susanne Cook-Greuter's (2007) website is worth exploring.

following idea is explored: The way to deepen integral theory is *through* postmodernism (by explicitly thinking postformally), not against it.<sup>7</sup>

## The Logic of Integral Vision

In terms of honouring integral theory, many elucidations could be given. Here, I simply wish to highlight the *logos* of logic: There is *logic* to integral vision—in all senses of the word. Firstly, integral conceptualisations foreground the significance of formal reason. Secondly, in this current era—perhaps aptly seen as “the best of times...the worst of times”—there is sense or logic in developing an integral vision—as an eco-social imperative.<sup>8</sup> Thirdly, integral theory carries the promise of cohering postformal logics.<sup>9</sup>

A commonly held default understanding is that integral and postmodern signify very different beasts. In such a characterisation, postmodern connotes incredulity toward grand narratives (à la Lyotard<sup>10</sup>), and a privileging of particularity, sensibility, nonlinearity, flux, liminality, and divergence (via Derrida’s *différance* and *déconstruction*). In contrast, integral connotes the credibility of (certain) grand narratives, and a privileging of universality, content, linearity, structure, definition, and convergence (coherence and construction). Such a characterisation is reinforced by Wilber’s foregrounding of the decisive differentiation between AQAL’s Green vMeme and those Wilberian vMememes which are theorised as transcending it.<sup>11</sup> Such is the given

---

<sup>7</sup> To adequately address the many facets of the subject matter, this article is necessarily relatively lengthy, and also features a few unorthodox “stylistic” elements. Due consideration should be thus given to this with respect to the reader’s *mode of participation* (as discussed & facilitated below).

<sup>8</sup> This might be regarded (dialectically) as *the logic of—an integral—logos* or text

<sup>9</sup> On a more personal note, I wish to honour the contribution that Wilberian integral theory has made in my intellectual development. As such, the critique below is not meant to infer an opposition to integral theory, but rather to open up possibilities of deepening it. This process necessarily involves both deconstructive and reconstructive elements, yet I enact both from constructive desire. I will no doubt sometimes stray from the appropriately wavy course I seek to find and follow, but when I do, I hope to be able to discern unruly attachment, and bend my ear toward peers’ and colleagues’ comments!

<sup>10</sup> Lyotard’s (1984) necessarily-translated words are: “In contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture—the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation” (p, 37). In this quotation, Lyotard appears to be describing his understanding of the status of certain discourses of which he was aware at the time he was writing. From the statement alone, it is unclear whether Lyotard’s affective perspective on this information is detached, appreciative or regretful. It would, of course, be illogical for the statement to be interpreted as a totalising narrative concerning the fate of *all* grand narratives. As such, even from this iconic—perhaps infamous—statement, there is window of opportunity in which integral narratives, which appropriately *defer* to postmodern considerations, might be open to legitimation from such a nominally futile perspective.

<sup>11</sup> Wilber’s Green vMeme includes: postmodernism, which he often refers to as “extreme postmodernism” or “deconstructive postmodernism;” relativism, often referred to as “extreme relativism;” and deconstruction. Its placement—along with all the preceding vMememes—as being located in the “first tier” (of Spiral Dynamics theory) is foregrounded by Wilber, partly through his catchy—fun but derogatory—phrase, “mean green meme.” In contrast, the proceeding “second tier,” starting with the Wilberian Teal vMeme (formerly known in AQAL as the Yellow vMeme) is mostly rendered as substantively offering the solution to Green’s failings and excesses.

integral view of postmodernism. It is not, however, the only possible one: Wilberian integral theory itself can be used to identify a different perspective on postmodernism.<sup>12</sup>

## Revising Integral Logic

Integral theory can be used to re-view postmodernism by way of foregrounding the latter's theoretic agency rather than adopt the default prioritisation of its mapping as object of study. In so doing, postmodernism may reflect back upon integral theory and open up new ways of thinking. In other words, the "way out" from the modern world(view) to integral level(s), integral understanding, integral participation, is *through* including the full contribution that the Green vMeme can offer.

A key to this re-viewing lies in postformal cognition—mapped in AQAL as lying within the upper (i.e., individually- rather than socio-culturally-related) quadrants<sup>13</sup> of the Wilberian Green and post-Green vMeme developmental levels. Put simply, a more distinctive differentiation could be drawn between the object of inquiry and the type of thinking used to inquire. When the commonly-held default interpretation of *postmodern*—as object of inquiry—is regarded, what kind of operation is being performed? Specifically, what developmental level of cognitive mode is being employed to realise such a perspective? Postmodernism, or integral theory—as objects of inquiry—can be viewed from different developmental perspectives, but, to date, in terms of developmental considerations, Wilberian theory has foregrounded the locating of *objects* of inquiry rather than the developmental locating of *modes* of inquiry (epistemologies or methodologies). Whilst Wilber's Integral Methodological Pluralism (Eight Native Perspectives) differentiates epistemologies or methodologies *horizontally*—according to zones or quadrants—it remains unclear which *vertical* developmental levels or waves these perspectives operate from.

In terms of reflexivity, moreover, Wilber (1995) briefly states the following.

What I am trying to do in this book, and what you are trying to do as you read it (or other similar books), is use vision-logic; not just reasonably decide the individual issues, but hold them all together at once in mind, and judge how they fit together as a truth-vision. In other words, vision-logic is a higher holon that operates upon (and thus transcends) its junior holons, such as simple rationality itself (p. 185).

Here, Wilber states that he is trying to use vision-logic, but he does not state whether he is using "early," "middle," or "late" vision-logic.<sup>14</sup> Nor does he substantively elaborate upon which

<sup>12</sup> By differentiating between, on the one hand, the participatory stance *Wilber* enacts in relation to AQAL, and, on the other hand, *alternative* modes of engagement with AQAL interpretations (such as the *autopoiesis* I am offering here), I am suggesting a manoeuvre that might facilitate a bridging between AQAL and the participatory integral approach identified by Ferrer, Romero and Albareda (2005).

<sup>13</sup> For an explanation of Wilber's four quadrants—a central feature of his integral theory, AQAL, see Wilber (2000a, pp. 67-72) Note will also be made here that Wilber has elaborated *the four quadrants* into *the eight native perspectives* (see 2006b).

<sup>14</sup> "Where the green meme [sic] uses early or beginning vision-logic in order to grasp the numerous different systems and contexts that exist in different cultures, second-tier thinking goes one step further and begins to *integrate* those pluralistic systems into integral and holistic spirals and holarchies (Beck and Cowan themselves refer to second-tier thinking as operating with holons)..."

*particular* postformal cognitive modes he is employing, or explicitly demonstrate such usage. How dialectical is AQAL? In what way complex? What is its relationship to critical theory (see for instance, Anderson, 2006) and critical thinking? How reflexive is it? What genealogies and conceptual ecologies are employed? How (much) has it embraced *the linguistic turn*? Important questions—which this article does not attempt to answer, but rather, put on the map.<sup>15</sup> In other words, the aim of this article is not to comprehensively assess integral theory—specifically AQAL—by means of postformal thinking, but rather to open up discursive spaces or Deleuzian “lines of flight.”<sup>16</sup>

A consequence of Wilber’s minimal reflexivity on postformal thinking (rather than the copious mapping of postformal thinking) is that there has been a substantive underappreciation or premature foreclosure regarding the potential contribution that postmodernism—in all its guises (not only pluralism, for instance)—might make to integral theory. By re-viewing the contribution of postmodernism or the Wilberian Green vMeme from this different integral perspective—the perspective of postformal cognitive modes—a potential inversion can be identified between the inquiring subject and the object of inquiry, where the inquiring subject changes from a default “integral” thinker (in which AQAL mapping is the primary operation) to a postmodern one (as a postformal thinker) whilst the object of inquiry changes from postmodernism to integral theory in order for integral theory to discern and digest this new reflexivity, and thence to be able to proceed more coherently. The bigger theoretical context all the while remains integral theory: AQAL is being applied upon itself, enacting a certain autopoiesis via the participation mode of the researcher. A theoretic re-searching. New questions arise such as: What new understandings of integral theory might arise from explicitly detailing and employing postformal modes of cognition upon itself? The territory envisaged is vast; hence, at this stage, I can seek only to open up this avenue of thought—to tentatively start to develop a conversation. Yet such a direction has the potential to revise the very fabric of integral theory.

---

“There are two major waves to this second-tier thinking (corresponding to what we would recognise as middle and late vision-logic)” (Wilber, 2000a, pp. 51-52).

<sup>15</sup> My tentative use of postformal operations in this article does not imply that Wilber does not enact particular postformal operations in particular ways with regards to AQAL. For instance, the breadth of territory covered in AQAL could be associated with postformal vision; the value of its mission potentially legitimised with reference to fuzzy logic and its “*transcendent*” relations, fuzziology and social fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002, p. viii); its systematisation can be viewed in relation to Michael Commons and Francis Richards’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity; the eight native perspectives can be seen to be a dialectical development of the four quadrants; Wilber’s purported methodology of orienting generalisations could be fruitfully linked to grounded theory, intuitive inquiry and other emerging academic methodologies; his style could be viewed in relation to certain postmodern affectivities; whilst the incorporation of holarchy via Hegel’s dialectical principle of *sublation* (Wilber’s “transcend-and-include”) can also be seen to emanate from a postformal perspective. In a similar way, both formal and pre-formal operations could also be identified. The degree to which Wilber explicitly reflects upon such postformal modes in relation to his writing also needs to be identified: he does this very little, relative to the objects of his inquiry.

<sup>16</sup> The facilitation of such dialogue at this juncture will necessarily involve *particular* assessments which lean towards problematisations with a view to future reconstructions.

## Postformal Thinking

Integral theory can be revised toward further coherence by way of postformal cognitive modes if the following turn is made: that these modes are reflexively embodied—enacted as modes of participation—rather than merely addressed (through the enactment of mapping). The operation of mapping can provide a first-stage conceptual reflexivity in certain contexts, and can evaluate participatory characteristics. But qualities of participation also have to be adequately regarded as an important theoretic feature and thus incorporated as part of integral theory. Addressing the developmental levels of engagement and participation could be a major consideration in postformal reasoning.<sup>17</sup>

Postformal thought is discussed primarily in three fields: developmental psychology, education and integral studies. After a very brief overview of some of the features of these three discourses, I will suggest ways to deepen and cohere the territory. I will then outline the way I will be applying postformal cognition to the object of inquiry, integral theory.

## Reviewing Postformal Thinking

The term *postformal* first erupted within developmental psychology in reference to possibilities of going beyond Jean Piaget's developmental stage of *formal operations*. Klaus Reigel (1973) was the first to posit a stage beyond formal operations.<sup>18</sup> He referred to it as *dialectical operations*. Two years later, Patricia Arlin (1975a) posited *postformal operations* as a variant theory. The term *postformal* has been in use ever since and refers to a number of theoretical approaches which seek to either (a) posit another stage or stages, level or levels, or complexity attractor(s), in addition to those elucidated by Piaget; (b) problematise Piaget's theory but not developmentalism *per se*; or (c) problematise developmentalism as a whole.

Much of the discourse surrounding the term has been within developmental psychology, notably in the *positive adult development* research community. This has ranged from the mathematical representations of Michael Commons and Francis Richards' (1984, 2002) Model Of Hierarchical Complexity to the critical reflections of John Broughton (1984). Various modes of cognition or operations, types of thinking, qualities, features and/or characteristics have been identified in this discourse as, or pertaining to, *postformal*. These include: complexity, dialectics, creativity, imagination, construct-awareness, problem-finding, reflexivity, dimensionality of systems thinking, contextualisation, holism, openness, unitary consciousness, dialogic consciousness, and wisdom. (Arlin, 1975a, 1975b, 1976; Basseches, 1980, 1984a, 1984b, 1986, 2005; Benack, Basseches, & Swan, 1989; Benack & Basseches, 1989; Broughton, 1984; Commons & Richards, 1984, 2002; Cook-Greuter, 1990, 2000, 2002; Demetriou, 1985; Kegan, 1982, 1994; Kohlberg, 1984; Koplowitz, 1984, 1990; Kramer & Woodruff, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, 1990; Loevinger, 1976; Marchand, 2001; Pascual-Leone, 1984; Powell, 1980; Riegel,

<sup>17</sup> A fruitful discussion here—beyond the scope of this article—would concern details of the relationship between postformal and formal. Suffice to indicate a working proposal of *postformal* sublating (transcending-and-including) *formal*, so that the reasoning mode of *formal operations* is appropriately honoured. (It has facilitated production of this very article, for example, and should form a significant part of its potential evaluation, too!)

<sup>18</sup> Due regard should be given to the ecology of forerunners to Positive Adult Development research into postformal thought. Notable here is Roberto Assagioli's (1965/2000) *Psychosynthesis*, and Abraham Maslow's (1971) Self-Actualization Theory including his developmental *hierarchy of human needs*.

1973, 1975, 1976; Sinnott, 1998, 2003; Sternberg, 1998; Wade, 1996). The literature also demonstrates a wide variety of conceptualisations regarding the theoretic legitimacy, number, positioning and/or relationship among postformal developmental levels.<sup>19</sup>

The term *postformal* took on a somewhat different usage and meaning in 1993 within the field of education via Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg (1993) who posited a *socio-cognitive* theory regarding post-formal thinking, describing postformal thought as the socio-cognitive expression of postmodernism. In addition to features identified above with the developmental psychology discourse, they included: critical theory, genealogy, etymology, structuralism, metaphoric cognition, ecological thinking, deconstruction, nonlinearity, holistic causation, and power-awareness. This genealogical thread is still current in the educational literature and in significant ways provides a contrasting perspective to the developmental psychology discourse, although there is a small cross-over between the two fields (Hampson, in preparation).

Meanwhile, Wilber has been writing on postformal thought since 1977, notably in his 1995 *magnum opus*—*Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*—where he coined the neologism (analogous to postformal thought), *vision-logic*. Postformal thought forms a significant part of AQAL. Both *postformal* and *vision-logic* are used in integral studies discourse—see, for example, Meyerhoff (2006). Through referencing two other *magnum opa*—*The Life Divine*, by Sri Aurobindo (1914/1960), and Jean Gebser’s (1949/1985) *The Ever-Present Origin*—AQAL brings together psychological and socio-cultural components (though in a different way to the education discourse) associating *formal* (as in *formal operations*) with the *modern* worldview, and *postformal* variously with *postmodern* and *integral* worldviews via a developmental and holonic framework described as *integral*.

### Developing Postformal Thinking

There are clearly many modes of thinking indicated here and it is beyond the scope of this article to report or discuss the manifold possible interrelationships among these.<sup>20</sup> Yet to facilitate explicit enactments of thinking postformally, I posit that a deepening and a cohering of postformal qualities might be helpful. Both moves (deepening and cohering) can be seen to have affective (embodied) and mental (intellectual) aspects.

In terms of *deepening* postformal thinking—from an affective perspective, a relationship between self-sense and postformal concept could be developed through trust: an *opening up* to the postformal quality in question via affective embodiment (such as via intuition). The mental correlate of this would be to *open up* the postformal concept via the intellect.

For example, if we were to regard the postformal concept of dialectics, we might represent this procedure as:

(Beginning to) thinking dialectically → engaging with literature on dialectics → thinking (more) dialectically

The generic heuristic algorithm would be:

<sup>19</sup> Although a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article, my research does not readily support the regard of AQAL’s particular developmental framing of postformal modes as an *orienting generalisation* of the whole literature, but rather supports the viewing of AQAL’s framing as one (necessarily contestable) *type* of summarising perspective on it.

<sup>20</sup> Further elucidation is given in “Thinking postformally” (Hampson, in preparation).

Thinking  $x$ -ly ( $n$ )  $\rightarrow$  engaging with literature on  $x$   $\rightarrow$  thinking  $x$ -ly ( $n+1$ )

The example regarding dialectics would thus connect the psychological construct, *dialectical operations*, with the philosophical construct (in its varying interpretations and contestations), *dialectics*.<sup>21</sup> A similar connection would be made between the identification of *complexity* as a construct complicit in psychological development, such as Commons and Richard's Model of Hierarchy of Complexity on the one hand, and *complexity theory*—representing the philosophical dimension—on the other. (In this way, such a relationship between psychological and philosophical constructs could be used in the concretisation of postformal educational theory). The general case can also be seen as hermeneutic circling.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of *cohering* postformal cognitive qualities—a similar framework could be helpful. Conceptual cohering could be facilitated through systematic consideration of the possible ecology of / dialogue among postformal features. A corresponding manoeuvre can be conceptualised with regard to the interpersonal domain, through such dialogic lifeworld practices as Bohmain dialogue and Gangadean's (2007) Deep Dialogue. (Such schemas could also be seen as useful for *intrapersonal* work.)

The net effect of the above could be to better theorize the facilitation of embodying the central theme of this article: namely, to switch priorities from formally addressing postformal cognition (as an object of inquiry) to enacting *thinking postformally* (as a cognitive process of the inquiring or participating subject). Specifically, in relation to the postformal modes outlined in the following section, the following summaries could be given:

- *Deepening postformal thinking*: thinking creatively, reflexively and “embodiedly” about postformal cognition (dialectics, complexity, criticality, conceptual spacetime context)—regarding the object of inquiry (e.g., integral theory);
- *Cohering postformal thinking*: thinking ecologically (dialogically) about postformal cognition (dialectics, complexity, criticality, conceptual spacetime context)—regarding the object of inquiry (e.g., integral theory).

### Applying Postformal Thinking

It can be readily seen that there would be many ways to enact postformal thinking. The types of postformal cognition I have selected for this article are related to, on the one hand, my knowledge of, and experience with, integral theory—notably, AQAL—and on the other hand, my research on postformal thought. It is intended to exemplify particular usage of postformal operations whilst facilitating a pertinent development of integral theory.

In terms of my research on postformal thought, I have included certain postformal items that feature strongly in the literature, and with which I have personally come into significant (and ongoing) relationship, namely: genealogy, conceptual ecology, dialectics, critical theory and

<sup>21</sup> Also see Basseches (2005).

<sup>22</sup> *The hermeneutic circle* (as advanced by Schleiermacher) denotes the idea that the knowledge of the whole is to some extent already needed in order to understand the parts. A hermeneutic *helix* might perhaps be a better metaphor, as two conceptual dimensions are involved in the learning procedure: a *returning to origin* (represented by the circle of the helix—as viewed end-on) and an *advancement* (represented by the *linear*—if wavy—dimension of the helix, as viewed side-on).

complexity (see, notably, Basseches, 1984a, 2005; Commons & Richards, 2002; Cook-Greuter, 2000, 2002; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1993; Riegel, 1973, 1976; Sinnott, 1998; Sternberg, 1998; Wilber, 1995). Each of these have large and varied terrains, and it is beyond the scope of this article to elucidate such domains in detail. Mention, however, will be given to the following three points as markers for more detailed research. Firstly, at least two uses of the term, genealogy, can be found within postmodern discourse: one in reference to complexity theory (see Davis, 2004), and the other in relation to Foucault (see Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005). In this article, I am employing the former. Secondly, substantively different interpretations of the term dialectics can be variously identified—in relation to, for example, the following five major threads: Socratic (inquiry dialectics), Hegelian (dialectical method), Marxist (dialectical materialism), Daoist (Taijitu dialectics) and Derridean (the dialectics of deconstruction). In this article, I am demonstrating an instance of the use of dialectical operations through calling upon an amalgam—a particular conceptual ecosystem—of the above threads. I am using the metaphor of ecosystem (a complex adaptive system) to facilitate the quality of dialectics in my conceptual operations—my participatory engagement with the object of inquiry (in this case, integral theory). Complex dialectics<sup>23</sup> would thus seem a suitable signifier for this.<sup>24</sup>

In terms of integral theory, I have focused on particular issues that have not apparently been adequately addressed—notably, the following two concerns. Firstly, from a formal perspective—employing a Cartesian template based on formal Aristotelian logic—the theoretic basis of integral would most likely interpret the concepts of construction (or reconstruction) and deconstruction as adversaries. Whilst not denying the partial truth of such a perspective, dialectical operations can be used to realise finer distinctions. Secondly, formal/modern constructions of theory can be seen to be based on dualistic conceptual templates metaphorically derived from Aristotle, Euclid, Descartes and/or Newton, whilst postformal/postmodern theoretic constructions would be based on conceptual templates which sublate (transcend and include) the aforesaid formal ones (hence contestability over the relationship between theory and narrative from a formal perspective<sup>25</sup>).

<sup>23</sup> Numerous generative, transdisciplinary concepts are found within complexity theory (I am using the term broadly to encompass chaos theory). These include: emergence (and its relationship to, for example, bifurcation, creativity, nonlinearity, unintended consequences, the irreducibility of quality to simple “quantity,” and the identification of “ontological” levels), hysteresis (time lag, internal complexity, historical memory), simple holarchies and entangled holarchies, first cover, sensitivity to initial conditions (the butterfly effect), recursion, indeterminacy (dimensions of intractability, etc.), openness (permeability of boundaries), attractors (e.g., point, curve, manifold, strange) adaptation, autopoiesis (self-organisation), and dynamism (“life” / life). The complexity quality I am foregrounding in this article is recursion (fractals, holography, holonomy).

<sup>24</sup> In relation to the five strands, one might say—at first blush—that: (a) it is an approach to Socrates-like inquiry (yet acknowledging both certain guidance and uncertain outcome); (b) it has the capability of being used as a Hegelian-like systematic method (yet where system is seen as complex rather than mechanical); (c) acknowledgment is given to dialectics identified in the material world (yet, again, where this is not held mechanically, but complexly; also where a complex dialectics is also identified *between* material and conceptual worlds); (d) acknowledgment is given to the spirituality, intuition, complex recursion, and interpenetrative dynamics of dialectics (yet avoiding the fundamentalisation of myth); and (e) the subtle dialectics of text is acknowledged (yet allowing for its enactment to be panoramic).

<sup>25</sup> E.g., the question, “is it a *real* theory?” and comment, “it’s just a story” come from such an either/or perspective. Yet, that is not (necessarily) to say that what is left is an indistinguishable blurring: that conclusion would also come from an either/or perspective.

These two strands—namely, those aspects of postformal thinking that I am foregrounding, and those aspects of integral theory that I am foregrounding—result in the following sections in this article.

- Thinking Contextually about Integral Theory
  - o Sharing Schelling: A Genealogy of Postmodernisms—reporting on a genealogy which links integral and postmodern philosophical tendencies via Schelling as bifurcation point;
  - o An Ecology of Integrals—identifying a conceptual ecology of *integral* constituted by six genealogical threads, among which there are commonalities and contestabilities;
- Thinking Dialectically about Integral Theory
  - o Deepening Vision-Logic—identifying dialectical operations in the concept of vision-logic, then developing this perspective;
  - o Contra-Indications of *Construction*—exploring considerations which run counter to the formal default integral perspective regarding (*re*)*construction* and *deconstruction*;
- Thinking Critically about Integral Theory
  - o Boomeritis: An (un)Critical Americanitis?—raising a question concerning the significance of cultural type—or marked national idiosyncrasy—in relation to postmodernism;
- Thinking Complexly about Integral Theory
  - o Nanotextology (A Recursion of Content)—exploring a recursion of the theoretic component of “content” as related to (an interpretation of) a particular poststructuralist understanding of “style”; and
  - o Holonomic Nonduality (A Dialectical Recursion)—exploring a recursion of *nonduality* (including the possible connection between this and a recursive dialectical template).

## Thinking Contextually About Integral Theory

*It's turtles all the way down* (Wilber, 1995, p. 35).

Space and time—and metaphorical resonances of space and time—can be used as loci to extend theoretic contextualisations.

Temporalising of the past can be extended in a linear fashion (already evident in integral theory's apt consideration of pre-history, for example). Past times can also be more richly or adequately understood by adopting a genealogical approach (incorporating a bifurcating structure derived from non-Euclidean complexity theory). Possible futures<sup>26</sup> can also be extended in a linear fashion (surfacing the ethics of long-term thinking: due speculative consideration of medium-term, long-term, far and distant futures). And correspondingly, possible future time can be regarded genealogically via conceptualisations regarding the bifurcation of future scenarios. Present time can be conceptually extended through spatial metaphors, via, for instance, the

<sup>26</sup> I draw attention here to the academic field of future studies. As excellent introductions, see, for example, Richard A. Slaughter (2005) and Sohail Inayatullah (2007).

postformal construct of conceptual ecology—a construct which not only enables the dialogical consciousness of holarchical conceptual space, but also local temporality and the metaphorical resonances of organicity and life.

In the first of two sections, a genealogy is described which philosophically links the integral quest and the postmodern quest as two complementary branches. In the second section, a conceptual ecology is identified which contextualises different interpretations of integral. A particular relationship is then chosen to exemplify a pertinent contestability: that between the integrals of Wilber and Gebser.

## Sharing Schelling: A Genealogy of Postmodernisms

A starting place to view a less adversarial relationship between *integral* and *postmodern* than that connoted by Wilber and some members of the integral community, is to consider their shared genealogy. Philosopher Arran Gare (2002) has done just that. He presents the following picture: As scientific materialism began to increase in societal power in late 18<sup>th</sup> Century Europe, a “postmodern” countertradition arose in the footsteps of Giambattista Vico and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Johann Herder led the way, identifying: suffering caused by abstractions; the need for self-realisation; an appreciation of cultural plurality; the importance of the particular, the sensory, the active; and a purposeful nature. This thread led—via Johann Wolfgang von Goethe—to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Like Rudolf Steiner, Wilber (1995), and Jennifer Gidley (in press), Gare identifies Schelling as an inspiration, and a pivot in history. He highlights Schelling’s dialectical method and also his understanding of *that, that we are*: an “unprethinkable Being” which precedes all thought and is presupposed by it. Gare then identifies a historical bifurcation stemming from Schelling. One branch leads to the poststructuralists (“poststructuralist postmodernism”), the other to a high-order quest for coherence (“cosmological postmodernism”).<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the dialectical nature of the philosophy that lies at the root of the two branches, the branches themselves can be seen as a dialectic between Schelling’s *alignment* with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on the one hand, and his *critique* of Hegel, on the other.

The branch that proceeds from Schelling’s *critique* of Hegel includes Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault (largely influenced by Nietzsche), Jacques Derrida (largely influenced by Heidegger) and Gilles Deleuze (who retains more influence from Schelling than the others). Somewhat resonant with Roland Benedikter’s (2005) seminal work on postmodern spirituality, Gare proffers that, “poststructuralists require Schelling’s earlier philosophy or developments of it to sustain their arguments” (Gare, 2002).

The branch which is more *aligned* to Hegel leads to Henri Bergson and Alfred North Whitehead via Charles Peirce and also via Karl Ernst Von Baer’s evolutionary theory of nature. Gare identifies this thread as a high-order quest for coherence. Such a quest for coherence is surely central for any integral theory. But surely a greater integral quest would be to attempt to respectfully honour both branches? Although the branches may seem somewhat incommensurable from a formal perspective, a postformal perspective on *integral* might better facilitate such a quest. But what is *integral*? A postformal approach to answering that question

<sup>27</sup> Consideration might be given here regarding the nature of the relationship between Gare’s genealogy and Wilber’s (1995) bifurcation of post-Enlightenment as “Ego” and “Eco.”

might well address the conceptual ecology among different (connected and contested) uses and interpretations of the word.

## An Ecology of Integrals<sup>28</sup>

*Integral*—meaning, “of or pertaining to a whole”—entered the English vocabulary from the Latin, *integer* (via the French, *intégral*) in 1471. In terms of integral theory and correspondent developments, Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1914/1960) used the term to describe a type of knowledge or yoga, as published in *The Life Divine*. Unaware of Aurobindo’s usage, Jean Gebser (1949/1985, p. xxix) began using the term (as a conjunct to *aperspectival*) in 1940, culminating in its usage in *The Ever-Present Origin* in 1949.<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile, Haridas Chaudhuri carried the term through from Aurobindo and founded the California Institute of Integral Studies (C.I.I.S.) (n.d.) in 1968. Michael Murphy also brought through Aurobindo’s integral theory when he co-founded the Esalen Institute<sup>30</sup> (2005) in 1962. He has since adopted the term *integral* with George Leonard, in their *Integral Transformative Practice* (2007). The most popular(ist) integral theorist—Ken Wilber (1997, 2000a, 2000c)—had started using the term by 1997 to describe both his own writing,<sup>31</sup> and thence his institutional frameworks, such as the Integral Institute (2007) including Integral Naked.<sup>32</sup> Global-outreach tertiary institute, Pacific Integral (n.d.), was founded in reference to this genealogical branch, as well as to William Torbert’s work.<sup>33</sup> Wilber’s genealogical branch entered futures studies via Richard Slaughter (1998). Ervin László (2004) started foregrounding the term in relation to integral science in 2003, competitively using with the same turn of phrase as Wilber—*An Integral Theory of Everything*—in 2004. Global philosopher Ashok Gangadean (2006a) incorporates László’s work among others, to form his own dialogical integral approach. Gidley acknowledges Gangadean as part of her quest to “integrate the integrals,” notably an exploration of connections between Gebser, Wilber and Rudolf Steiner, the latter of whom she identifies as an integral pioneer (Gidley & Hampson, 2005). Meanwhile, others have furthered representations of C.I.I.S.’s mission, including Robert McDermott, Richard Tarnas (see, for example, 1991), and Jorge Ferrer, the latter of whom has identified a *participatory* integral approach along with Marina Romero and Ramon Albareda (Ferrer et al., 2005), directors of Estel, a centre for personal growth and integral studies in Barcelona (Albareda, n.d.). In addition, William Irwin Thompson (2003)—whilst acknowledging Aurobindo and Steiner—has, for some decades, been running with Gebser’s interpretation to foreground a certain artistry: *integral performances* that seek to generate new horizons; such alignment with creativity parallels both Bernie Neville’s (1989) Gebserian and archetypal

<sup>28</sup> As *integral* can be contextualised within “an ecology of integrals,” so *an ecology of integrals* can itself be contextualized within “an ecology of related terms.”

<sup>29</sup> Alan Combs (2005) comments that it remains unclear as to the degree of influence Aurobindo had on Gebser, remarking, “the whole affaire of Eastern influences in Gebser’s thought would be an excellent topic for an investigation” (§ *The Inner and The Outer*, ¶ 8).

<sup>30</sup> Beck and Cowan (1996) address Esalen as Green vMeme.

<sup>31</sup> The original edition of *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* (1995) does not have an entry for “integral” or “integral ...” in its 33-page index, whilst the second edition (1995/2000) does.

<sup>32</sup> To date, the nascent Integral University (2007) has not yet emerged.

<sup>33</sup> Also see below regarding Cook-Greuter’s ego developmental model.

educational approach, and, substantively, Alfonso Montuori's (1997) interpretation of *integral* as a form of disciplined *improvisation*, via the generative metaphor of jazz.<sup>34</sup>

From this particular ecological perspective,<sup>35</sup> there are six intertwined genealogical branches of *integral*: those aligned with Aurobindo, Gebser, Wilber, Gangadean, László and Steiner (in respective chronological order of first usage<sup>36</sup>), among which there are varying degrees of commonality and contestation in various dimensions.<sup>37</sup> As such, we may regard the above as an outline of some “semiotic attractors” within a (necessarily complex and dynamic) hermeneutic ecosystem.<sup>38</sup>

Picking up one such inter-branch contestation, let's turn to the relationship between the *integrals* of Wilber and Gebser. Thompson (1996) foregrounds a difference between the two in relation to Gebser's “grand” European sensibility and loving attention to detail. Bonnitta Roy

---

<sup>34</sup> Further—in addition to the integrally-oriented *ReVision* (co-founded by Wilber)—there has recently been an upsurge in integral journals—including *Kosmos* (2001), *The Journal of Conscious Evolution* (2005), *Integral Review* (2005), and *AQAL* (2006); there has also been the Gebser Society's *Integrative Explorations Journal* (currently not in print).

<sup>35</sup> Different perspectives are, of course, possible. For instance, although he doesn't mention Gebser or Steiner, Daniel Gustav Anderson (2006) gives an alternate perspective that, “integral theory...remains Aurobindian from tip to toe inclusive of thinkers as diverse as Wilber and Thompson” (p. 63, n. 3). This can be seen to signify an ecology stemming from one root. Other perspectives might dispute inclusion and/or exclusion of various branches for various reasons (see following footnote, for example). Furthermore, I am not claiming this sketch is comprehensive, but rather, a reasonable point of departure. Every framework inevitably comes with a bias, and I apologise to any authors who may feel underrepresented by identifying / constructing this particular genealogy.

<sup>36</sup> Noting that the Steiner branch is via the conduit of Gidley.

<sup>37</sup> Most contestations occur in relation to Wilber's genealogical branch. Possible causes for this include (a) the power base of each branch (see Appendix C), and (b) Wilber's competitiveness over the term, *integral*. For example, the website for Wilber's Integral University (2007) advertises itself with the tagline, “the world's first integral learning community.” Apart from the tense-related misnomer regarding the fact that it is not yet in operation, such a claim has the quality of being decidedly competitive with regard to the term, *integral*, in relation to the ecology of interpretative uses of the term as described in this article. Specifically, Sri Aurobindo's thread was established first, Gebser's second and Wilber's third. C.I.I.S. was founded in relation to Sri Aurobindo's *integral* (and this relationship has been in continual—if varying—reference to this thread ever since (Wexler, 2005). It would also be difficult not to interpret C.I.I.S., at least in part, as a “learning community.” In this way, it could readily be argued that C.I.I.S. was the world's first integral learning community. Two questions arise here: (a) In what specific ways has Wilber (or The Integral University) honoured this understanding concerning C.I.I.S.'s Aurobindian—and thus integral—heritage? and, (b) Given the central utilisation of Aurobindo by AQAL, in what specific ways has Wilber (or The Integral University) detailed a differentiation between C.I.I.S.'s interpretive use of Aurobindo and his own interpretive use of Aurobindo to the extent that he can justify unilateral interpretative usage of the term, *integral*, in the manner described here? Also—although associated primarily with Wilber's integral thread with regard to interpretive usage of *integral*—a further question could be asked with regard to the already-existent integral learning community at Pacific Integral: namely, Would they regard themselves *primarily* as being part of Integral University's learning community to the extent that I.U.'s claim is understood as congruent with their own sense of identity? Such are some of the power relations (AQAL lower right quadrant identifications) regarding the term or meme, *integral*. For further discussion on the current status of *integral*, I would recommend Cowan and Todorovic (2006).

<sup>38</sup> I note that, through publication of this article, I myself am participating in this ecosystem.

(2006a) adds to this line of reasoning. She makes the point that codification / categorisation, such as is dominant in AQAL, is a *mental-perspectival* (rational / formal) operation, and that we need to move beyond this into thinking, experiencing, and expressing in *aperspectival* (integral) ways.

Jean Gebser points out a critical distinction between the Rational Level tendency to codify perspectives, that is to arrange any number of perspectives according to their relations in systematic terms (aka, making maps) and the Integral Level which goes beyond the mapping of perspectives, beyond even the making of perspectives, into thinking and experiencing in *a-perspectival* ways (p. 28).

Yet, reminiscent of Wilber's *transcend-and-include*, such "going beyond" still has to *include* the mental-perspectival structure of consciousness. But such inclusion can only take place when the structure—Rationality, in this case—has been mastered and given its rightful place, no more, no less—as Gebser (1949/1985) elucidates: "The various structures [of consciousness] which constitute [us] must...become *transparent* and conscious to [us]" (p. 99) and that we need to

master the deficient components by [our] insight so that [we] acquire the degree of maturity and equilibrium necessary for any concretion. Only those components that are in this way themselves balanced, matured, and mastered concretions can effect an integration (p. 99).

Notably here, in order to "effect an integration," Gebser refers to three necessary qualities in regard to the other structures of consciousness (such as the mental/rational structure), namely: insight, maturity and balance. I posit that each of these can be fruitfully regarded as conceptual portals (linking philosophical and psychological dimensions) which can facilitate integral modes of engagement—thus linking Gebser's integral theory with Ferrer et al.'s participatory integral theory mentioned above. Moreover, insight, maturity and balance point to (or, perhaps, can be encapsulated as) the *art* of integrality. As Roy indicates, integration needs to be well-crafted: it needs to be artful; artful with a capital A.

A question regarding the art of crafting—or the craftiness of artistic licence, perhaps—arises when Wilber's mapping of Gebser's structures of consciousness is addressed, specifically in relation to the detail of the liminal territory between the modern/mental/rational structure and the integral one—the general area constituted by Wilber's (2006b) Orange, Green, and Teal (a.k.a. Yellow) vMemes,<sup>39</sup> "waves" or levels. This conceptual terrain is critical in that it potentially constitutes the transition between where we are now—the modern/rational/formal world(view)<sup>40</sup>—and where we (presumably) want to go—namely, the integral world(view); and

<sup>39</sup> After Beck and Cowan parted company, Beck and Wilber developed Spiral Dynamics Integral for several years. Wilber's reference to the "yellow meme" dates back to this period—a period Wilber refers to as "Wilber IV" (see Kazlev, 2007). After Beck and Wilber parted company, Wilber adopted his own coloured developmental level system based on the rainbow spectrum (thus negating the interwoven, DNA-like, Caduceus-like helix of cool and warm colours—the *spiral* in Spiral Dynamics—and instead established a *straight* rainbow-based topology). In this, some colours have stayed the same (e.g., Orange and Green); others have changed (e.g., Yellow has become Teal).

<sup>40</sup> Of course, as Wilber (2000c) clearly indicates, *where we are now* is a very complex territory comprising the entire spectrum of socio-cultural developmental levels, variously manifesting across the globe. For instance, he places 40% of "the population" at the mythic level (having 30% of the power), and

so it behoves me, as an explorer of this terrain to describe the following. When Wilber refers to Gebser's model, he often correctly identifies Gebser's structures of consciousness. However, at other times, especially when he refers to Gebser in a context of other authors, and also notably in his more recent work, his text and charts are often substantively misleading<sup>41</sup> (if one wishes to explore the particular territory rather than operate at the level of "orienting generalisations"<sup>42</sup>). Consider the following indicative statement:

Jean Gebser [amongst others]...believe[s] that the general waves of evolution or unfoldment have included **archaic**, **magic-tribal**, **mythic-traditional**, **modern-rational**, **postmodern-pluralistic**—all of which together are often called "first-tier" waves—and **integral-aperspectival**—which is often called "second tier" (Wilber, 2006a, p. 5, emphasis in original).<sup>43</sup>

This statement is incorrect. Gebser has *not* posited a postmodern-pluralistic stage. Unfortunately, Wilber reinforces this error in various charts and tables frequently propagated at face value by a significant proportion of the integral community. In an iconically glossy insert in *Integral Spirituality* (Wilber, 2006b, between pp. 68-69) for example, he identifies Gebser's "pluralistic" stage as corresponding with the Wilberian Green vMeme. In an exacerbation of the situation, he also associates Gebser with a "super-integral" developmental level. Such errors also occur in the *Wilber-Combs Lattice*, a key feature in Wilber's latest work (2006b, p. 90). Gebser only elucidated five structures: archaic, magic, mythic, mental and integral. No postmodern pluralism, no "super" marked-up<sup>44</sup> integral. Gebser's understanding instead is that the integral

---

30% of "the population" at rational-formal (with 50% of the power) (pp. 9-10). Unfortunately, he does not specify what geographical territory is constituted by "the population," nor does he specify how these figures were derived.

<sup>41</sup> This is a view shared by Matthew Dallman (2006), once art director for Wilber's Integral Institute and researcher into *the archetype of integral*. From evidence in the integral community's *blogosphere* and elsewhere, he is concerned about "the growth of superficial thinking about matters of the world. Contexts are smashed together and collapsed. Entire fields of thought are skimmed over" (Part III: Absurdities & Superficialities, ¶ 12). Evoking postformal languaging as identified by developmental psychologist, Susanne Cook-Greuter, he says that "worldview" understanding requires cognitive depth and *nuance*; "in Gebser, worldviews are poetic, not scientific" (Dallman, 2006, Part III: Absurdities & Superficialities, ¶ 12).

<sup>42</sup> This is the neologistic term given by Wilber (1995, pp. viii-ix) to refer to his "broad brush stroke" theoretical approach.

<sup>43</sup> The use of the phrase, "often called," is disingenuous in that (a) the terms were coined by Beck and Cowan, yet Wilber but does refer to Beck and Cowan in this text as part of his list of "leading theorists of consciousness evolution." Indeed, there has been a substantive change from Wilber IV—e.g., (Wilber, 2000c)—to Wilber V—e.g., (Wilber, 2006b)—with regard to Beck and Cowan and their Spiral Dynamics in that, for example, AQAL no longer identifies developmental levels via the coloured vMememes of Spiral Dynamics; (b) Other than Spiral Dynamics, the only substantive referential point of the use of these terms is Wilber himself. But on what empirical research is Wilber now using these terms if he is distancing himself from the research of Spiral Dynamics? Alternatively, what legitimate justification might he have for disavowing Spiral Dynamics with regard to their research on vMememes yet still utilise that part of their research which distinguishes between two genera of vMememes?

<sup>44</sup> Or super-marketed! (see below for discussion concerning Wilber and the Orange vMeme).

structure follows on, as it were, *directly* from the mental-perspectival (modern) one<sup>45</sup> and that it has various unique attributes or characteristics which infer a “translucence” of—a certain (re)opening up to—*previous* structures rather than the theoretic construction of *further* stages beyond integral. (See Appendix A for further discussion).

An associated contestation between the genealogical branches of Gebser and Wilber’s *integrals* concerns the following. As noted above, Wilber often associates Gebser’s *integral* with his *vision-logic*, and he elsewhere differentiates *vision-logic* between *early* (relativist) and *later* (dialectical/integral)<sup>46</sup>—a differentiation which has been identified in developmental psychological research, which Wilber references (2000a, pp. 21-22). Such research, however, does not carry a sufficiently unified voice for a call of “orienting generalization” to be legitimately made. There are substantive contestabilities. Piagetian commentator, Helena Marchand (2001), for instance, concludes from her review of the literature,

The great diversity of theories, and of methodologies ... presented by authors who postulate the existence of stages of development beyond the formal operations stage makes it difficult, if not impossible, to get a unified view of the characteristics of this level of thought (§ 11).

She also cites Labouvie-Vief (1992), for instance, as presenting an alternate theoretic topology of postformal cognition: “The term postformal may not imply a progression in formal complexity. Instead, it could mean that for some individuals, formal thinking forms a base from which thought branches out into more nonformal domains” (1992, p. 221, cited in Marchand, 2001, § *What is the nature of postformal thought?* ¶ 6). Nevertheless, a significant theoretical thread shared by other researchers can indeed be characterised as a transition from relativist to dialectical stages, and it would indeed seem that there is validity in such identification. However, from a postformal point of view rather than an either/or one, this theoretic identification may represent only a partial perspective: this *relativist* → *dialectical* construction is not an understanding shared by all researchers on postformal thought and *may* form part of a greater understanding rather than be necessarily—or prematurely—put into a competitive conceptual arena. My research of the current state of play indicates that, collectively-speaking, postformal terrain is still (stimulatingly) work-in-progress (Hampson, in preparation).

However, even if we disregard such contestability, Gebser still cannot be legitimately used in this manner to support such a distinction in the socio-cultural (particularly lower left) AQAL quadrants regarding the status of postmodernism. As conversational openings, I see a number of options here. Either, (a) a convincingly detailed in-depth hermeneutic needs to be conducted between Gebser’s integral-aperspectival and Wilber’s theorizing of socio-cultural stages—this might involve, for instance, either (i) attempting to tease out a distinction between Green and Yellow (Teal) vMememes within Gebser’s integral-aperspectival structure, and/or (ii) attempting to tease out a distinction between Orange and Green vMememes within Gebser’s mental-rational

<sup>45</sup> Via a complex process of decreasing “efficiency” in this structure as it overextends or intensifies via over-quantification—the ratio in rational leading to an undue rationing of consciousness—see, for example, (Gebser, 1949/1985, p. 95).

<sup>46</sup> With confusing contradiction, Wilber states, “I use ‘postformal’ both ways (as the first major stage beyond formop—namely, vision-logic, and as all levels beyond formop), as context will tell” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 224, n. 14). In this statement, he denotes vision-logic solely with the Green vMeme and implies that vision-logic does not refer to subsequent vMememes, such as his “post-pluralistic” integral.

structure; (b) an appropriate refinement of AQAL holon theory needs to occur, perhaps involving (i) identifying a relationship between Gebser's understanding of *deficiency* and *unbridled relativism*, for example (although there would be substantive implications for the linear orderliness of Wilberian level identification here), or (ii) taking heed of Susanne Cook-Geuter's, Stanislav Grof's or Jenny Wade's comments (outlined below) concerning the radical reflexivity arising from postconventional/integral development; (c) evidencing for this socio-cultural transition should no longer include Gebser but instead should newly establish this territory via other substantive reference (if such a reference were to be found); (d) Wilber's conceptualization concerning the Green/Teal relationship should be abandoned; (e) a substantively pertinent critique should be given of my analysis; or (f) a "craftful" combination of the above! If (d) is identified, an alternative Wilberian concept, *vision-logic*, could be fruitfully used and developed. Such development could use dialectical operations—a postformal mode of reasoning that has even wider implications for integral theory than the deepening of vision-logic. It is this postformal perspective I will now address.

## Thinking Dialectically About Integral Theory

Dialectical operations<sup>47</sup> can be used to both deepen and problematise integral theory. The former can be achieved via the concept of vision-logic and the interpenetrative play of the visionary logic embedded within the term; whilst the latter can be achieved through counterpointing the default (conventional / formal, non-dialectical) view of the concept of construction with a dialectical view regarding the concept of deconstruction.

### Deepening Vision-Logic

In contrast to Wilberian conceptualisations concerning the sharpness of distinction between postmodernism (as Wilberian Green vMeme) and integral (as Teal and beyond), *vision-logic* straddles the Wilberian postmodern/integral divide (2000a). Wilber comments that "signs of the emergence of vision-logic" would be constituted by "movements that would be 'postrational' or 'poststructural' or 'postmodern' in the best sense" (1995/2000, pp. 195-196). The term brings together developmental psychology research on postformal, postconventional (but pre-transpersonal) thought with corresponding socio-cultural perspectives, thus covering both individual (upper quadrants) and collective (lower quadrants) aspects of one holon.<sup>48</sup>

Vision-logic is a neat term (in both senses) as it creatively embraces a number of postformal features simultaneously, evoking a "magic synthesis" (Wilber, 2000a, p. 259, n. 27). Gidley (2006) indicates that academic research often privileges *logic* over imaginative *vision* and consequently does not achieve such a "psychoactive" outcome. It's perhaps also a quintessentially postformal term in that it is a neologism constituted by a dialectic between two contrasting formal concepts—*vision* and *logic*. It is thus variously analogous to William Stern's

---

<sup>47</sup> Wilber (2000a, p. 22) indicates that dialectics itself is an important characteristic of postformal thought. This view is supported by Helena Marchand (2001) who concludes that, "the dialectical and the relativist models stand out, because of the influence they exert on the bulk of the conceptualisations of postformal thought." Benack and Basseches (1989), in line with Susanne Cook-Greuter (2002), Wilber and others, identify dialectical thinking as more advanced than relativist thinking.

<sup>48</sup> For Wilber's interpretation of holon theory, see Wilber (1995).

(1938) *unitas multiplex*, Benedikter's (2005) *productive void*, Goethe's *delicate empiricism* (Seamon, 1998), Foucault's (2003) *epistemologico-political*, Dewey's (1919/2004) *end-in-view*, Bussey's (2006) *critical spirituality*, Gangadean's (1993) *meditative reason*, Steiner's (1910/1983) *spiritual science*, and also, perhaps—in more condensed or expanded forms—to Derrida's *différance* (as dialectic between *difference* and *deference*), Gebser's (1949/1985) *integral-aperspectival*, Hafiz's *God in drag* (1999) and Zhuangzi's (n.d.) *Transformation of Things* (as exemplified by Zhuangzi's dialectical narrative regarding a person's dream that they were a butterfly, in question with an alternate understanding that the butterfly was dreaming the person). The term is inherently “unstable” from a formal perspective, but paradoxically generative and vitalising from a *postformal* perspective in that it can facilitate a spark of cognitive transformation in the reader if the context of the reader is such that the concept is sufficiently *trusted* and given space to internally reside, so to speak. Regarding the *logic* of “cognition” and the *vision* of “integration,” Wilber (2000a) refers to various researchers on postformal thought:

Commons and Richards, Fischer, and Sinnott tend to emphasise the cognitive component of vision-logic (and often its extreme developments), while Basseches, Pascual-Leone, Labouvie-Vief, and Deirdre Kramer highlight more of its dialectical, visionary, integrative capacities. Arieti stressed that vision-logic is an integration of primary and secondary processes—fantasy and logic—and thus it can be very creative (p. 259, n. 27).

In addition to the overall dialectic of the term, Wilber interestingly attributes dialectical thinking itself as belonging to one side of the term—the *vision* side. A complementary understanding would be that dialectics is a type of postformal logic and can therefore be found in the *logic* side of the term: such is the imaginative generativity of the term.

Wilber (2000a) says that “vision-logic can be applied (as can most cognition) to any of the major *levels* (or realms) in any of the quadrants” (p. 261, n. 27). Applying vision-logic as a postformal lens upon itself (through visionary-rational extension), the following possibilities open up:

*Vision* variously connotes, among other things,

- Seeing as understanding
- Visionary futures-thinking
- Both the sharp focused detail of *central* vision, and the wide-angle, panoramic—“big picture”—soft focus of *peripheral* vision
- Spatial literacy
- Art
- Sensory-perceptual phenomena
- The differentiation of qualities
- Imagination

whilst connotations of *logic* variously include,

- Rationality
- Reason, explanation
- Correctness, rectitude, right

- Logos, The Word, words
- Decision-making
- Pattern, form
- Formalism, formality
- Mathematics: the “play” of quantities

Additionally, from a more linguistically-oriented or creative postmodern angle, a characterisation might be to assign *logic* the role of Wilberian horizontal *translation*, the “flatland” of the *plan* view of *ex-plan*-ation; and, conversely, *vision* the role of Wilberian vertical transformation by means of identifying the (Erotic<sup>49</sup>) creativity inherent in the *image* of *imag*-ination (see Wilber, 1995, pp. 59-61). From this perspective, the neologism is metaphorically holonic which adds to its generativity. Meanwhile, from a dialectically-oriented mode of cognition, vision-logic can deepen into a plurality of vision-logics (a plurality still encompassed by the term as *genus*). This could include such domains as:

- Visions and versions of different logics—including:
  - o many-valued logics (Malinowski, 1993), including
    - fuzzy logic (Novák, 1989; Zadeh, Klir, & Yuan, 1996),<sup>50</sup>
    - and the related: fuzziology & social fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002), and vagueness (Williamson, 1994)
  - o dialectical logic (Adorno, 1990; Ilyenkov, 1977);
- The logic of different visions—the rectitude of plural imaginations<sup>51</sup>—including
  - o (post)modern imaginations (Kearney, 1998)
  - o the embodied imagination (Johnson, 1992)
  - o the theoretic imagination (Weick, 1989)
  - o the scientific imagination (Holton, 1998)
  - o the geometrical imagination (Hilbert & Cohn-Vossen, 1952)
  - o the sociological imagination (Mills, 1959/2000)
  - o the philosophy of imagination (Warnock, 1976)

In summary, beautifully situated in the liminal world of a generative, postformal flux gestured by a postmodern-integral dialectic, Wilber’s vision-logic is an inspiring neologism which can facilitate cognitive transformation. The above demonstration of such a constructive facilitation—the production of a higher order of (integral) construction (or an intensification of resonance)—has, however, involved a certain (postmodern) deconstruction of the term. The demonstration above can therefore be seen to exemplify possible interpenetrative dialectics between construction and deconstruction.

<sup>49</sup> Referring to Wilber’s AQAL placement of Eros as Creative force of the Kosmos (1995, p. 69; also see pp. 338-341).

<sup>50</sup> In a somewhat reflexive move, I note that fuzzy logic—and thence (holonic) fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002)—could be useful for facilitating the justification of Wilber’s linguistic construct, *orienting generalizations* and other such “big picture” languaging inventions.

<sup>51</sup> The correctness of realising imaginations as valuable—inspired by, for instance, the transdisciplinary imagination (Gidley, 2001)

## Contra-Indications of Construction

From a postformal viewpoint, *construction* and *deconstruction* can dialectically interpenetrate each other in various ways. To explore this perspective, a *formal* or *conventional* view of the terms—that construction involves a putting together, and that deconstruction involves a taking apart—are taken as given and not further explored. Instead, this section explores contra-possibilities or counter-intuitions.<sup>52</sup>

When we regard the terms, *construction*, *reconstruction* and *deconstruction*, what form of cognition are we using? From a pre-formal perspective we might feel a flood of emotive mythic resonances so that we conflate *construction* and *reconstruction* with *salvation*, and *deconstruction* with *destruction*. From a formal perspective, we might seek to carefully define exactly what the terms “actually” mean so that there is maximal differentiation; from the formal perspective, preformal confluences no longer apply, but *construction* and *reconstruction* still each stand in unequivocal semantic opposition to *deconstruction*. From a post-formal perspective, however, the situation may not (necessarily) be as clear-cut. A deeper understanding would beckon—one potentially calling upon any number of, or combination of, postformal approaches, epistemologies, ways of thinking and modes of expression, chosen (or happened on) by us to form a (non-relativist) “integrality.” Such postformal modes of reasoning include thinking complexly, creatively, reflexively, dialogically, ecologically, “embodiedly,” “constructivistically,” and dialectically. In the following discussion, dialectics is used as an overall structure, whilst attention is given to the constructed nature of language. A transcendence of a simplistic / formal / Orange perspective on *deconstruction* and (*re*)*construction* is thus effected. In so doing, particular texts from Wilber and Derrida—chosen for their contra-indicative properties—are developmentally assessed to problematise the premise that Wilber’s (*re*)*constructive* approach is necessarily operating at a more mature developmental level than Derrida’s *deconstructive* approach. Firstly, an example is given indicating inappropriate destruction in the guise of reconstruction, as text from Wilber is analysed. Secondly, the constructiveness of deconstruction is demonstrated, as text from Derrida is analysed.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> A metaphor here would be to consider the harmonics of a musical tone: *formal* semantic qualities could be understood as the fundamental frequency of the note, whilst the *postformal* dialectical semantics could be viewed as the harmonic overtones. Lest such a metaphor be consequently taken to necessarily signify the superfluity of dialectical semantics with regard to overall “pitch of meaning” (as it were), due regard should be given to the possibility of substantive *change* of “pitch of meaning” caused by particular intensifications of “postformal timbre”—as would be exemplified by the pitch of a note on a wind instrument reaching a bifurcation point and suddenly changing by an octave—through the practice of “overblowing.” Another example would be feedback from an electric guitar. Perhaps analogous to an intensification of yin leading to sudden yang (or *vice versa*), the subtler characteristics of phenomena such as musical timbre or dialectical semantics should not be assumed to lack substantive power: *details* regarding integral theory have the potential not only to join up the dots, but also to create qualitatively novel surprises with regard to what *emerges* once the dots are joined up.

<sup>53</sup> The postformal approach I am employing is non-relativist in that substantive qualitative distinctions are made.

## Destructive Reconstruction

Wilber uses the term *deconstructive postmodernism*<sup>54</sup> and strongly associates it with AQAL's Green vMeme—described by Wilber as the green “meme,” “level,” “stage” or “wave,” alongside the similarly strong associations of *pluralism* and *relativism*.<sup>55</sup> Wilber (2000a) confidently asserts that,

the bright promise of a constructive postmodernity slid into a nihilistic deconstructive postmodernity when the pluralistic embrace turned into a rancid levelling of all qualitative distinctions. Postmodernity, attempting to escape flatland, often became its most vulgar champion (p. 160).

In this vignette, *constructive* is the hero, one associated with bright, hopeful promise; whilst *deconstructive* is the villain, associated with nihilism, rancidity and vulgarity. On the “vulgar” side of postmodernity, he identifies two features: denial of depth and denial of qualitative distinctions. He evidences this via sole reference to two American novels: Ellis' *American Psycho* and Gass's *The Tunnel*—he presents no evidence from non-fictional sources and no evidence from the viewpoint of other nations. He goes on to say that,

*Constructive postmodernism*...takes up the multiple contexts freed by pluralism, and then goes one step further and weaves them together into mutually interrelated networks. (...By whatever name, pluralistic relativism gives way to integral holism. See especially...Deirdre Kramer, Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Jan Sinnott, Don Beck, Clare Graves, Susanne Cook-Greuter, Kitchener and King, Blanchard-Fields, William Perry, and Cheryl Armon, among others) (2000a, p. 172).<sup>56</sup>

This “one step further” infers the holarchy (or non-dominatory hierarchy) of Wilberian theory, AQAL (1995, pp. 32-78), where constructive postmodernism is the next holarchical level after deconstructive postmodernism. But to what, exactly, is Wilber referring, when he uses the term, *deconstructive postmodernism*? Is he perhaps denying the possibility of *depth* in deconstruction? Is he “denying a qualitative distinction” between *deconstruction* and *deconstructive postmodernism*?

To answer such questions, one might perhaps imagine that Wilber's volume entitled, *A Theory of Everything* (2000c), would hold sufficiently adequate keys. In this, he associates the Green vMeme, *inter alia*, with Derrida,<sup>57</sup> deconstruction,<sup>58</sup> relativism, and the narcissism of—

<sup>54</sup> I will be not necessarily inferring the absolute lack of utility of the term, *deconstructive postmodernism*; I will rather be problematising its uncontextualised or unreflexive usage, and in so doing, attempt to raise pertinent awareness.

<sup>55</sup> Spiral Dynamics does not map *Derrida*, *deconstruction*, *poststructuralism*, *postmodernism*, *nihilism*, or *pluralism* or *relativism* (Beck & Cowan, 1996) in (or gravitating toward) the Green (or any other) vMeme. Therefore Wilber's theoretic use of the Gravesian terms, *first* and *second tier*, cannot legitimately be used in AQAL (e.g., Wilber, 2006b, p. 90) to make connective inferences regarding pluralism, postmodernism, deconstruction, etc.

<sup>56</sup> The current article variously refers to most of the authors Wilber mentions here.

<sup>57</sup> This placement of Derrida (published in 2000) would seem to contradict an earlier discussion of Derrida by Wilber, in *Sex Ecology Spirituality* (1995, p. 601). This is a discussion, I further note, left

and regression in—“boomeritis.” Connecting *deconstruction* with *boomeritis*, we can observe the following—potentially revolutionary but unfortunately unsubstantiated—cultural criticism of this developmental level—the Wilberian Green vMeme:

In green’s admirable attempt to go *postconventional*—it has often inadvertently embraced anything nonconventional, and this includes much that is frankly *preconventional*, regressive, and narcissistic.

This strange mixture of very high postconventional memes with preconventional narcissistic memes is boomeritis. A typical result is that the sensitive self, honestly trying to help, excitedly exaggerates its own significance. It will possess the new paradigm, which heralds the greatest transformation in the history of the world; it will completely revolutionize society as we know it; it will revision everything that came before it; it will save the planet and save Gaia<sup>59</sup> and save the Goddess; it will be the most extraordinary. ... Well, and off we go on some of the negative aspects of the last three decades of boomer cultural studies. ... Boomeritis has significantly tilted and prejudiced academic studies; it is behind much of the culture wars; it haunts almost every corner of the New Age; it drives many of the games of deconstruction and identity politics; it authors new paradigms daily (p. 27).

What should be made of such heroic words which caution us against war, haunting, and games of deconstruction? A call, it would seem, for boomers to turn from The Dark Side and acquire Wilber’s Brave New Paradigm. Yet in such an admirable attempt to “go *integral*,” certain shadow questions arise: Has Wilber unwittingly embraced the preconventional

---

unrevised for the second edition of SES (2000). Here, Wilber says that, “Derrida is often called on to support the notion that there are no transcendental signifieds at all (only sliding chains of signifiers and endless cultural mediation). But this is a misreading of Derrida. ... According to Derrida, the fact that we *can* translate languages to some significant degree means that there are genuine transcendental signifieds ... even if all contexts are situated, a great number of contexts are *similarly situated* across cultures. ‘Context’ does not automatically mean ‘relative’ or ‘incommensurable.’ *It often means ‘common’...*” (1995, pp. 601-602) In this, Wilber appears to infer that Derrida should *not* be mapped as a “relativist.” Wilber does not say in this discussion where Derrida *should* then be located. I have not found a reference where this apparent discrepancy is clarified. Notwithstanding discussion concerning the possible (though apparently unreflexive) postformal embrace of such a paradoxical position, this article will follow the particular subjectivity in Wilber that voices Derrida *as* a relativist, for these reasons: (a) this particular voice or stance of Wilber’s appears to be later thinking; (b) it is expressed in the more populist of the two books; (c) it is voiced near the beginning in the main body of text rather than as an endnote.

<sup>58</sup> I have not come across a discussion by Wilber differentiating “Derrida” from “deconstruction” in terms of AQAL mapping.

<sup>59</sup> Interestingly, Beck and Cowan (1996, p. 47) attribute James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia hypothesis’ to the Turquoise (highest level, second-tier) vMeme—two levels beyond Green. They also identify “Gandhi’s ideas of *pluralistic* harmony,” “theories of David Bohm [sic]” (see discussion below) and Wilber’s *Spectrum of Consciousness* each to Turquoise. (There is no reference to any other Wilber in this regard). The latter is an interesting choice given Wilber’s self-distancing from this work, coming as it does from the historical subjective identity he labels, *Wilber I (the Romantic)* (Kazlev, 2007). An implication here would be that Beck and Cowan might have a different theoretical perspective on what Wilber calls “Eco” or “Romantic,” and on “pluralistic harmony” and Bohmian theory, and instead attribute such qualities or approaches to the highest evaluation.

linguaging of *Cowboys and Indians*?<sup>60</sup> In what way is Wilber *not* claiming that AQAL will “revision everything that came before it”? and: In what way would the incongruence potentially identified here *not* significantly “tilt and prejudice” integral studies? Then again, perhaps this is not the most important part of the story. Regardless, an emotively stirring scene has been set regarding the paramount significance of what needs to transform: the Wilberian Green vMeme with its “games of deconstruction.”<sup>61</sup>

Before such judgements are made, however, perhaps due regard should be given to empirical research concerning attitudes toward the Green vMeme. Natasha Todorovic’s (2002)<sup>62</sup> careful research into relationships among the Spiral Dynamics vMememes unequivocally concludes that, “it is those with high Orange scores who reject Green most strongly,” (p. 3) whilst, “yellow accepts green more than any other system” (p. 3). A conversational opening here, then, might involve an assessment of the developmental value of the integral discourse—exemplified above—can be most adequately be seen to align with. It is worth noting the possibility of “vMeme colonisation.” (See Appendix A for further discussion.)

Such shadow-work would benefit us all, no doubt. In this regard, what is, might or should be the relationship between integral theory, shadow-work, dialectics and deconstruction? For that matter, *qu'est-ce que la déconstruction?*

### Constructive Deconstruction

From a vernacular perspective, deconstruction<sup>63</sup> and Derrida go together like two peas in a proverbial pod. To adopt something of a semi-formal approach as mentored by Wilber (Murray, 2006),<sup>64</sup> we might, in addition, also want to turn to that semi-formal of media, the Wikipedia, to get an ordinary-yet-informed perspective on the term.<sup>65</sup> Wikipedia’s entry regarding

<sup>60</sup> If such languaging can be theorized as part of a grand Magician’s art—the art of the Spiral (Dynamics) Wizard (able to call upon all vMememes), then why is the teaching of this art not enabled through patient and demonstratively reflexive visibility?

<sup>61</sup> Perhaps *this* is such a game? Am *I* authoring a “new paradigm”? Phone 012-3π45-6789 for *YES* and 987-654π-3210 for *NO*. (N.B. “Extreme Postmodernists” can phone whatever number they like! whilst Reasonable Postmodernists can phone whatever number they like...*within reason*.)

<sup>62</sup> The referenced link (Todorovic, 2002) requires a simple membership procedure. For access, follow: <http://www.spiraldynamics.org/> → Articles → Advanced Resources → (registration) → “The Mean Green Hypothesis: Fact or Fiction?” Memes and vMememes in SD - the confused language of Spiral Dynamics”

<sup>63</sup> My interest here is not in attempting to establish a formal answer through detailed research (even if that were possible, given the elusive nature of the concept) but in ascertaining what would be a reasonable assumption—on first blush. Derrida’s response to the question is given later.

<sup>64</sup> Tom Murray also says, “the integral community, taking Wilber’s lead, has a propensity toward informality, pragmatism, and popularism” (Murray, 2006, p. 9) and I would add to this: the languaging ensemble that is Wilber’s style is no doubt an important reference point for expressivity mode; however, due consideration should also be given to the languaging modes of other integral theorists, whose chosen styles of communication may offer additional integral insights and languaging-template openings.

<sup>65</sup> On the Wikipedia page for “deconstruction” (2007a), Derrida is the only person mentioned in the first paragraph and the only deconstructionist mentioned in the first two. Apart from eight other deconstructionists listed in paragraph three, we have to wait until the eighth paragraph before a deconstructionist other than Derrida is mentioned again. In total, Derrida’s name appears 73 times. The names of all other deconstructionists put together total 44.

*deconstruction* clearly indicates that it would be reasonable to assume that in the discursive realm in which Wilber mostly operates, *deconstruction*, first and foremost, refers to Derrida. And what is the object to which *deconstruction* directs its attention? Language. So, as an interpenetration of *integral* and *postmodern*, we might want to answer the following question: In what ways might languaging be mapped across structures of consciousness?

An integrally-oriented developmental psychologist whose work specifically concerns language is Susanne Cook-Greuter (1990, 2000, 2002, 2007). She identifies *the language habit*—the way in which we confuse our experience with our *conceptualisations* of our experience. Somewhat inferring Commons and Richards’ Model Of Hierarchical Complexity, perhaps, she refers to Kegan, Basseches and herself regarding, “the fundamental language problem inherent in meaning making and scientific theorizing no matter how many systems are integrated and at what level of hierarchical complexity” (2000, p. 234).<sup>66</sup> She identifies the following features of the language habit:

- It is a universal for humans;
- It is innate but needs modelling in early childhood to emerge;
- It becomes unconscious once acquired;
- “It bundles the flux of sensory input and inner experience into labelled concepts shared with one’s speech community”;
- “It is so deeply ingrained that speakers of any given language are not aware of the reality construction imposed on them by their language”;
- “It can become a barrier to further development if it remains unconscious, automatic and unexamined” (2000, p. 228).<sup>67</sup>

As an opening for further research, a pertinent question arises here concerning possible relationships between Cook-Greuter’s identification of *the language habit*, her *construct-aware* developmental level (outlined below), constructivist theories, and *the linguistic turn* of postmodern philosophy, including Derrida’s *déconstruction*.

Drawing upon her doctoral research, Cook-Greuter (2002) identifies numerous developmental stages of language habits as part of her model of ego development, and corresponds these to stages in the Action Logics of William Torbert’s Leadership Development Framework. She groups the stages according to the following four levels: preconventional, conventional, postconventional, and transpersonal. Our primary interest here concerns the postconventional level.<sup>68</sup> In this, there are three stages. In ascending order of development, these are:

---

<sup>66</sup> She goes on to say, “except for those who study the limits of language professionally, only individuals at the second level of postconventional differentiation seem to appreciate the magnitude of humanity’s automatic and unconscious dependence on the language habit for all aspects of living” (Cook-Greuter, 2000, p. 234). She does not make clear here whether “those who study the limits of language professionally” (Cook-Greuter, 2000, p. 234) are solely constituted by linguist specialists, or whether this term covers poststructuralist philosophers, and/or writers and poets, for example.

<sup>67</sup> Indeed, the following question is pertinent here: In what ways can one adequately examine language when the very tool one is using—language—is also the object under investigation? Perhaps, for instance, one needs to deconstruct as one goes—in a spirit of continual construct-awareness?

<sup>68</sup> It is worth also outlining here languaging characteristics from the two most developed of the *conventional* stages, as these bear relationship to the orthodox style expected of academic writing such as *this very text*, or regarding integral community discourse. The first is the *self-conscious* stage (aligned to

- The Individualist stage—aligned to Torbert’s Individualist;
- The Autonomous stage—aligned to Torbert’s Strategist;
- The Construct-aware stage—aligned to Torbert’s Magician (a.k.a. Alchemist or Clown).

The Individualist stage she identifies as *relativistic*. She also relates this stage to *deconstructive postmodernism*, in which truth “can never be found. Everything is relative; there is no place to stand or judge from” (p. 21), whilst those at the Autonomous / Strategist stage “try to do justice to the complexity of life in their verbal expressions” (p. 26) and have “the capacity to see and accept paradox and tolerate ambiguity” (p. 24). Additionally, the shadow side of the self can be acknowledged to a greater degree and therefore a new integration and *wholeness* is possible” (p. 24); they walk the talk. Language clues include complex, flexible syntax, linguistic coherence, linguistic complexity. Lastly, at the most mature of these three postconventional stages, the Magician starts to realise “the absurdity or automatic limits of human map making in the representational domain” (p. 27); that, “all cognition is recognized as constructed” and there is the recognition of “paradoxes inherent in rational thought” (p. 27). And in terms of identifiable features, “the language of Magicians is often complex, vivid, authentic and playful...Magicians express a vast matrix of topics, concerns, questions, insights and commentary cleverly united into one complex sentence structure” (p. 31).

Given this schema, and given the aforementioned primary understanding that deconstructive postmodernism refers to deconstruction and thence to Derrida, one would reasonably assume that Derrida’s languaging would be adequately mapped within the relativist, individualist stage. So, Is Derrida an Individualist? Is deconstruction merely relativist?<sup>69</sup> In a discussion regarding a preference between two different language habits—Edmund Husserl’s perspectival *univocity* and James Joyce’s relativist *equivocality*—John Caputo (1997) reports that,

Derrida is struck by the self-limitation of both ideas. For unbridled equivocality would breed such confusion that “the very text of its repetition” would be unintelligible, even as perfect univocity, were such a thing possible, would result only in paralysis and sterility...

---

Torbert’s Expert/Technician) (Cook-Greuter, 2002, pp. 15-16). Language habits at this stage indicate that the speaker regards themselves as “ultrarational”—that they have it all figured out. Value is place on the accumulation of facts. There is often a sense of superiority, of one-upmanship, often accompanied by a ridiculing or hostile tenor. The second (the one directly preceding *postconventional* stages) is the *conscientious* stage (aligned to Torbert’s Achiever) (pp. 16-20) Language habits at this stage include seriousness, earnest conviction, intellectual scepticism, recognition of complexity, ownership of responsibility, revealing “I” statements, an ability to listen and restate expressions without adding one’s own interpretation, asking questions such as “what does it feel like?”, suppression of one’s shadow through “positive” attitude, time-related terms have an emphasis on the local future and time effectiveness. Cook-Greuter comments that, at this stage, “formal operations are at their peak and rationality, progressivism, positivism and reductionism have their strongholds.” (p. 18) Summarising the conventional mindset, Cook-Greuter comments that its major limit “is the acceptance of facts and the external world as real and its blindness to the constructed nature of beliefs, especially the grand myth of conventional science. Although complex scientific analysis is applied, the underlying assumptions of any system are rarely questioned or made explicit. ... knowledge, measurement and prediction are taken for granted as means to control nature, self and society” (p. 20).

<sup>69</sup> My judgement at this point is not to attempt to differentiate the gamut of Derrida’s *text* from a notion of Derrida’s *déconstruction*.

Deconstruction—as usual—situates itself in the distance between these two. It does not renounce the constitution of meaning and the transmission of scientific ideas...(p. 183).

Caputo reports here that deconstruction is *beyond* equivocity, and so beyond pluralistic relativism. But what of Derrida's (necessarily translated) languaging itself? Let's consider Derrida's (1987/1989) reading of Heidegger and the discourse surrounding Heidegger. In this, Derrida makes a judgement and takes a stand against something he identifies in the discourse. That certain something is *a discrimination against Spirit*:

Is it not remarkable that this theme, spirit, occupying...a major and obvious place in this [genealogical] line of thought, should have been disinherited...No-one ever speaks of spirit in Heidegger. Not only this: even the anti-Heideggerian specialists take no interest in this thematics of spirit, not even to denounce it (pp. 3-4).

Judging this to be unjust, he asks, "why this filtering out in the heritage, and this discrimination?" (p. 4). He goes on to decisively comment: "This preliminary work has not yet been systematically undertaken—to my knowledge, perhaps not even envisaged. Such a silence is not without significance" (p. 5). Derrida here is operating with/in a *hierarchy* of values—favouring the value of work that is systematically undertaken over work which is not. Derrida then constructively elucidates three arguments concerning Heidegger's avoidance of the term, *spirit*—arguments which give preference to certain perspectives over others. (pp. 4-6).

Derrida's comments here are therefore *not* coming from a relativist perspective. He is making value judgments in favour of a discussion of Spirit and against Heidegger's inappropriate silence on the issue. Furthermore, deconstruction itself is clearly articulated as being *beyond* the relativism of unbridled equivocity: Derrida sees relativism as self-limiting, confusing, unintelligible.

With regard to the following developmental stage, Cook-Greuter (2002) identifies "the capacity to...tolerate ambiguity" and "the capacity to see and accept paradox" as two features indicative of the Autonomous-Strategist ("constructive postmodern") stage (p. 24). With regard to ambiguity, consider the following text from Derrida (1983/1985): "To deconstruct [is] a structuralist gesture... But it [is] also an antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity" (p. 2). With regard to paradox, consider the following from Derrida: "All sentences of the type 'deconstruction is X' or 'deconstruction is not X' a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false" (p. 4). These comments therefore align with<sup>70</sup> Cook-Greuter's Autonomous-Strategist stage (at least).

Lastly, in consideration of the most mature of the postconventional stages (i.e. the stages under consideration here)—the construct-aware Magician—consider the Cook-Greuter identifiers of this stage—authenticity, vividness, playfulness and complexity—with regard to the following two Derridean (1997/2001) quotes—the first with particular regard to authenticity:

In principle, there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no "to what point?"... Forgiveness is often confounded, sometimes in a calculated fashion, with related

<sup>70</sup> From a formal perspective, it could be stated that this paper will be employing Cook-Greuter's model as a heuristic, as it will not be conducting the type of sentence completion analysis she used as part of her methodology. It will, nevertheless, be conducting hermeneutic sentence analysis.

themes: excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription, etc...[but] forgiveness must in principle remain heterogeneous and irreducible (p. 27).

and the following single sentence with its complex structure:

For if, as I believe, the concept of a crime against the humanity is the main charge of this self-accusation, of this repenting and this asking forgiveness; if, on the other hand, only a sacredness of the human can, in the last resort, justify this concept (nothing is worse, in this logic, than a crime against the humanity of man and against human rights); if this sacredness finds its meaning in the Abrahamic memory of the religions of the Book, and in a Jewish but above all Christian interpretation of the ‘neighbour’ or the ‘fellow man’; if, from this, the crime against humanity is a crime against what is most sacred in the living, and thus already against the divine in man, in God-made-man or man-made-God-by-God (the death of man and the death of God would here betray the same crime), then the ‘globalisation’ of forgiveness resembles an immense scene of confession in progress, thus a virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession, a process of Christianisation which has no more need for the Christian church (pp. 30-31).

Here, in addition to Derrida’s vividness of language regarding concerns and insights into matters spiritual—with a sense of appropriate wordplay—we can also see Cook-Greuter’s identification of the construct-aware Magician where “concerns, questions, insights and commentary cleverly united into one complex sentence structure.” A plausible hypothesis, then, would be to consider that these comments from Derrida centre around the perspective of The Magician—a level *beyond* Wilber’s Teal / Integral / “post-postmodern” / Yellow vMeme.

In short, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the above text from Derrida is operating from the construct-aware stage. But what does Derrida (1983/1985) himself say about reconstruction? Is deconstruction negative?

The undoing, decomposing, and desedimenting of structures...[is] not a negative operation. Rather than destroying, it [is] also necessary to understand how an "ensemble" [is] constituted and to reconstruct it to this end (p. 3).

Derrida rationally differentiates deconstruction from destruction and indicates that deconstruction is a constructive activity. He also explicitly reflexes upon its subtle dialectical quality. His writing demonstrates a high level of developmental maturity, in which deconstruction is recognised and reflexively enacted in a post-relativist, dialectical, construct-aware mode. Derrida and deconstruction are clearly something Other than that signified by Wilber in his use of the term, deconstructive postmodernism.

## Thinking Critically About Integral Theory

So, a question arises: What might account for such confusion between deconstruction and deconstructive postmodernism? Through attending this question, an anomaly stemming from Wilber’s universalising interpretation of the notion of deconstructive postmodernism can be seen

to emerge, opening up a conversation concerning possible relationships between critical thinking and critical theory.<sup>71</sup>

## Boomeritis: An (un)Critical Americanitis?

Let's turn firstly to Derrida (1983/1985) for an insight into this question: "It is true that in certain circles (university or cultural, especially in the United States) the technical and methodological 'metaphor' that seems necessarily attached to the very word deconstruction has been able to seduce or lead astray" (p. 3). The suggestion here is that the U.S.A. constitutes a substantively *special* case of being "led astray" by the term. Referencing Curler (1982), Ben Agger (1991) continues that there is a distinction to be had—perhaps between Derrida's *déconstruction* and a certain metaphorical use of the term, or perhaps between Derrida's text and a "methodology" called *deconstruction*—and that this strongly affects the U.S.A.: "Literary critics prise out of Derrida a methodology of textual reading called *deconstruction*. This deconstructive method has spread like wildfire through American humanities departments" (p. 112). Wilber (1995) develops this line of reasoning regarding deconstruction:

Here was a "literary criticism" made to order for the tenured radicals of the sixties: haven't the wits to build a building? No problem, just blow one up instead. Thousands of Ph.D. dissertations in deconstructionist themes were issued by American universities... Deconstruction as a movement never caught on in Germany or France or England (or anywhere else for that matter)...(pp. 721-722, n. 4).

Here, Wilber emotively reinforces Derrida's and Agger's more qualified comments, asserting that deconstruction as a movement never caught on *anywhere* other than in the United States of America.<sup>72</sup> He also seemingly implies that the sensibility of the cultural movement was sufficiently violent to warrant use of—shall we say—a *weapon of metaphorical destruction*—namely, the metaphor of *destroying* a building by explosive detonation (rather than, say, carefully *deconstructing* the aforesaid building, should such demise be warranted).<sup>73</sup> He furthermore implies that such destructive American deconstructionists were insufficiently *intelligent* to *construct* conceptual "buildings" or structures. An alternative understanding of deconstruction's contribution is offered by integral commentator, Ray Harris (2004):

The major function of green is to consciously deconstruct values in order to reconstruct them as freely agreed principles. Green is actually a very moral stage. It is orange that is the most amoral. It is orange that tends to unconsciously and destructively deconstruct – green arises to repair the damage (§ *Misunderstanding postmodernism*, ¶ 18).

<sup>71</sup> And possibly neo-imperialism

<sup>72</sup> It is possible, of course, that Wilber meant "anywhere" in a non-literal, colloquial way—i.e. where he didn't mean *all* places, just *most* places or *all places mostly*... or some variant. It is also possible that his intention was for the reader to take such utterances "with a pinch of salt." But if this were argued, how would the reader be able to distinguish between "serious" intent and "throw-away" comments? Would it depend on the maturity of the reader? Even if such comments were not believed, what (metaphorical) non-verbal communication might be taking place here?

<sup>73</sup> A forerunner to Derrida's *déconstruction* was Heidegger's "positive" *Destruktion*. Such a philosophical genealogy would beckon a yet finer distinction to be made than that being made here.

If this alternate understanding is true, then Wilber's unevidenced text here could be seen as arising from the Orange vMeme, and could be interpreted as his substantive underappreciation of the Green vMeme. The idea that the Orange vMeme can be destructive in this way would be in keeping with Gare's comment earlier concerning the destructive nature of modernity. Wilber, in turn, also substantively critiques modernity, yet his later writings do not foreground the destructive aspects of Orange in relation to those of Green (see Appendix A). A conversation opening here would be: How might we ascertain or evaluate such a distinction between modern-mental-rational and inclusive-integral levels?

## American and Other Interpretations

From a slightly different hermeneutic perspective, the following question arises: From whence does such violence emanate? Which AQAL quadrants are implicated here? Lower right power structures? Lower left cultural values? Upper right bodily urges? Wilber's upper left subjectivity? or something tetra-arising? One interpretation is that Wilber appears to be referring to an event occurring in (his) lower left quadrant—in American cultural values.

Interestingly, Ben Agger's (1996) interpretation of the situation is both significantly convergent and significantly divergent from Wilber's. In terms of agreement, Agger reinforces the hypothesis that there is something singularly wayward with America's interpretation of postmodernism and deconstruction. In terms of difference, Agger suggests that, rather than being related to America's *excess* of radical politics, it is actually American culture's *deficiency* in radical politics that is the cause of wilful or careless "ignorance" regarding deconstruction:

the American reception of postmodernism has tended to ignore postmodernism's stress on the linkage between discourse and democracy, a linkage that I contend is precisely the opening of Derrida's critique of western logocentrism to radical politics. Put differently, the American reception of postmodernism suppresses (or simply never learned) the social and intellectual history of French postmodern theory, which emerged out of the 1968 May Movement as a critique of Stalinist and orthodox-Marxist authoritarianism in preference for a radical micropolitics of everyday life (later to emerge as new social movements theory). Far from turning away from politics, people like Derrida and Foucault viewed their own philosophical work as intensely and obviously political, contributing to the heterodox French left project, especially in ways that embrace the feminist and gay/ lesbian movements (§ 14).

Could an adequate interpretation of this instance, then, be that the American nation-culture constitutes a "pathological" aberration among the plurality of global nation-cultures, in that it, substantially alone, has interpreted postmodernism as a form of destructive violence against the radical politics of an authentic democracy? a masculinist *straight*-jacketing of meaning—from, shall we say, French fries (delicately-sautéed *postmoderne*)—to McGiveMeGiveMeGiveMeU.S.NewNewsNewsweakNewspeakFreedomNowNow "Freedom" fries?—contributing to an exponential escalation of the prison population of concepts?<sup>74</sup>—a suppression of freedom in the name of freedom?

<sup>74</sup> Reviewing the prison population in countries of the world, consider the following statistics (figures show prison populations per 100,000 inhabitants): England and Wales 148; Australia 125 ; Canada 107;

Perhaps not. Perhaps, conversely—as Benedikter (2005) indicates—the U.S., including Wilber’s sizable contribution, leads the world in new thinking—in integrating, specifically, “Pacific” or “Eastern” conceptualisations. There is certainly strong evidence that points this way, too. Then again, does it have to be either/or? It is surely not the intention of well-respected American authors to perpetuate neo-imperialist languaging; but, if Wilber’s comment is true, and if integral theory, developmental theory or socio-cultural theory seeks to speak from a global rather than a local (i.e., American) perspective—and to a global rather than a provincial (i.e., American) audience—then note might be made that the rest of the world might not have substantively partaken of such a cultural fad as *deconstructive postmodernism*—or, at least, might not have substantively partaken of a “vulgar” *interpretation* of postmodernism. It would seem that the theoretic transition from *modern* to *integral* needs to take into account the importance of different cultural types—specifically addressing the 242 of the 243 nation-cultures that are *not* the U.S. of A. (regardless of how many *subcultures* the U.S.A. includes).<sup>75</sup> If cultural type or state can skew the normalised theoretic structure of cultural development to the extent indicated above, then such *straight* linear interpretations of AQAL’s default theoretic hierarchy of significance between levels of development and cultural type and state become problematic or untenable. Instead, a much subtler, more complex theoretic structure needs to be envisaged, where cultural variants (such as the identification of the AQAL *state* of neo-imperialism regarding the current U.S.) can be seen to be a major player amongst integral elements—the AQAL ecology of types, states, lines, levels and quadrants / native perspectives.

Another view on this would be to address pertinent (lower right quadrant) global power structures. Notwithstanding such considerations, dominant discourse from Wilber suggests that obstacles to embracing Integral Transformative Practice “are not found exclusively in boomers or in Americans. Pluralistic relativism is a universally available wave of consciousness unfolding...” (2000c, p. 31).

This statement could arguably be supported by non-American integral research and/or concerning non-American concerns, such as Olen Gunnlaugson’s (2004) research regarding “unhealthy” Green—and its moment of (potential) transformation—in a Swedish college.<sup>76</sup> And, indeed, a picture would seem to be emerging here that, regardless of first (Wikipedic or popular) impressions, an important distinction should be made between Derrida and deconstruction, in that the latter might have been appropriated (or somewhat forcibly *prised out* of Derrida—as Agger has intoned) by humanities departments both in the States—and elsewhere—to become something quite *other* than Derrida’s *déconstruction*.

Nevertheless, even where this cultural stage is identified in other countries, it would still appear to be the case that the “virulent” memetic strain of postmodernism seemingly constituted by the term deconstructive postmodernism is found in the U.S. in an unusually high ratio. According to Wilberian theory, this would suggest that the Green vMeme is significantly more

---

Italy 104; Germany 94; France 85; Ireland 72; Norway 66; Japan 62; USA 737 (Walmsley, 2007). What accounts for such a cultural discrepancy with regard to the US? What socio-cultural noospheric/languaging features might there be associated with such a difference? Or, put another way: what Wilberian left-hand quadrant correspondences (both individual and cultural) might there be to these Wilberian right-hand quadrant phenomena (both socio-structurally and regarding the physical experiences of prison inmates?).

<sup>75</sup> Noting that this does not necessarily concern other features of postformal/postconventional development, whether in the US or elsewhere.

<sup>76</sup> Notwithstanding its subsequent malaise.

prevalent in the States than elsewhere. Yet, Wilber (2000c) indicates that Europe's memetic centre of gravity is more advanced than the U.S. and that it has a significantly stronger Green vMeme presence than in the U.S. (p. 119, fig. 6-2). But then, if this is so, why doesn't Europe apparently suffer as much "boomeritis"? What might explain this anomaly, this inconsistency between the two features:

1. The difference between Europe and The States with regard to the strength of the Green vMeme and
2. The difference between Europe and The States with regard to the strength of the Green vMeme pathology of "boomeritis"?

How much is deconstructive postmodernism a function of "boomeritis"? How much a question of American-itis? No doubt, a complex question. But, as the above discussion has perhaps indicated, integral theory might still have a way to go if it is to adequately align, resonate, or become congruent with the complexity of the world. We need to start thinking complexly about integral theory.

## Thinking Complexly About Integral Theory

If Jean Gebser and Sri Aurobindo were alive today we might guess that they would see in the wondrous emergent properties of complex adaptive systems...an opening for the invisible. And perhaps the science of the future will validate such thinking, finding in the influences enfolded in the implicate order or the quantum vacuum field the infinitesimally tiny whispers that pivot us toward our personal and collective fates (Combs, 2005, §*Gebser and Modern Science*, ¶ 9).

Both the butterfly effect of "pivotal whispers" and the "wonder" of complex adaptive systems can be theoretically encompassed by complexity theory. Perhaps if Jean Gebser and Sri Aurobindo were alive today, they might advance integral theory via complexity theory as an integral part of the artful science of the future, and not only validate such an opening into Mystery, but reflexively realize their participation in it through such theoretic evolution.

The considerations explored in the context below follow a specific interpretation of complexity: that of complexity theory with specific reference to the complexity characteristic of (fractal) recursion.

Recursion will first be applied in relation to the notion of substantive content, exploring the idea that qualities of conceptualization and textual style can be viewed as a theoretic recursion of larger "content parcels"; further, that this perspective can be facilitated by the ludic neologism, nanotextology, and that the substantive content of integral theory should be reflected at all (or most) fractal scales—an integral nanotextology.

Secondly, a recursion of nonduality is considered, in which connections between nonduality, dialectics and deconstruction are gestured toward. Address is also given to the relationship between complexity theory and quantum theory via holonomy and David Bohm's explicate and implicate orders.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> For a scholarly critique on Wilber's regard for David Bohm's ideas (and thence for Jenny Wade's), see Falk (2007).

## Nanotextology (A Recursion of Content)

Many authors within both integral and postmodern discourse attest to the need to substantively regard languaging. Consider the following, for instance.

A critical poetics transcending both the empire of reason and the asylum of un-reason has become an urgent concern... (Kearney, 1998, p. 9).

No matter how seemingly insignificant, every rhetorical gesture of the text contributes to its overall meaning. How we arrange our footnotes, title our paper, describe our problem, establish the legitimacy of our topic through literature reviews, and use the gestures of quantitative method in presenting our results—all contribute to the overall sense of the text (Agger, 1991, p. 115).

And following Whitehead's call for the production of a diversity of metaphysical schemes, Arran Gare (2002) advocates for

the development of new abstractions that will allow us to understand the immanent dynamics, intrinsic significance, and the diversity of processes participating in the creative becoming of the world, including ourselves. This is the condition not only for an effective opposition to the destructive imperatives of modernity. It is the condition for overcoming it (p. 50).

Throughout his seminal work, *The Ever Present Origin*, integral theorist Jean Gebser (1949/1985) also refers to the impossibility of fully realising the integral structure of consciousness unless there is a close scrutiny of current concepts, attitudes and modes of thinking—languaging emanating from the mental (modern) structure. From such considerations as these, we can readily ascertain that in order to embody integral understanding, we need to be linguistically-aware. The formal semantic characterisations of the concepts, *style* and *content*, can evolve into a postformal conceptualisation which might not only view them as a dialectically interpenetrating pair, but also as in reference to different recursive *scales* of substantive “content transmission.” The alteration of “content chunks” *might* be the major communication conveyor—or “fundamental tone”—but the alteration of format, syntax and terminology can act as writing's metaphorical *non-verbal communication*; and frequently, the “timbre” of such subtext may be such that the fundamental semantic message is substantively changed.<sup>78</sup> (For instance, the hidden curriculum “timbre” of an education system might unwittingly *dominate* its purported “fundamental” mission, as per Gatto, 1992). And if, like Blake (1803/1960), one is able “to see a world in a grain of sand,” then one might be able to see an entire integral theory in just one word. Perhaps an integral micropsychology, an integral micropolitics; a linguistic recursion of integrality.

Wilber's thinking can be arguably seen to be primarily conveyed by means of a high-order manipulation of “chunks” of “content.”<sup>79</sup> Plausibly the most *stylistically* complex he gets is when he expresses “non-dual realisation,” notably his use of spiritual paradox—when he intones, for

<sup>78</sup> See footnote 52 regarding the metaphor of harmonics.

<sup>79</sup> Content, as conventionally understood, can be seen as “chunks” whose *interiors*—e.g., semantics—remain (apparently) undisturbed, unaltered.

example: “Aware of color, you are colorless. Aware of time, you are timeless. Aware of form, you are formless.” The conscious employment of postformal paradox is also evident in Gebser’s writing—such as that between clarity and complexity (a *clarity~complexity*<sup>80</sup> dialectic<sup>81</sup>), as follows:

Even where the measurements of contemporary methodologies are based primarily on quantitative criteria, they are all vitiated by the problem of the antithesis between "measure" and mass... Our method is not just a “measured” assessment, but above and beyond this an attempt at "diaphany" or rendering transparent (1949/1985, p. 7).

The content involves an explanation concerning the need for transparency, for clarity. Yet the linguistic style is unorthodox in (at least) three ways: firstly, through the use of quotation-marked “measure”/“measured,” secondly, through reference to a dialectic between it and “mass,” and, thirdly, through use of the neologism, “diaphany.” A take on this apparent paradox is that it remains unresolvable within a mental-perspectival structure but becomes transparent, congruent, within an integral-aperspectival one. The quest or calling for those who seek to move beyond the conventional structure is surely to be able to use such textual *startlement* as a wake-up call rather than as a frustration. More is then said, however, concerning such transparency:

Our concern is with a new reality—a reality functioning and effectual integrally, in which intensity and action, the effective and the effect co-exist; one where origin, by virtue of "presentation," blossoms forth anew; and one in which the present is all-encompassing and entire. Integral reality is the world’s transparency, a perceiving of the world as truth: a mutually perceiving and imparting of truth of the world and of [us] and of all that transluces both (p. 7).

This “explanation” does not appear, however, to be an explanation from the point of view of the mental-perspectival structure of consciousness—a “rational” mindset. It is rather, to my reading, an explanation from an integral-aperspectival one. We might wish to pause here and ponder on the etymology of *explanation*. It means, “to flatten out”—as in the *flattening out* of a three-dimensional object to a two-dimensional drawing. Not only is such an “explanation” a reduction from three dimensions to two, but it is a two dimensional *explanation*, a privileging of a “plan” or top-down view, in contrast to the different rendering offered by a side view, an “elevation” perspective. Questions arise: Is such a top-down view aligned with the false transcendence of a disembodied Cartesian thinker? and: What relationship might there be between a depth-revealing elevation and an integral-aperspectival structure of consciousness? A solution might seem to involve a resonance with Gebser’s use of a sphere as metaphor for integral consciousness. In particular, we should note his neologism, *presentation*, and the unconventional syntax of the verbal configuration regarding *translucent*. The former is suggestive of “making something (fully) *present*” (rather than: absent; partially present; in the past or future; only *apparently* present...). It is also suggestive of *presence*, and *presencing*—a concept which is foregrounded and theoretically extended by Otto Scharmer (2000, 2005). The latter also aligns with the privileging of verbs over nouns (relative to “conventional” discourse)

<sup>80</sup> The symbol “~” seems suitably suggestive of the interpenetrative qualities of complex dialectics.

<sup>81</sup> Clarity and complexity are, of course, not antonyms, yet a fruitful dialectic can be identified between them in this context. This is an indication that dialectics, like most other valuable operations, is an art.

found in both poststructuralist and process (e.g., Whiteheadian) philosophies. Further elevated explanation, depth or diaphany concerning the complex clarity of integrality is perhaps offered when Gebser (1949/1985) states,

Whenever the linguistic structure is freed from the perspectival fixity without reverting to linguistic chaos, initial aperspectival, no-longer-rational but arational manifestations are visible. Where the stylistic inversion of rational syntax transforms the sentence...The achronon shines forth and its sustaining-in-truth presupposes that the rational is not just negated but overdetermined, whereby it necessarily foregoes its claim to exclusivity... The mental is reduced to its proper sphere of the conceptual, visible, palpable, and demonstrable, and can no longer function obtrusively, but must open the path, the leap towards verition... (pp. 503-504).

Here, neologisms include: *aperspectivality*, *overdetermination*, *achronon*, and *verition*. The rational can only go so far and should not be *overused* but rather be *appropriately* used as part of communication at an integral level. It could be said that his neologism, *verition*, is a vertiginous turn on the conventional, mental structure's *verity*—"being in accordance with reality." One could further "note" that *accordance*—from *accordare*—literally means "being of one *heart*" (noting two semantic harmonics of *being*) whilst an aphasis of such *accord* is a musical "chord." "Verition" might suggest we should not (merely) quest "truth," but rather, *a heartfelt accord of truth*. Habits of our heart, harmonics of our text, de-/re-constructed. Gebser's words are beautiful but, to many, they are also dense and difficult. Yet, as Agger (1991) says of Derrida: "[he] would defend his own density by arguing that difficulty educates. He would also say that simplicity brings false clarity" (p. 114). Such are the dialectics of clarity. It would appear Gebser might very well agree with him.

Another unorthodox languaging is that offered by integral-global philosopher, Ashok Gangadean (2002, 2006b). He distinguishes between two orders or "technologies" of perceiving, thinking, speaking, being: firstly, an egocentric one, and, secondly, an integral-holistic-dialogic one, and differentiates between these through novel typographical syntax. Namely, he uses "/.../" for egocentric languaging—as in /mind/—and "((...))" for dialogic-global-integral languaging—as in ((mind)). In this way, these textual marks can be used as a micro-integral transformative practice, a startling ((wake-up call)) to partake of an integral spirituality which can be identified in the ((logic)) of each ((word)). Moreover, Gangadean's work explicitly connects integrality with urgent global concerns and spirituality, thus congruently aligning with worldcentric perspectives.

There is no doubt a plethora of postformal-postconventional-postmodern-integral languaging options. But to generalise, one might say that we need tools for our Wilberian left hand quadrants as well-crafted and powerful as those currently in operation—and those being exponentially developed—for our Wilberian right hand quadrants. We urgently need the linguistic equivalent of nanotechnology: we need an integral nanotextology. An example of its use might be demonstrated through postformally exploring the semantic ecology among deconstruction, dialectics and nonduality.

## Holonomic Nonduality (A Dialectical Recursion)

In AQAL topology (for example, Wilber, 1979/2001, pp. 126-144), nonduality occurs at the final stage of (individual) development. Wilber arrives at this understanding through addressing nondual spiritual traditions, notably Zen and Dzogchen.<sup>82</sup> When he writes about the nondual, he tends to do so as the blossoming poetic culmination of much theoretic prose. This format thus mirrors somewhat the model of spiritual development he explicitly discusses. In this release from Wilber's dominant style, the realisation he expresses is in paradoxical reference to the many developmental waves he otherwise discusses—namely, “there's only one wave, and it's everywhere” (1979/2001, p. 142). Further wisdom flows: “It is always already undone, you see, and always already over” (p. 345), and, apparently aligning somewhat to Eckhart Tolle's (2001) *The Power of Now*: “There never was, nor will there ever be, any time other than Now. What appeared as that primal moving *away* from Now was really an original movement *of* Now” (Wilber, 2001b, p. 143). In this context, he is also aware of the limitations of formal theory: “Galaxies rush through your veins while the stars light up the neurons of your night and never again will you search for a mere theory of that which is actually your own Original face” (Wilber, 2000c, p. 141).

This part of his writing has a substantially different quality to the rest of his theoretic writing, which generally has a less poetic, less paradoxical, more technical (and sometimes “polemic”) character. As such, his text displays something of a duality. And, although such a comment might appear to be insubstantive in that it refers to style rather than content, such a perspective, as we have seen, is not necessarily a postformal one. Moreover, a proposition I will be exploring below is that the theoretic conceptualisations concerning all stages prior to Wilber's nondual are themselves generally embedded in a dualistic (Cartesian) template. Pertinently, I will explore the metaphoric value of this duality in positing that although Wilber addresses nonduality, his mode of theorising does not honour the potential contribution of nonduality. Moreover, I contend that this is because he has not fully actualised the import of postmodernism's complexity theory—notably the component of recursion, fractality, holonomy.

But first, let's turn to another type of discourse in which nonduality can be found: poststructuralist discourse. One could argue that Derrida's address of the nondual binary of identity and the Other, for example, is central to *déconstruction*. The logistic structure of dialectics, also, can be seen as being based on a type of nondual premise. Wilberian theory sharply differentiates between final stage nonduality (individual enlightenment) and these other types of nonduality, which are mapped as forming part of the Wilberian Green vMeme—relativistic postmodernism. But is such an absolute differentiation justified?

One of the developmental psychologists Wilber has called upon to support his theory is Jenny Wade. But Wade's (1996) theoretic understanding of nonduality is significantly different from Wilber's. Referring to the holonomic paradigm of explicate and implicate orders—a central contribution of David Bohm to quantum theory—she states,

The holonomic paradigm posits the existence of (at least) two dimensions of the same reality in a nondual whole—the material manifestation of energy as the explicate order, which is enfolded in, and emanates from, an implicate transparent order of pure energy,

---

<sup>82</sup> A cautionary note, though, is given by Roy (2006b) when she concludes: “Wilber's AQAL model does not contradict Dzogchen thought per se; but...Dzogchen cannot be fitted into its framework” (p. 119).

which is infinite and absolute. ... Their conjunction is like the two “sides” of a Moebius ring... (p. 201).

From this understanding, nonduality might not only be “found” at the final stage of individual development, but could permeate the whole integral model. And it would do so via a holonomic paradigm (*holonomic* signifying the generic conceptual template from which *hologram* is linguistically constructed). Holonomy can be seen to be in familial relationship with a non-Euclidean geometric principle found in complexity theory—namely, recursion: the production of fractals. In this way, a type of nonduality could be theorized at any developmental level of integral theory, including postmodernism. This would open a way to exploring, among other things, the theoretic relationship between Derrida’s *déconstruction* and the spiritual *déconstruction* of the ego. Such a theoretic venture would resonate with the seminal work on postmodern spirituality by integral philosopher, Roland Benedikter (2005), in which the spirituality of poststructuralists—notably, Derrida, Deleuze, Feyerabend, Foucault, and Lyotard is identified, explored and valorised.

Wade also elicits transpersonal researcher, Stanislav Grof (1985), as applying “holonomic metaphysics to developmental theory, beginning with a criticism of Wilber’s emphasis on linearity”—quoting Grof as saying,

As much as I agree with [Wilber] in principle, the absoluteness of his statements seems to me too extreme. The psyche has a multidimensional, holographic nature, and using a linear model to describe it will produce distortions and inaccuracies. ...

My own observations suggest that, as consciousness evolution proceeds [from Authentic to Transcendent consciousness] and beyond, it does not follow a linear trajectory, but in a sense enfolds into itself (Grof, 1985, p. 137, cited in Wade, 1996, pp. 201-202).

Grof seems to making two points here, both concerning holonomy. The first concerns “the absoluteness of... statements.”<sup>83</sup> The second concerns the nature of consciousness evolution *from and beyond Authentic consciousness*.<sup>84</sup> The latter understanding—that Authentic and post-Authentic consciousness enfolds into itself—would specifically problematise Wilber’s theorizing of levels specifically *for Green and beyond*, whilst the former understanding—concerning the nature of statements—regards the linguistic fabric of theorizing: Wilber’s *type* of theorizing.

The relevance of an integral nanotextology can be identified here. Specifically, whilst from a formal perspective the issue of “theorizing type” may be regarded as being “merely style” and thus insubstantive, such simplicity is (most plausibly) untenable from a postformal perspective. Postformally speaking, the type of linguistic constructs employed—the particular qualities in statement construction—form part of the substantive “content.” Much poststructuralist discourse implicates the importance of such considerations; through the neologism *nanotextology*, I am attempting to bridge such consideration—formally seen as “style”—with more macro-considerations—formally seen as “content”—via the developmental understanding that postformally, *style* and *content* are holonomically related and therefore both substantive—as,

<sup>83</sup> And I note here that Grof appears to be implying that *all* of Wilber’s statements are too extreme, thus falling into something of an absolutist text.

<sup>84</sup> Constituents of Wade’s (1996) Authentic stage include identification of the Other, the desire for personal growth, postformal operations, empathy, and respect for diversity (p. 169, Table 9)—features regarded elsewhere as postmodern or Green. See, for instance, Beck & Cowan (1996, p. 260-273).

shall we say, *postformal content*. Such a statement, however, is not necessarily to relativistically give such micro and macro postformal content modes equal address, but rather posit that there can be a theoretic framing regarding their connection (or communion) *and* their difference (or agency). Using nanotextology in this instance, the framing of concepts or statements as *absolute* could possibly be seen as a type of Blue vMeme (conformist, technician or mythic) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of *conceptual fundamentalism* or conceptual *technology*) or as a type of Orange (formal) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of conceptual *definition*), in contrast to, say a post-Orange (postformal) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of conceptual *ecology*).

From this postformal theorizing perspective, other features of Wilber's theorising could be problematised. An example would be his framing of the "Pre/Trans Fallacy" (Wilber, 1980) which *sharply* distinguishes between the pre-formal and the post-formal. Here, the imperative to distinguish sharply and non-paradoxically can be seen as a pre-postformal manoeuvre. In contrast, from a subtler, postformal perspective, Stanislav Grof comments, "the distinction between pre- and trans- has a paradoxical nature; they are neither identical, nor are they completely different from each other" (1985, p. 137, cited in Wade, 1996, p. 202). Here, both conceptual agency (or difference) *and* conceptual communion (or mutual identity) are foregrounded.

A framing that Wade uses in relation to either/or (pre-postformal) thinking is constituted by the metaphor of Newtonian physics: "Regression and transcendence are neither opposite nor the same, though they may appear to be in a Newtonian conceptualisation—and it may be useful to speak of them in those terms there" (p. 202). Elaborating on this, a developmental hierarchy of conceptual templates based on developments in physics can be imagined: using Einstein's theory of relativity and then quantum mechanics as metaphorical templates for types of conceptualisation. Developmental psychologist Jan Sinnott (1998) has made such a move—at least in relation to Einstein. She compares his theory to postformal *relativistic* thought. Although Piagetian commentator Helena Marchand (2001) critiques Sinnott's use of metaphor, I would contend that such a judgment emanates from a *formal* mindset which does not appreciate the theoretical significance of metaphor—such appreciation can be seen as coming from postformal understanding. The theoretical significance of metaphor is indicated, for example, by Alfred North Whitehead—a philosopher whose work sits at the very core of AQAL's evolutionary theory (Hargens, 2001; Roy, 2006b, p. 123; Wilber, 1995, pp. 42, 49, 78).<sup>85</sup> Arran Gare (2002) valorises Whitehead's recognition of the primary role that metaphors play "in thought, language, philosophy, and science" (p. 48). The postformal understanding of the role metaphor plays in languaging, including that of theory, is substantively explored in the seminal work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003; 1999). Their research, which has substantive implications for the sublation of formal thinking, convincingly demonstrates that, "the traditional view of metaphor is empirically false" (1999, p. 118) in that, "metaphorical thought is what makes abstract scientific theorizing possible" (p. 128). From a postformal perspective, metaphor is not mere linguistic ornamentation, but rather, is (varyingly) implicit in the very fabric of all communication.

Given this, an apt metaphor for dialectical thinking might well be quantum theory<sup>86</sup>—connoting an integrative-but-fluxing dialectic between wave and particle. But the window of possibilities here can be seen to extend beyond such physiospherical metaphors to biospherical

<sup>85</sup> I am referring to Eros / Creativity as the universal "drive to integration" (or transcendence) here, and to holon theory. Gertrude Blanck and Rubin Blanck also make a central theoretical contribution.

<sup>86</sup> Sinnott (1998) *does* refer to quantum theory but does not make the particular distinction I am making here.

ones. Much fruitful research in this direction could seed new vital(ising) ideas, “living” concepts, “organic” templates.<sup>87</sup> Jenny Wade can be seen to refer to such a postformal conceptual template in her discussion regarding the theorising of relationships between regression and transcendence or between the preformal and the postformal via a holonomic paradigm:

The regression/non-regression argument is resolved because it is placed in the context of epistemology outside historical time. This creates a heterarchical conceptualisation of development employing both linear and nonlinear paradigms that *alters the structure of developmental theories that purport to address these levels* (Wade, 1996, p. 202, emphasis in original).

Such a template based on complexity rather than duality could have incisive repercussions for AQAL. Consider, for example, the following constitutional AQAL point of departure:

If the Kosmos is not holistic, not integral, not holonic—if it is a fragmented and jumbled affair, with no common context or linkings or joinings or communions—then fine, the world is a jumbled mess the various specialities take it to be. But if the world is holistic and holonic, then why do not more people see this? And why do many academic specialities actively deny it? If the world is whole, why do so many people see it as broken? And why, in a sense, *is* the world broken, fragmented, alienated, divided? (Wilber, 2000c, p.41).

Here, Wilber constructs two opposing camps: (a) the camp of fragments, jumble, mess, breakage, alienation, division; and (b) the camp of holism, integrality, holons, linkages, joinings, communions, wholeness. This construction is dualistic: no interpenetration between the two camps is allowed for. But why does it necessarily have to be either/or? A complex-aware theoretic template could embrace *both* camps. Through this, the world could be identified as: whole *and* jumbled, holonic *and* entangled, broken *and* linked—in varying ways. Differentiation could then be identified between contexts where Wilber’s general argument is valid and those contexts where it is not. For example, whilst a panoramic perspective might display the suitability of various AQAL orienting generalisations, a local (detailed) perspective—with its specific requirements—might even display *the very inversion* of these same generalisations. As an apt metaphor, consider the following. A traditional dance whose *general* advancement forward is constituted by the specific (“local” / detailed) algorithmic routine of *one step back, two steps forward*, is substantively constituted by both advancement and retreat—though at different recursive scales. From a macro (AQAL-like) perspective, the *one step back* phenomenon would appear as a messy datum interfering with the theoretic elegance of

---

<sup>87</sup> Perhaps inspiring and/or apt metaphors regarding the potential significance of possible alteration of conceptual templates might include (a) Edgar Morin’s (1999/n.d.) principle regarding, “the mole that digs underground and transforms the substratum before anything is changed on the surface”; (b) Sohail Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis where the myth / metaphor layer is seen to underpin the worldview layer which in turn underpins policy and litany layers respectively; (Sohail Inayatullah, 2000, 2004); and (c) the following: Imagine a vector applied near the circumference (“surface”) of a wheel; imagine an equivalent vector applied near the centre (“core”) of the wheel; even though each vector is similar to effect, the one applied nearer the centre of the wheel will effect a greater rotation of the wheel than the one applied nearer the circumference.

advancing forward; perhaps something even to be eliminated. Conversely, the substantive interest of a dance teacher with a dance student whom was only *stepping forwards*—failing to take a step back each time—would be to focus (perhaps repeatedly) on the instruction to *go backwards*. If this was a common problem, perhaps an academic might then assist in the matter through conducting a detailed investigation into the failure to go backwards among dance students. The whole context here would be the goodness inherent in going backwards, and the inappropriateness of moving forwards. In other contexts, however, Wilber’s thrust of argument would be highly pertinent. The issue is one of context and of recursive scale. An integral theory explicitly based on a complexity template could adequately accommodate such differentiation; an integral theory based on a non-complex or non-dialectical complex template could not so readily. Moreover, even where Wilber’s general argument is appropriate—as in the indication above that academia could benefit from less specialisation and more transdisciplinarity—complex cross-currents can be identified. Wilber frequently derides Cultural Studies, for example, yet this young academic field has partly arisen via a similar evaluation to the one Wilber makes himself, namely, insufficient connectivity. Cultural Studies is transdisciplinary. And Integral Studies is transdisciplinary. Both are appearing to attempt to counter “traditional” academia’s tendency toward specialisation. There is no need for antipathy here.

To summarise: Through embracing a complex-aware template,<sup>88</sup> specific AQAL features can be problematised or deconstructed, constructively leading the way to higher orders of integration. Wilber’s (1980) Pre/Trans Fallacy, for example, can itself be seen as a (partial) fallacy in the way it is currently conceptualised. The implications of such postmodern theorising for integral theory in general and Wilberian theory in particular are wide-reaching. As Wade (1996) indicates: “The linearity inherent in evolutionary models is a contextual convenience” (p. 200).<sup>89</sup> Such an understanding might lead one to conclude that there is “no way out” from this poststructuralist statement to integral evolutionary theory. One might instead recognise, however, that the way to an integral evolutionary theory that moves beyond dualistic modes of theorising is through embracing the postformal modes of cognition found in postmodernism. In short, the way out is through.

---

<sup>88</sup> The interpretive stances constituted by such a template would most probably be in contrasted reference to the modern worldview which has extended and/or over-extended (a) the cosmological estrangement heralded by Copernicus and concretised by Newton, (b) the ontological estrangement initiated by Descartes, and (c) the epistemological estrangement instigated by Kant (see Tarnas, 1991, p. 416-422). Abstract theoretic mantras such as the yinyang-DNA-Ouroboros template elucidated by Clifford Matthews (2002, p. 220-226) could also be generative here.

<sup>89</sup> Such a statement concerning the inadequacy of linear models of development *as a whole* could be seen to be aligned to Grof’s comment above regarding the inapplicability of linear modelling *beyond* the Authentic stage if one considers that both can be true from the perspective, say, of different quadrants—where Wade’s comment can be seen as a postformal left-hand quadrant understanding, and Grof’s as a postformal right-hand quadrant understanding—or perhaps of different levels, where Grof’s statement arises from a conventional level and Wade’s from a postconventional one. Another conversational opening, no doubt.

## Conclusion—Ends-in-View

*The soul sings of the glory of God inasmuch as it follows its own folds,  
but without succeeding in entirely developing them, since 'this communication'  
stretches out indefinitely (Deleuze, 1988/2006, p. 3).*

An integral re-viewing of the developmental wave of postmodernism can highlight the current undervaluation of thinking postformally. Postformal cognition can be enacted in relation to a variety of concerns and interests including integral theory itself. Integral theory thus contains the means to develop itself—a participatory autopoiesis. In this way, the manifold contributions that Wilber has offered to integral theory and its panoramic horizons can be enhanced and reconfigured. The AQAL model maps contextualism, dialectics, and complexity as postformal features. Integral theory could more reflexively enact such ways of reasoning. By more consciously participating in the ecology of postformal modalities—including thinking contextually, thinking dialectically, thinking critically and thinking complexly—AQAL could be reconfigured, and its metasystematic or paradigmatic *geist* could be appropriately furthered in service of the dialogic evolution of integral theory. This article has demonstrated a few uses of such postformal cognitive modes. Regard for all dimensions of embodiment and the metaphoric nature of theorising also need to be duly considered, whilst shadow-work can be fruitfully brought into the fabric of integral theory via the dialectics of deconstruction. Below is a concluding elucidation and possible futuring of these ideas—ends-in-view.

### Identification of Problems

In attempting to transcend postmodernism, Wilberian integral theory appears not to sufficiently include its contributions. AQAL's current theoretic status of the Green vMeme and its relationship to post-Green conceptualisations is substantively problematic. It would appear this has led to the memetic propagation of myths concerning integrality. The following points can be made.

1. From a vMemetic theoretic perspective, the Green vMeme (postmodernism and postformal thinking) is accepted most strongly by the subsequent Yellow (Teal / integral) vMeme and is rejected most strongly by the Orange vMeme (including modernism and formal thinking), and is also substantively rejected by the Blue vMeme (absolutist thinking). The *mean green meme* can most adequately be identified developmentally as an Orange vMeme perspective. Blue vMeme attitudes can also be associated with the *mean green meme* meme.
2. Gebser does not posit a structure of consciousness between the current *mental-perspectival* one and the emerging *integral-aperspectival* one; he does not identify a deconstructive postmodernism. He cannot therefore be legitimately used in service of AQAL theory in this regard.
3. Uncontextualised association between relativism, deconstruction and Derrida is constituted by substantive mythic elements. Derrida and *déconstruction* can be legitimately identified as operating from an advanced developmental level. Derrida's potential contribution to integral theory needs to be digested. The developmental maturity

and spirituality of postmodern philosophers such as Deleuze, Derrida and Lyotard need to be adequately addressed by integral theory.

4. There is an anomaly in current integral theorising regarding, on the one hand, the strength of the Green vMeme in the U.S.A. in relation to Europe, and on the other, the strength of the pathology of the Green vMeme in the U.S.A in relation to Europe. This might be evidence of a more endemic theoretic problem. Nation-cultures need to be more adequately addressed.

## Summary of Re-view

Integral theory itself can be used to address these points, thus effecting an autopoiesis. Specifically, the way to a respectful and internally consistent integral approach can be seen as being *through* the myriad features postmodernism offers, not in substantive antipathy to it. Re-viewing postmodernism from an integral perspective can enhance the adequacy of AQAL, leading to an integral theory which is more internally consistent and respectful.

Whilst appropriately including many and various contexts and dimensions with regard to formal reasoning, postformal reasoning includes substantively different types of cognition to formal thought, including—thinking complexly, contextually, creatively, critically, dialectically, dialogically, ecologically, “embodiedly,” linguistically and reflexively. The reflexive enactment of such modalities may consequently alter the conceptual template—the very fabric—upon which integral theory is based.

## A Forward View

The primary intent in this article has been to open up particular conversations to further facilitate the appropriate evolution of integral theory. As such, the following could variously act as a guiding framework for further research.

## Toward an Explicitly Linguistically-Aware Integral Theory

A central feature of the postmodern developmental wave regards the significance of languaging. Integral theory should take this contribution to heart, deepening its enactment. Notably, reflexive embrace could be given to the following understandings concerning the languaging of theoretic narrative:

- a. Its constructed qualities.
  - i. Research could be undertaken, for example, with regard to possible relationships between the poststructuralist “linguistic turn,” constructivism, and Cook-Greuter’s “construct-awareness.”
  - ii. Developmental constructs and theoretic topologies could themselves be addressed through differentiating between the linguistic signifiers (such as “developmental *wave*”) and the underlying topology or theoretic signifieds with which they are associated (for example, linear or non-complex topology).
- b. Its metaphorical qualities.
  - i. Research could be undertaken regarding the relationship of integral theory to Lakoff and Johnson’s work on conceptual metaphor and embodied philosophy.

- c. Its complex dialectical qualities.
  - i. Research could be undertaken concerning the operation of complex dialectics at the micro-scale of concepts—“integral nanotextology.”
- d. Its poetic qualities.
  - i. Further investigation could be undertaken with regard to the relevance of Gebser’s poetic density of languaging for integral theory.
  - ii. Further exploration of the relevance of Gangadean’s novel typological syntax to integral theory might assist in the evolution of integral theory.

Theoretic narrative can be deepened through its participants (co-creating users, including you and me!) becoming more linguistically-aware—as demonstrated or gestured by the deepening of vision-logic offered in this article.

### **Toward an Explicitly Ecological (Dialogic-Critical-Contextual) Integral Theory**

Further research could be conducted in relation to the following various dimensioning contexts of ecological thinking:

- a. Critical contexts<sup>90</sup> (contexts of compassionate imperatives), including
  - i. Biospherical ecological contexts—at different scales of recursion, especially planetary.
  - ii. Social justice contexts—at different scales of recursion. For example, the criticality of integral theorising could be addressed in relation to such power imbalances as those involving the over-extensions of Western, American, Orange vMeme, Anglophone or other hegemonic domains.
  - iii. Other ethical, spiritual and futures contexts.
- b. Conceptual ecological contexts
  - i. Time—genealogies.
  - ii. Space—geographies. Chinese integrals, Indian integrals, Spanish integrals, and so forth, could be identified as different *types* of integral, stemming from alternate genealogical threads.
  - iii. Conceptual space—regarding both the conceptual ecologies in which *integral* may be appropriately identified (such as amongst *holism*, *integration*, *transformation*, *spirituality*, *planetary consciousness*, etc.), and the (more local) ecology of interpretive uses of *integral* itself (as demonstrated in this article).
- c. Social ecological contexts—community-in-dialogue
  - i. Voice-in-community—As part of acknowledging the potential role of my voice in this article in relation to the integral community, I have attempted to indicate certain openings to conversation and community dialogue. Further research here thus lies, in the next instance, beyond me.
  - ii. Community-in-voice—I also acknowledge the community already *in* my voice, so to speak. I have multiple subjectivities; no-one can logically speak from a position of absolute authority. Consequently, I have attempted to allow a range of languaging here whilst variously maintaining a certain tentativity of tenor. There will necessarily be flaws in this text, so a space has hopefully been left in the

---

<sup>90</sup> See also Anderson (2006).

fabric of my text for the involvement of the Other (such as that *you* might variously identify).<sup>91</sup>

As part of deepening critical awareness regarding integral theory, further research could be undertaken regarding a more comprehensive evaluation of the current situation than was within the scope of this article to conduct.

### **Toward an Explicitly Dialectical Integral Theory**

Notions of *construction* and *deconstruction* as necessary adversaries can appropriately be seen to stem from an either/or mindset. Thinking dialectically, their relationship can fruitfully be rather understood as complexly interpenetrating. Deconstructive and reconstructive postmodernisms share one genealogy which itself has a dialectical underpinning. Hence contra-possibilities can be identified: that discourse under the mantle of deconstruction can be constructive and/or appropriate, whilst discourse under the guise of reconstruction can be destructive and/or inappropriate. Derrida's work should not be regarded as antipathetic to an integral approach. There is evidence regarding the maturity of Derrida's discourse; there is also evidence regarding a dissonance between the theoretic content of Wilberian theory and perspectives given toward that content by Wilber. Further research could be undertaken in these regards. Resultant conceptual bridges could further mutual understanding; and a greater, more cohesive (or paradoxically more stable) integral theory could result.

Paradoxical thinking is associated with dialectical thinking. For instance, other parts of my life<sup>92</sup> are not directly congruent with the sensibility expressed in this article. I sit with the paradox contained within the ecology of these different "lines."

### **Toward an Explicitly Complex-Aware Integral Theory**

I have demonstrated a particular use of the complexity theory element, *recursion*—with respect to both *content* and nonduality in integral theory. Further research could be undertaken with regard to other elements of complexity theory such as emergence, bifurcation, hysteresis, sensitivity to initial conditions, indeterminacy, attractors, and dynamism.

Both differences and similarities could be identified between different fractal scales of construction, such as the construction of theories and the construction of terms; both differences and similarities can be identified between different fractal scales of *deconstruction*, such as Derridean *déconstruction* and the deconstruction of the ego.

A conceptual template based in part on complexity theory could facilitate an internally-congruent evolution of integral theory. Further research could explore, for example, in what appropriate ways *pre-* and *trans-* could be identified as distinct yet complexly interpenetrating.

---

<sup>91</sup> As Edgar Morin (1999, n.d.) wisely points out: "The adventure remains unknown." One could add: each word is a venture.

<sup>92</sup> For instance, whilst I have been beavering away at this article, my body has suffered from insufficient exercise!

## Toward an Explicitly, Dynamically Creative Integral Theory

AQAL places the concept of creativity as a core generic driver (“healthy” transcendence as characterised as Eros) in holonic development-evolution. Numerous theoretic perspectives on creativity could be given. One such perspective is that offered by Arthur’s Koestler’s (1970) triad of the Sage, the Artist and the Jester.

- a. The Sage
  - i. Research could be undertaken to facilitate a reflexively wise and compassionate integral theory.
- b. The Artist
  - i. Research into the *art* of integral might investigate the artfulness involved in all dimensions of participation.
  - ii. Research could explore bringing more beauty into the good and true.
- c. The Jester
  - i. Ludic research could explore the transition from *boomeritis* to *bloomeritis*!

As Wilber (2000a, p. 3) says, “choose your big pictures with care.”

## Acknowledgement

*I am indebted to my mentor and fellow postformal researcher, Jenny Gidley. Our ongoing, passionate dialogues are co-inspiring, our ideas frequently co-arising.*

## References

- Adorno, T. W. (1990). *Negative dialectics*. London: Routledge.
- Agger, B. (1991). Critical theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism: Their sociological relevance. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 17, 105-131.
- Agger, B. (1996). *Postponing the postmodern*. Retrieved 25 May, 2007, from <http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/agger1.htm>
- Albareda, R. V. & Romero, M. T. (n.d.). *Estel Center of Personal Growth and School of Integral Studies*. Retrieved 24 May 2007, from <http://www.estel.es/eng/estel.htm>
- Anderson, D. G. (2006). Of syntheses and surprises: Toward a critical integral theory. *Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Journal For New Thought, Research, and Praxis* (3), 62-81.
- Arlin, P. (1975a). Cognitive development in adulthood: A fifth stage? *Developmental Psychology*, 11(5), 602-606.
- Arlin, P. (1975b). Piagetian operations in problem finding. *Developmental Psychology*, 13(3), 297-298.
- Arlin, P. (1976). Toward a metatheoretical model of cognitive development. *International Journal of Aging & Human Development*, 7(3), 247-253.
- Assagioli, R. (2000) *Psychosynthesis: A collection of basic writings*. Amherst, MA, US: Synthesis Center. (Work originally published 1965)
- Aurobindo, S. (1960). *The life divine*. Auroville, India: Sri Aurobindo Ashram. (Original work published 1914)

- Benedikter, R. (2005). Postmodern spirituality: A dialogue in five parts. Retrieved 14 February 2007, from <http://www.integralworld.net/index.html?benedikter1.html>
- Basseches, M. (1980). Dialectical schemata: A framework for the empirical study of the development of dialectical thinking. *Human Development*, 23(6), 400-421.
- Basseches, M. (1984a). *Dialectical thinking and adult development*. Norwood, NJ, US: Ablex.
- Basseches, M. (1984b). Dialectical thinking as a metasytematic form of cognitive organization. In M. L. Commons & F. A. Richards (Eds.), *Beyond formal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development* (pp. 216-238). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Basseches, M. (1986). Comments on social cognition in adulthood: A dialectical perspective. *Educational Gerontology*, 12(4), 327-334.
- Basseches, M. (2005). The development of dialectical thinking as an approach to integration. *Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Journal For New Thought, Research, and Praxis* (1), 47-63.
- Beck, D. E. & Cowan, C. C. (1996). *Spiral dynamics: mastering values, leadership, and change*. Malden, MA, US; Oxford; Melbourne, Vic, Australia: Blackwell.
- Benack, S., Basseches, M., & Swan, T. (1989). Dialectical thinking and adult creativity. In J. A. R. Glover, R. Royce, C. R. Reynolds (Eds.), *Handbook of creativity* (pp. 199-208). New York: Plenum.
- Benack, S., & Basseches, M. A. (1989). Dialectical thinking and relativistic epistemology: Their relation in adult development. In M. L. S. Commons, J. D. Sinnott, F. A. Richards, C. Armon (Eds.), *Adult development, Vol. 1: Comparisons and applications of developmental models* (pp. 95-111). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Benedikter, R. (2005). *Postmodern spirituality: A dialogue in five parts*. Retrieved 14 Feb 07, 2007, from <http://www.integralworld.net/index.html?benedikter1.html>
- Blake, W. (1960) "Auguries of Innocence" [poem]. In Wilbur R. (general ed., The Laurel Poetry Series) *Blake* (pp. 99-102). New York: Dell (Original work published 1803)
- Broughton, J. M. (1984). Not beyond formal operations but beyond Piaget. In M. L. Commons, F. A. Richards & A. Cheryl (Eds.), *Beyond formal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development* (pp. 395-412). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Bussey, M. (2006). Critical spirituality: Towards a revitalised humanity. *Journal of Future Studies*, 10(4), 39-44.
- California Institute of Integral Studies. (n.d.). *History and mission*. Retrieved 24 May 2007, from <http://www.ciis.edu/about/history.html>
- Caputo, J. D., & Derrida, J. (1997). *Deconstruction in a nutshell: A conversation with Jacques Derrida*. New York, NY, USA: Fordham University Press.
- Combs, A. (2005). Inner and outer realities: Gebser in a cultural/historical perspective. *The Journal of Conscious Evolution*, 1, n.pp.
- Commons, M. L., & Richards, F. A. (1984). A general model of stage theory. In M. L. Commons & F. A. Richards (Eds.), *Beyond Formal Operations: Late Adolescent and Adult Cognitive Development* (pp. 120-140). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Commons, M. L., & Richards, F. A. (2002). Organizing components into combinations: How stage transition works. *Journal of Adult Development*, 9(3), 159-177.
- Cook-Greuter, S. R. (1990). Maps for living: Ego-development stages from symbiosis to conscious universal embeddedness. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), *Adult development Volume 2: Models and methods in the study of adolescent and adult thought* (pp. 79-104). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.

- Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2000). Mature ego development: A gateway to ego transcendence? *Journal of Adult Development*, 7(4), 227-239.
- Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2002). *A detailed description of the development of nine action logics in the Leadership Development Framework: Adapted from ego development theory*. Retrieved 29 May 2007, from [www.cook-greuter.com](http://www.cook-greuter.com)
- Cook-Greuter, S. R. (2007). *Cook-Greuter & Associates*. Retrieved 29 May 2007, from <http://www.cook-greuter.com/>
- Cowan, C., & Todorovic, N. (2006). *FAQ Integral*. Retrieved 29 May 2007, from [http://www.spiraldynamics.org/faq\\_integral.htm](http://www.spiraldynamics.org/faq_integral.htm)
- Curler, J. (1982). *On deconstruction: Theory and criticism after structuralism*. Ithaca, NY, US: Cornell University Press
- Dallman, M. (2006). *On Ken Wilber: Hopelessly new age, hopeless for the humanities*. Retrieved 14 February 2007, from [http://www.matthewdallman.com/essay\\_object/on\\_wilber\\_object.html](http://www.matthewdallman.com/essay_object/on_wilber_object.html)
- Davis, B. (2004). *Inventions of teaching: A genealogy*. Mahwah, NJ, US; London: Lawrence Erlbaum
- Deleuze, G. (2006). *The fold: Leibniz and the baroque* (T. Conley, Trans.). London, New York: Continuum. (Original work published 1988)
- Demetriou, A. (1985). Structure and sequence of formal and postformal thought: General patterns and individual differences. *Child Development*, 56(4), 1062-1091.
- Derrida, J. (1985). "Letter to a Japanese friend." In D. O. Wood & R. Bernasconi (Eds.), *Derrida and différance* (pp. 1-6). Coventry, UK: Parousia. (Original work published 1983) Retrieved 14 February 2007 <http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/letter.html>
- Derrida, J. (1989). *Of Spirit: Heidegger and The Question* (G. Bennington & R. Bowlby, Trans.). University of Chicago Press (Original work published 1987)
- Derrida, J. (2001). *On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness*. London, New York: Routledge (Original work published 1997)
- Dewey, J. (2004). *Reconstruction in philosophy*. Mineola, NY, US: Dover (Original work published 1919)
- Dimitrov, V. & Hodge, B. (2002). *Social fuzziology: Study in the fuzziness of social complexity*. New York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg.
- Esalen Center. (2005). *Brief biographies: Michael Murphy*. Retrieved 24 May 2007, from <http://www.esalenctr.org/display/bio.cfm?ID=9>
- Esbjörn-Hargens, S. (2006). Integral education by design: How integral theory informs teaching, learning, and curriculum in a graduate program. *ReVision*, 28(3), 21-50.
- Falk, G. D. (2007). *Wilber and Bohm: An analysis of the problems with Ken Wilber's 'refutations' of David Bohm's ideas*. Retrieved 25 May 2007, from <http://normaneinsteinbook.com/nechapters/appendix.php>
- Ferrer, J. N., Romero, M. T., & Albareda, R. V. (2005). Integral transformative education: A participatory proposal. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 3(4), 306-330.
- Forbes, S. H. (2003). *Holistic education: An analysis of its ideas and nature*. Brandon, VT, US: Solomon
- Foucault, M. (2004). *Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975*. V. Marchetti & A. Salomoni (Eds.) (G. Burchell, Trans.) New York: Picador. (Original work published in 1999)
- Gangadean, A. (1993). *Meditative reason: Toward universal grammar*. New York: Peter Lang.

- Gangadean, A. (2002). Logos of Dao: The primal logic of translatability. *Asian Philosophy*, 12(3), 213-221.
- Gangadean, A. (2006a). The awakening of global reason: The logical and ontological foundation of integral science. *World Futures: The Journal of General Evolution*, 62(1-2), 56-74.
- Gangadean, A. (2006b). A planetary crisis of consciousness: The end of ego-based cultures and our dimensional shift toward a sustainable global civilization. *World Futures: The Journal of General Evolution*, 62(6), 441-454.
- Gangadean, A. (2007). *Introduction to ((deep dialogue))*. Retrieved 24 May, 2007, from <http://www.awakeningmind.org/>
- Gare, A. (2002). The roots of postmodernism: Schelling, process philosophy and poststructuralism. In C. Keller (Ed.), *Process and difference: Between cosmological and poststructuralist postmodernisms* (pp. 31-53). Albany: State of New York University Press.
- Gatto, J. T. (1992). *Dumbing us down: The hidden curriculum of compulsory schooling*. Philadelphia; Gabriola Island, BC, Canada: New Society.
- Gebser, J. (1985). *The Ever-Present Origin*. Athens, US: Ohio University Press. (Original work published 1949)
- Gidley, J. (2001, June). *The dancer at the edge of knowledge: Imagination as a transdisciplinary force*. Paper presented at the Second International Philosophy, Science and Theology Festival, Grafton, NSW, Australia.
- Gidley, J. (2006). Spiritual epistemologies and integral cosmologies: Transforming thinking and culture. In S. Awbrey, D. Dana, V. Miller, P. Robinson, M. M. Ryan & D. K. Scott (Eds.), *Integrative learning and action: A call to wholeness* (pp. 29-53). New York: Peter Lang.
- Gidley, J. (in press). Educational Imperatives of the evolution of consciousness: The integral visions of Rudolf Steiner and Ken Wilber. *International Journal of Children's Spirituality*.
- Gidley, J. & Hampson, G. (2005, October 19). *Integral education - An integrative perspective: Divining for the 'leading edge' of knowledge*. Paper presented at the Community for Integrative Learning and Action, Amherst, MA, US.
- Green Party of the U.S. (2000). *Ten key values of the Green Party*. Retrieved 27 May, 2007, from <http://www.gp.org/tenkey.shtml>
- Grof, S. (1985). *Beyond the brain: Birth, death and transcendence in psychotherapy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Gunnlaugson, O. (2004). Toward an integral education for the ecozoic era: A case study in transforming the global learning community of Holma College of Integral Studies, Sweden. *Journal of Transformative Education*, 2(4), 313-335.
- Hafiz. (1999). "The Sun in Drag" [poem]. D. J. Ladinsky (Ed. & Trans.), *The gift: Poems by Hafiz, the great Sufi master* (p. 252). New York; London; Ringwood, Vic., Australia; Toronto, Ont., Canada; Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Compass.
- Hampson, G. P. (2007). Thinking postformally. Manuscript in preparation.
- Hargens, S. (2001). *Integrating Whitehead: Towards an environmental ethic*. Retrieved 26 May, 2007, from <http://www.integralworld.net/index.html?hargens.html>
- Harris, R. (2004). *Integral platitudes*. Retrieved 19 February 2007, 2007, from <http://www.integralworld.net/index.html?harris19.html>
- Hilbert, D. & Cohn-Vossen. (1952). *Geometry and the imagination*. New York: Chelsea
- Holton, G. (1998). *The Scientific imagination*. Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press.
- Ilyenkov, E. V. (1977). *Dialectical logic: Essays on its history and theory*. Moscow: Progress

- Inayatullah, S. (2000). Causal layered analysis: Post-structuralism as method [CD-Rom]. In R. Slaughter (Ed.), *The knowledge base of futures studies, Vol. 2*. Indooroopilly, Qld, Australia: Foresight International.
- Inayatullah, S. (2007). *Metafuture.org*. Retrieved 24 May 2007, from <http://www.metafuture.org/>
- Inayatullah, S. (Ed.). (2004). *The causal layered analysis (CLA) Reader*. Taipei, Taiwan: Tamkang University Press.
- Integral Institute. (2006). *Integral Institute*. Retrieved 24 May, 2007, from <http://www.integralinstitute.org/public/static/default.aspx>
- Integral Institute & Davis, S. (2007). *Escaping flatland. Part 1. Tragedy, terrorism, and the VA Tech massacre*. Retrieved 25 May, 2007, from <http://in.integralinstitute.org/talk.aspx?id=886>
- Integral University. (2007). Retrieved 24 May, 2007, from <http://www.integraluniversity.org/>
- Integral Transformative Practice International. (2007). *What is integral transformative practice (ITP)?* Retrieved 24 May 2007, from <http://www.itp-international.org/practice/index.html>
- Johnson, M. (1992). *The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination and reason*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kazlev, A. M. (2007). Ken Wilber's philosophy, and some recent appaisals. Retrieved 29 May 2007, from <http://www.kheper.net/topics/Wilber/index.html>
- Kearney, R. (1998). *Poetics of imagining: Modern to post-modern*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Kegan, R. (1982). *The evolving self*. Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press.
- Kegan, R. (1994). *In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life*. Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press.
- Kincheloe, J. L. & Steinberg, S. R. (1993). A tentative description of post-formal thinking: The critical confrontation with cognitive theory. *Harvard Educational Review*, 63(3), 296-320.
- Koestler, A. (1970). *The act of creation*. London: Pan
- Kohlberg, L. (1984). *The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea of justice*. London: HarperCollins.
- Koplowitz, H. (1984). A projection beyond Piaget's formal operations stage: A general system stage and a unitary stage. In M. L. Commons & F. A. Richards (Eds.), *Beyond formal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development* (pp. 272-296). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Koplowitz, H. (1990). Unitary consciousness and the highest development of mind: The relation between spiritual development and cognitive development. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), *Adult development Volume 2: Models and methods in the study of adolescent and adult thought* (pp. 105-112). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Kramer, D. A. & Woodruff, D. S. (1986). Relativistic and dialectical thought in three adult age-groups. *Human Development*, 29(5), 280-290.
- Labouvie-Vief, G. (1990). Modes of knowledge and the organization of development. In M. L. Commons, C. Armon, L. Kohlberg, F. A. Richards, T. A. Grotzer & J. D. Sinnott (Eds.), *Adult development Volume 2: Models and methods in the study of adolescent and adult thought* (pp.43-62). New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Labouvie-Vief, G. (1992). A neo-Piagetian perspective on adult cognitive development. In R. Sternberg & C. Berg (Eds.), *Intellectual development* (pp. 197-228). UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (2003). *Metaphors we live by*. University of Chicago Press. (Original work published in 1980)

- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). *Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought*. New York: Basic Books.
- László, E. (2004). *Science and the Akashic field: An integral theory of everything* Rochester, VT, US: Inner Traditions
- Loevinger, J. (1976). *Ego development: Conceptions and theories*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). US: University of Minnesota Press.
- Malinowski, G. (1993). *Many-valued logics*. UK: Oxford University Press.
- Marchand, H. (2001). Some reflections on postformal thought. *The Genetic Epistemologist*, 29(3). Retrieved 29 May 2007, from <http://www.tiac.net/~commons/Some%20Reflections%20on%20Postformal%20Thought.html>
- Maslow, A. H. (1971). *The farther reaches of human nature*. New York: Viking
- Matthews, C. N. (2002). Images of enlightenment: Slanted truths. In C. N. Matthews, M. E. Tucker & P. Hefner (Eds.), *When worlds converge: What science and religion tell us about the story of the universe and our place in it* (pp. 207-228). Peru, IL, US: Carus, Open Court.
- McGuinn, C. (1997). Reason the need. *The New Republic*.
- Meyerhoff, J. (2006). *Bald ambition. Chapter 3: Vision-logic*. Retrieved 18 May 2007, from <http://www.integralworld.net/index.html?meyerhoff-ba-3.html>
- Mills, C. W. (2000). *The sociological imagination*. New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published in 1959)
- Montuori, A. (1997). Social creativity, academic discourse, and the improvisation of inquiry. *ReVision*, 20(1), 34-37.
- Montuori, A. (2005). How to make enemies and influence people: Anatomy of the anti-pluralist, Totalitarian Mindset. *Futures*, 37(1), 18 (21).
- Morin, E. (n.d.) Homeland earth; A new manifesto for the new millenium. *The Journal of Conscious Evolution*, 1, n.p. (Original work published in 1999)
- Murray, T. (2006). Collaborative knowledge building and integral theory: On perspectives, uncertainty, and mutual regard. *Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Journal For New Thought, Research, and Praxis* (2), 210-268.
- Neville, B. (1989). *Educating psyche*. Burwood, Vic, Australia: Collins Dove.
- Novák, V. (1989). *Fuzzy sets and their applications*. Bristol, UK: Adam Hilger.
- Pacific Integral. (n.d.). *Pacific Integral*. Retrieved 24 May, 2007, from <http://www.pacificintegral.com/>
- Pascual-Leone. (1984). Attentional, dialectical, and mental effort: toward an organismic theory of life stages. In M. L. Commons & F. A. Richards (Eds.), *Beyond formal operations: Late adolescent and adult cognitive development* (pp. 182-215) New York; Westport, CT, US; London: Praeger.
- Powell, P. M. (1980). Advanced social role-taking and cognitive development in gifted adults. *International Journal of Aging & Human Development*, 11(3), 177-192.
- Riegel, K. F. (1973). Dialectic operations: The final period of cognitive development. *Human Development*, 16(5), 346-370.
- Riegel, K. F. (1975). Toward a dialectical theory of development. *Human Development*, 18(1-2), 50-64.
- Riegel, K. F. (1976). The dialectics of human development. *American Psychologist*, 31(10), 689-700.
- Roy, B. (2006a). The map, the gap, and the territory. *Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Journal For New Thought, Research, and Praxis* (3), 25-28.

- Roy, B. (2006b). A process model of integral theory. *Integral Review* (3), 118-152.
- Saiter, S. M. (2005). A general introduction to integral theory and comprehensive mapmaking. *Journal of Conscious Evolution*, 1. (no page reference)
- Scharmer, C. O. (2000, May). *Presencing: Learning from the future as it emerges: On the tacit dimension of leading revolutionary change*. Paper presented at the Conference On Knowledge and Innovation, Helsinki, Finland.
- Scharmer, C. O. (2005). *Theory U: Leading from the emerging future: Presencing as a social technology of freedom*. Retrieved 14 February 2007 from <http://www.ottoscharmer.com/>
- Scheurich, J. J. & McKenzie, K. B. (2005). Foucault's methodologies: Archaeology and genealogy. In N. Denzin, K. & S. Lincoln Yvonne (Eds.), *The handbook of qualitative research: Third Edition* (pp. 841-868). London: Sage.
- Seamon, D. (1998). Goethe, nature and phenomenology: An introduction. In D. Seamon & A. Zajonc (Eds.), *Goethe's way of science: A phenomenology of nature* (pp. 1-14). Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Sinnott, J. D. (1998). *The development of logic in adulthood: Postformal thought and its applications*. New York: Plenum
- Sinnott, J. D. (2003). Postformal thought and adult development: Living in balance. In J. Demick & C. Andreoletti (Eds.), *Handbook of adult development* (pp. 221-238). New York: Kluwer Academic, Plenum.
- Slaughter, R. (1998). Transcending flatland: some implications of Ken Wilber's meta-narrative for futures studies. *Futures*, 30(6), 519-533.
- Slaughter, R. A. (2005). *The knowledge base of futures studies: Professional Edition*, from [http://foresightinternational.com.au/catalogue/product\\_info.php?products\\_id=34](http://foresightinternational.com.au/catalogue/product_info.php?products_id=34)
- Steiner, R. (1983). *Metamorphoses of the soul: Paths of experience, Volume 2*. London: Rudolf Steiner Press. (Original work published in 1910)
- Stern, W. (1938). *General psychology: From the personalistic standpoint* (H. D. Spoerl, Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1998). A balance theory of wisdom. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(4), 347-365.
- Tarnas, R. (1991). *The passion of the western mind: Understanding the ideas that have shaped our world view*. London: Pimlico.
- Thompson, W. I. (1996). *Coming into being: Artifacts and texts in the evolution of consciousness*. New York: St. Martin's
- Thompson, W. I. (2003) Literary and archetypal mathematical mentalities. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 10(8), 58-70
- Todorovic, N. (2002). *The mean green hypothesis: Fact or fiction?* Retrieved 14 February, 2007, from [http://www.spiraldynamics.org/resources\\_account\\_articles.php](http://www.spiraldynamics.org/resources_account_articles.php)
- Tolle, E. (2001). *The power of now*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Wade, J. (1996). *Changes of mind: A holonomic theory of the evolution of consciousness*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Walker, J. (2007). *Prerational and transrational spirituality: The difference is?* Retrieved 21 February 2007, from <http://pods.zaadz.com/ii/discussions/view/94401>
- Walmsley, R. (2007). *World prison population list* (7th ed.). Retrieved 25 May, 2007, from <http://www.prisonstudies.org/>
- Warnock, H. M. W. (1976). *Imagination*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Weick, K. E. (1989). Theory construction as disciplined imagination. *The Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 516-531.

- Wexler, J. (2005). Toward a model of integral education. *ReVision*, 28(2), 29-55
- Wikipedia. (2007a). *Deconstruction*. Retrieved 17 February 2007, from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deconstruction>
- Wikipedia. (2007b). *Four pillars of the Green Party*. Retrieved 17 May 2007, from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four\\_Pillars\\_of\\_the\\_Green\\_Party](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Pillars_of_the_Green_Party)
- Wilber, K. (1980). The pre/trans fallacy. *ReVision*, 3(2).
- Wilber, K. (1995). *Sex, ecology, spirituality: The spirit of evolution*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Wilber, K. (1997). An integral theory of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 4(1), 71-92
- Wilber, K. (2000). *Sex, ecology, spirituality: The spirit of evolution* (2nd ed.). Boston: Shambhala. (Original work published 1995)
- Wilber, K. (2000a). *Integral psychology: Consciousness, spirit, psychology, therapy*. Boston, London: Shambhala.
- Wilber, K. (2000b). *One taste: Daily reflections on integral spirituality*. Boston, London: Shambhala.
- Wilber, K. (2000c). *A theory of everything: An integral vision for business, politics, science and spirituality*. Boston, London: Shambhala.
- Wilber, K. (2001). *No boundary: Eastern and western approaches to personal growth*. Boston; London: Shambhala. (Originally work published in 1979)
- Wilber, K. (2001). *The eye of spirit: An integral vision for a world gone slightly mad*. Boston, London: Shambhala.
- Wilber, K. (2006a). *Excerpt B: The many ways we touch. Three principles helpful for any integrative approach. Overview: An integral paradigm is a set of practices, not theories*. Retrieved 14 Feb 07, 2007, from <http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptB/intro.cfm/>
- Wilber, K. (2006b). *Integral spirituality: A startling new role for religion in the modern and postmodern world*. Boston, London: Shambhala.
- Williamson, T. (1994). *Vagueness*. London; New York: Routledge.
- Zadeh, L. A., Klir, G. J., & Yuan, B. (1996). *Fuzzy sets, fuzzy logic, and fuzzy systems: Selected papers by Lotfi A. Zadeh*. Singapore; Hackensack, NJ, US; London; Delhi; Shanghai; Beijing; Hong Kong: World Scientific.
- Zhuangzi (n.d.). *Chapter 22: Knowledge wanders north* (N. Correa Trans.). Retrieved 14 February 2007, from <http://www.daosisopen.com/ZZ22.html>

**Gary P. Hampson.** Gary is currently a PhD candidate at Southern Cross University, Lismore, Australia, re-searching integral thought in relation to educational transformation. If pushed, he might describe himself as a (Koestlerian) JesterSageArtist. If further provoked, he might mumble something about the poetry of Life, the evolution of Hermes, or the postformal cognition of dolphins...but such oblique allusions in the current context would surely be beyond the bounds of reason.

[gary.ph@ozemail.com.au](mailto:gary.ph@ozemail.com.au)

## Appendix A: The Green vMeme Attractor—Big Mind, Kind Heart, Healthy Hierarchy

In an Integral Naked advertisement originating from Wilber's Integral Naked website (Integral Institute & Davis, 2007), the following assertion is made concerning the Virginia Tech massacre:

Ken points out how extreme postmodernism (boomeritis, mean-green-meme) has contributed to an atmosphere in which...the two developmental waves responsible for most terrorist acts...are allowed and even encouraged to flourish. What's needed is...[an] AQAL toolbox with which to be able to prevent, recognize, and effectively address malevolent and terrorist activities. Of particular interest to scholars will be Ken's discussion of the difference between a merely **deconstructive postmodernism** a la Derrida, and a **genealogical/developmental postmodernism** a la Foucault, which paves the way to an Integral view, rather than blowing up the road. (§ *Scholar's Notes (for Advanced Students and Curious Listeners)* ¶ "Postmodernism," emphasis in original)

The explicit foregrounding of association between the worst U.S. tertiary education massacre in history on the one hand, and Derrida on the other—via a (metaphorical) inference that Derrida *blows up roads*—perhaps indicates something of the nature of the propagation of the *mean green meme*. One might be tempted in this instance to proffer two questions: (a) Could the above advertisement be described as a “vulgar” or even “nihilistic” attack on Derrida? and—in the spirit of furthering inquiry into collective shadow-work—(b) Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the meanest of them all?

I shall explore such questions by investigating evidence concerning the Green vMeme and its alleged “meanness.”

### Is the *Mean Green Meme* Construction a Mythic Meme?

A significant feature I have noticed in my ten or more years of research into Wilber's work is that there is a significant emotive dissonance between, on the one hand, Wilber's substantive focus on the negative aspects of the Wilberian Green vMeme (substantive in the sense that there is significant repetition and intensity of theme, and that such repetition-and-intensity is not given to any other vMeme by name) and, on the other, the emotive void caused by theoretic over-generalisation—in Wilber, in certain other texts, and in the integral community at large. An example of such text is evident from two quotes from an article in a new journal grounded in Wilberian philosophy. The first:

One of the main reasons why there is such a thing as Integral Studies, Integral Theory, Integral Psychology, Integral Business, Integral Consciousness Studies, and Integral Art can be understood in terms of multidimensional, multi-level thinking and, furthermore, *being*. As already mentioned, this is what Gebser calls *integral-aperspectival*, what Wilber calls *vision-logic* and what Beck calls *Second-Tier* (Saiter, 2005, ¶ 10).

And the second, regarding,

a ‘higher’ order of thinking (as in Wilber's vision-logic). As already mentioned, Jean Gebser uses the term(s) ‘integral/aperspectival’ to refer to a similar state of high comprehension. Don Beck follows suit when he describes the manifestation of Second Tier thinking starting with the Yellow vMeme” (Saiter, 2005, ¶ 14).

In both these quotes, the Green vMeme is ignored.

Is vision-logic partly constituted by the Green vMeme? Is aperspectivity partly constituted by the Green vMeme? Is Second-tier partly constituted by the Green vMeme? If the answers are equivalent, this question might be of minor consequence. But the answers are not equivalent. Wilber’s vision-logic *is* partly constituted by the Green vMeme; Spiral Dynamics’ second-tier is not; whilst the Green vMeme is not addressed in Gebser’s aperspectivity (Gebser’s work predates Spiral Dynamics). If the Green vMeme had not been given special treatment by Wilber, then such lack of care as exemplified by these statements might, again, be of minor consequence. But Wilber has emotively set up a deep conceptual division precisely in this liminal territory, a division which is magnified by his popular appeal in the community—and power base (see Appendix C)—so that such a device could divisively begin to assume a mythic (dismissively-defended, under-analysed) status.

Such notion of an under-analysed but virulent *myth of Integral* would be supported by the following casual perusal of an Integral Institute discussion forum on the “koolest” website, *zaadz*. By way of explanation regarding the basics of AQAL, Julian Walker (2007) enthusiastically introduces the audience to Wilber’s *Pre/Trans Fallacy* by way of drawing a chart constituted by three levels: (a) “Preconventional; Prerational; Archaic/Magic/Mythic; Sensorimotor/preop; Purple/Red/Blue” (b) “Conventional; Rational; Rational; Concrete Operations; Orange/Green” (c) “Postconventional; Transrational; Integral; Formal Operations/Vision Logic; Yellow/ Turquoise” (see Table 1).

Table 1. Walker’s Chart

<b>Preconventional</b>	<b>Conventional</b>	<b>Postconventional</b>
Prerational	Rational	Transrational
Archaic/Magic/Mythic	Rational	Integral
Sensorimotor/preop	Concrete Operations	Formal Operations/Vision Logic
Purple/Red/Blue	Orange/Green	Yellow/Turquoise

Numerous fallacies and misplacements are given even in this simple schema. These include the equating of “Formal Operations” with both “Postconventional” and “Vision Logic,” rather than with “Orange” / “Rational.” The most extreme is the conflation of “Green” with “Concrete Operations”—a misalignment—to Green’s disadvantage—by a whole *two* stages. This, indeed, would be something toward the *antithesis* of Wilber’s *Pre/Trans* iteration—namely, this young teacher’s thinking that the Green vMeme was *pre-rational* when in fact it is *post-* or *trans-rational*.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>93</sup> I am using “transrational” to denote a sublation (*transcending-and-including*) of *rational* rather than to make a distinction between *transrational* and, say, *postrational*. This usage I am making here is congruent with the categories identified by Walker.

Of course, any student can get details wrong about anything they are learning, or even, unfortunately, about anything they are passing on to others as (informal) teachers. The specific discussion here, though, would concern the possible perpetuation of misunderstanding not through a student's failure to understand something correctly, but because the more experienced teacher's text was itself already confused, conflated, inflated. Wilber's communication that the Green vMeme *transcends the rational* occurs substantively less frequently and less emotively than his stress on the idea that *the Green vMeme is pre-rational—regressive—and/or pathological*. As our specific hermeneutic interest here would concern the issue of an inappropriate attack on Green, suspicion would surely be raised by such evidence, and a hypothesis could be posited concerning, let us say, *the Green/Yellow Fallacy*.

Following on from the parting of company between Beck and Cowan, Cowan has been a keen supporter of maintaining the authenticity of Clare Graves' work, on which Spiral Dynamics was originally based. He has furthered this work with new colleague, Natasha Todorovic. Her (2002) research into the Wilberian Green vMeme reinforces this suspicion. She statistically analysed data from over 600 profiles and found the following.

1. "Blue/Orange tends to avoid ambiguity by simplifying interactions into narrow categories" (p. 5).
2. "Individuals centralized in Blue, Orange and the Blue/Orange pairing appear to have a stronger tendency than other systems to reject the Green vMeme" (p. 2).
3. "It is those with high Orange scores who reject Green most strongly" (p. 3).
4. "Those centralized in the Yellow system reject statements describing the D-Q (Blue) system most strongly—NOT Green" (p. 3).
5. "Yellow accepts green more than any other system" (p.3).

She also notes that

6. Clare Graves had modified his view from "monumentous leap" between Green and Yellow to seeing them as more alike than he had previously realized (p. 3).
7. There is no evidence of substantive Green/Red pairing. In fact, "the data shows that when Green increases so does the rejection of Red" (p. 6).
8. There was a significant "yellow false positive" whereby "Selection of statements intended to elicit Yellow appear to be reflecting a more sophisticated form of Orange instead" (p. 3), and that,
9. "The dominant profile for those pegging falsely on Yellow came from the Blue/Orange pairing and from Nodal Orange" (p. 3). In regards to this, she says that, "this might explain much of the 'second tier' elitism coming from MGM [mean green meme] advocates. The Blue need to rank order combined with classism and right thinking minds at Orange, results in a drive to convince self, and others, of living at 'second tier' (if such a thing actually exists!)" (p. 3).

I think it is notable that a scholarly researcher investigating Clare Graves' original data should doubt whether "second tier" actually exists. What justification could there be in the propagation of myths concerning second tier when detailed research problematises such type of propagation?

Coining the term, “Meme-ism”, as a form of spiral classism, Todorovic comments that, “the spread of terminology like MGM has weaponized the previously neutral SD colors and opened the door to prejudice, even hatreds...” (p. 10). She concludes that,

the most objectionable example of the MGM label in action has been as a capricious stereotyping tool. ... This results in intimidation and promotes a habit of labelling then dismissing detractors with negative words wrapped in spiral dressing. MGM artificially closes doors to understanding. Inquisitors wield MGM as a coercive tool, forcing critics into defensive positions where they must either recant or be diminished through cheap name-calling. It diverts focus from the object or idea under investigation and shuts down important debate (p. 10),

...such debate as this article seeks to facilitate. In so doing, my intention would in no way be to problematise *all* problematisations against the Green vMeme—whether as an entire construct or in terms of its possible constituents—but to draw attention to its problematic use in a non-contextualised, and non-construct-aware fashion, and specifically to point to some—potentially—major theoretic obstacles to its employment as an “orienting generalisation.”

The wordplay “mean green meme” first appears in its own section in *A Theory of Everything* (Wilber, 2000c, pp. 122-125) in which Wilber quotes Beck (unreferenced) as saying, “green has introduced more harm in the last thirty years than any other meme” (p. 123). Wilber takes this to mean: “a culture that tries to ram pluralism and multiculturalism down everybody’s throat is going to come apart at the seams faster than you can say ‘deconstruction’” (p. 123-124). His claim is that Green has damaged Blue infrastructures by way of quoting George W. Bush regarding, “the soft bigotry of lowered expectations.” He speaks harshly of “the highly developed postformal [sic] green wave” which champions “any and every ‘multicultural’ movement;” and of “order-Left imperatives commanding everybody to be sensitive;” of the “nihilism and narcissism of extreme postmodernism;” of “the harsh intolerance of the politically correct thought police;” and says that, “the green meme has been in charge of academia, the cultural elite, and much of liberal politics for the past three decades, but it is now being challenged on all sides” (p. 122-125).

What should be my response to all this? As a concerned global citizen I should surely feel stirred by such righteous indignation; I should surely join a crusade against such evil. Yet, as a non-American, I am unclear as to what precisely he is referring: I have witnessed “mean” actions from some people, for instance, but they’ve tended mostly to be from dog-eat-dog or man-eat-man corporate careerists (if one had to coin a phrase) rather than liberal academics. And I can’t recall that I’ve ever had anything unpleasant *rammed down my throat*—at least, not to my knowledge! Moreover, as a novice liberal academic myself, I wonder whether I am unwittingly part of a nihilistic cult? Indeed, is *this* very article a highly developed but covertly narcissistic *command* to be “green-sensitive”?

But sadly, Wilber offers not one piece of evidence in this section on the “meme green meme” and so I am left none the wiser, though a tad more fearful.

## A Discourse Analysis

The following discourse analysis below addresses the contents of the three pages constituting the last section of the first chapter of *A Theory of Everything*, entitled, “The jump to second-tier

consciousness” (Wilber, 2000c, pp. 13-16). From my research on Wilber, I consider this to be sufficiently indicative of Wilber’s general perspective toward the Green vMeme for the consideration below.

### **Green vMeme Features Identified**

Wilber identifies the following features of AQAL’s Green vMeme. (This analysis also indicates the number of respective repetitions of these features within the text in question; and categorisations used for the associated Table 2 are given in parentheses).

- Features framed as substantively negative
  - o “Narcissism,” “subjectivism,” “boomeritis” (narcissism)—10
  - o Fighting or “accusing” higher developmental levels—such as against “holism” (competitiveness)—5
  - o Inefficiency (inefficiency)—3
  - o Competitive nature (competitiveness)—2
  - o Expression of feelings (other)—1
  - o Deconstruction (narcissism)—1
  - o Inverted values (as in, “bend[ing] over backwards” to accommodate)—(other)—1
  
- Features framed as substantively partial
  - o “Pluralism,” “relativism” and “pluralistic relativism” (pluralism, relativism)—15
  - o Items related to the above—inclusivity, non-universalism, diversity, multiculturalism, antihierarchy, egalitarianism, anti-marginalisation, avoidance of exclusion, redress of social imbalances (pluralism, relativism)—12
  - o Nobility (e.g., “noble intent”) (other)—2
  - o Individualism (other)—1
  
- Features framed as substantively positive
  - o Compassion, sensitivity, care (compassion)—4
  - o Civil rights (civil rights)—1
  - o Convincing philosophical critiques (worthy text)—1
  - o Environmental protection (environment)—1
  - o Richness of text (worthy text)—1

This is summarised in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Wilber's Green vMeme identifiers  
(based on the text analysed)

Identifier	Occurrences in text
Pluralism, relativism	28
Narcissism	10
Competitiveness	7
Compassion	4
Inefficiency	3
Worthy text	2
Civil rights	1
Environmentalism	1
Other	7

### A Contrasting Perspective on the Green vMeme

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this current presentation to conduct a comprehensive contextualisation of AQAL's Green vMeme (as indicated above), it nevertheless behoves me to present a certain contrasting perspective as a point of departure for further research.

Noting that the Green vMeme denotes a memetic attractor regarding "green values," it would seem to be an adequate "orienting generalisation" to employ a similar methodological *tenor* to that of Wilber (as previously described in this article). I thus turn to the Wikipedia for an "ordinary-yet-informed" perspective on what *green values* might signify.

Searching Wikipedia for "green values" produces 4 main results, each of which refer to the values of Green political parties. From this, two main sets of values are readily apparent—one from the U.S. Green Party (2000), and the other from general guidelines from European Green Parties.

The ten key values of the U.S. Green Party are

- Grassroots democracy
- Social Justice and Equal Opportunity
- Ecological Wisdom
- Non-violence
- Decentralization
- Community-based economics and economic justice
- Feminism and gender equity
- Respect for diversity
- Personal and global responsibility
- Future Focus and sustainability (Green Party of the U.S., 2000)

The "four pillars" of (many of) the European (and other) Green Parties are

- Ecology
- Social Justice

- Grassroots Democracy
- Non-violence (Wikipedia, 2007b).

It is clear from this presentation that there is no significant correlation between the two sets of articulations of Green values—those by Wilber and those by Green parties.

Whilst Green parties would obviously not intentionally present any negative aspect of Green values (and therefore, a discussion regarding Wilber’s critical hypothesis regarding narcissism and inefficiency, for example, could not be directly contextualised here), the contrast to the Wilberian Green vMeme is nonetheless striking.

Firstly, Wilber mentions “environmental protection” only once among the 61 items identified. This is, of course, in contrast to both the popular conception of Green values (where the environment would be identified as the major feature), and it also contrasts the sets of values by Green parties—again, where ecology / ecological wisdom is a major feature. Specifically, it constitutes 25% of *the four pillars*, whilst in *the ten key values* it is given approximately the same weight (the totality of “ecological wisdom,” a major share of “future focus and sustainability,” a share of “personal and global responsibility” and, perhaps mootly, “respect for diversity”). This orienting generalisation contrasts markedly to 2% identified in the analysis of Wilber’s text.

The next feature from Green Party values concerns social justice and economic justice. This term infers the ethics of considering others’ welfare. Wilber does not use this term. He refers to “civil rights” once (2%). He also refers to “diversity” once (2%)—a contrast to the clearly specified “respect for diversity” in the ten key values (10%).

Grassroots democracy, decentralisation and community-based considerations are identified as major players in Green Party values (25-30%), but Wilber does not address this dimension in any way.

Non-violence is also identified as a major Green Party value (10-25%). This contrasts with Wilber’s identification of the feature of “aggressive competitiveness” of the Wilberian Green vMeme (notably with regard to other vMemes).<sup>94</sup> (Although plausibly, the theoretic relationship between these opposites could perhaps be seen as dialectical—aggressive competitiveness being the shadow of non-violence).

It is notable that Wilber does not directly identify personal and global responsibility as a Green value. It is also notable that Wilber does not regard Green’s ethical futures-orientation.

Apparent, too, is the contrast between Wilber’s significant repetition of the terms, “pluralism” and “relativism” and the lack of use of these terms by the brief text above regarding Green parties values. Of course, “pluralism” and “relativism” can be adequately regarded as *philosophical* terms, and Green party values may not be framed in this manner. A more detailed hermeneutical analysis would therefore need to be conducted with regard to *pluralism*—in reference, for instance, to the following:

---

<sup>94</sup> Wilberian theory variously infers and asserts that Green values aggressively fight against Wilberian-identified higher levels of development, including particular dimensions of spirituality (see, e.g., Wilber, 2006b). It could be argued, however, that many spiritual approaches align most strongly to Green values. By substantively foregrounding the Green vMeme as narcissistic and a major facilitator of global terrorism (see the Wilber-approved quotation associating addressing Derrida with terrorism above), is Wilber then inferring that the Quakers, for instance—whose approach can be reasonably seen to align with the four pillars of the Green party—are significantly associated with, or constituted by, such a *terror-inducing* meme?

1. The apparent core *raison d'être* of AQAL (in Wilber IV) to move “beyond pluralism” (Wilber, 2000c, p. 29);
2. Wilber’s recent (Wilber V) use of the term in his “Integral Methodological Pluralism;”
3. Such substantive considerations as being mindful of the relationship between anti-pluralism and totalitarianism (Montuori, 2005).

Regardless, Wilber’s “orienting generalisation” toward the Green value-Meme attractor is substantively different from the orienting generalisation of the Wikipedia public’s perspective on green values. The Green value-Meme attractor can, instead, be seen to be constituted by a philosophic vision of planetary wisdom (which could be characterised as “big mind,”), a substantive spirit of compassion (“kind heart”) and a hierarchy of values which clearly prioritises ethical considerations above egocentric financial gain and other vanities (“healthy hierarchy”).

## Referencing

In the analysed section of Wilber’s text, the following references are made. Wilber refers to Beck / Cowan / Graves research (Spiral Dynamics) three times. I note that Wilber has since distanced himself from Spiral Dynamics, yet incongruently still substantively discusses (a) “memes” and (b) the generic distinction between “first” and “second-tier” thinking, a distinction which Cowan and Todorovic have indicated is substantively contra-indicated by Clare Graves’ later work. When he is discussing such phenomena, is Wilber still referring to Spiral Dynamics or not?

In the analysed section, Wilber also refers to Colin McGuinn (1977) once. This is made via reference to Wilber’s *One Taste* (2000b). Through this, the reference Wilber uses to critique *academia (in toto)* is from *The New Republic*, which is (a) a magazine, (b) politically neo-liberal, and (c) American.

## Comments Regarding Mode of Participation

Wilber (2000c) states that “‘cross-level’ debates are rarely resolved” because “no amount of scientific evidence will convince blue mythic believers; no amount of green bonding will impress orange aggressiveness; no amount of turquoise holism will dislodge green pluralism” (p. 14).

The last point associates holism with the Turquoise vMeme as a contrast to the Green vMeme, yet holism is also one of the core features of the Green vMeme.<sup>95</sup> For example, in accordance with AQAL theory, Sean Esbjorn-Hargens implies that “integral” education (signifying *education theory derived from AQAL*) is developmentally beyond *holistic* education (Esbjorn-Hargens, 2006), inferring holistic education is a Green vMeme approach. AQAL theory would be doubly problematic here in that Scott Forbes (2003) has argued in his seminal work on holistic education that the very *raison d'être* of holistic education is “Ultimacy” (p. 17) a concept substantively founded on a developmental hierarchy approach—an approach that AQAL substantively posits as antithetical to the Green vMeme.

<sup>95</sup> Wilber differentiates *integral* as a holonic/hierarchical type of holism from *Green* as a “flatland,” “monological,” non-holonic/hierarchical type of holism, (e.g., Wilber, 2000c, pp. 30-31) but does not directly evidence the substance of this connection between *green holism* and *antihierarchy*.

With regard to the second point, my primary intent in this discourse analysis (or, indeed in this article as a whole) is not to engage in interpersonal bonding; this analysis cannot therefore be attributed to the Green vMeme as per Wilber's comments above. Rather, I am conducting an analysis, which infers the Orange vMeme of Wilber's first point (regarding "scientific evidence"). As such, if one presumes the legitimacy of Wilber's comment, then if this current analysis fails to "convince" the reader, then the reader might well be operating at a Blue vMeme level in this regard—consequently strengthening the plausibility of mythic belief within the integral community. (Of course, Wilber's comment might be misplaced, in which case the above deduction would not be applicable).

### *An End-in-View*

Pending adequately referenced critical contextualisation, there is thus sufficient evidence to suggest the contra-indicative plausibility that (a) the memetic construction, *mean green meme*, is substantively mythic (transmitted more by the emotive dogma of received opinion than via the reflexivity of balanced reason), and (b) an alternate characterisation of the Green vMeme could be coined as, "big mind, kind heart, healthy hierarchy."

## Appendix B: The Seduction of Formal Academic Expectations

The seduction of formal academic expectations may have led to the following consequences:

1. My foregrounding of difference to, or differentiation from, Wilber's approach in this article. Whilst this has its merits, it may not sufficiently express the commonalities I might share, nor adequately convey my appreciation of Wilber's panoramic vision and courage. If this is so, I apologise. It is work-in-progress (and, in my defence, the purpose of this article is not to comprehensively address Wilber's work but rather to explore in detail a certain—problematic—territory within it). I look forward to pertinent community dialogue, analysis, deconstruction.
2. Language which is less dialectical or deconstructed than I might otherwise have desired. Specifically, my authoring "voice of authority" is privileged over the voicing of uncertainty, tentativity, Mystery, Other.
3. An overall structure which is less complex and more linear than I initially believed would be congruent with my "content chunks."
4. A de-emphasising of artistic and ludic dimensions.

Nevertheless, I have attempted to retain expression of:

1. A moderate variability in voicing—among various formal and non-formal (particularly postformal) modes.
2. A subliminal encouragement, perhaps, for the reader to *slow down* through the punctuation afforded by "generous" footnoting—such slowing being congruent with both the learning afforded by hermeneutic circling (or helixing) and also with the (e.g. Derridean) questioning of the default formal privileging of writing-as-speech above writing-as-writing.
3. A certain allowance or toleration of the loose, fuzzy and open-ended, amidst a formal textual landscape of the privileging of the tight, clear, and "buttoned-down."

Furthermore, lest it be imagined that I engaged in an idealistically formal process in the researching and writing of this article—setting out with totally clear ideas about what I wanted to do and then methodically working my way to achieving them—I present the following points and musings.

1. This article was originally submitted to *Integral Review* as "Interpenetrating Integral and Postmodern Liminalities" and, compared to the current article, had more of an artistic experimental flavour, in my striving for an honouring of Arthur Koestler's (1970) *Jester-Sage-Artist* creativity triad. Due to *Integral Review's* wisely innovative submission process, however, whereby an initial editorial review is offered prior to formal peer-review, it was clear that the readership, in the first instance, would probably benefit more from a contribution in which the theoretic is foregrounded. Consequently, my "hermeneutic hovercraft" was vacated (!), my poetic density decimated and a more formal structure instituted.

2. One perspective on my process can be identified as a complex dialectic between reason and intuition. The sharp left brain requires the fuzzy right brain; fragrant roses require smelly manure; and certain method requires a certain madness. Apropos, /technologies/ and their theoretic counterparts reside *within* ((human complexity)), not *vice versa*.

## Appendix C: An AQAL Contextualisation

A core concern of Wilber's is the evaluation of the writing of others with respect to the degree to which they have addressed the AQAL dimensions of quadrants, levels, lines, states and types. Certain designations are then given by him, notably whether the writing is "integral"—connoting *full approval by Wilber*—or not; or whether the writing is "integrally-informed," connoting *partial approval*.

I offer the following contextualisation to indicate my particular address of these AQAL dimensions. Given the conclusions of this article, however, it would seem that a new designation of "integrally-informing" might be in order—connoting attempts to assist in the cohering and evolution of integral theory.

### Eight Native Perspectives (in Quadrants)

1. *Upper Left Inside*—I have foregrounded somewhat the concept of reflexivity (and its connotations of "know thyself") in this article. I have also offered some personal self-reflections—see, for instance, Appendix B, and the current Appendix. I have attempted, however, not to fall prey to the Wilberian critique of (Green) subjectivism
2. *Upper Left Outside*—(a) It could be argued that a main object of inquiry in this article—namely, AQAL—is a form of structuralism. (b) Could poststructuralism be fruitfully regarded as sublating (transcending and including) structuralism?
3. *Upper Right Inside*—I have attempted to enact an autopoiesis.
4. *Upper Right Outside*—An important marker of objectivity is careful attention to the details of the phenomena under investigation. With regard to physical phenomena, the procedures and particularities of scientific experiments facilitate such rigour. With regard to noospheric phenomena or noospheric signifiers of physical phenomena, the rigour concerning the discussion of ideas is facilitated in part by the procedures and particularities of scholarly conduct, including referencing. In this regard, I have attempted to reference adequately. I have also attempted to indicate where Wilber has potentially suffered through not employing such evidential rigour.
5. *Lower Left Inside*—I have attempted to weave hermeneutic considerations into the very fabric of this text.
6. *Lower Left Outside*—Further research could be undertaken regarding the propagation of mythic memes within the integral community.
7. *Lower Right Inside*—I am attempting to facilitate a social autopoiesis within the integral community.
8. *Lower Right Outside*—(a) If we regard *global* power structures, then we need to substantively address such identifications as (i) hegemonic / homogenous globalisation (ii) the critical (and shadow-forming) overextension of the Orange vMeme; capitalism; instrumental rationality; the United States' current unique global positioning. (b) If we regard the current global influence of *ideations*, then we could regard both *integral* and *postmodernism* as underdogs, (c) If we regard *integral theory*, then we should address the dominant power position of AQAL across many contexts. In this regard, I note the following:

Power base of the six major genealogical memes whose identity is in substantive relationship with the term, *integral*

—as identified by the following analysis which shows number of texts (articles, etc.) which cite the first 20 pertinent listings identified by Google Scholar<sup>96</sup> via the following phrase:

- Integral “Rudolf Steiner”: 21
- Integral “Ashok Gangadean” 39
- Integral “Jean Gebser”: 71
- Integral "Ervin Laszlo": 72
- Integral “Sri Aurobindo: 100
- Integral "Ken Wilber": 577

## Levels

I have taken AQAL developmental levels as a substantive object of inquiry—notably Orange, Green and Yellow/Teal, and have adopted a developmental approach with regard to them. I have also demonstrated a particular usage of developmentalism toward (a) discourse (b) conceptual templates regarding theoretic narrative. To this degree, I have valorised developmentalism. I have also inferred particular value in the construct of *holarchy*.

I have made use of numerous AQAL-identified postformal modes of cognition, such as dialectical operations and complex-aware thinking, in addition to formal reasoning.

I have also made substantive use of text from the following authors—some of whose research form important aspects of AQAL theory (including *Wilber V AQAL*), namely, (a) the cultural theoretic narrative of Jean Gebser; and (b) the developmental models of Susanne Cook-Greuter, Jenny Wade, and Spiral Dynamics (the latter with regard to e.g., (i) “memes” and (ii) “first-tier” / “second-tier” distinction).

I have valorised *vision-logic*.

I have also valorised certain postformal developmental perspectives—including those of theoretic narratives Wilber calls upon with regard to post-Orange levels. I have nevertheless substantively problematised (from different angles) *AQAL* theory regarding *that which lies beyond Orange*, notably regarding the theoretic narrative around the Green / Teal (a.k.a. Yellow) transition.

## Lines

Could the following be fruitfully regarded as lines:

- Perspectives on postmodernism?
- Methodologies?
- Postformal cognitive modes?
- Nonduality?
- Deconstruction?

---

<sup>96</sup> Retrieved 27 May 07

How might *interrelationships* between lines be adequately conceptualised? As conceptual ecologies?

What might the relationship be between *lines* and poststructuralist *subjectivities* (if we consider the bridging concept of *subpersonalities*, for example)?

## States

I have identified *neo-imperialism* as a possible cultural *state* (from a lower right perspective). What other *states* might be identified in the lower quadrants?

The research process necessarily involves a host of gross, subtle and affective states. I particularly note entering creative *zones*; and also the alternation of active and passive states—such as in Otto Scharmer's (2005) *Theory U*—across surprising timescales. Passion is a major mover for me. So is intuition.

## Types

It might be helpful to regard global language regions—such as the Anglophone world—as a form of lower left *types*.

Perhaps postformal cognition modes can be regarded as *types* of cognition (at the postformal level).

I type the following: *I suspect I might be the type of person that loves to type.* ☺