

Towards an Integral Critical Theory of the Present Age

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Abstract: A new model of a critical theory that is integral is introduced. It adds a seventh stage to a six-stage model of critical theory. Building on the model's predecessors, from Kant, Hegel, and Marx to Habermas and Wilber, this proposal is a three-pronged model of material, socio-political, and spiritual critique of the present age. Each dimension is non-reducible to the other. The current model echoes the attempts to bridge social and existential perspectives by early Marcuse and Sartre, and the author's prior work that did this for Habermas and Kierkegaard. This model of an integral critical theory introduces a self-transformational axis, the integer or witness-self, complementing transversally the vertical stages and horizontal states of consciousness.

Keywords: Critical theory, Habermas, integral, model, Wilber

Introduction

A new—integral—critical theory (ICT) of the present age calls for at least three non-reducible dimensions of inquiry and practice, each dimension addressing a distinct field of human needs. My thinking about the possibility of ICT is programmatic in ways it poses its questions: How do we come to terms with economic, political, and religious conflicts in the context of their globalization? And, in response to their global character, how do we integrate the fields of the economy, politics, and spirituality? Answering these questions is a matter of planetary survival, and some preparatory work is in order. In taking such a propaedeutic step in the direction integral questioning opens for us, I describe three distinct and yet interrelated fields of needs and their historical modes of economic, political, and spiritual scarcity. ICT requires us to rethink the fault lines of conflict not as so many clashes of civilizations but rather as collisions of frameworks among material, political, and spiritual levels of development within each civilization and increasingly globally. By "integral" in the context of "critical theory" I mean a theory that includes the three essential and non-mutually-reducible (or orthogonal) dimensions of human existence: material, sociopolitical, and spiritual needs. ICT endeavors to bring together the personal or existential freedom with sociopolitical liberation and spiritual self-transformation.

While there have been schools of thought in other disciplines that chart various integral perspectives on human development, there have not been new or fully successful attempts in philosophy that would bring together the personal or existential freedom with sociopolitical liberation and spiritual self-transformation. Integral perspectives on human and social development were not generally available as a possibility before the notions of biological evolution (Darwin), psychological development (Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Piaget, Freud, Kohlberg), and social evolution (Hegel, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Habermas) were introduced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Accordingly, I will begin with a brief review of major efforts that pave the way for the very possibility of ICT and next describe the seven stages of critical theory. I will introduce then three fields of human needs and corresponding ideal dimensions of their satisfaction. With the ready-made outline of dimensions, fields, and ideals of ICT, I will chart the basic modes of critical deficit that describe various types of failure of meeting the ideality. Finally, I will show that *integral* critical theory must embody *redemptive critique*, insofar as its motive not only develops a theory with practical intent but also with transformative hope.

Sources of Integral Critical Theory

My thinking about an ICT of the present age does not originate in a vacuum. It has numerous theoretical and practical forerunners, and thus raises both old and new questions. While the notion that the political is personal and the personal is political echoes some of the more recent ferment of the 1960s, in the West we find much earlier ideas for integrating personal and social perspectives both in the Judeo-Christian and philosophical writings. The Jewish Law, Torah, and the early Christian faith embody the communal forms of life that are at once socially and personally transformative. Plato's *Republic* offers a thorough examination of the intrinsic relationship between the twofold founding of justice, that of a just individual (psyche) and society (polis). The Middle Ages achieve an increasing synthesis of these classical perspectives: St. Augustine's *City of God* responds not just to Cicero but mainly to the collapse of the ancient Roman civilization, and the "city" becomes the dominant metaphor of personal-political *Ordo* in its human and divine ordinances. St. Thomas Aquinas erects in his *Summa* an architectonic of a spiritually informed real-politics. And the Jewish, Christian and Arabic scholars in the Golden Age in Spain, e.g., Maimonides, engage in a civilizing, philosophical dialogue among the three religions of the Book.

The precursors to what I call integral critical theory are found much closer to our times. In his early essays from the 1930s, Herbert Marcuse attempted to integrate the existential ontology of Martin Heidegger with the newly discovered humanistic perspective of the young Karl Marx. That attempt, initiated while Marcuse was writing his second doctorate under Heidegger, was cut short by the rise of Nazism. Marcuse joined the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research on its flight into exile and never resumed the project of phenomenological Marxism. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that Jean-Paul Sartre embarked upon a major effort to link in a single philosophical space of theory the existential (personal) together with the sociopolitical (public) perspectives on human development. The accent of the early Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* falls on the personal development, the accent of the late Sartre in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* falls on the social, political, and institutional analysis. These two perspectives, existential Marxism, Marxist existentialism, are like the popular optical illusion showing, depending on one's figure/ground perspective, a duck or a rabbit, and so one can never quite see both at the same time. There were other parallel projects of phenomenological or dialectical Marxism proposed by the Yugoslav *praxis* philosophers, such as by Mihailo Markovic and Svetozar Stojanovic, and by the Czech philosopher Karel Kosík. The Yugoslav experiment in thought had its unreliable companion in Tito's authoritarian socialist regime that morphed after his death into ethnic warfare. Some of the former philosophers of existential praxis became the proponents of the new Serbian nationalism. The Czech idea of existential humanism was promulgated in practice by Alexander Dubček's socialism with the human face, only to be crushed by the

invading Soviet army in 1968. What was left of this existential perspective immigrated into the theater of the absurd of Václav Havel who performed it faithfully from his dissident years all the way into his Czechoslovak Presidency after 1989.

In my earlier work (Matušík, 1993, 2001), I took one small step in the direction abandoned by early Marcuse and unsuccessfully pursued by Sartre. I did so by articulating Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative or discourse ethics in conjunction with Søren Kierkegaard's indirect communication underwriting his existential ethics. To be sure, Kierkegaard is able to provide critical theory with an existential dimension of communication that critical theorists of the Frankfurt School tradition for the most part rejected on account of Heidegger's momentary lapse into Nazi activism and more recently also because of the lapse of the Yugoslav *praxis philosophers* into Serbian nationalism. Throwing out the baby of existential perspective with the dirty bath water of nationalism left critical theory too weak to be able to confront the arising religious fundamentalism in the present age. Whether or not one can begin to sketch a critical theory that would give justice to self-transformative and socially transformative perspectives without violence and reductionism, this is no longer an academic question. What is at stake is our ability to come to terms with globalization of socioeconomic, political, and religious conflicts. While social experiments in real existing socialism yielded at least as much suffering as they hoped to alleviate, the reigning neoliberal market ideologies deepen the wasteland left by the previous century. We must learn from their failures as much as achievements, but have we found yet an economic way of life that would not be self- and other-destructive, that would resemble in the material domain what many invoke in their Friday or Sunday prayers? Have we found a political and cultural way of life that would prevent even our best institutions from taking self- and other-destructive paths? Can we say with clear conscience that more democracy has meant less war and exploitation? I pose these as questions, lest someone thinks I easily dismiss the levels of complexity seen in our age and the good-efforts of humanity to meet them. These questions are not rhetorical points for a homily, asking them should not be judged as preaching either. The search for integral thinking and living in the fields of the economy, politics, and spirituality is a matter of global survival.

Seven Stages Toward Integral Critical Theory

While one could name numerous other contemporary sources of or precursors to integral thinking, my most immediate motivating impulse for developing the notion of ICT came from engagement with Ken Wilber's thought in 2006. Because I discovered Wilber rather late, I had both certain distance of a centurion who had never been a disciple as well as independence of years of thinking on the topic with which I came into our dialogue. I want to conclude this review of precursors with two relevant impacts of Wilber's thought on my thinking about integral critical theory.

The first is Wilber's (1997) early engagement with Habermas's critical theory. In my 2001 (xxv-xxvi) biography of Habermas I describe six stages of theory on the way to becoming 'critical.' In my recent engagement with Wilber and other integral thinkers I began to work toward the seventh, integral stage of critical theory, which I introduce in this programmatic essay. To briefly outline the seven stages: First, the Kantian critique of the conditions of possible experience gives us apriori structures that, while as formal perspectives are never experienced

themselves, set limits to rational thinking and protect understanding from illusions and contradictions. Second, Hegel, impacted by Darwin and historical consciousness of nineteenth century, taught us that all formal structures or perspectives are themselves developmental, and so while also never experienced as such, they can be grasped retrospectively in their forms of life. Third, Marx discovered that because structures of understanding are not only apriori and developmental conditions of possible experience, but also categories rooted in material career of institutions and modes of economic life, critical theory must not only think possibilities, it must become emancipatory of concrete people and their lived possibilities. Fourth, Western and Freudian Marxists asked the Soviet or orthodox Marxists why greatest critical deficits occurred in the context of revolutionary upheavals of the twentieth century? With Nietzsche and Freud and later with postmodern and literary critical theorists found in cultural studies, they theorized the failure to attend to the depth (hidden, irrational, or deceptively willed) dimensions of human unfreedom. Fifth, early Frankfurt School thinkers, Benjamin, Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer among them, learned as much from Western Marxists as from Max Weber and rejected the vanguard hubris of the Soviet and Chinese Marxism, but they retained the emancipatory aims of critical theory. Here belongs also Horkheimer's (1937/1972) classical differentiation of critical, emancipatory theory from traditional, disinterested theorizing. Sixth, Habermas introduces from the late 1970s a communicative model of critical rationality that integrates the elements of Kant, Hegel and Marx and yet reinscribes their achievement within the study of linguistic competences and social evolution. Seventh, ICT adopts Habermas's (1984, 1987, 1992) linguistic-communicative turn and his postmetaphysical standpoint as both a step forward and partial to its own achievement of formal rationality. It is a step forward insofar as Habermas's critical theory explains the apriori structures of understanding or perspectives as grammatical (performative) moves within communicative interaction in which a speaker (I) addresses a hearer (you, we) about something (it) in the world. Habermas is, however, partial to his version of postmetaphysical thinking insofar as he accepts Weber's reduction of all religious development into one of the secularized validity spheres of culture (science, morality and law, and art). In disagreement with Habermas, ICT allows for the possibility of post-metaphysical and postformal spirituality to emerge precisely where he projects a blank vanishing point, that is, under the disenchanted and linguistified conditions of postmodernity. (See Habermas, 1987, figure 28, where the bottom two spaces are left blank, indicating reduction of all sacred contents into profane domains of validity claims. This is precisely where I would theorize in ICT an emergence of postmetaphysical and postformal spirituality.)

Now Wilber adopted the Habermasian linguistic structure of three validity claims and the distinct nonlinguistic rationality of systems theory into the structure of four quadrants. The four holons (the wholes that are simultaneously parts of some other whole) of the integral AQAL perspectival structure (subjective, intersubjective, objective, and inter-objective perspectival wholes) correspond roughly to Habermas's three validity claims of communicative action (intentional or truthfulness speech claims, cultural or normative speech claims, and behavioral or objective speech claims) and the noncommunicative systems rationality (social or inter-objective, functional imperatives of markets and administrative power). At this juncture Wilber and Habermas share all that comes under the sixth stage of postmetaphysical critical theory. The key to my thinking is not what Wilber takes over from Habermas but rather what he impugns to him, namely that his social evolutionary model stops with formal stage of communicative rationality and neither allows for postformal stage of consciousness (read: individual, social, and

cultural) development nor for nondual postformal states of awareness. Habermas adopts Weber's reading of Kant's three critiques (reason, morality, and art) and Hegel's three spheres of culture (science, morality and law, and aesthetics). On that view social rationalization of modern cultures resulted not only in a disrupted, fragmented value spheres of expert knowledges (laboratory, jurisprudence, museum and aesthetic criticism), but also in a thorough reduction of the differential rationality-deficit between sacred and profane domains. In brief, social evolution has ushered our age into a thorough postmodern disenchantment with all spiritual or religious claims about subjective, intersubjective, and social worlds. If there has been a line of religious or spiritual development, like the evolution of dinosaurs, it ends with the linguistification of its claims to validity because those very claims are now answered by the expert cultures and the formal (I, you, we) perspectives we can take on all contents (it). Habermas, just like Wilber, integrates post-Darwinian, Piagetian, Kohlbergian, Hegelian models of human evolution but unlike Wilber stops short of allowing for religious evolution after Weber's and generally critical theory's disenchantment with religion. The postformal model of human evolution is, like Habermas's, based on a reconstructive social science, yet unlike Habermas, it theorizes experience and claims of individuals who already today develop stages and states of consciousness beyond formal rationality. This permits us to raise spiritual claims to existence *after* the postmodern disenchantment with religion; indeed, certain atheism or "death of God" may be assumed in such postformal and nondual claims.

Nothing in Habermas's model precludes, Wilber (2001) writes in response to him, postrational stages and states of consciousness because the unfolding of new patterns cannot be read off the accomplished forms of understanding. And so in responding to Habermas's brand of critical social theory, Wilber boldly calls for an integral "critical spiritual theory." While Habermas's "religion or ultimate concern," is communicative rationality beyond which he finds "no alternative to postmetaphysical thinking," Wilber proposes to develop "a thoroughly postmetaphysical, post-Kantian spirituality." And he hopes that this can be accomplished in part within a Habermasian formal framework, as a reconstructive science, yet with new sets of evidence of postrational development offered by those with developmental competence in the dimensions of postmetaphysical spirituality. To sum up my discussion of the seven stages leading up to the ICT, let me cite Wilber's (2001, Part 1) most important statement about Habermas's research program in critical theory:

I consider Habermas [to be] the world's greatest living philosopher. This does not mean, however, that I agree with all of what he has to say. But in very general terms I do find much agreement with his quasi-universalist approach; his developmental perspective; his dialogical methods; his three domains and three validity claims (art, morals, science—one version of the four quadrants); his championing of the lifeworld in addition to the systems world; his attempt at a reconstruction of the pragmatic history of embodied consciousness; his normative boldness; his blend of both transcendental and context-bound claims; and his critical stance.

I respectfully disagree on many of the details of those broad programs, however; and I strongly part ways with Habermas on his treatment of both pre-linguistic and trans-linguistic realms. Habermas relates humans to both preverbal Nature and transverbal Spirit in ways that I believe are profoundly incorrect. A more integral (or "all-quadrants, all-

levels, all-lines, all-states”) approach allows us to handle a much larger view of the Kosmos than Habermas allows.

This brings me to the second area that impacted my current thinking about ICT, my on-line exchange (Wilber & Matušítk, 2006) on stages and states of development. In that conversation I proposed something analogical to my published work on Habermas and Kierkegaard, namely that we introduce an existential dimension into the The Wilber-Combs Lattice (Wilber, 2006, figure 4.1), the integral model of stages and states, and that we do so by drawing a distinct transversal axis that would complement the vertical axis of stages and horizontal one of states. This proposal addresses the question of whether there might be a need for a third, transversal axis, in addition to states and stages of consciousness, in order to account for Kierkegaard's spheres of existence. This is the two-fold background to my question: First, to resume from the previous discussion of stage six of critical theory, Habermas's analysis of social evolution gets us to the amber level of modern and perhaps also higher postmodern consciousness, yet Habermas requires reduction of the rationality differential between sacred and secular, and so requires a translation of spiritual faith-based *mode* of human development into the validity and cultural value *domains of modernity*. In this translation the religious value sphere drops out. Second, Kierkegaard's study of existential spheres admits (with Hegel and so also with Weber and Habermas) that there is no existing religious culture in modernity; there are no Christians in Christendom, though there are nationalist, herd-religious forms and Christians in despair. We are thus required to change the entirety of our sphere of existence. I argued in my book, *Postnational Identity*, that Kierkegaard's transformation of individuals is required by the type of social evolution posited by Habermas, otherwise it falls into anomie and meaninglessness and remains too weak to resist fundamentalist and nationalist modes of individual and group formation (consciousness falls back into tribal-ethnocentric stage).

I agree that we cannot jump the stages of consciousness, or as Habermas, with reference to Hegel's and Marx's developmental theories, would say of social evolution. I also agree with Wilber and against Habermas that the modern Enlightenment reduced all enlightenment to its particular stage of development, and so it now treats all religious states as ego- and ethno-centric, traditional, pre-critical, requiring falsely a full translation of the spiritual into the secular. And the fundamentalist forms of that archaic-cum-postmodern consciousness then clash with the modernist critical view represented, e.g., by Habermas's formal rationality. Iran's treatment of its philosopher Ramin Johanbegloo, who likes to quote Habermas among others, is the case in point (Matušítk, 2006). But I want to hold that we need, besides the vertical axis of stages and the horizontal axis of states also the transversal, or genuinely vertical-inward axis of existential self-transformation. It is true that one cannot jump the stages, but in a non-evolutionary sense the spheres of existence, as shown by Kierkegaard, are available to everyone at every stage of consciousness. Yet existence spheres are not exactly the same as states of consciousness. Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel for confusing transition with transformation, evolutionary developmental dialectic of both-and with existential transformative dialectic of either/or. We need to posit in contrast to Hegel-Marx-Habermas-Piaget-Kohlberg-Gilligan, etc. and their evolutionary models, something akin to Kierkegaard's existential spheres of existence (esthetic, ethical, ethico-religious, generic and higher level-religiousness) as a motivational-inward prerequisite for the very possibility (condition of possibility) of evolutionary change. And since states are not the conditions of the emergence of stages, then we cannot speak of spheres of

existence simply in terms of states either. My model of ICT assumes that we can introduce a three-pronged lattice or axis with stages and states of consciousness and spheres of existence. Enlightenment is vertical (stages of conscious and social evolution leading to the fullness of content), horizontal (states of possible awareness receding to the emptiness of form), and transversal (existential spheres moving ever deeper to the awakening of spirit in the witness self).

Three Fields of Needs, Three Dimensions of Ideal

Beginning with the seventh, integral stage of critical theory, let us imagine a triangle: At the base of the triangle are material needs (IT as represented by the objective behavior and body and inter-objective functional systems of markets and administration) and social-political needs (YOU/WE of intersubjective and cultural interaction), at the top are self-transformative or spiritual needs (I-I no longer as a metaphysical soul or transcendental ego but as an integer and existential witness, awareness within stages and states of consciousness). Speaking of needs and dimensions of ICT indicates that critical theory must operate in both incarnate and ideational modes. The needs represent the basic nourishment necessary for sustaining the very human existence. Each type of nourishment has its own field for growing and harvesting. Ideals become critical tools when we lack certain needs, and the time and place where one stands while envisioning what one lacks in the present condition is not a field but a projective dimension (*utopos* has no place or field, yet it exists in a dimension of ideal, hope, waiting, possibility). Any impetus for transformation of the field of needs thus comes from the recognition of the dissonance between the reality and the ideal, thus from the material, political and cultural, and spiritual dimensions of critique and possibility.

One field of ICT pertains to *material needs* and resources for their satisfaction. Its corresponding dimension encompasses *critique of political economy*, whereby it articulates vehicles for just economic distribution of material resources for the satisfaction of bodily needs. Another field concerns *social and cultural needs* for recognition and institutions for their expression. This dimension of ICT develops *critique of society*, whereby it seeks political vehicles for social integration, democratic participation, and cultural reproduction. The third field articulates ultimate concerns or hope—*spiritual needs* for the self-transformation. The dimension of *spiritual critique* in this field is to unmask not only the secular but also the religious idolatry of *finite absolutes*. In this triple approach, an ICT would promote ways of human self-transformation, practices aiming at spiritual liberation, and communicative channels to redemptive hope.

No one field of needs can be satisfied by another field (any such attempt would lead to suffering and violence); hence no dimension of critique can be overtaken by another dimension (any such attempt would lead to ideological reductionism). Material scarcity can be overcome by social justice, while the scarcity of recognition is met by reducing the democratic deficit in social, political, and cultural institutions. The scarcity of hope can be overcome neither by economic nor political means. Political economists, critical social theorists, and social activists presuppose hope for their work but do not have access to its renewable resources. The ultimate concern or hope is not like addressing an inconvenient political truth about the climate and energy decline, e.g., by converting soybeans into biodiesel or switch grasses into ethanol. Hope is not the same as hopes, one can have ultimate concern, hope (verb) yet one must not project

one ultimate something, a hope (noun). As Rabbi Cooper (1997) says, “God is a verb.” No critical theory can get off the ground without hope in the verbal, active, performative sense, yet this dimension is recovered only within the seventh stage of critical theory that integrates material and sociopolitical hopes with redemptive hope. The scarcity of hope calls for a redemptive dimension of critical theory (Matušík, 2008).

ICT addresses three non-reducible *fields of human needs*—material, social and cultural, and spiritual—developing *three dimensions of critique and possibility*—political economy of social justice, politics of recognition, and ultimate concerns for self-transformative and redemptive hope. These are laid out in Table 1.

Table 1. Dimensions, Fields, and Ideals of Integral Critical Theory

<i>FIELD OF NEEDS</i>	<i>DIMENSION OF CRITIQUE</i>	<i>REGULATIVE IDEAL or POSSIBILITY SOUGHT</i>
1. material needs	critique of political economy	social justice: economic redistribution of resources
2. social & cultural needs	critique of society	deliberative democracy: political & cultural recognition
3. spiritual needs	critique of secular and religious idolatry	redemptive hope: spiritual liberation & existential self-transformation

The Basic Modes of Deficit

When fields, dimensions, and their projected idealities are conflated or reduced into one another, major deficit and even violence may occur. I introduce some *basic deficit modes*, where in the following “-” indicates a deficit and “+” a reduced (truncated) addition of a field or dimension of ICT. For example, “(2) - (1) + idolatrous (3)” means a perspective that focuses on sociocultural needs, does not adequately consider material needs, and supplements with an idolatrous interpretation of spiritual needs.

(2) - (1): If we try to meet social and cultural needs without attending to the material needs, we get *an economically deficient model*. Safeguarding democratic institutions, access to opportunity, and even political pluralism and multiculturalism, yet doing so without addressing the material conditions for their very possibility yields the economic deficit of bourgeois liberalism. For example, Hegel formulates in his *Philosophy of Right* a social ideal of a rational state in which he reconciles various modern conflicts, such as those between the individual rights and social duties, by envisioning a higher-level ethical whole. In such a higher-level whole, the individual finds his or her fullest self-expression in and through the social institutions of the state, not against them. Yet Hegel, against Kant who proposed before him the League of Nations and even perpetual peace for the end of all wars, leaves all nation-states in the international state of nature in their mutual relations, each state exposed both to hunger and war. Poverty, class-based racism, gender ceiling, and international struggle among warring nations are all conceded as necessary evils by Hegel’s ethical state as well as by the other great modern theorist of political liberalism, John Rawls.

(1) - (2): We get a *politically deficient model* if we reverse Hegel's ideality and focus on the economy alone without safeguarding the institutions of the lawful state. This deficit is best exemplified in the Soviet Marxism or Stalinism. Of course this deficit can plague both classical market liberalism that has but few minimal legal protections against wild markets and neoliberalism that has taken away as many of such protections as possible. This is the meaning behind calls for the withering away of the state (Lenin) as well as for starving the state with reducing social spending (market liberalism). The protests against the lack of political and representative democracy in the World Trade Organization on the other hand call for more political transparency. In state socialism (defined by Webster as *etatism*) state becomes a badly run corporation and all citizens are at its mercy as its employees without any independent legal protection. Without deliberative democratic institutions and sociopolitical recognition, the markets and attendant corruption rule by their not so invisible hand, as we see in many a post-Communist country today. Before them, the party directives for economic redistribution relied on models of social totality. All real existing socialisms, not just the Soviet and Chinese Marxism, tended to reduce political, legal, and multicultural sphere to the economic. Just as Hegel balked at Kant's hope for perpetual peace in the League of Nations, so Marx, unlike Hegel and Habermas, never saw the need for a philosophy of right.

(2) - (1) + *idolatrous* (3): Take the economically deficient model and add to it an idolatrous form of religiosity. The major difference between secular political liberalism and *religious conservatism* does not lie merely in the economic sphere to which they tend to be inattentive (or which they treat with minimalism), but rather in their pseudo-religious means of legitimating and justifying persisting social inequalities. Idolatrous religiosity elevates as ultimate one or another political or cultural or economic need. Dostoyevsky's literary figure of the Grand Inquisitor describes idolatrous satisfaction of spiritual needs. Moral majorities and televangelists, whether among the believers or from the bully pulpits of churches, mosques, synagogues, and political parties, emulating the Grand Inquisitor, offer the angry and pliant individuals and masses false redemptive hope, for they promote vengeance against and fear and envy of the hated other.

(1) - (2) + *idolatrous* (3): Take the politically deficient model and add to it an idolatrous form of religiosity. Insofar as the cults of personality in Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, or Castro's Cuba replaced, and so stealthily supplemented, the ultimate human concerns, they exemplified *in that field* the worst Caesaro-papist excesses also described by the portrait of the Grand Inquisitor. The secular idolatry of the party or progress or personality cult (the ultimates or practico-inert absolutized hopes supplied by to so-called atheistic states) differs only in kind from the religious idolatry of conservative religious-moral majorities in developed West (the ultimates or practico-inert absolutized hopes supplied by nationalist or state interests). While the deficit of the model (1) - (2) + *idolatrous* (3) can justify someone to claim that 9/11 was God's punishment on the sins of homosexuals and feminists in America; the deficit of the model (1) - (2) + *idolatrous* (3) justifies violent revolutionary means of the present as a necessary sacrifice for the secular-cum-divine future to come.

(3) - (1) - (2): The model that jettisons both the economic and the political needs and tries to meet both spiritually yields myriad forms of *religious oligarchy and theocracy*. These modes of incarnate (economic and political) deficit within the religious forms of life entrench priestly or other religious elite, which then lives from natural wealth and the toil of the poor it serves. All

along the elite cult imposes on the people strict codes of behavior, perhaps exhibiting more of a drive for power than for the divine. These deficit modes are rare in the West ever since the end of the Middle Ages. But they define a great part of the Middle and Far East. The Shiite Ayatollahs of Iran or the Saudi Arabian Sunni rulers could care less for their own poor or even for the poor Palestinians, whether these poor happen to be Muslim or Christian believers. The impact of a religiously informed ICT would be to speak as powerfully to established *Islamist* order today as Kierkegaard did to the powers that be in Christendom, to develop a religious critique of certain spiritlessness, to ask where are the Muslims in Islamdom? A religiously informed ICT would unmask any notion of a “holy land” as a piece of a prized real estate that must be won at all cost, even that of social and economic oppression.

(3) - (2) + *supplement of (1)*: When religious groups attempt to satisfy material needs while suppressing political freedom, we get a postsecular convex mirror of the state socialist or *etatist* deficit model. *Fundamentalist religious movements* try to meet the material needs of economically oppressed and politically unrecognized groups through institutions of social welfare, but they bind the hearts of the masses with strict adherence to a religious-nationalist doctrine. The success of Hamas or Hezbollah mirrors the initial success of the welfare policies in the Communist East, perhaps also those of the Kibbutz movement (both socialist and religious) among the early Jewish settlers in Israel. The success lies in their program of economic sharing and redistribution. Religious fundamentalists and the orthodox vanguard (whether on the Left or on the Right) alike suffer from democratic deficits. The secular idolatry of the Communist cults differs only in kind from the religious idolatry of fundamentalists.

But There Are Alternatives!

One often hears from the liberals that there is no political alternative to modern democratic institutions, and so, we hear, we must learn to live with some economic deficits and even with war. One often hears from the leftists that there is no just economic alternative to commanded (revolutionary) redistribution of material resources, and so, we hear, we must learn to live with some democratic deficits and even with class conflict and the transitory dictatorship of the poor. One often hears from religious conservatives, fundamentalists, and even many a sincere believer that there is no spiritual alternative to their real existing religion, and so, we hear, we must learn to live at times with economic and at times political deficits and even with ensuing religious conflicts.

TINA—there is no alternative—is a condition of paralysis, a failure of imagination, thinking, and hope, cancer affecting all three fields of needs, dimensions of critique, and ideals sought. TINA has been originally formulated in the field of material scarcity and its dimension of economic critique as a claim that there is no economic alternative to the economy shot through with some social injustice. But, secondly, one could speak more specifically about material, postmodern, and postsecular forms of TINA.

The postmodern TINA condition affects the field of the political and its scarcity of recognition and social critique. It is the claim that there is no alternative political narrative and thus viable ideal of liberation. The postmodern TINA condition expresses the scarcity of critical resources (it asserts the impossibility of formulating normative critique and liberating narratives).

Thirdly, the postsecular TINA condition affects the field of the spiritual and its scarcity of hope and requisite critique of secular and religious idolatry. It is the claim that there is no religious alternative to the scarcity of hope. The postsecular TINA condition aggravates the scarcity of hope, namely the sinking sense that no alternatives exist to fundamentalist and secular wastelands of the present age.

The reductionisms of analysis of human needs and the deficits of critical thinking about alternatives have crippled experiments in economic, socio-political, and religious change affecting the last two centuries. The human race has been producing unparalleled economic, political, and spiritual wastelands in the last hundred years. The productivist, functionalist, and technological paradigms of thought and action have dominated both the evolving capitalist mode of production and real existing state socialism that just wanted to best it. The inconvenient truth about industrial socialist experiments is their ecological devastation carried over to the wild free-market economies in the post-Communist East. The fear of open thinking and exchange of ideas in the East and the market manipulation of the liberal field in the West have produced several generations of people incapable of thoughtful democracy. The Chinese economic miracle is underwritten by Western internet companies willing to close off free access to information. The authoritarian political models are the preferred ones from Asian economic tigers to Islamist theocracies to Bush's America. Wastelands of spiritlessness in modern times (just like any serious ecological devastation) are scary in that they might be irreversible—from outright annihilation of religious life and ancient wisdom traditions not just in Russia and China but also in Albania or in the most atheistic of European countries, the Czech Republic, to spiritlessly reactive world-religious formations of rising Christian, Jewish, and Islamist fundamentalism.

My programmatic thinking about the possibility of ICT had but one aim, to begin to come to terms with globalization of economic, political, and religious conflicts and from it the emerging need to develop serious integral thinking and living in the fields of the economy, politics, and spirituality as a matter of global survival. In taking a step in this direction, I described distinct fields of needs and their historical modes of economic, political, and spiritual scarcity. In relation to the incarnate fields of needs, I distinguished corresponding ideal or redemptive dimensions of transformation from which alone any critique of the present gets its impetus. Would we be able to recognize our fields of scarcity without a dimension of anamnesis (recollection of the dangerous memory of our future) or without an existential repetition forward of our possibilities (active, redemptive hope)?

I showed how the deficits result from the reduction of fields as well as dimensions of inquiry to each other. The regulative idealities yielded the triple disenchantment housed in the reductionist claims (theories, ideologies, forms of life) of economic, postmodern, and postsecular TINA. The best work done today in each field of needs, dimensions of critique, and redemptive idealities is the integral thinking in which there has transpired an astonishing learning curve from the past and present failures. To mention just a few very specific examples: Addressing material needs, Schweickart (2002) dares to think about alternative economic institutions *after* the failures of state socialism and capitalism. His ideal is stimulated, among others, by economic cooperatives of Mondragon, Argentina's bankrupt companies that were saved and rejuvenated by their workers, as well as China's hybrid environment of postcapitalist attempts at economically viable socialism. In the area of struggle for recognition, the late rapprochement between Jacques

Derrida's impossible hope invoked as religion without religion, the works in feminist and race theory, and Jürgen Habermas's communicative paradigm of morality, law, and democracy all stimulate thinking about institutions that could accommodate our multicultural lifeworlds. Beyond the skeptical postmodern claims, a new critical postmodern theorizing is at once normative and self-limiting (see Matušík, 2001, 2008, part 1 on Derrida and Habermas). Finally, we are hoping against hope because we live in the crisis of idolatrous ultimates or under the conditions of the "death of God." There is growing a worldwide community of thinkers and meditation practitioners, theorists of developmental studies and integral spirituality introduced models of stages and states of human development suited for understanding the inward dimension of global human flourishing. Beyond the postsecular claims of aesthetic religiosity and secular idolatry, integral spirituality introduces post/modern stages and states of consciousness that envision the divine as at once opening the doors to social justice, multicultural worlds, and the priority of one's inherence in spirit over the adherence to doctrines.

There is one astonishing implication of taking steps in the direction of ICT: What we are suffering in the twenty-first century is neither solely an economic class war, nor Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations, e.g., between modern West and traditionalist Islam, nor simply religious wars. The revolutionary subject of true human needs, critique, and hoped-for ideals is not to be sought along one single trajectory: either economic or political class or orthodox religious brand-names. ICT requires us to rethink the fault lines of conflict as collisions of frameworks among material, political, and spiritual levels of development. Such collisions arise both from disturbances within the frameworks and in hegemonic struggles among them. The economic analysts need to focus on models best suited to local and global justice. Political theorists and social critics cannot resolve market efficiency and distribution questions, but they must develop legal and political safeguards for deliberative practices and social recognition. Economists and political theorists, whether secular or religious, should in their domains hold their tongues about ultimate concerns. Marx was not the first, Bush is not the last who misspoke from left or right sides of their mouths on religion. It is always disastrous when politics cross-dresses in religious costumes, or when religion underwrites politics, or when economic welfare buys religious adherence.

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