A Developmental Behavioral Analysis of Dual Motives' Role in Political Economies of Corruption

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Abstract: This paper is a developmental meta-analysis of behaviors that contribute to political economies of corruption, deploying bioneurological dual motive and behavioral development theories. Together, these systems of analysis enable a developmental perspective to illustrate and analyze a progression of dual motives' variations as humans and their conditions change. The progression of examples indicates that there are multiple evolutions of political economies that vary in their complexity, with different behavioral features at each level. Dual motive theory helps in identifying and understanding the complex linkages and layers of socio-political and economic behaviors as they become more complex. Increasingly complex horizontal and vertical stacks of social networks, like lattice-works of dual motives, enable individuals and groups to develop and maintain sturdy yet adaptable social systems of patronage, brokerage, and clientelism. These so-often informally structured relationships underlie corruption-like transactions long before, and long after, they are regarded as the enduring institution of corruption.

Three hypotheses under gird the development of that thesis. The first is that dual motive theory facilitates meta-analyses of social networks' often hidden layers of complexity. A second hypothesis is that analyses using dual motive theory can explicate more complexity when the theory is integrated with developmental behavioral theory. The third hypothesis is that analyses made possible by that integration offer substantive contributions to understanding socio-political-economic behaviors, including multiple political economies of corruption. Three strategies are employed to develop the paper's thesis. First, the concepts of social ties, networks, reciprocity and dual motive theory are introduced to set the context. second, a behavioral task measurement theory is introduced: the model of hierarchical complexity. Scoped for this paper to introduce only the most common adult-level tasks, that model's orders of increasing complexity describe developmental differences in the performance of individuals' and social systems' behaviors. Third, a series of international examples shows the hierarchically different ways the behavioral tensions of dual motives manifest in human exchanges. The hierarchical complexity of the examples' settings is correlated with the hierarchical complexity of adults' behaviors in those settings.

The results of the analysis indicate that (a) individual and system behaviors are continuously shaped and constrained by complex interrelations that can be explained in terms of the hierarchical complexity of dual motives; (b) there are predictably difficult transitions and breaches when systems of different hierarchical complexity disrupt pre-

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existing systems for managing behavioral tensions. The application of dual motive theory indicates its analytical usefulness for interpreting social, political, and economic phenomena. Political economies of corruption can be more thoroughly understood as enduring institutions through a developmental behavioral application of dual motive theory.

Keywords: Bioneurological, brokerage, clientelism, corruption, dual motive theory, model of hierarchical complexity, political economies, patronage, reciprocity, social networks, systems

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a meta-analysis of corruption from a developmental behavioral perspective. A key goal is to illustrate the essential role of dual motive theory (Cory, 2006) for identifying and understanding complex linkages and layers of socio-political and economic behaviors in which individuals and systems collaborate. Another goal is to demonstrate analyses that integrate dual motive theory with the model of hierarchical complexity (Commons & Ross, 2008; Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998).

This introduction begins with some general background to serve as context for the purpose of this paper and its organization. The paper's origins lie in a previous project I undertook to study social networks, called patron-client systems, in developing countries. It soon became clear that developed countries are also laced with such systems, and there are intricate linkages across and within geographic boundaries. I found that actors in the systems have different kinds of social ties (e.g., ethnic, ideological, economic), use different currencies of exchange, and the systems in which they operate mutate as socio-political and economic conditions change. At certain points in development, these behaviors come to be called *corruption*— in some quarters, but not all. My study became that of a developmental trajectory that shed light on political economies of survival. They appear in different guises as they mutate through all levels of apparently all societies. Analyzing this trajectory suggested to me why, at some point, these political economies of survival are called corruption. This paper traces the evolution of corruption through its stages of behavioral development. It introduces a thesis about the roots of corruption in perennial human systems and why corruption may be expected to be an enduring institution throughout much of the 21st century.

Anthropologists, in particular, and some sociologists and political scientists have mapped much of the picture of patronage and clientelist social networks—which come to be called corruption—through indispensable ethnographies. Through such sources and others, and through my previous critical study of the democratization literature (e.g., Ross, 2002, 2003, 2007), I noticed patterns—even as they mutated—across various individual behaviors, cultures, and social, political, and economic systems. I found no behavioral explanations for the durable patterns. I began analyzing them through the lens of a behavioral development theory, the model of hierarchical complexity (Commons, et al., 1998). About the same time, Cory's (2004) work on the bioneurological architecture of the human brain was published; it is now entitled dual motive theory. Cory's model afforded vital explanations for the vertical social glue that makes social networks sturdy, adaptable, and sometimes corrupt. Integrated with the behavioral analyses afforded by the MHC, the individual and social patterns and their shape-shifting

trajectories painted a new, dynamically mixed but coherent landscape. That landscape enabled a different rendering of the political economies of corruption. It underlies the paper's thesis about the endurance of the institution.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. It begins with an overview of the concept of social ties and networks to introduce the concept of reciprocity. Next, a deeper explication of reciprocity briefly introduces dual motive theory, highlighting only several elements for this analysis. The next section briefly introduces the model of hierarchical complexity (MHC) by charting a limited range of its orders of complexity that are referred to in this paper. The introduction to that Model is brief and abstract because the next major section of the paper employs it in concrete examples. Such examples help to convey differences among individual and social behaviors at different developmental stages of hierarchical complexity. A series of international examples are presented to provide just enough "story" and analysis to convey dual motives' roles in social networks and institutions at different stages of development. Following those, the developmental features in different political economies are summarized to provide generalized contexts for the examples. A closing discussion suggests implications of the paper's developmental application of dual motive theory for understanding the endurance of the institution of corruption.

Social Ties, Networks, and Reciprocity

In any setting, it can be easy to overlook the role of social ties in shaping how individuals, groups, and societies function. By permeating life, they can be virtually invisible and escape reflection or analysis. The purpose of this first section is to give an overview of the evolving roles of social ties that are the focus of this paper. Such roles are more fully described in the paper's central section. The generic term, social ties, refers to social systems. These natural social systems exist because they meet the needs of people who participate in them. Those needs include basic physiological needs, physical safety, emotional safety of belonging, economic or financial security, and the safety, security, and comfort of self-esteem, among others. Each stage of human development is characterized by such basic needs, in Maslow's (1987/1954) terms. Social systems develop and endure because humans rely upon their vital functions. The primary function is to mediate the individual and group needs with the larger environment: a reciprocal relationship. All social systems are characterized by various forms of reciprocity.

Anthropologists have long identified reciprocity as a universal found in all human societies (Brown, 1991; Cory, 2004; Gouldner, 1977). It serves as a "cornerstone of morality, rational action, and group life…and *the assiduousness with which reciprocal action and reaction are watched* also suggest some degree of innateness" (Brown, 1991, p. 108, emphasis added). Reciprocity involves social *processes*. These evolve as individuals, groups, and their environments develop and change, giving rise to different forms and functions. As they become complex, they become whole systems of processes to maintain social ties. The innateness endures because it plays a major role in keeping social systems stable (Gouldner, 1977), an essential human need.

 Early beginnings of reciprocity behaviors are apparent in various kinds of kinship groupings, where survival needs of the group result in the norm of reciprocity being embedded in the culture

of the group (e.g., Gouldner, 1977; Lutz, 1998/1988). They next evolve into a more self-interested form, for example in demographically homogenous peasant villages where social life is very stable and self-contained, with every adult pairing with numerous others to fulfill the range of social needs (Foster, 1977). This horizontal, dyadic latticework of social relations continues to operate even as vertical relations develop to compensate for deficits: the horizontal relations cannot meet expanding needs. When kingroup and local ties become inadequate to "perform linkage functions between persons of low and high status, or between the community and the nation" (Powell, 1977, p. 149) to meet needs, vertical relations between patrons and their clients develop.

The less complex forms of social ties have three consistent characteristics. They take place between two parties of unequal social or economic status, they depend on reciprocity of goods and services, and they heavily depend on in-person contact to maintain the relationship (Powell, 1977). This structure is evident in the form of feudal (Bloch, 1961) and big-man societies (Johnson & Earle, 2002; Wolf, 1997/1982). Such social systems are not confined to historical eras; they are widespread in contemporary society, evident in gangs, tribal wars, insurgencies, and mafia operations. As social groupings enlarge with population growth and geographic expansion, information and influence become additional commodities. Brokering intermediaries, i.e., "the middle man," facilitate and extend patrons' power and reach. A broker increases the "height" of the vertical relation between a patron and his or her clients. Brokers enable expanded reach for the concrete, personal contacts required at every social level. In nation-states with centralized government—weak or strong, authoritarian or democratic—multiple layers of patron-broker-client systems develop to hand resources up and down the social-political-economic ladders. The networks extend all the way through societies' apexes of power. From the national levels of government, across business and funding agency relations, and among elites that network through them all, the latticeworks of reciprocity operate in multiple guises. This paper shows how the dual motives that underlie the give and take of reciprocity construct the political economy of the world wide phenomenon called corruption. It illustrates that there is not one political economy of corruption, but many.

The foregoing concepts weave throughout this paper. They include the innate human need for social ties, the characteristic of reciprocity in enacting those ties and keeping social systems operating and stable, and functional roles, e.g., patron, broker, client. At less complex levels of social organization, all roles are played by individuals. As social systems develop more complexity, roles are accomplished by groups, organizations, and institutions, in addition to individuals. All of the roles, as described below, enact the universal pattern of reciprocity and are characterized by dual motives within each party to social transactions.

Dual Motive Theory

Although familiar connotations of reciprocity may suggest simple exchange between two actors (e.g., a gift prompts a thank-you note, a bribe prompts desired behavior), social processes of reciprocity become complex. They underlie why humans construct their not-so-simple social systems. Groups develop norms to ensure members of the groups will be able to meet predictable needs and have sufficient social stability to do so. The case examples given below illustrate the roles of various norms. Norms are often enacted unconsciously because they are embedded in the

culture of any group, rarely reflected upon all. They are "just the way things are done." This implies *systems* of doing things: social systems. Reciprocity implies systems, even if they are subtle and embedded as norms. These systems are *how* humans meet their needs, survive, and manage social, economic, and political life.

Cory's dual motive theory, based on the human brain's bioneurological architecture, explains reciprocity in terms of balancing *behavioral tensions* within the individual human organism. It offers an expanded view of the complexity of managing social life. By contrast, the simplism of the term, reciprocity, masks the very complexity that needs to be understood. Cory's concepts have more analytical power than *reciprocity* for understanding the complex layers of behaviors discussed in this paper. They alert one to the fact that these tensions play out in all human endeavors, including large social scales.

Whether informally or formally, the methods used to manage constant behavioral tensions become institutionalized as individuals and their levels of social organization evolve and adapt to changing conditions. The social sciences have coined terms to describe systems that both reflect and manage behavioral tensions. Here, the terms patron(age), broker(age), and client(elism) are used. It is noteworthy that each term has a form to refer to a particular role as well as to a *system* of roles. Dual motive theory, as applied in this paper, contributes to Gouldner's agenda (1977, p. 37), that "a full analysis of the ways in which the whole *reciprocity complex* is involved in the maintenance of social systems would require consideration of the linkages between each of its various elements and their relation to other general properties of social systems" (emphasis added).

As the examples below explicate in increasing complexity, the concept of balancing behavioral tensions explains a seemingly paradoxical relationship. For example, despite what may appear to be individuals' primary motives of self-deterministic "rational choice," it makes it possible to see such individuals' simultaneous comfort in lower ranks of power pyramids, other hierarchies, and in-groups that dictate behaviors, leaving little or no room for free agents' self-determination. Behavioral tensions describe the ongoing dynamic of the human organism's oscillations between self-interested ego and other-oriented empathy. Cory explicates a spectrum of decision-making oscillations that constantly move between two reciprocal poles at all scales from intra-personal to all social interactions.

1. Self-interested, egoistic behavior, because it lacks empathy to some degree, creates tension within us and between ourselves and others. The tension increases from low to high activity levels. And it increases as we move toward the extremes of ego. Within ourselves, the tension created by the tug of neglected empathy is experienced as a feeling of obligation to others or an expectation that they might wish to "even the score" with us. Within others, the tension created by our self-interested behavior is experienced as a feeling of imposition or hurt, accompanied by an urge to "even the score."

2. Empathetic behavior, because it denies ego or self-interest to some degree, also creates tension within ourselves and others. This tension, likewise, increases as activity levels increase and as we move toward extremes of empathy. Within ourselves, the tension created by the tug of the neglected self-interest (ego) is experienced as a feeling that "others owe us one" and a growing need to "collect our due." This tension, especially if

it continues over time, may be experienced as resentment at being exploited, taken for granted, not appreciated, or victimized by others. Within others, the tension created is experienced as a sense of obligation toward us.

The reactions that build in ourselves and others, again, are in proportion to the behavioral tension created. And again, the unmanaged, or excessive tension is experienced as behavioral stress. (Cory, 2004, p. 25)

Through case examples from others' research, this paper puts social flesh on the concept of dual motives. All living systems have a complex of internal modes of regulation so they do not spin out of control; social systems and the individual human are no exception. In short, they are feedback systems. Behavioral tensions are human and social regulators. When tensions increase, they deliver information to organisms and systems that things are moving further from a more stable-feeling, comfortable equilibrium. When tensions decrease, there is a sense of more stability and safety. Behaviors of individuals, social groups, and societies both manage and indicate these tensions through giving and receiving feedback.

Individual and social systems are laced with feedback processes. The latticeworks of vertical and horizontal social organization described in this paper are complexly layered feedback systems. They have been studied under the names of patronage, brokerage, and clientelism. On the surface, they may appear to deliver only the goods, services, information, and influence that are discussed in examples below. Beneath the surface, there is a universal bioneurological basis *for* the behavioral activity: reciprocal interactions to manage behavioral tensions. Each interaction delivers and elicits feedback about current and expected stability. The feedback offers a stimulus; if received, there is a response. The perception of stimuli and the responses to them depend upon the hierarchical complexity of the individual or social system involved.

Model of Hierarchical Complexity

The model of hierarchical complexity, originating from work in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Commons, & Richards, 1984) stands as a universal, cross-cultural, cross-species theory (see Commons & Ross, 2008). Its application is independent of context and content. As a behavioral task measurement theory, it distinguishes between stimuli (task) and response (performance), and distinguishes discontinuous, scorable orders of complexity that apply across any domain of activity (for examples and more discussion, see Commons, Rodriguez, Miller, Ross, Locicero, Goodheart, & Danaher-Gilpin, 2007). While it defines 14 orders of complexity, ranging from simple machine language to innovations of geniuses such as Einstein, only four orders apply to the stages of individual and social behaviors evident in the spectrum presented here. Those orders are introduced briefly in Table 1.

Table 1. Orders of Hierarchical Complexity Evident in Political Economies

Order or stage	Order or stage name	General descriptions of tasks performed
8	Concrete	Carry out full arithmetic, form cliques, plan deals. Do long division, follow certain social rules, limited ability to take and coordinate perspective of other and self. Use variables of simple interrelations; talks about concrete evens, e.g., social events, what happened among others; makes reasonable deals. Task: There are behaviors that order the simple arithmetic behaviors when multiplying a sum by a number. Such distributive behaviors require the simple arithmetic behavior as a prerequisite, not just a precursor. $5(1 + 3) = 5(1) + 5(3) = 5 + 15 = 20$ Also: Short time horizon, avoids shame,
9	Abstract	Discriminate variables such as stereotypes; use logical quantification; form variables out of finite classes; make and quantify propositions; use variable time, place, act, actor, state, type; uses quantifiers (all, none, some); make categorical assertions (e.g., ⱯWe all die.@); Form a class based on an abstract feature. Task: All the forms of five in the five rows in the example are equivalent in value, x = 5. Also: Seeks group membership, status, and is loyal to in-group and dogma; places high value on saving face.
10	Formal	Argue using empirical or logical evidence; logic is linear, one-dimensional; use Boolean logic=s connectives (not, and, or, if, if and only if); solve problems with one unknown using algebra, logic, and empiricism; form relationships out of variables; use terms such as if . . . then, thus, therefore, because; favor correct scientific solutions. Task: The general left hand distributive relation is $x * (y + z) = (x * y) + (x * z)$ Also: seeks causes and solves problems based on one input (causal) variable; reflects dogmatism; accepts feedback only from objectively acknowledged masters; uses longer-term thinking to achieve results.
11	Systematic	Construct multivariate systems and matrices, coordinate more than one variable as input; situate events and ideas in a larger context, i.e., considers relationships in contexts (e.g., present and historical); form or conceive systems out of relations: legal, societal, corporate, economic, national. Task: The right hand distribution law is not true for numbers but is true for proportions and sets. $x + (y * z) = (x * y) + (x * z)$ $x \cup (y \cap z) = (x \cup y) \cap (x \cup z)$ *Symbols:* $\cup$ = union (total elements); $\cap$ = intersection (overlap, elements in common) Also: Constructs higher level abstractions (e.g., "transparency," "accountability," "legitimation"); exhibits relativism while juxtaposing multiple relations; inclines toward infrequent judgment of others; starts to recognize self as system.

Note: From "Applying the model of hierarchical complexity" (pp. 61-62), M. L. Commons, J. A. Rodriguez, P. M. Miller, S. N. Ross, A. Locicero, E. A. Goodheart, and D. Danaher-Gilpin, 2007, Cambridge, MA: Dare Association, Inc. Copyright 1991-2007 by Dare Association, Inc. Adapted with permission.

A Developmental Trajectory of Examples

To provide tangible contexts for how dual motives manifest in social processes and systems, the examples below illustrate their developmental progressions of increasing hierarchical complexity. The first sections illustrate how dual motives play out in simple societies scored at the concrete stage. The next sections illustrate more complex behaviors and social systems, first at the abstract stage and then at the formal stage. The progression indicates what people and groups do to adapt and meet changing basic needs. Hierarchical complexity accounts for the differences in how the dual motives of self-interested ego and other-oriented empathy can be seen to play out in these social systems.

Figure 1 serves as an orienting framework for the progression to increasing social complexity covered in the examples, portraying both horizontal and vertical systems of social ties. The vertical layers indicate that patrons, themselves, are clients of the next higher layer. Figure 1 emphasizes this analytical insight because it is crucial for understanding political economies: dual motives manifest in the same person or entity *differently* because dual social roles are played. The vertical layers indicate that an intermediary brokerage role develops between patrons and their clients. As the examples narrated below become more complex, they are accompanied by more discussion to explain and highlight key features. Indicated but not discussed is the effect of squeezing lower level networks out of the mainstream (but see Ross, 2006). A summary of the most relevant analytic features is provided after the progressive presentation of examples is completed.

Key to Figure 1.

Figure 1. Evolution of social complexity: Latticeworks of Dual Motive Relationships

Survival and Safety: Concrete Behavioral Tasks Exhibit Ego and Empathy

A small family or tribal group or village society characterized by simple, sequential reasoning illustrates the roots of ego-empathy power relations and human tendencies to socially organize around meeting the demands of dual motives. Lutz's (1988/1998) ethnography of the Micronesian Ifaluk indicates that Ifaluk claims of *justifiable anger* are the real indicator of power relations and the core moral code of that society. Lutz's case shows how concrete stage reasoning balances ego-empathy behavioral tensions.

In Ifaluk society, where dangers are daily concerns, the norm of calm, nurturing behavior helps ensure that people (a) do not frighten one another, which would add stress to their already stressful subsistence conditions, (b) live the norm of caring for each other, and (c) feel secure in relationship-attachments that otherwise feel at risk of loss (Lutz, 1988/1998). While Ifaluk portrayed care and nurture as "mature and altruistic," Lutz had another observation: that care of the needy (e.g., those without kin) "allows for and legitimates control over the needy person…… [if denied] the opportunity of caring for others, they are unable to control others, and in being unable to do so, they cannot command respect, which has both socioemotional and more tangible rewards" (p. 142).

The script that plays out in everyday Ifaluk life when justifiable anger is expressed (Lutz, 1988/1998) reflects ego and empathy oscillations of dual motives. An objectionable action is performed by person 1, evoking expression of justifiable anger by person 2; thus chastised, person 1 is expected to become "fearful/anxious" (p. 175) and the expected conformity with harmony is restored with each person's status, at that time, clarified in the process. Person 2 demanded respect in reaction to the behavior and person 1 accommodated. Lutz observes that such daily occurrences are "like a red flag, marking the form of, and fissures in, Ifaluk sociopolitical structures" (p. 174); in Cory's terms, these are the behavioral tensions of daily life. Lutz reports that in most cases, such interchanges reflect the social hierarchy by the downward direction of the flow of justifiable anger from one who is older or otherwise of higher status to one who has lower status. Thus, the social system's equilibrium is under constant maintenance, in effect by every member in the system as he or she performs a norm-dictated role.

More Concrete Transactions: A Precursor Form of Patron-Client Systems

Various kinds of small social systems display the roots of later, more explicit forms of patronage. Anthropologists identify different social structures in lineage descent and bilateral kinship groups in peasant villages. A model for the social structure of the dyadic contract in peasant villages shows a precursor form of patronage.

Foster's (1977) model proposes that in societies with structural features similar to peasant villages such as Tzintzuntzan, Mexico, where residents share the same socio-economic status, that "every adult" develops informal but real contractual relationships with contacts beyond the immediate family (p. 16). Sometimes called *compadrazgo*, referring to god-parent (compadre) relationships in Catholicized areas, the dyadic relations go beyond the godparent role and can include siblings, neighbors, and friends. There are two distinct forms these contracts take, both based on reciprocal relations, and we can image them together as forming a social latticework

with both horizontal and vertical dimensions: this latticework appears throughout the remaining analyses here. Foster's analysis focuses specifically on the first of the two dynamics; later sections of this paper discuss forms of the second dynamic via separate cases.

The symmetrical contracts Foster examines most closely are made between socio-economic equals, whether of the same village or another. The reciprocal exchanges of goods and services are complementary by virtue of being basically the same over time, and are "continually exchanged" as the "glue that holds his [sic] society together and the grease that smoothes its running" (pp. 17-18). For the adult, these exchanges link the institutions of family, compadrazgo, and neighbors and friends into a coherent social world, and to the observer, that social world is a crisscrossed network of many linkages and many individual nodes. Foster found that "no two people have the same combination of compadres" (p. 22), as is the nature of dyads (Lande, 1977). A key characteristic of these contracts is that they represent the solidity of the relationship, and while they are in effect, they never balance out to zero. In bookkeeping terms,

> A functional requirement of the system is that an exactly even balance between two partners never be struck. This would jeopardize the whole relationship…the contract would cease to exist….The dyadic contract is effective precisely because partners are never quite sure of their relative positions at a given moment. As long as they know that goods and services are flowing both ways in roughly equal amounts over time, they know their relationship is solidly based. (Foster, 1977, p. 23)

The overall social stability of such peasant villages is due to the thoroughly embedded symmetrical dyads. Because such communities' inhabitants share the same socio-economic status, there are no factions, no divisive dynamics. Foster explains that villagers tend to be distrustful, suspicious, and back-stabbing toward their neighbors, and attempt to diminish any who gets ahead. The result is that they are "reluctant to join in cooperative enterprises of any kind" (p. 20), and they resisted all previous "outside attempts to stimulate cooperative action for community improve[ment]. People consistently are reluctant to work with others toward group goals" (p. 27). Thus, when a society is so thoroughly constructed as a network of dyadic relations, where no two people have the same compadres, nothing concrete arises for people to set themselves for or against that would otherwise result in factions. Such communities are striking examples, then, of humans constructing very stable, resistant-to-change social systems, where subsistence, security, and social nurturing needs appear to be adequately met within the system. The village bickering and backstabbing, conflictual dynamics offer the behavioral tension-releasing side of the reciprocity-power relations dyad. This form of managing dual motives appears adequate to meet individuals' needs at the concrete operational level. It results in mild degrees of interior and exterior tension.

Since the remainder of this paper focuses primarily on the asymmetric and vertical patron-client relations, it is important to underscore that this horizontal lattice of social networking comprised of dyadic relations is concurrent and also serves the vertical relations in various ways, some of which will be highlighted. The first way it serves them, of course, is by being a prototype for the vertical contracts, and secondly, they form a broad firm base of reliance on the higher social layer of patrons and brokers. Such horizontal relationships are means by which humans survive when societies sever or do not construct a social contract with their members.

This is the underbelly of developed societies, and in Figure 1 is represented by those systems that have slid out from under—or been squeezed out of—the main social structures, to the fringes of society.

Early Forms of Patron-Client Systems: Big-Men, Chiefdom, and Feudal Societies

Asymmetrical contracts are qualitatively different because the two parties have different socio-economic statuses and exchange non-complementary goods and services that are different in nature from one party to the other (Auyero, 2000; Foster, 1977). These represent the patron-client relationship. The flow of exchanges always takes place over time as an inherent feature of the social structure, but "it is difficult and sometimes impossible to strike an equivalence in time and monetary value" (Foster, p. 17). This discussion combines several societal forms that develop from different trajectories, times, and places, because they derive from the same levels of hierarchical complexity and illustrate common functions and relationships—including those evident in the highest reaches of today's advanced societies.

As societies become more complex, the layers of explicit stratification grow. Where the Ifaluk had two distinct layers, the people and the chiefs, more complex societies generally evidence four: the immediate household, a cluster of patrilinear households, clan, and local geographic group (Johnson & Earle, 2000). Now the social layers and scales appear clearly, each having horizontal and vertical networks that could be imaged as a four-dimensional social latticework that expands and evolves over time. From this village level of organization spring the dynamics of competition for leadership and status, and needs for representation with outsiders and early forms of political economy (Johnson & Earle, 2000).

In kinship groups the whole organization of society is oriented to the corporate group and maintaining exchange networks to furnish basic needs (Johnson & Earle, 2000). As circumstances and needs dictate that exchanges must be sought with outsiders, chiefs of kinship groups become the first patrons to study. The social systems and their assumptions generated by humans operating at this concrete stage of development will demonstrate, below, the progression to domination/submission as tensions between reciprocity and self-interest move further out of balance between the poles in dual motive theory's algorithms. Through this focus on big men, chiefs, and feudal lords emerge stark looks at the patron's needs and function, the development of factions, an introduction to the context of brokerage, and the needs of clients. These elements construct a picture like an x-ray by which to gaze at the skeleton of contemporary social structures, including those that support corruption.

Patrons by definition must have resources to provide their clients—the group—and those resources introduce new social classes of haves and have-nots. Such a chief needs to create the institution of political power that kinship groupings lack, a radical transformation of the societal structure involving new leader-follower and in-group, out-group classes (Johnson & Earle, 2000; Sahlins, 1977; Wolf, 1982/1997). He can do this only by developing "new political instruments of domination" that guarantee him "independent power over resources," and the redirection of some of the social labor under his control is the mechanism available (Wolf, p. 99). The exploitation inherent in this mode of production is starkly evident as the big-man stockpiles a "fund of power" (Malinowski, as quoted in Sahlins, 1977, p. 223) and creates and exploits

relations to "give him leverage on other's production and the ability to siphon off an excess product—or sometimes he can cut down their consumption in the interest of the siphon" (Sahlins, 1977, p. 223). Stemming from inhabited environment and whether a society is pastoral, horticultural, or coastal, the resources and surpluses that big-man leadership controls may be primarily defensive or economic in nature (Johnson & Earle, 2000) but the extraction dynamics that develop are found in those big-man polities that are "well delineated" (Sahlins, 1977, p. 224).

It has been observed that followers' compliance is a result of relationship-specific motivations in connection with the leader (Pospisil, as cited in Sahlins, 1977). Sahlins takes the systemic analysis deeper, citing an inevitable contradiction embedded in the relationship. The *initial* reciprocal relationship between the leader and each of his factional followers (discussed below) has the general asymmetrical structure of patronage. As it becomes complicated by the demands of keeping resources flowing and of increasing power and renown, the structure begins to feed on itself to keep the cycle intact. This classic pattern merits Sahlin's own words.

> Here it is important that not merely his own status, but the standing and perhaps military security of his people depend on the big-mans' achievements in public distribution. Established at the head of a sizeable faction, a center-man comes under increasing pressure to extract goods from his followers, to delay reciprocities owing them, and to deflect incoming goods back into external circulation [rather than to immediate followers]. Success in competition with other big-men particularly undermines internal-factional reciprocities: such success is precisely measurable by the ability to give outsiders more than they can possibly reciprocate…. Some center-men appear more able than others to dam the inevitable tide of discontent that mounts within their factions…. But paradoxically the ultimate defense of the center-man's position is some slackening of his drive to enlarge the funds of power. The alternative is much worse [and is illustrated by his subsequent list of sometimes gruesome consequences captured in the anthropological record]. (pp. 223-224)

In a similar way, feudal systems developed when kin group ties "proved inadequate" and were unequal rather than hierarchical structures, with "rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men" (Bloch, 1961, p. 443). Bloch traces how feudalism in Europe—which existed elsewhere, e.g., Japan—was the result of the "violent dissolution of older societies" (p. 443). The record suggests people in feudal times demonstrate the same concrete reasoning structures as other early social systems, which may be an integral, contributing factor in the violent dissolutions. Violent concrete stage behaviors are also observable in contemporary times, whether in Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, or in inner cities.

The tensions for the big-man, chief, and feudal lord systems arise from the conditions that gave rise to the structures themselves. As such leaders create and maintain a following, or faction, and engage their dealings with the environment outside that circle, they situate themselves in the tiny neck of an hourglass, with time and supplies always running out before the pole's demands must be filled, often from the same source it just supplied. Sahlins (1977) likens this inherent pressure on such a "center-man" to "a kind of two-sidedness in authority…a division of the big-man's field of influence into two distinct sectors" (p. 222). The smaller sector

is the internal one comprised of personal followers, which Sahlins reports can number up to 80 in, for example, Melanesia. This is about the maximum size for concrete stage leadership to manage (M. Commons, 2005, personal communication). Big-man collectivities can range in size from 20 to 800, and chiefdoms communities from 200 to 500 (Johnson & Earle, 2000). The latticeworks of social pyramids enable larger populations to be coordinated.

From the realm of internal power over followers there is a "qualitative change" as the big-man turns outward to the larger "tribal galaxy" where not power but "only fame and indirect influence" (p. 222) are his tools to compete against other such leaders. The evolutionary dynamic of leaders rising to powerful positions in control of resources includes public vertical relationships beyond those found in family groupings. Big-men factions in large communities faced a pragmatic demand of dual motives to serve the sorts of functions discussed next.

The Appearance of the Brokerage Function

Warfare, leaders' extravagance, the exercise of powerful control, and new modes of production characterize these societies, but should not be a distraction from another important social structure that evolved as an integral part of those activities: brokerage rooted in the early factions that were the first public, vertical relationships. In both chiefdoms and feudal societies arise the early forms of brokerage, in the warrior elite (Johnson & Earle, 2000) of the former, and in the lords' knights, vassals, and tenants (Bloch, 1961) of the latter. Regardless of setting, the function of brokerage is to extend the reciprocal reach, influence, control, and power of the patron. The personal contact required at the developmental stage of concrete operations appears consistently throughout these different societal contexts and evolves naturally from factions to brokerage.

The roots of this function originate in the core need met in dyadic relationships: the concrete, face-to-face contact with the other party to the agreement. This connective function is essential since, outside of periodic public performances, the leader cannot be everywhere at once and needs surrogate functions performed by his followers. The chain of vertical relationships can take the form of a pyramid, where each follower develops a layer of followers beneath him that extends his reach in passing resources up and down the social and economic ladder (e.g., Schmidt, 1977). At each layer, the face-to-face contact serves as the social glue. Brokers have a clientage relationship with their patron, and a patronage relationship with their clients, forming the basic building block of the pyramid structure in Figure 2: "Thus the patron-broker-client network pyramid is created by the stacking up and combining of many dyadic patron-client networks" (Schmidt, 1977, p. 306). Depending on population size and its needs, and the locus and distance of resources to meet those needs, the pyramid rises into higher social levels comprised of the same patron-broker-client building block.

Formal Government Program, Abstract Leadership, and Concrete Followership

Once brokerage's systemic function became more widely studied through accruing case studies of more complex societies, the term *clientelism* developed as a general way to refer to the social structure of patron-broker-client (Scott, 1977). When this structure operates in the context

of political parties—as it seems to always do, although also in other contexts—it is called *political clientelism*. Auyero (2000) adopts the term "*personalized political mediation*" (p. 26, emphasis in the original) to highlight the functions of "problem-solving networks" among the poor, "the *microphysics of politics*" (p. 24, emphasis added). As this case indicates, that microphysics is thoroughly economic as well.

The barest essential features of this microphysics are: (1) the thorough embeddedness of clientelism in socio-political life; (2) how clientelism derives from concrete and abstract stage behaviors and affects individual and collective development; and, (3) how the norm of reciprocity manifests in the economic relations and transactions. These are organic system dynamics that illuminate ego-empathy behavioral tensions. The presentation of an Argentine shantytown case takes the form of a summary of the clientelist practices and graphic images of the complex networks of actors' dual motives therein.

Before illustrating the clientelist structure Auyero describes, the narrative in this section sketches primary features of his network findings, with occasional bracketed supplements of my own.

1. Around each person in a leadership role there is an inner circle or faction characterized by intense, frequent personal relationships. Depending on the leader, family members may be active participants in the faction. Ties between the leader and members of the inner circle are thus fictive kinship if not blood kinship in nature. The leader of a faction has a dyadic patronage relationship with the clients—"personal satellites" (Sahlins, 1977, as quoted in Auyero, p. 91) —who are in this inner circle (and familial relationships may co-exist with it). The degree and nature of personal contact correlates with the leader's influence. People performing top-of-the-pyramid functions have a circle of closer contacts than those performing mid- or bottom-of-the-pyramid functions with less intense but nonetheless face-to-face dyadic contacts. This core feature results in vertical networks of relationships. Members of a leader's inner circle do not compete with each other unless their self-interests are at stake in a particular situation. Note that leaders of different factions on each socio-political scale of influence comprise an elite at each scale. This results in horizontal elite networks.

2. Each person in the inner circle depends in some way upon the leader's patronage and serves the leader's needs in degrees that depend on the leader's span of influence and the nature of activities chosen to promote it. In order to serve the leader's needs and (conscious or unconscious) self-interests that can be served by doing so, each factional member develops and maintains a factional inner circle of his/her own. Note that this results in an elite at a lower social scale, another horizontal network.

3. Means of being accessible to and attracting more clients are essential, and take various forms, because they serve as the infrastructure of the clientelist pyramid that conducts the flows of resources and services. Local base units (*Unidad Basica,* or UB, in Villa Paraiso; precinct or ward in the U.S.) provide physical location for face-to-face client contact, just as do regular visiting hours or soup kitchens conducted in a broker's home.

The opening of new physical locations is a means of creating or expanding territory to increase a base of political power.

4. To gain and remain in a brokerage position, the two central functions of "gatekeeping and information hoarding" (p. 96) are essential. Since the flow of goods and services down to clients correlates directly with the volume of services received from clients, strategies include both obstructing and facilitating flows to certain constituencies. Public service and other information is funneled through elites to pass down to their followings; the more vital the information that is hoarded (e.g., dates for periodic distributions of specific food rations), the more dependency that is created.

5. Horizontal family and neighborhood networks reciprocate in serving poor persons' survival needs. Members of these informal networks may be clients of different brokers (defined above as a patron from the client perspective). Additional horizontal networks develop and overlap among people at various social scales as high-level patrons' diverse activities are furthered by numerous members of inner circles at the different social scales. These overlapping relationships at scales from bottom to top comprise multiple sets of dual motives' problem-solving network, the structure of political clientelism.

6. There are gangs outside of the network that people in the networked system look down upon and are fearful of.

The clientelist system of problem solving is comprised of these core features, at minimum. Fractal-like, factional circles form around elites at each social scale, resulting in multiple pyramids of localized influence. Each node in the network strengthens both horizontal and vertical ties, which satisfy as many subjectively defined core needs as humans have been able to devise to do so. The following two graphic illustrations together portray the overlapping vertical and horizontal networks evident in this case. Figure 2 presents the pyramidal structure of the Para Vida program (which seems representative of state-level social welfare programs in general), and Figure 3 shows the functions for handing resources up and down the pyramidal structure in a depiction of the shantytown's network of vertical relationships. These are comprised of roles for individuals and organized entities such as brokers' community centers, indicated as "UBs."

Key to Figures 2 and 3: The dual-colored circle is used to represent dual roles as patron and client within a larger system. The circle may stand for an individual, group, or organized entity that has dual roles. The green half is positioned in the figures to indicate the receiving role of a client in the network system. The orange half is positioned to indicate the delivering role of a patron in the network system.

Figure 2. A Partial Representation of the pyramidal structure of the Para Vida food

Figure 3. Villa Paraisio's Peronist Problem-Solving

Political Clientelism: Developmental Shape-Shifting

As living systems, humans' social system dynamics adapt organically to changes in the environment, while retaining earlier capabilities that may be important insurance if the environment reverts to previous conditions. When conditions make it feasible, it is more efficient, productive, and satisfying to adopt new ways of relating and conducting transactions that replace earlier modes. Komito (1985) investigated how Dublin residents manage to acquire needed resources, especially those available from state agencies, and "traced the exchanges between voter, politician, and bureaucrat that revolve around public needs" (p. vi). He found that information needs outweigh material needs, while also identifying where the state has failed the social contract to assure the poor's basic needs are met. He found that

> Irish clientelism is no less significant for this lack of material exchange. Clientelism provides voters with a personal and moral link with the state and so maintains support for the existing political and administrative structure. It compensates for the relative impersonalism of universalistic values by infusing exchanges with personalistic qualities of trust and solidarity. Finally, this study shows the importance of information as a brokerage resource. The structures and procedures of the state bureaucracy prevent the public from having access to information about state benefits. This closed bureaucratic system makes information a valuable resource for politicians. (p. 163)

From the top to the bottom, "an Irish political party is a pyramid of patron-client links" (p. 62). The needs of the politicians at the apex of a party pyramid are concerned with recruiting and maintaining "allies" (p. 61) and clients to buffer threats from party conflict and competition at that level. Their patronage activity includes control of positions into which a lower level politician can be placed as a client that helps the senior member in various ways depending on the position (e.g., votes, interpersonal conflicts). The client's benefit is the acceleration in the climb through the party ranks. Each of the levels running from local up to national have characteristics of big-man societies in the cut-throat competition within each horizontal plane. At the local level the "zero-sum game" (p. 56) is characterized by such conflict.

> The conflict within the local party arena goes on all the time and is the reason why politicians are always attending party branch meetings; they want to keep things under control. The basic question of constituency politics is "whose man are you?" and it is impossible not to be somebody's man. There is no way to avoid local factional conflicts; one must be aligned to someone. Local branch politics do not permit a person to be neutral; if he tried to be, he would simply be trusted by no one. (p. 58)

Brokering With the Public. Expectations of brokerage services are linked with socio-economic class *origin* rather than current status. He found "socialization has a lasting influence on *beliefs* regarding politicians' roles as brokers, which is not altered by subsequent changes in socio-economic circumstances… [to the contrary] current class status, rather than class origin, determines brokerage *strategies*" (p. 82, emphasis added). The personal contact that characterizes the local politician's dyadic relation with a citizen results in a patron-client relation at the dyadic level with a brokerage function at the systemic level. The politician's big-man party behavior transforms into that of a kindly, attentive, and patronly figure when nurturing relations with potential voters. In Dublin, the transaction *content* is that of information and services from

the patron role, rather than provisions of sustenance needs and other material goods, or personally hiring a client to obtain services from him/her. Further, the information and services are public in nature. Komito observes that "Irish politics appears dominated by the 'privatization' of public goods: politicians provide (or appear to provide) government services to voters who, in exchange, become their clients" (p. 103).

However, politicians assume that many clients shop around for the best bargain available among nearby politicians, and further, they have no way of knowing if a client actually casts a vote for them. Their attempts to cultivate connections with individuals are designed to "create the aura of a special personal relationship [that will] engender a sense of moral obligation on the part of the voter, who will reciprocate at election day" (p. 102).

The Role of Bureaucracy. Since there is no guarantee of payoff from helping clients, politicians use their knowledge of the system and social programs to write to or contact appropriate officials, often impressing clients with their ability to get results: "They exaggerate their influence over state services in order to make a greater moral claim on voters' support. [They] encourage voters' dependency, and make little attempt to disabuse them of their beliefs in the efficacy of brokerage" (Komito, 1985, p. 112). Those beliefs play a role in the endurance of brokerage. In behavior analysis, the delivery of reinforcement independent of behavior produces extremely strong responding. The fact of the non-contingent nature makes the behavior quite independent of the consequences; this fosters superstition (M. Commons, personal communication, June 2005).

A multi-leveled look at the Irish bureaucracy's entrenchment as a barrier of "distrust and anonymity" (p. 147) between its servants and the public indicates that the "administrative system operates to restrict information to a very few people" and results in giving politicians "control over these resources of access, information, and influence" (p. 114), thus, "instead of reciprocal rights and duties, the welfare scheme becomes authoritarian; the official makes any decision he wants and the applicant is dependent on his magnanimity" (p. 115).

The Abstract/Formal Mixture of Dublin Clientelism. The Dublin study describes a stable social system operating at a level above that of traditional clientelist forms that meet daily subsistence needs. It provides an important look at the interacting dimensions of culture, structure, and individual needs and capacities that make Dublin clientelism, at the time of the study, a durable, closed system. Clientelist behaviors are integral to the lives of a significant portion of the population. At the core of the system are its institutionalized structural supports. At this abstract/formal stage mixture of social development, the presence of an impersonal, inefficiently layered bureaucratic structure both makes possible the social contract constituents need and also blocks not only access to its benefits but also their continuing need for concrete, dyadic personal contacts as they navigate their lives. The hierarchically rigid, procedural-bound civil service is the perfect environment for the conventional, abstract reasoning of the career bureaucrats trained into the system. In their isolation, the only needs that are concrete to them are their own and that of preserving the status quo.

In this system, politicians "are forced" (p. 106) to create as many personal links as possible to get votes to beat intra-party competition. Politicians' efforts to build wide horizontal networks through their close followers and community clients are required by the pyramidal patronage

form and function of the party that forces them into the community and its needed brokerage roles to survive as politicians. The civil service and party structures are both products and agents of the cultures that shape them and the different actors' needs within and without.

Komito mentions only tangentially a crucial dimension in socio-economic behavior analysis: those citizens whose status or capacities result in low levels of contact with government services. When they need services, they rely more upon their contacts with family, friends, neighbors who are officials, and occasionally politicians, because the system does not "work" for them, either. Political clientelism operates at a social level beyond the very poor's daily subsistence needs.

> To some extent, clientelism is a formalized preference for dealing with friends. Personal contacts are formalized throughout Irish society…. There is, in Ireland, a "tendency to operate through personal contacts rather than through organizational procedures" (Pyne, 1974: 34) but the resource of "personal contacts" is unevenly distributed throughout the population. It is the unequal distribution of such contacts, due to economic and social differences, that is relevant. (p. 161)

Developmental Spectrum of Patronage and Clientelism in the U.S. System

U.S. cases provide a look at patronage and clientelism in political parties and Congress. These dynamics constitute the overall system. Periodic uproars over such unveilings as the Abromoff scandal and more recently, the U.S. Justice Department's firing of prosecutors suggest only the tips of ongoing patronage systems few seem to assume endure. Freedman (1994) acknowledges that, in the U.S., patronage is considered by many to be a largely bygone institution that no longer plays a meaningful role in U.S. politics. Her own and others' suspicions are that

> patronage is still a feature of the American political landscape. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, those who are in the know don't want to talk. Patronage has gone underground. No one wants to admit to a practice that bears the taint of corrupt machine politics. And, now that many forms of patronage have become illegal as a result of a series of laws and Supreme Court decisions, openly discussing patronage has become even more foolhardy. Probably because of the obstacles involved, the [U.S.] literature on patronage is quite sparse. (p. vii)

Whether or not patronage is viewed as tainted is a matter of perspective in the US and elsewhere. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court's majority ruled in the Rutan case that patronage, in the form of politically based hiring, was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent that patronage is a "venerable and accepted tradition" and "bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic" (Scalia, 1990, as quoted in Freedman, 1994, p. 8). The Rutan case and Freedman's usage of the term confine patronage to the rewarding of supporters with appointments to government jobs for partisan reasons. Indicative quotes below indicate the role of dual motives in the practice U.S. patronage.

> "You can't keep an organization together without patronage. Men ain't in politics for nothin'. They want to get somethin' out of it." (Plunkitt, Tammany Hall leader, in Riordon, 1963, as quoted in Freedman, p. 15)

"You've got to have people in government who are politically smart. ... This means they have to understand that part of politics is the art of obligation." (Lindsay, late-60s New York mayor, in Tolchin & Tolchin, 1972, as quoted in Freedman, p. 25)

"If we can't have fun by getting our side in, we shouldn't be a party to begin with …. I don't need the hassle of politics if I can't get my friends and children jobs." (Indiana politico, in 1990 *Indianapolis Star*, as quoted by Freedman, p. 82)

Clientelist structures enable dual motives to develop new forms of exchange for meeting new needs. As the environment allows some individuals' basic in-group identity and rule-bound (and thereby security) needs to be met sufficiently, ego needs for self-determination emerge as a natural course of development, and. their reasoning gradually develops the strategic capacities that reflect a formal, linear logic stage of hierarchical complexity. The time horizons incorporated into strategies become longer than could be considered earlier, and transactions can be conceived of as exchanges with a less concrete nature than jobs, although jobs continue to be a currency of exchange. While "individualist" is a label frequently applied to behaviors at this stage of hierarchical complexity, it emphasizes the ego-pole, masking the deeper needs still operating beneath the surface toward the empathy-pole. The empathy side is evidenced in behaviors that are still highly conventional, with the individuals attached to their identity with in-groups that may now be chosen for strategic purposes. The vertical patron-broker-client pyramid is a comfortably familiar structure where they know the ropes and the rules of the game and can enact their hero's journey" up the organizational ladders and across the horizontal networks of the political and business playing fields. At this stage, there is no desire to change the structure; rather, due to its familiarity, it can be "worked" to advantage. At this stage, there is savvy aplenty to launder the transactions by whichever currency of exchange will seal the deal.

In all too frequent error, the individualistic side of the human coin at this stage is mistaken *as* the coin. This may be the chief reason that the scale of systemic patronage and clientelism in the higher reaches of U.S. and other Western institutions go mostly unrecognized for what they really are. And too often, the *corruption* label artificially detaches acts and their actors from the systemic cord that traverses an entire network of exchanges, like the Peronist problem-solving network represented in Figures 2 and 3 that suggest the hierarchical skeleton of social structures that are innate at several levels of human development.

Based on humans' evolutionary trajectory to date, it is evident that they have a "predisposition for hierarchically structured social and political systems" (Somit & Peterson, 1997, as cited in Cory, 2004, p. 26). Most social structures are the linear ones inherent in hierarchical organization. This tendency can be accounted for in a number of ways; for simplicity here, I select three related factors. The socio-cultural evolutionary path traced in this paper demonstrates that humans build on and modify their social systems in the course of adapting to changes in the environment, retaining successful ways of relating and creating new ones. Thus, ancient patterns are carried forward as long as they continue to work the way the user needs them to work. From the developmental perspective, the imaginative and logical capacity available to create new ways of relating is limited (and conversely, expanded) by the structures of reasoning people have managed to develop in their socio-cultural context. Finally, the bioneurological dimension plays a dynamic role in how humans interact within the social systems they create.

An integration of these three dimensions can explicate the polarity of ego and empathy in the widespread strategic-individualistic stage of hierarchical complexity, the formal logic of rational choice agents. The idea of the rational choice agent appears not only in political science but also in economics. Cory's critique of prevailing economic theory is at the same time a critique of this prevailing idea, because economic assumptions have been based on it. He explicates the "logical fallacy" (p. 80) and its shortfalls, essential in understanding political economies of corruption.

> The confounding of *self-reference* with *self-interest* is, in fact, a fundamental fallacy of the entire traditional economic approach. The fallacy allows the subsuming of all motives under the rubric of self-interest and obscures the roughly equal role of empathy. Taking the individual as the starting point, microeconomic theory [and often, political theory] mistakenly *transforms* this individual or self-referential *perspective* into an all-inclusive *motive* of self-interest. From this logically unwarranted transformation any other motive is, thus, obscured or swallowed up in self-interest. Therefore empathy—and its derivatives of cooperation and altruism, even love—cannot be considered true motives. They must, therefore, be trivialized as tastes or preferences indistinguishable in significance from such banalities as coffee, tea, or milk. But as we saw . . . under the sweeping searchlight of the social brain dynamic, the hidden duality of ego and empathy is revealed in every demand curve [domination] and supply curve [submission], especially when both are combined to show price [social-political] equilibrium. The dual roles are always present implicitly if not explicitly. The supplier performs the empathetic role; the demander performs the egoistic role. (p. 80)

One pitfall of such assumptions is misapprehending the real nature of human transactions. However, it is possible to develop a more realistic understanding of agents' behaviors. For example, the transaction between a client and broker can look like power/ego in the broker prevailing over powerless-need/empathy in the client. The lens can simultaneously view the supply/empathy in the broker and the demand/ego in the client. Herein may lie the secret of the social system's stability, stable as long as it "feeds the balance" of each transaction-party's poles in sufficient degrees to keep them in the system. And they are locked in the system, from their perspective, when no alternative exists.

A hierarchical structure affords a comfortable operating environment for many individualistic persons because it supplies the demands of both ego and empathy poles in an extremely stable fashion. Especially initially, the goals and challenges such persons set for themselves in work and social environments tend to stretch the ego's confidence as it launches out on its own. There is ballast, though, in the in-group(s) of chosen association, like a safe harbor to return to, and this anchoring in a preferred group is characteristic of these individuals. As confidence and experience grow, such people are often viewed as being in their prime, taking leadership roles of various kinds, strategizing and making deals that make things happen in the orbit they have constructed for themselves within the larger system, whatever it is.

In relating with a patron, the individualistic client both supplies the patron with service of some kind (empathy) and demands from the patron an exchange of some kind (ego). The reverse is true for the patron. Later, when that client operates in a patron (or boss) role toward his or her own client(s) (or subordinates), the donned ego role of patron can directly balance the donned empathy role of client the person plays with his or her own patron. The system acts as an

external and internal stabilizer as humans meet their diverse needs. The human actors' interactions are the homeostatic regulator in the social system. Finally, the needs of the strongly individualistic person are "weighted" on the ego side of the spectrum *because* the developmental challenge at that stage *is* to strengthen the ego beyond its conventional operations. Yet, as Cory asserts, there are inherent balancing dynamics with empathy, and the foregoing suggest the diverse ways that an individualistic person can perform within a hierarchical system, such as the U.S. Congress, to which this discussion now turns.

The Tribes on the Hill

Weatherford (1985) initially expected that this anthropological study would enable him to do comparative analyses between Congress and such legislatures as Germany's Bundestag, Iceland's Althing, or the then-USSR's Supreme Soviet. He found that modern parliaments had little comparative basis with Congress. Instead, he realized the daily congressional activity was "better explained by the practices" of tribes in Venezuela, the Amazon Basin, or New Guinea, and he "saw more parallels, contrasts, and analogies with the ancient Aztecs, the Byzantines, or the Pygmies" than with those other parliaments he'd hoped to compare (p. xiii). The Congress does not fit a feudal model because the power pyramid is not fixed and stable, but shifts with the results of elections, parties and leaders in power at different times. The veneer of democracy lends itself to masking the institutionalization of nondemocratic practices in the halls of power. Further, climbing the ladder of success and power in Congress is not based on a bureaucratic seniority sequence, but "depends more on the individual initiative, skill, and plain luck of the politician." ... "Yet the hallowed principle of seniority still plays a significant, if not determining, part in the process" (p. 26).

Once a member of Congress has succeeded in the clan-building process, the parent clan sends its offspring into the spaghetti-weave, through the institutions beyond Congress to solidify the political base. Such subclans "enhance the daily operational power of the parent clan on the Hill, but at the same time they offer a long-term insurance against sudden death and destruction to the parent clan in times of political plague" (p. 86). The array of subclans belonging to parents under the roof of Congress "form the network base around which government operates ... [by] crosscutting the formal organization of government departments, political parties, and lobbies" (p. 86). Infiltrating the bureaucracy is a prime objective, and patronage networks facilitate getting subclan staff hired, who gain tenure and power in those civil service roles.

The bureaucracy's pyramids shift in power in ways similar to that of Congress, since congressional big-men reorganize departments when they take over from the previous party or big-man. Also responsible for reorganization are presidential appointees: the President has a total "patronage universe" of about 6,000 positions (Patterson, 1988, as quoted in Freedman, 1994, p. 21). Weatherford's study of the federal bureaucracy led him to the conclusion that the redundancy of bureaucratic operations is attributable to the congressional big-men's fetishes to be patrons of all possibly desired services for their constituencies.

> Even though Congress as a whole and congressmen as a group may exercise very little day-to-day power over the operation of the bureaucracy, individual congressmen do exercise that power through their private bureaucracies, their clans. Each Big Man runs his own separate part of the government as a sovereign, independent chief, but because Big

Men do not interfere with the clan operations of other Big Men, and because the junior Congress members lack the power to interfere, the Congress as a whole has little means at its disposal to oversee the government. (p. 102)

Nor do congressional big-men want to incur debt to other big-men; the ego pole resists shifting too perilously close to that of a client. Weatherford studied how lobbyists come into use as brokers between big-men and their staffers, and the roles they play as "political surrogates" (p. 122) while big-men remain above the dirty fray. Lobbyists are, therefore, also clients of big-men, particularly when as ex-staffers they become lobbyists, only one of the mechanisms of clientelist politics in the U.S. Congress.

Apexes of Pyramidal Social Structures

From tracing dual motives to and beyond the national Congress level, the next step is to extend the horizon to higher-level institutions, formal and informal. From Mills' (1956) exposition to current events, it is evident that the horizon encompasses and integrates social, political, economic, and military domains, with dual motives' often incestuous relations among their elites via personal and institutional transactions. One cannot study any country's internal and external behaviors without encountering the myriad social systems that reflect dual motives at every scale. Parastatals, national governments, transnational corporations, and international institutions weave the same patterns across the international arena. Public-private partnerships rooted in meeting their parties' dual motives play out in such debacles as the United Nations Oil for Food program, U.S.-Halliburton et al.-Iraq (non)reconstruction, and the disappearance of billions of international development aid monies to governments worldwide. The social, political, and economic power wielded at these scales generally reflects strategic behaviors based on linear, formal logics of the tenth stage of hierarchical complexity.

As indicated in Table 1, formal logics develop from processing one input variable at a time, and arrive at well-justified conclusions based on the logic employed. The limitation of this order of complexity is that agents are unaware that there are multiple input variables to coordinate in any social, political, or economic transaction or decision. Generically, it can be said that the multiple other input variables are invisible at the formal stage, although they are omnipresent conditions in every social system in which transactions take place. As Guastello (2007) suggests, sensitivity to initial conditions influences decision paths and decision-making's results. Behaviors at the tenth order of hierarchical complexity are inherently less sensitive to initial conditions because it requires the next order of complexity, systematic stage reasoning, to develop matrices of relations.

Formal logic, as a structure of reasoning in an individual and as a characteristic of an organized system, reflects a sturdy equilibrium that is difficult to affect or change. The logics, though partial, are experienced as solid, hard-to-refute truths (in individuals) and "best practices" (in organized structures). Thus, there is an institutionalized equilibrium that represents a fundamental challenge for addressing such economic behaviors as corruption. Mills (1956) was convinced that "for every epoch and for every social structure, we must work out an answer to the question of the power of the elite" (p. 23). And to do that, we need to include the entire pyramidal structure on which they depend. From the elite top to the subsistence bottom, sturdy

latticeworks of behavioral tensions ensure durable social systems that meet multileveled needs of many actors while ignoring the needs of many others.

Features in Political Economies of Corruption

A complete developmental analysis of political economies of corruption needs to include the intersection of individuals and groups with their institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements include the stages of development evident in forms of government and other governance entities, political parties, ethnic relations, the formal and informal economies, rural-urban interfaces, historical trajectory, status of education, natural and other resources, influences of international players, e.g., structural adjustment policies—in other words, the meta-system comprised of numerous subsystems. With their emphasis on introducing a developmental application of dual motive theory, the foregoing examples omit discussion of many elements that would be necessary for a complete analysis. The following summary includes key features abstracted from the presented developmental progression of political economies at various stages of hierarchical complexity. It includes additional categories of hierarchical complexity (HC) of form of government and balance between formal/informal economy to flesh out features the examples could not develop (but see Ross & Commons, 2008; Ross, 2005, 2007).

Concrete Stage

Behaviors of social groupings dominated by subsistence concerns tend to be at the concrete stage. Concerns have short time horizons, accordingly. Reciprocal exchanges are concrete goods and services, and their timelines for performance may be immediate or considerably longer to keep the relationship active for future transactions. Leaders are either personally known or known of, and followership is based on patronage ties. Even where formal government has been introduced, its purpose or function is vague. In such cases, specific officials (e.g., a president or minister) essentially "are" the government. Roles are not distinguishable from the individuals who have roles. "Democracy" may mean getting a job, rather than have anything to do with government or elections. If election processes are introduced, the abstract concept of political party is meaningless; voters favor their tribal or ethnic group's endorsee, their patrons, or their patrons' patrons. Manual labor in the informal market is customary (agriculture, sewing/weaving, crafts and repairs, machine operation, drugs, arms, and slave trades). Poverty is common in subsistence-based social groupings, as are low levels of education. There are no concepts of formal contracts or title to goods; physical possession equals ownership. Social ties often dictate customers and vertical ties to brokers or patrons are common means to secure a place in the local market. As social complexity increases, people who perform at the concrete-stage tend to remain on the lowest levels (see Figure 1).

Abstract Stage

Leadership roles in concrete-stage social groupings tend to be held by those who can function at the abstract stage, usually due to having some education or native ability. Brokerage functions can be performed at the abstract stage, as can basic clerical tasks. Loyalties to leaders, parties, ethnic groups, and belief systems are strong. It is the norm to identify with and not question the group. There is an ability to manage multiple reciprocal relationships (i.e., a patron and multiple

clients; associate with peer elites (a distinct group) even if they are from competing groups). Low level jobs in the formal economy or civil service are common at the abstract stage; labor unions and associations form at this stage. With structure and procedures provided, abstract stage includes loyal bureaucrats and teachers. Reciprocal exchanges are for concrete goods and services, with either immediate or deferred payoffs. In non-Western settings, abstract stage individuals are likely to associate with concrete-stage persons, often their clients, but abstract stage *groups* are more likely to become an elite class, distanced from concrete-stage groups. Simple abstract concepts become accessible at this stage. For example, the concept of *role* is learned, such that people understand different individuals may fill and later leave the same role (e.g., boss, local priest, teacher, president). Abstract concepts cannot be compared or coordinated, however. Individual rules can be conceived of to accomplish a desired end, but the method to implement the rule cannot be conceived (although punishments for breaking rules come easily). A rule can be explained and followed. But any contradiction with a different rule or norm is not noticed. For example, a bureaucrat may be as faithful to the norm of charging bribes because that is the way things get done everywhere, as to the rule to be honest and give constituents fair and equal service. The legal purposes of government and elections are vague; simple concepts at this stage are "like" concrete things, unsupported assertions characterize speech, and there is no self-reflection.

Formal Stage

Characteristics of formal stage behaviors are apparent in individuals who are competent entrepreneurs and managers; they are more likely to be the population who enter the formal economy in non-Western settings. In Western settings, formal stage behaviors characterize a large majority, but they are minority behaviors in non-Western settings. Western structures of government or business derive from formal logic's reasoning. When they are imported to non-Western countries, there are few formal stage persons to understand how procedures are supposed to work or their underlying logic (e.g., separation of legal powers or separation of administrative duties). The new forms of government or business procedure provide new facades to which conventional behaviors of patronage and clientelism adapt and persist, usually more effectively because access to new resources is available. For example, the formal concept of employees on payroll is used to pass to clients, often as "ghost employees" who do not work for the government or business employer (e.g., see Figure 3). Bureaucracies grow huge when formal institutions and their resources are used "like" the tools of patrons and brokers in servicing clients' needs. Formal logics successfully develop formal roles and responsibilities. It can distinguish between a role in an employment setting, such as financial manager, and roles in non-employment settings (e.g., union member, family member). Because in-group ties are strong, it is often less successful distinguishing employment role from political party role. This is particularly true in the widespread practice of patronistic political appointments, where party loyalty can trump formal role responsibility. Formal stage logic successfully develops rules and methods to enforce them. People who use formal logic are very good at using rules to find or create loopholes that help them implement their strategies. Formal logic's focus on one linear sequence at a time means that it is not successful at foreseeing unintended consequences that are not already evident to it. For example, it is clever at "cooking the books" to hide bribes or the true nature of investments. It can manipulate a developing counties' lack of procedures for checks and balances to funnel cash to brokerage clients, loyal party supporters, and militants to

buy services. But it is unable to imagine the perspectives of people who are not in the in-group or foresee the repercussions of actions taken on a wider band of society or the environment—or know why it should care. The tendency to favor the ego-pole in managing behavioral tensions leads to formal stage behaviors that do not coordinate ethics concerns in every self-serving equation. This contributes to double-standard behaviors or rationalizations that judge others for wrong behaviors even when the judge has done likewise. However, formal logic is the origin of concepts of rights, duties, corruption, equal protection, checks and balances, and other foundations that structure modern societies. Formal education through decent secondary schooling is usually the minimum requirement for development of formal stage reasoning.

Systematic Stage

The ability to coordinate multiple disparate relations among factors at this order of hierarchical complexity led to the development of higher level abstract concepts such as transparency, accountability, social justice, and sustainability. While such concepts have entered some mainstream vocabularies, these concepts do not mean the same thing to abstract and formal stage reasoning as they mean at the systematic stage. Systematic reasoning is more likely to develop during graduate school education, if then. It is not wide spread in any society. With respect to corruption, systematic reasoning can consider a combination of such factors as the rule of law, fear of exposure, preservation of image, methods of reporting, and market pressure, for example, to conceive a system of transparency to reduce corrupt practices. Systematic reasoning can also conceive of a system to skirt efforts to enforce transparency. What it cannot do is consider multiple social, economic, and political systems, such as those described in this paper. It can neither succeed in entirely escaping transparency measures nor eliminate efforts to sabotage efforts to institutionalize transparent practices and reduce corruption.

These orders of hierarchical complexity have been summarized separately to distinguish them. However, complex social systems are comprised of individuals operating at several of these stages. Similarly—and a major point in this paper—the social systems themselves reflect concurrent operations of several different orders of complexity. There are no clean-cut divisions but rather many overlapping systems and relationships among different people and entities.

Implications and Conclusion

A major implication for understanding the political economies of corruption is that not only are there multiple kinds of political economies but also that they are interdependent and mutually supportive. Figures 2 and 3 are fair representations of the most prevalent social network structures operating around the world, for the most part needing adjustments only for the names of roles and entities and to show the multiple additional such structures operating simultaneously. *Corrupt* practices, by definition, emerge in a society only when a rule of law has been adopted that identifies them as law-breaking. Passage of a law does not change the hierarchy of needs experienced by a society's members. Passage of a law does not dismantle the time-tested social systems for meeting those needs. Patron, broker, and client roles are embedded in social systems at each of the orders of hierarchical complexity described above because they serve essential roles in meeting needs along the entire spectrum of ego-empathy motives. As societies develop, patron and broker roles are performed by corporate employers and

governments for some of the population, and by individuals and groups for others in the population. Complex mixtures of social arrangements that adapt with changing conditions are the norm.

Individuals and institutions across the planet have been dedicated to "fighting" the corruption that attends human interactions from local police behavior to transactions within international corporations and development funders. For many, corruption is a starting point and the presenting problem, and there are numerous justifications for that. I suggest a prerequisite for addressing corruption is a grasp of its underlying developmentally-different social structures, which perform patron, broker, and client roles, and the larger social, economic, and political contexts that support them. The ethics and repercussions of destroying a social system without replacing its functions need to be seriously examined.

Societies at different stages of development have different apexes of power that correspond to their social, economic, and political structures. Much of the corruption literature suggests that efforts based on some of their assumptions may prove to be as destabilizing and inappropriate in many of the same ways as democratization efforts are (Ross, 2007). Rose-Ackerman (1999) however, has a keen insight into the dynamics that are predictably inevitable when mis-matched institutions are introduced. She writes "societies based on strong interpersonal relations may have little notion of formal agency-principal relations and the obligations they impose on agents. The idea…may seem strange and unnatural…. The introduction of new institutions that fit poorly with underlying norms can produce pathologies…." (pp. 106-107). From the developmental perspective introduced here, it may be seen that the ideas and practices of formal stage institutions will not only seem strange and unnatural but that they will not even "compute" to concrete and abstract stage social systems and actors. Her explanation includes how and why such policies actually increase the undesired "corrupt" behavior, and it is related to a premise of this paper: social systems arise organically to meet otherwise unmet needs. Komito's *Whose man are you?* and *It is impossible not to be somebody's man* should be internal mantras in every analysis so entire networks are recognized. Powell (1977) views the understanding of clientelist politics as having "profound importance" as "an heuristic device for the understanding of a wide range of political behavior which political scientists, in the main, consider to be either pathological, deviant, or of minor import" (p. 147). Understanding this device, Scott's (2002) phases of transition dynamics suggests the kinds of gradual, planned shifts in relational ties that need to be provided at all levels. Most often, attention placed on corruption starts at the wrong end of the system, the patron-laden apex, and new instabilities and social and economic costs result. The entire complex—social, economic, and political systems, the functions and roles they perform, and dual motives of the actors that perform them throughout the horizontal and vertical latticeworks—needs to be addressed as the stable, coherent whole that it is.

Anomie is a useful concept in connection with systemic change efforts. The dictionary defines this as the social instability that results from a breakdown of—or, I would add, a radical change in—standards and values, and also as the personal unrest, alienation, and/or uncertainty that can result from a lack of purpose or ideals. Poorly conceived interventions can, and do, all too easily destroy solid social systems that reflect those often taken for granted social glues of meeting diverse needs. Radical, non-indigenous change tends to catalyze social instability (e.g., structural

adjustment policies, outlawing the Baath party in Iraq, imposing or importing Western models and requirements).

This developmental behavioral analysis of dual motives' role in political economies of corruption indicates that the roots of corruption lie in both the bioneurological architecture of humans' functioning and the social systems developed to balance behavioral tensions in the process of meeting evolving needs. The bioneurological basis of dual motives shaping society, politics, and economics is supported throughout this analysis. The trajectory of social systems' development presented here indicates that political economy is mostly synonymous with the term, social system. The reciprocal relationships that characterize what we call corruption are clearly deeply rooted in humans' social nature and survival as a species. The reciprocity complex explained by dual motive theory is very much in evidence once there is a systematic method to recognize the guises and systemic dynamics through which it manifests. The model of hierarchical complexity provides such a method.

Because humans are living, whole systems, their behaviors, and therefore psychology, are intimately and inherently related to their bioneurological architecture. It will require new methods to adequately address needs of diverse people who populate entire social systems via comprehensive alternative systems before new norms of behavior and more complex behaviors are developed widely. Failing that level of ingenuity, it is unlikely that policies will cut short the life of the institution of corruption in our lifetimes.

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