

INTEGRAL REVIEW

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Editorial

We are pleased to welcome readers to our tenth year and thus the tenth volume of *Integral Review (IR)*! This current issue has four academic articles, two extended book reviews, a brief overview of developmental theory, an essay on social issues, and an analysis of the intersection of Wilber and Bhaskar's works.

The issue begins with an article by Verna DeLauer, Andrew Rosenberg, Nancy Popp, David Hiley and Christine Feurt on *The Complexity of the Practice of Ecosystem-Based Management*. DeLauer's dissertation on this topic was reviewed in IR last year by Thomas Jordan. We are pleased now to showcase part of that original research, because one of its valuable contributions is its emphasis on understanding preconditions for adults developing the capacities needed for managing complex issues. DeLauer *et al* provide a concrete, detailed account of the gap in complexity capacity between the demands of ecosystem-based management and the demands on those managing such a system. The authors analyze the complexity of meaning making of participants involved in the stakeholder management group. Recommendations out of the research include the need to attend to complexity-of-mind issues, the need for greater awareness of decision making processes, and a call for research partnerships between developmental psychologists and social scientists.

Next, Kevin Bowman focuses on *Correcting Improper Uses of Perspectives, Pronouns, and Dualities in Wilberian Integral Theory: An Application of Holarchical Field Theory*. This article builds on his agenda in previous articles published in the *Journal of Integral Theory and Practice*, to extend Wilberian meta-theory into what Bowman calls holarchical field theory. Bowman describes his purpose as encouraging "a more formal and consistent analysis of action and events between subjects and objects using Wilberian integral metatheory." He focuses on how alternatives to Wilber's use of grammar suffer from conflating philosophical and grammatical issues and he clarifies some applications of Wilber's integral mathematics. More broadly, Bowman's work contributes to the general topic of integral communication.

The third article is contributed by Latha Poonamallee and Sonia Goltz, *Beyond Social Exchange Theory: An Integrative Look at Transcendent Mental Models for Engagement*. The authors develop an "integrative conceptual framework capturing the underlying mental models that guide engagement in relationships at work and elsewhere." They examine both top down and bottom up mechanisms for explaining how to go beyond the current emphasis in social exchange theory on ego-centric behaviors. They present a three-layered integrative model to extend this discourse more fully to a tribal-centric domain and then into transcendent interdependent domains. Their goal "is to present a more complex picture of human cognition and behavior," and their approach makes a step in that direction.

The peer reviewed section of this issue concludes with Sara Ross's *A Developmental Behavioral Analysis of Dual Motives' Role in Political Economies of Corruption*, a developmental meta-analysis that integrates dual motive theory and the model of hierarchical complexity. It shows how and why political economies of corruption come into being as



functional patronage and clientelism and will most likely always persist in developmentally-predictable forms. Her analysis and case examples indicate why the political economies of “how things get done” clearly evolve along well-defined developmental stages, extending through all levels of all societies.

Opening the editorially reviewed section of this issue is Jonathan Reams’ *A Brief Overview of Developmental Theory, or What I Learned in the FOLA Course*. Information in this article is drawn from the Foundations of Lectical Assessment course I took in the fall of 2013. I take a lay person’s approach to understanding a broad range of the history and current state of the field of developmental psychology as presented in that course, along with some description of how Lectical assessments have been developed and applied. My reflections from this overview include problematic issues with the tendency towards “growth to goodness” orientations as well as reifications of stages that show up in common use.

Thomas Jordan presents some initial thinking and analysis he has done on a local social issue in *An Exploration of the Meaning-making of Vehement Hardliners in Controversial Social Issues: Reactions to Youth Unrest in Suburbs of Gothenburg Sweden*. This essay takes statements made by various people in online public forums discussing issues around youth violence in Gothenburg. Jordan analyzed hundreds of posts to understand measures citizens proposed to address youth violence. In particular, he seeks to understand the nature of *vehement hardliners* who take strong stances on the issue. His preliminary analysis leads to a tentative explanatory framework for how a weak level of complexity awareness leads to strong emotional reactions, judgments and aggressive attitudes.

Zak Stein reviews Marc Gafni’s recent work in *On Spiritual Books and their Readers: A Review of Radical Kabbalah*. As a philosopher of education, Stein is concerned with what people read, and the limitations of books as a technology of knowledge transmission. He is also concerned with distinguishing New Age types of spiritual teaching from more robust religious scholarship. He positions Gafni’s work as being beyond both academic and popular genres of writing. His appreciative review gives us a taste of the power that this form of writing can have when done well.

Another appreciative review comes from my recent reading of August Turak’s *Business Secrets of the Trappist Monks*, a book that encapsulates Turak’s lifetime of lessons learned through experiences in business and through spending large amounts of time with Trappist monks. The simplicity of the core principles could provide readers a powerful foundation to understand what makes for great leadership. The power of Turak’s story telling makes this an evocative read.

Bonnitta Roy examines the soteriological streams of Ken Wilber’s AQAL theory and Roy Bhaskar’s meta-Reality and shows how they are first seem to be flowing in divergent directions. She notices that whereas integral theory formulates salvation as additive or multiplicative (freedom + fullness, depth x span), for critical realism, the path to salvation is primarily a process of subtraction or absencing conditions or structures that occlude, hide, distort, or otherwise prevent us from accessing our innate and always-present state of original grace. This reveals two important questions. For integral theory; what drives the need for increasing

complexity? For meta-Reality; what gets in the way? The answers Bonnitta finds works its way into the recent online conversations between Wilber and Bhaskar and the different ways they conceive of the relationship between epistemology and ontology.

We hope this issue of *Integral Review* provides you with a useful diversity of perspectives to generate insights, and with research that can enhance your understanding and service in our increasingly complex world.



Jonathan Reams
Editor in Chief

The Complexity of the Practice of Ecosystem-Based Management

Verna G. DeLauer, Andrew A. Rosenberg, Nancy C. Popp, David R. Hiley,
Christine Feurt¹

Abstract: In the United States, there are more than 20 federal agencies that manage over 140 ocean statutes (Crowder et al., 2006). A history of disjointed, single sector management has resulted in a one-dimensional view of ecosystems, administrative systems, and the socio-economic drivers that affect them. In contrast, an ecosystem-based approach to management is inherently multi-dimensional. Ecosystem-based approaches to management (EBM) are at the forefront of progressive science and policy discussions. Both the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (USCOP, 2004) and the Pew Oceans Commission (POC, 2003) reports called for a better understanding of the impact of human activities on the coastal ocean and the result was President Obama's National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, our Coasts, and the Great Lakes (2010).

EBM is holistic by seeking to include all stakeholders affected by marine policy in decision-making. Stakeholders may include individuals from all levels of government, academia, environmental organizations, and marine-dependent businesses and industry. EBM processes require decision-makers to approach marine management differently and more comprehensively to sufficiently require a more sophisticated conceptual

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understanding of the process and the people involved. There are implicit cognitive, interpersonal, and intra-personal demands of EBM that are not addressed by current literature. This research seeks to understand the mental demands of EBM. A constructive developmental framework is used to illuminate how decision-makers reason or make sense of the ideals and values underlying EBM, the mutual relationships that must be built among natural resource management agencies, and the personal experiences and emotions that accompany change.

Keywords: Adult development, adult learning, complexity, constructive developmentalism, natural resource management, stakeholder engagement.

Background

Marine ecosystems are complex mosaics of ecological, chemical, biological, geophysical, and human interactions. They are valued for the services they provide for humans including food, pharmaceuticals, shoreline protection, climate regulation, and tourism. Human disturbance specifically threatens these interactions and services through destruction of habitat, pollution, and displacement of native fauna and flora. The current single-sector, single resource approach to management attends to human activities such as coastal development, fisheries, tourism, and shipping, each in isolation from the others. This single sector approach fails to address, much less maintain, the integrity of the interactions between the sectors, leading to a loss of valued ecosystem goods and services, and ultimately to a diminishment in potential human well-being. Single-sector approaches are called less effective because they tend to treat the cumulative impacts of human activities as unimportant (DeLauer, 2009).

In the United States, there are more than 20 federal agencies that manage over 140 ocean statutes (Crowder et al., 2006). A history of disjointed, single sector management has resulted in a one-dimensional view of ecosystems, administrative systems, and the socio-economic drivers that affect them. In contrast, an ecosystem-based approach is inherently multi-dimensional. Ecosystem-based approaches to management (EBM) are at the forefront of progressive science and policy discussions. Both the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (USCOP, 2004) and the Pew Oceans Commission (POC, 2003) reports called for a better understanding of the impact of human activities on the coastal ocean and the result was President Obama's National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, our Coasts, and the Great Lakes (2010).

In 2005, over 200 scientists and resource managers in the United States endorsed the Scientific Consensus Statement on Marine Ecosystem Management (McLeod et al., 2005). This document lays out the underlying principles and characteristics of the approach, particularly that humans are part of ecosystems. This definition, and others like it, refers to the impact humans have on parts of ecosystems and conversely, the impact ecosystem services have on human well-being. What's missing, from all definitions of EBM, is the fact that humans are also part of the decision-making process about ecosystems; they have a responsibility to the marine environment through the decisions they make. Current definitions implicitly assume that all stakeholders have the capacity to manage in the way the definitions suggest – to adapt to a different set of principles when given the mandate or enough information to do so.

Due to added complexity, resource managers and policymakers engaged in marine management in the United States grapple with the challenge of taking EBM from concept to practice to move beyond decades of fragmented management (Parenteau et al., 2007). Our research question is: Do the implicit expectations and mental demands of EBM practices require a complexity of logic and reasoning that outweighs participants' capacities?

This paper is based on dissertation work (DeLauer, 2009) that sought to understand how stakeholders were making sense of an ecosystem-based management decision-making process in the state of Massachusetts located in the northeastern part of the United States. She spent 16 months embedded within a stakeholder engagement process whose goal was to get feedback about pending State ocean management legislation. Her research focused on the ways in which stakeholders held their own perspectives and took in the perspectives of others during dialogue and deliberation. Robert Kegan's theory of mental complexity (2009) was used to identify characteristics of meaning making in that particular context.

Introduction

In the last 15 years, considerable research has gone into examining integrated watershed management decision-making processes and learning that occurs through interaction, democratic deliberation, collaborative problem-solving, and design of fair and competent processes (Habron, 1999, 2003; Rhoads et al., 1999; Webler & Tuler, 1999, 2001; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Wooley & McGinnis, 1999). A stronger institutional design that better supports these types of decision-making processes is needed at all governmental scales (Imperial, 1999). Particularly needed is institutional support for social science aspects of integrated management (Endter-Wada, 1998) and recognition that social and ecological environments reciprocally shape each other and this necessitates that their networks and relationships be understood as part a complex system. This conceptualization of "social-ecological system" is that any delineation or separation between the human and environmental system is artificial (Folke et al., 2005).

Ecosystem-based management has gained traction in land-based management initiatives prior to its influence on marine management because of its focus on integration of governmental agencies and of social and ecological interactions. Interpreting EBM theory for implementation is an ongoing constraint. The Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Lucille and David Packard Foundation have taken an interest in ecosystem approaches at a regional scale and international scale, respectively. Through a grant from the Packard Foundation, The University of Michigan did extensive research on ecosystem-based management case studies throughout the world. The result is an informative, interactive website for practitioners to learn from the mistakes and successes of others trying out this new approach (<http://webservices.itcs.umich.edu/drupal/mebm/?q=node/68>).

The focus of this research, however, wasn't in the nuts and bolts of how to implement ecosystem-based management. We were interested in the mental and emotional capacities of people to engage in this process of personal and institutional change. Because EBM processes require more coordination among management sectors, decision-making becomes more collaborative and thus, more complex. Taking an EBM approach means intentionally bringing together individuals from diverse interests to discuss the trade-offs associated with management

decisions. Using Robert Kegan's model of adult mental complexity, we wanted to understand the meaning-making of those involved in these cross-institutional collaborations.

A comprehensive literature review revealed studies within the last decade that have studied collaborative natural resource policymaking as referred to in the beginning of this section. Few, however, use adult developmental frameworks that focus on the individual's capacity to participate in such policymaking. However, there has been an influx of studies using mental models of environmental knowledge and reasoning (Jones et al., 2011). In the marine management field, these studies are gaining credibility as rigorous methods for revealing gaps in systems thinking. Some studies do use a developmental lens such as Daniel and Walker's work, which weaves ideas from conflict resolution, public participation, experiential learning, and adult development to create a user manual with concrete recommendations for practitioners to work through environmental disagreements (Daniel and Walker, 2001). We found one study that used Kegan's model of adult mental complexity. Robbins et al. (1994) used Kegan's model to study women's pro-environment behaviors and their perception of their relationship with the natural environment. The need for these women to conform and align themselves with their friends with shared values was influential in causing pro-environment behavior (Robbins & Greenwald, 1994). We were curious if these characteristics were similarly important in natural resource management decision-making. Next, we present a brief explanation of Kegan's theory.

Adult Development and Learning

The role of individual learning in group settings has been extensively researched within the adult development literature (Fisher et al., 2003; Kegan et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 1998). This study contributes to that literature through its focus on environmental policy processes and the strengths and limitations of any individual to contribute to the process.

This research used constructive-developmental theory or how an individual takes in, organizes, and makes sense of his/her experiences. Developmental Psychologist Robert Kegan's sequential stage model of adult development was used to uncover and describe the regular, predictable, and recognizable continuum of how participants constructed meaning from their experiences.

Kegan's theory describes cognitive and social-emotional growth along a continuum on which there are key mindsets. Each mindset reflects a qualitatively different way of knowing. These mindsets are often compared to metamorphosis in that one builds upon another, they are recognizably different, and the content of each is a unique system of logic that determines the way one understands and makes sense of his/her experiences (Baumgartner, 2001; Kegan & Lahey, 2009).

Each meaning-making system, or mindset, describes specific and discrete patterns that govern how an individual makes sense of his/her experience at any given time. Each mindset reflects a different relationship between what a person is *subject* to and what he or she can take as *object*. At each subsequent mindset, what *was* subject is now object. In simpler terms, what a person is subject to can be thought of as the lens through which he or she sees and understands the world—the lens itself cannot be seen, but it brings what *is* seen (what is “object”) into focus.

What is object, then, are those aspects of the person's experience that he or she sees, can take a perspective on, and see as separate from him or herself. Each subsequent stage transcends and includes the last, continuously constructing more complex systems of meaning and logic. The continuum of meaning-making complexity includes the following elements (Taken from Kegan & Lahey, 2009, pg. 14 - 15):

- There are qualitatively different, discernibly distinct meaning-making systems; that is, the demarcations between levels of mental complexity are not arbitrary. Each represents a different way of knowing the world.
- Development does not unfold continuously; there are periods of stability and change.
- The intervals between transformations to new meaning get longer as time goes on.

Individuals are constantly engaged with their environment and organize meaning and interpret information based on their meaning making system (Kegan, 1994; Popp & Portnow, 2001; Robbins & Greenwald, 1994). An individual moves beyond his/her meaning making when their current assumptions no longer fit a given experience, and in response they experience an internal conflict about the way that they know - not *what* one knows but *how* one knows. Meaning-making is distinct from what we understand as "personality," in that personality is the expression of one's self. Meaning-making is not about personality or what a person does in the expression of their personality. It is about the *complexity* of the ways in which a person understands and describes (the expression of) their own personality, and the complexity of their perspective on their relationship to others and the world.

Kegan's theory identifies four mindsets found in adulthood with four transitional phases between each one of them (1994). A person in transition between two mindsets may exhibit a mix of the two mindsets, and their reasoning will be held within these two structures. The following are general characteristics that reflect individuals operating fully at one of three overarching mindsets found in this study: the Socialized mind, the Self-authoring mind, and the Self-transforming mind (Kegan, 2009).

Qualities of a Socialized Mind (Adapted from McGuigan & Popp, 2007)

1. Literal, descriptive understanding of processes.
2. Unquestioned conformity to peer, social, or legal norms.
3. Guilt, hyper-awareness of others needs even if those are imagined, e.g. "I am responsible for your feelings and vice versa."
4. Differences threatening.
5. Invisible and unquestioned assumptions.
6. Ambiguity challenging.
7. Criticism as destructive to self – need a sense of belonging, driven by need to be understood, aligned with, validated by and connected to a person, group or philosophy.

Qualities of a Self-authoring Mind (Adapted from McAuliffe, 2006)

1. Aware and sensitive to others feelings but not responsible for them.
2. Differences respected and valued.
3. Former assumptions examined, accepted or rejected.
4. Concern with consequences for personal integrity and meeting one's own standards.

5. Integrates others perspectives including criticism as one perspective among many.
6. Self-initiating, correcting and evaluating rather than dependent on others to frame problems and determine if things are going well.
7. Conceives of processes from the outside - can see one's part in relation to the whole.

Qualities of a Transforming Mind (Adapted from Rooke & Torbert, 1998)

1. Engages with others to self-evaluate.
2. Experiences internal paradox, contradiction, and ambiguity as normal.
3. Allegiance to larger principles not rules.
4. Embraces the tension of not knowing something to purposely take on multiple perspectives on issues.
5. Recognizes that ambiguity is the norm and that standards and methods are constructed in a world in which dialogue is the only foundation for knowing – understands that all knowledge is constructed through human interaction – more comfortable engaging in collaborative inquiry where meaning emerges.

The Case Study - SeaPlan

In June 2008, the Oceans Act was enacted and Massachusetts became the first state in the United States to “pursue ecosystem management of offshore waters through federal, regional, and state coordination and cooperation” (EOEEA, 2010). The Oceans Plan offers a guiding framework for individual sectors to work more collaboratively to manage human activities in Massachusetts State waters. While the Plan is comprehensive, it does not explicitly account for stakeholders' different interpretations of the charge or interpersonal challenges associated with management trade-offs or taking on new responsibilities.

Prior to the Oceans Act, there was no direct mechanism to connect disparate sectors on a regular, on-going basis. SeaPlan created this necessary mechanism for cross-sector interactions as a safe way to hash out individual and/or sectoral differences. Their first goal was to create a five-year strategic plan to identify how they would support the development and implementation of an integrated multi-use ocean management plan for Massachusetts waters. One primary strategy was to expand stakeholder understanding of integrated multi-use ocean management issues to increase effectiveness and durability of a plan. SeaPlan strived to create a stakeholder engagement process in which participants came to the table as independent individuals who represented various sectors but were not bound by them with an understanding that motivations, intentions, and complexity of understanding ocean management would be diverse.

SeaPlan was chosen as a case study because it provided a setting in which to investigate the interplay between learning about EBM and participants' current perspectives (Fazey & Fazey, 2005). The more people participating, the more meanings, perspectives, and behaviors existed. The unsaid is that when people come together around a single sector mandate, they likely share an implicit background of assumptions, values, expectations, and routines for decision-making. All of this is lacking when participants come together in an EBM process. This lack of shared/taken for granted background makes the process less stable / more dynamic.

In this paper, we focus on the finding related to perspective-taking, or the degree to which stakeholders can and do author their own perspective, i.e. the degree to which a stakeholder can create his or her own perspective, ideology or identity, manipulate it in their minds, weigh it against others, and set standards for themselves based on an internal authority (DeLauer, 2009; Kegan, 1994).

Methods

Overarching Research Question:

Do the implicit expectations and mental demands of EBM practices require a complexity of logic and reasoning that outweighs participants' capacities?

Procedures

DeLauer spent 16 months embedded within the SeaPlan decision-making process. She attended bi-monthly, two-day meetings as an observer. SeaPlan members agreed to let her observe, copy meeting transcripts, and conduct interviews.

Sampling

All 41 participants were recruited by email invitations. More than 20 responded favorably. Respondents were compared based on their affiliation and expertise until it was determined which of them reflected the demographics of the group at large. All participants signed informed consent forms with an understanding that published data would remain anonymous.

Materials

The Subject Object Interview guidebook (Lahey et al., 1988) was used to assess some of the data. A qualitative coding research program (HyperResearch) was used to organize and assess another part of the data.

Participants

SeaPlan participants lived and worked throughout the Massachusetts coastal watershed. Participation in SeaPlan was by invitation from an organizing committee. Participation was voluntary and consisted of scientists, resource managers, industry professionals, and not-for-profit organization employees. Participants in this study included fifteen men and seven women reflective of the gender ratio of the broader group. Half of the participants had PhDs and half had a master's or bachelor's degree, which was also representative of the broader group.

Data Collection

Triangulation was critical to this research whereby three data sources were used as three forms of evidence to prove and support findings. DeLauer collected data using the Subject Object Interview, an EBM Interview, and meeting transcripts.

Subject Object Interview

The Subject Object Interview (Lahey et al., 1988) was first introduced in the early 1980s to understand the developmental complexity of psychiatric patients. It consists of a semi-structured interview that invites participants to describe the meaning behind their experiences using a series of 10 provocative, subject cards which include Angry, Anxious/Nervous, Success, Strong Stand/Conviction, Sad, Torn, Moved/Touched, Lost Something, Change, Important to Me. Data that exhibit meaning making characteristics are hypothesis-tested. Some of the questions asked to test hypotheses include: How does a person defend their position? Is their position flexible? What does it cost to maintain it? What does the person take responsibility for? Researchers using this technique are not as concerned with the what, the content of information, but how each participant organizes his/her experiences.

The Ecosystem-based Management Interview

A semi-structured interview was used to explore ways in which the SeaPlan participants thought about and understood ecosystem-based management and their relationship to the SeaPlan process and other participants.

Meeting Transcript Content Analysis

Transcripts were copied and meeting observations were recorded. This was useful to have real-time data illustrating the dynamic group process as opposed to one-on-one interviews.

Data Analysis

Phase 1: For the EBM interview, DeLauer used a grounded theory approach (Schram, 2006) which included an inductive and iterative data collection and analysis process that led to working theories that described the data. Details of that process are as follows:

1. Writing Field Notes. A bound journal was kept throughout data collection and analysis for personal notes that were not considered data but rather hunches, questions, and emotional reactions.
2. Creating Episodic Threads. A workable data set was developed through the meeting transcripts and EBM interviews. Preliminary codes were developed given what the data were showing. Excerpts from the data sources were pieced together to form themes.
3. Open Coding. Key themes were identified and defined toward the development of working theories (based on threading together excerpts). It became clear that the SeaPlan process itself was very important for participants. Hence, the participants' understanding of the SeaPlan process was explored. A brainstorm began of all of the potential paths that could lead to understanding this better. Ninety themes or analytic possibilities were created. At this point, themes were broad and static. Eventually, they became specific and active.

4. Marking Potential Paths of Inquiry. Several paths of inquiry were explored with the understanding that the working theories might eventually change and would certainly evolve.
5. Writing Initial Memos & Questioning Them: This time was spent toward journaling that was retrospective, interpretive, and analytic.
6. Selective Coding. Three themes emerged as significant, perspective-taking, dealing with change, and understanding the decision-making process. To determine what was significant, either the data expressed which themes encapsulated others to describe what was occurring or particular attention was paid to pieces of the data that were paradoxical or beyond what was expected. Once a good chunk of the data was conceptually eliminated, significant pieces were tested by tracking thematic variation found across data sets, to see if they were truly comprehensive. Data were examined across the three data sources (Subject Object Interview, EBM Interview, meeting transcripts), chronologically across meeting transcripts, and across participants.

Phase 2: Developmental Linkages

Subject/Object data were analyzed using *A Guide to the Subject-Object Interview: Its Administration and Interpretation* (Lahey et al., 1988). It is used to score bits of cognitive structure underlying meaning making. Due to its uniqueness, it has its own specific protocols for being administered and analyzed. DeLauer and Popp analyzed the Subject Object data. The three themes described in Phase 1 were cross-analyzed with the subject-object scores to uncover distinctions of meaning-making among all participants.

Results

SeaPlan participants generally understood the EBM concept and described it in similar ways using similar terminology. However, how they made sense of its implementation and their role and others' roles within it differed substantially among participants. For example, some participants wanted to have joint ownership of decisions made through Partnership discussions. Others wanted to defer to a selected governing body. Some believed consensus was crucial for success. Others didn't think consensus was possible nor did they feel it was important. Some saw SeaPlan as a safe meeting place to hash out individual differences. Others saw it as an ill-defined mechanism that worked better in theory than in practice. Such wildly different perspectives among participants called to attention the differences in how they made sense of the directives of SeaPlan. We explored whether these were merely differences in opinion or fundamental differences about the very way in which participants understood the task at hand.

The following is a chart that summarizes the mindset of each research participant. These mindsets are previously described in this paper. These mindsets are not value judgments about participants; they are characteristics of how individuals made meaning of SeaPlan and EBM.

- Socialized
- Socialized with some Self-authoring

- Socialized (Dominant) and Self-authoring
- Self –authoring (Dominant) and Socialized
- Self-authoring with some Socialized
- Self-Authoring
- Self-Authoring with Self-transforming

Key:

Socialized Mind = 3

Transitional between Socialized and Self-authoring = 3/4 or 4/3

Self-Authoring = 4

With Transforming Mind = 4(5)

Table 1: Chart of Mindset Scores

Participant	Mindset	Age	Education	Gender
One	3/4	34	PhD	F
Two	4(3) - 4	56	MS	M
Three	3	33	MS	M
Four	4	51	PhD	M
Five	4-4(5)	64	PhD	M
Six	3	33	MS	F
Seven	4	54	PhD	M
Eight	4	52	PhD	F
Nine	4-4(5)	49	MS	F
Ten	4/3	49	PhD	M
Eleven	4-4(5)	54	PhD	M
Twelve	4/3	37	PhD	M
Thirteen	3/4 - 4/3	54	PhD	M
Fourteen	3	56	BS	M
Fifteen	4-4(5)	50	PhD	M
Sixteen	4	N/A	PhD	F
Seventeen	4	72	PhD	M
Eighteen	4	66	MS	M
Nineteen	3/4 - 4/3	46	MS	F
Twenty	3-3(4)	40	MS	M
Twenty-One	4	54	MS	M
Twenty-Two	3(4)	43	BS	F

Next, we discuss the significant findings related to the theme of *perspective-taking*. See DeLauer, 2009 to read about the other significant findings.

Discussion

The theme *perspective-taking* was broken down into four sub-themes. These sub-themes resulted from the coding process described above. Once themes were identified through the qualitative coding process, they were examined by mindset for each participant. The sub-themes

are Connection to Affiliation, Self-authoring, Capacity for Self-reflection, and Perspective of other. Each is analyzed below by mindset.

The following is one of the more prominent definitions of marine EBM:

Ecosystem-based management is an integrated approach to management that considers the entire ecosystem. The goal of ecosystem-based management is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive and resilient condition so that it can provide the services humans want and need. Ecosystem-based management differs from current approaches that usually focus on a single species, sector, activity or concern; it considers the cumulative impacts of different sectors. (McLeod et al., 2005)

By breaking down these sentences, one discovers additional meaning inherent in the definition. “Ecosystem-based management is an integrated approach to management that considers the entire ecosystem.” Underlying this sentence is the sentiment that the human perspective of coastal oceans must be broadened. “The goal of ecosystem-based management is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive and resilient condition so that it can provide the services humans want and need.” Underlying this sentence is the perspective that it is a responsibility to conserve and sustain ecological value in order for humans to continue to benefit from ecosystems. “Ecosystem-based management differs from current approaches that usually focus on a single species, sector, activity or concern; it considers the cumulative impacts of different sectors.” Implicit in this sentence is the need for dialogue and deliberation among sectors and reflection within sectors about impacts to ecosystem goods and services. As the terminology used to describe EBM is broken down, more explicit meanings emerge. In short, the definition of EBM is calling for decision-makers to take and hold three perspectives at the same time: a holistic perspective on the marine environment, an introspective perspective on one’s responsibility to it, and a reflective perspective on one’s actions and interactions in relation to others during decision-making.

Sub-theme 1: Connection to Affiliation

The following are excerpts from participants who saw the relationship between their professional affiliation and SeaPlan in unique ways. These excerpts were primarily responses to questions asked during the EBM interview. Each mindset is discussed separately.

Socialized Mind. Participants exhibiting a predominant Socialized mindset came to their perspectives about SeaPlan and their roles within it largely through the authority of their professional affiliations. These affiliations were with their organization or agency or another person, usually someone whom they regarded as an expert on the subject. Others came to SeaPlan because of their affiliations, but the difference was in the ways they “held” their affiliation, i.e. how identified they were with it and how they made sense of it. Here is one participant’s response to the question about why she was engaging in this process.

I think just because I serve more of a coordinating role in the region and can have a good sense, a good bird’s eye sense of what (my affiliation) can bring to the table and also sort of high-level politics that might be brought to their partnership in a positive light, and also

because, well (Personal affiliation) asked me and she is one of my all time favorite mentors so the bottom line is that is why I did it. But, I think the reason why she asked me is because of my multi-faceted role within (my affiliation) in the region and sort of what I represent there.

“Because I was asked” and personal affiliation to someone involved were both important reasons to participate.

These participants talked about acting from a need not to be excluded from something perceived as influential. The thought of exclusion led to a fear that one’s affiliation and consequently, one’s self would be the victim of changes in marine policy. “You’re either at the table, or on the menu,” said one participant. There was a sense that one’s role in a process like SeaPlan was to ensure there was inclusivity, specifically of one’s particular affiliation. The need for equality was a strong value for those with a Socialized mindset. They needed to feel that in exchange for their participation, others would reciprocate by considering their interest. SeaPlan and EBM-type processes were something they join or get on board with; these processes were a new kind of affiliation. However, they must first trust that their interest was being heard and accepted by others in order to consider something an affiliation.

Socialized – Self-Authoring Transition. In the transition to a Self-authoring mindset a tension started to exist between someone’s affiliation and his or her new capacity to see themselves and their ideas as distinct from their affiliation. Where they were in that transition determined how they defined their responsibility to that affiliation. Participants who exhibited both the Socialized and Self-authoring mindsets felt comfortable separating SeaPlan and the legislation but were concerned with balancing the needs of the State government and the needs of other interests.

“We need to balance both science and management with the legislation. It’s critical that we integrate all.”

This demonstrated a new capacity to consider two possibly opposing perspectives. In general, Socialized/Self-authoring participants might have mentioned affiliation but also mentioned more personal reasons for getting involved with SeaPlan such as, “I am someone who is interested in policy work. I am someone who is interested in trying to get a better idea of how you would actually do EBM.” Or “I am sort of fascinated by the intersection of science and policy and seeing how that comes together and how scientific information actually gets used or not in making decisions. It is a personal interest.” There also started to be a tension between competing priorities and personal and professional boundaries started to emerge. They no longer allowed someone in authority to be the sole determiner of their time or values; They began to realize some of their own internal authority. Yet, they also had a profound and fundamental sense of loyalty and obligation to their affiliations.

Self-Authoring Mindset

I’ve spent a lot of time in the public policy arena and in the Atlantic and Pacific watching the evolution of oceans...I’ve watched the decline of marine life and coastal oceans and that’s exactly what SeaPlan addresses. SeaPlan is trying to build a community of interests

that recognizes that there are a variety of competing interests for the use of the oceans and we have to work out common grounds as to how the interests can work together rather than all individualistically trying to pursue selfish interests. I look at it as a commons situation.

Note the use of the word *community* in the excerpt above. The idea of community was a strong thread throughout the Self-authoring interviews. Community meant a group of diverse individuals coming together to learn. This type of learning community became an affiliation of sorts where difference rather than similarity was valued, expected, and was the underlying principle for coalescing. They didn't "belong" to a particular affiliation rather they created their own affiliation; they were creating it via the SeaPlan process. Consider an exchange at a SeaPlan meeting between Socialized and Self-authoring participants. The Socialized participant was concerned with fitting in and ensuring that the interest of her affiliation was not forgotten. The Self-authoring participant responded indirectly with her belief that there was concern for small businesses and that she hoped a budding partnership would begin.

Socialized participant: I hope that this is a balanced initiative that supports all stakeholders and values small businesses along the waterfront. I want to make sure that there is access for everyone and everyone can continue to make a living.

Self-Authoring response: I believe in what local communities are all about. I want to forge local community and government partnerships. I hope we can set the benchmarks for success and that all other groups start following us.

Both individuals used the word hope. The individual with the socialized mindset was reacting to an initiative she saw as "out there," and defined by/created by someone else. She did not yet have a sense that she could manipulate and own the process. The Self-authoring person stated her belief as a personal conviction, as someone who felt a sense of ownership of the process; she was responsible for contributing to its creation.

Differences in how someone related to the idea of affiliation were powerful motivators or disincentives for collective change. The strength of those exhibiting Socialized mindsets was that they got the idea of connection and thrived on it. Their limitations existed in being able to separate from and differentiate among the various connections and embrace their differences as a means to self-growth. It was difficult for them to step back from their own affiliation and embrace a different, and perhaps competing, affiliation. If they were to make a connection, they wanted it to be harmonious and agreeing. Disagreement and conflict tended to be very difficult for them, which led them to try to avoid it.

The strength (from an EBM perspective) of those exhibiting a Self-authoring mindset is that they were interested in learning in connection with others who were different. They were interested in actively seeking out and constructing new knowledge and understanding through dialogue with others. These individuals were interested in developing a new kind of affiliation, a community of discourse. Within this community, they were comfortable with making room for things to evolve which, in turn, helped to create a whole new process and understanding for everyone. Their limitations were reflected in their identification with their own set of values and beliefs in how things "should be." They were too invested in their own perspective and unwilling

to change their minds, which often caused the process to stall and ironically, negated their strengths.

There were no significant findings from the Transforming mindset within this sub-theme.

Self-Authoring

The following are excerpts from participants with different mindsets discussing their perspectives about their role in SeaPlan or the role of SeaPlan generally. What's unique was the way in which participants saw the process as either prescribed or open to interpretation. Those with a Socialized mindset saw the process as created "out there" by someone else. Those of a Self-authoring mindset saw it as an open-ended process awaiting the group's actions.

Socialized Mindset. SeaPlan's Socialized meaning makers tended to create their sense of reality through another's frame of reference such as a leader they respected. There was a need to hold others' perspectives to a test, which resulted from seeing themselves and their roles in the process as loyalists of and protectors of their own affiliation and interests. Their loyalty to and identification with their particular affiliation was the guide to their participation in SeaPlan. They entered into the SeaPlan process as one that was prescribed for them and they wanted to ensure their interests fit the prescription. They played more of a reactive role – one in which they reacted to others and the process rather than actively creating it. This way of making sense of the SeaPlan process caused one to act with trepidation. This participant is responding to a question about endorsing the SEAPLAN process and strategic plan.

So we're behind it, we just don't wanna have the XX make a knee-jerk plan that ends up causing all kinds of havoc for small businesses that already have to go through just dozens and dozens of layers of permitting and regulation to do the smallest thing on the water front. I fear that the die may already be cast and words like EBM suggest that we just want marine protected areas everywhere. I want to make sure that there is access for everyone and everyone can continue to make a living.

For others a prescribed process lessons one's responsibility.

I am very comfortable in the (SeaPlan) dialogue. I haven't been put on the spot but again it is state waters and I have the luxury of being a (AFFILIATION). How separate is the SEAPLAN process from the legislative piece, I can imagine that makes others much more uncomfortable than me because it is not really my business. I can't lobby for that, I can't work toward it. As a (AFFILIATION), I would be reacting to that legislation passing.

Self-Authoring Mindset. As the Socialized meaning maker's capacity grew, a kind of personal theory or sense of reflection on SeaPlan began to take shape. The content was described as well as their conception of it. This Self-authoring participant talked about something as his perspective.

So in my view if this is a successful effort, it will actually begin to push the envelope on what gets done from a management perspective. There will be more integration, more

analysis of cumulative impacts. But that will only be partly success. If it did just that, it would fail in my mind if it didn't also try to advance the science behind this and try to understand how you would not just practically do it but try to think about it and use it as a way to inform other processes.

This participant identified multiple aspects of success and comes with multiple, diverse ways to put it to use – implement and apply it - regardless of his own affiliation's interests. Individuals exhibiting Socialized mindsets had a deep interest in their own sector's issues and concerns but had difficulty critiquing those concerns or stepping outside them to embrace competing concerns. They experienced doing that as being disloyal to their own affiliation.

The strengths of Self-authoring meaning makers could also be considered limitations depending on the context of the situation and the mix of individuals involved. Self-authoring individuals brought their own perspectives to the SeaPlan process and continued to develop their own perspective in response to new information and understanding. They recognized that others had their own interpretations and biases and they advocated for these other views in pursuit of the mission of SeaPlan. Socialized meaning makers reacted to the many perspectives put forth which allowed them to maintain loyalty to affiliation. In conversation, those differences in mindsets often played out as passive and active discussion participants, e.g. those with a Socialized mindset spoke up to ask questions, give examples, or clarify something about their affiliation's interest while those with Self-authoring mindsets, offered new theories for the group to explore. Those new theories were not always fully understood by all the participants. This significant point was often missed by Self-authoring participants who implicitly assumed that they were understood, which resulted in confusion and sometimes, defensiveness.

Self-Authoring with Transformative Mindset: Lastly, there were four participants who exhibited the Self-authoring mindset yet also exhibited the transition towards the Transformative mindset. In some instances, this made a difference in terms of the capacity with which they reasoned about a situation or idea. For example, in the case of actively generating theory, there was a strong sense of personal responsibility, theory and reflection on that theory yet there was a hint of something more. There was uncertainty weaved into their theory about SeaPlan's purpose, yet, with a clear understanding that ambiguity would be part of the experience.

We don't really know what MOP is yet and that's been a repeated discussion at every meeting. People are there to some extent out of curiosity. If it's going to happen, you want to be there when it happens and want to be able to influence it and make sure it comes up with what you want it to be. I think that's what keeps people coming but I also think it keeps people away and on their guard. We don't really know how open people have been because we haven't gotten to anything tough. It would be great to see all of the thought bubbles behind all the nice words. We haven't been challenged yet. It's been hard in that it's been grueling and there's been a lot of uncertainty but ...

Capacity for Self Reflection

The following are excerpts of participants with different meaning making complexities discussing their own perspectives on the SEAPLAN process.

Socialized Mindset. Participants with a predominant Socialized mindset primarily reflected on how others perceived their input or their role. When asked about their voice in the process, they referred back to the collective voice of their affiliation, e.g. agency, sector. Whether through an affiliation or the SeaPlan process itself, they tended to be keenly aware of what they believed to be the effects of their participation through the eyes of others. They judged the process by how they thought others responded to them and their affiliation's interests.

They internalized the many perspectives of others in the group. Consequently, they were very aware and focused on how their thoughts and opinions were the same as or different from others. Self-reflection was described in relation to sameness or difference. Differences were generalized to "other(s)" when reflecting on the motivation of participants.

Everyone's obviously interested in their own thing (in SeaPlan). It's diverse. There are social scientists. Me and the social scientists have of course very little in common with how we see the world.

Over time once perceived differences evolved to feelings of connection for some. This connection was often due to an initial trust of those perceived as authority and eventually transferred to others.

I didn't walk in that room (SeaPlan meeting) at all initially and feel comfortable. I was surrounded by people who were senior to me and certainly more educated. The room was dominated by scientific types which I'm not. It was initially an intimidating environment. I came to see over time that through the facilitation and leadership, a lot of my fears went away and my comfort level grew. And that's partly their style of soliciting opinions from quiet people and also getting to know the expertise in the room.

Self-Authoring Mindset. Those exhibiting a Self-authoring mindset reflected that it might be necessary to move beyond one's personal comfort zone when the process conflicted with one's personal theory.

I assumed that since I'm on a science advisory panel, I was there for that reason and that makes sense. But it seems it hasn't been thought out yet what exactly is going on. I have been pushing for some context in these meetings and once I understand the context, it is much easier to say okay this is what we should do. I am a little uncomfortable with that because I am comfortable with myself as a (PROFESSION) and I am not comfortable with myself as a big thinker but in order for me to get to the point where I'm comfortable participating as a (PROFESSION), I need to understand the context.

Some of the participants with Socialized mindsets were able to broaden their perspectives because of supportive challenges from trusted others. One participant described how she felt out of her element at first and was very skeptical of the whole process. Yet, because of the kindness of the facilitator and the inclusion from other members, she started to reflect on her fears and discomfort and open up to new possibilities. This, however, took time – nearly a year of on-going interactions. Individuals of all mindsets created meaning that enabled them to feel safe and familiar. With supportive challenge, individuals could extend themselves to new ways of

knowing – not necessarily a full transformation from one mindset to another but a glimpse at what could be. From an outside perspective, the transition from Socialized to Self-authoring seemed quite rewarding as one started to see oneself in completely new ways. It also seemed daunting and difficult for these individuals to make sense of the conflicting sides of the self. The SeaPlan Facilitator played an important role for the Socialized meaning makers. They trusted her and saw her as a neutral authority with their best interest in mind. She was a conduit for them to experience different ideas and uncomfortable exchanges.

There were no significant findings from the Transforming mindset within this sub-theme.

Perception of Other

Throughout both the EBM and the developmental interviews, participants commented on motivation of other SEAPLAN partners, co-workers, state authorities, family, and friends. How participants perceived someone's underlying motivations differed among mindsets.

Socialized Mindset. The strong link to affiliation and authority was a recurring theme when those exhibiting a Socialized mindset discussed their perspectives of others involved with SEAPLAN.

And so, even though they (SEAPLAN facilitators) asked and said you (participants) are not signing your office up to support this document. This is you personally. I think for most people who work for agencies and XXX, they go into meetings with the mindset of their agency, not just them personally. I think they are there to see what this is. They are not mandated to do this so they are not going to speak up. If they were mandated, they would speak up but because we are getting together and trying to create this, they are there to listen.

Similarly to the Socialized excerpts under the affiliation theme, affiliation came up again as a motivating factor for them – influencing how they acted and reacted. There was not clear differentiation between one's personal feelings and ideas and the ideas perceived to be upheld by the affiliation.

Socialized / Self-Authoring Transition. In the excerpt below, a participant who was just starting to exhibit some Self-authoring started to see that differentiation and still saw others suppressing personal feelings and ideas to uphold the relationship to the affiliation.

I think the partnership was blessed to have adept facilitators who were able to keep conversations on topic and identify areas of friction, entertain them but not wallow in them. I don't think that resulted in further polarization. I'd like to think that some of these barriers are starting to come down and people were not on the defensive by the end of this and really starting to feel like there was a level of trust that was being built and shared. I do think some parties basically remained entrenched in the party line. Whether that party line was the message they were forced to carry and maybe they believe differently personally or professionally, I don't know. I'd like to think that would be the case and they were doing what they thought they had to do.

With participants who were in transition from Socialized to Self-authoring mindsets, upholding a responsibility to an affiliation was a fine balance between responsibility to other and responsibility to self. A responsibility to the self and its perspective, as well as understanding the “truth” of others from their own perspective, was the balance beam.

It’s like two channels I’m thinking of. One is developing a substantive rapport with the group so there’s a mutual respect. They understand what I bring to the table and I value their expertise because of the role they fill. But to me equally as important is establishing a personal, professional connection because I really care about how these people do in their jobs because it affects the overall success of what we’re trying to do together so I try to take an interest in understanding their challenges, their road blocks.

Simultaneously, this participant upheld her Socialized need for mutuality among participants but equally as important was her Self-authoring need to understand others’ differences and define her own differences. To do this, she must hold both her need for mutuality and her need to form a realistic picture of the others’ different perspective. This was a balance for her.

Self-Authoring Mindset. Balancing the needs of self and other was described differently in Self-authoring individuals. When discussing barriers to SEAPLAN’s success, they reflected on others as though they, too, were juggling many variables.

One of SEAPLAN’s challenges will be convening groups as they’re working toward harder positions or consensus on tangible things – find ways of setting the table so people will feel that they really have to be there – that they’re going to miss out on something if they’re not there. Because some obviously haven’t been attracted enough to come and it’s tough because everybody is busy and these are long meetings and a lot of conference calls. It’s a lot if you’re not bought in. You have to really believe in the concept, the big picture – not just that it’ll be a value to you.

There was a concern about paying attention to the underlying needs and interests of others instead of the concrete standpoints of others.

Self-Authoring Mindset with some Transformative Mindset. Similarly, those with some Transformative mindset were intrigued by the many variables that made people tick and were particularly interested in better understanding those as a path toward self-understanding. This next excerpt was from one of the participants who wanted to get a different perspective from his own on the logging happening in the old growth forests of the Olympic Peninsula. To do this, he engaged a logger in conversation. While this excerpt is about a different theme, it was taken from his Subject Object interview and is interesting to note. Unlike those participants straddling the Socialized/Self-authoring balance beam, there was no line to be drawn. He was “available” to have his thinking re-oriented by another. Those parts of himself were integrated. Note also that he was speaking about difference as interesting not threatening.

(Talking with him) completely re-oriented my thinking about the issue because I’d never had direct contact with anybody in that part of it.” Interviewer: What compels you to put yourself in these positions to be reoriented? “People are much more irrational and hard to

follow and complex but I believe it's possible to model their dynamics and to predict how they will react to a change in state of the rest of the natural system. I view this as essential preparation for doing anything innovative or useful in conversation. I really want to know every nuance of every single person so I can understand how they work. People are interesting. It's rewarding to learn about how people deal with the world. It's better than television. I don't know where to draw the line professionally.

Pertinent differences between Socialized and Self-authoring mindsets included the extent to which they reflected on why another person did what he/she did, the extent to which they recognized another's underlying reasons for acting in such a way, and the extent to which they recognized and readjusted their own interpretations, needs, motives, and reaction patterns to another.

For Self-authoring mindsets and beyond, there was an increasing ability to step outside oneself or one's perceptions and separate from one's own view to observe and reflect on all the subtleties of what was happening. When this happened, the conclusion one formed about another wasn't entirely framed by one's own feelings and interests (Jordan & Lundin, 2006).

The participant in the last excerpt considered his counterpart's reasons for his/her attitude to imagine and understand someone else's reality. He was aware that his reality was separate from another's and that they were both whole pictures of reality. This participant's Transformative mind peeked through as he reflected upon his own motivation. What's interesting about this next excerpt is that as he reflected on his own motivation, he not only noticed his own internal contradiction that he believed people mean well but could also have a dark side but he actively and explicitly makes a decision about how he was going to think. As he began to see and accept the many sides within him and his contradictions, he began to see and accept others and their contradictions (Sinnott, 2006).

I've decided to believe that most people mean well. I have many, many experiences to the contrary. It's interesting to know what motivates people in my profession to do this kind of stuff. And I'm wondering how many others have had to face that same decision to deliberately exercise faith in humanity and in people...I think it's a prerequisite for accomplishing anything like bringing communities together to discuss how they're going to relate to the world, setting up systems for stewardship. It just requires a general trust that people share certain values. They value their children's lives. They value the future. They value that life remain glorious in its diversity and complexity. You have to otherwise, it's pointless but that said, that ambition leads people like myself toward humungous projects that can really only be approached with immense cynicism. And in those projects, which I'm still not sure why I get involved in, I have been double-crossed, been hurt very badly, become very ill - had horrible experiences. It's always because of a real minority of people, like one or two in a region the size of east Africa or North America. Those individuals are so bad that they restore my faith in one other thing - evil. They're really genuinely are evil people and it only takes a couple to make these challenges that we're involved in seem sometimes insurmountable.

Particularly important to note about the last two excerpts is the empathic voice that comes through in his words. Each of us engages with other people all the time, people who are different from us. Throughout most of these engagements, perspective-taking capacities stay intact. However, there are some interactions that are so powerful that they become transformative, i.e. a new way of making meaning is constructed. He explicitly faces and acknowledges contradictions in his own way of knowing. It was only within the interviews with participants who exhibited some Transformative structure where these internal contradictions were mentioned.

Interviewer: What are the barriers within SEAPLAN to creating a new paradigm?

Participant: Well, I think preconception is certainly one. I have plenty of preconceptions it is not that I'm out of that loop but certainly, preconception and its handmaiden -fitting within existing structures -they kind of reinforce one another, and there are the absolute realities that we have governmental structures and funding structures, both of which are the foundations of any action that can be taken and those structures change slowly so it is not surprising that those concepts keep coming up. It is why I say maybe there is not another way and I think that's why those people that guide us with their own concepts and don't put down any good ideas that don't fit with their views are very facile. Maybe there is no other way than to use the old concept sort of rethreaded. I think that if anyone, particularly some of the organizers, heard me say that, they would say -geez, let's throw him off. But, I am an enthusiastic supporter, I just worry that things are declining faster than any of these processes can really make any difference, maybe that is just a fact of life on this earth.

Ongoing dialogue and exchange of different ideas, within an emotionally safe meeting space, was important for those with Socialized mindsets in order to buy-into cooperating with diverse interests and to start separating oneself from other. Dialogue for nearly all participants was a sort of education about oneself and one another. For Socialized individuals whose conceptions of other were more closely tied to oneself, open dialogue helped them to reflect on how their initial perception of someone might have been reconceived. They became less defensive. Differences didn't seem as threatening to one's sense of self as one began to separate oneself from other.

Summary

One cannot pick and choose who manages the marine environment. EBM is about cross-sector interactions and progress is achieved by communication among and between decision-makers of different mindsets. More insight is needed into how different mindsets interact with one another and how those interactions affect policy formation processes.

Perspective-taking on self and others takes on many forms. What does this all mean for environmental decision-making? At the very least, understanding "where someone is at" with their capacity to have and take on new perspectives is helpful for setting expectations for which EBM tenets are achievable given existing learning mechanisms. SEAPLAN facilitators can build a learning community by setting up processes that speak to participants where they are and acknowledge differences in meaning making. In addition, there is a tremendous opportunity with processes like SEAPLAN that are focused on cross-sectoral decision-making to become venues for developmental growth. Time, continuity, support, and practice are essential elements for

developmental growth. SEAPLAN's structure currently supports these elements. There is time, outside of government, for participants to hash out individual differences. There is continuity among members and they are continuously courted to remain involved. The meetings provide a supportive environment to "leave your affiliation at the door" and speak openly. The nature of SEAPLAN is to provide capacity for these diverse individuals to practice trying out new perspectives, get clearer about their own, and/or understand others'. SEAPLAN can become a model for other EBM-like processes by being even more intentional about these elements. Kegan calls this type of environment a "holding environment" in which an individual's environment has three functions: 1. To support them where they are developmentally, i.e. how they interpret and reason about the situation (Kegan et al., 2001; Popp & Portman, 2001). 2. To challenge the individual to stretch the limits of one's current meaning making system. 3. To provide a stable space an individual needs to integrate new ideas and feelings into his/her current meaning making system that will transform his/her way of knowing. This transformational learning can, in turn, benefit the stakeholder engagement process itself. The process becomes a classroom for learning rather than a courtroom for debating, winning and losing.

Conclusion

The following are research considerations for SeaPlan and other stakeholder engagement processes whose main purpose is to manage marine resources more holistically. Our overarching question was: Do the implicit expectations and mental demands of EBM practices require a complexity of logic and reasoning that outweighs participants' capacities?

Considerations for EBM Stakeholder Engagement Processes

1. The complexity of an EBM decision-making mandate requires attention to the complexity of the adult mind. Developmental psychology has a role to play in creating more optimal stakeholder engagement processes that are more relevant and therefore, meaningful for the individual stakeholders.
2. Decision-makers must be acutely aware of the act of decision-making, i.e. the process itself must be intentional. Optimal stakeholder engagement must be part of the decision-making process from the onset and not relegated to a supporting role.
3. Research partnerships should be developed between developmental psychologists and social scientists studying public participation and engagement.

Consideration 1: The complexity of an EBM decision-making mandate requires attention to the complexity of the adult mind: Developmental psychology has a role to play in creating more optimal stakeholder engagement processes. It is not necessary nor is it feasible for managers or professional process facilitators to be experts in developmental psychology in order to consider the mindsets of decision-makers. It is necessary, however, for them to learn how to facilitate processes that effectively invite all of the mindsets into the room. There are ways in which one can recognize developmental traits and adapt and/or create a process that works with and for a range of developmental capacities. If the complexities of meanings which individuals bring to the process of engagement continue to be ignored, processes will be created and policies enacted that are not truly and comprehensively EBM. To accomplish EBM's primary tenet of managing across sectors, the stakeholders across all sectors must be engaged. They cannot be optimally

engaged without attention to how they make sense of the process and its intended goals. And if they are not engaged in ways that meet them where they are, the process will fall short of fully integrating all stakeholders into decision-making. From a developmental standpoint, a stakeholder engagement process must be created with the people in mind. It needs to speak to them, where they're at developmentally. The process does not and cannot stand alone separate from its participants. The process itself cannot have a direction or a goal separate from what its participants understand it to be.

How someone makes sense of the process translates into what and, more importantly, how they learn. A person with a Socialized mindset may come to the process to gain knowledge about EBM because they feel responsible for their affiliation's interest. As one participant said, "This is going to happen. It's just a matter of how and when and I want to make sure I understand how it affects my affiliation." These participants come to a learning process asking "What am I supposed to know?" A person with a Self-authoring mindset may come to a learning process thinking about what they want to learn and accomplish. Stakeholder engagement processes, when looked at developmentally, are ripe classrooms not only for developmental growth but for creating processes or reworking existing ones to more fully connect with participants' capacities.

Consideration 2: Decision-makers must be acutely aware of the act of decision-making, i.e. the process itself must be intentional. Stakeholder engagement must be part of the decision-making process from the onset and not relegated to a supporting role. It must support deliberative characteristics. Throughout the research process, it became apparent how important stakeholder engagement was in order to obtain EBM objectives, particularly those related to making trade-offs more explicit. Decision-making must move away from an interest-based discourse to a deliberative discourse that takes into consideration the inherent interaction and interdependence between the individuals involved and the context in which they find themselves. EBM literature on stakeholder processes offers considerations aimed only at upholding an ideal rather than simultaneously considering who the stakeholders actually are. By intentionally considering developmental capacities when creating a stakeholder engagement process and by using deliberative characteristics, EBM processes can become mechanisms for a new kind of learning which in turn enhances the EBM process.

Stakeholders must be optimally engaged from the onset through an official mechanism that is connected to, but not directly from, government (such as a public/private partnership). The engagement process should start long before the mandating process starts, if possible, and become a permanent mechanism for ongoing dialogue across sectors. EBM stakeholder engagement processes should not be predetermined. There must be intentionality about the process development and ongoing recognition of process traits as the process unfolds. And most importantly, participants should be aware or made aware of these process traits. With awareness, there is a better chance that some participants can help enable the process to adapt.

Consideration 3: EBM stakeholder engagement processes, as described above, are inherently excellent learning organizations. Many stakeholder engagement processes are not necessarily created with actual participants in mind. They are not created to meet the needs of a range of participants. They promote informational versus transformational learning. They encourage dialogue and deliberation but fail to understand and/or acknowledge when participants can't

achieve these ideals. Cross-disciplinary collaborative research can teach us how to address the cognitive, emotional, social, and political variables that EBM stakeholder engagement processes inherently demand. And in doing so, create and sustain processes that do, in fact, consider and include the whole of the ecosystem.

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Correcting Improper Uses of Perspectives, Pronouns, and Dualities in Wilberian Integral Theory: An Application of Holarchical Field Theory

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Abstract: This article uses my pre-existing extension of Wilberian metatheory, holarchical field theory, to diagnose and work towards overcoming the confusion within attempts to analyze action, events, and communication using Ken Wilber's AQAL model. In holarchical field theory, *holarchical fields* become the fundamental component of reality. These fields comprise 1) holons in relation to one another and to their potential, and 2) their interpenetrating forces engaged by their interactions. In light of the theory, problems in the Wilberian literature have included inconsistent uses of certain dualities (subject-object, interior-exterior, and inside-outside) as well as person perspectives and pronouns. Previous attempts to overcome these issues without precise diagnoses suffer from a conflation of the dual definitions of the subjective-objective duality, one a philosophical definition, the other grammatical. State versus action language is classified within the dualities of holarchical field theory.

Keywords: AQAL, holarchical field theory, integral communication, integral scientific pluralism, Ken Wilber.

Introduction

In my recent work (Bowman, 2009, 2012a, 2012b), I have extended certain key aspects of Ken Wilber's AQAL model to form what I call holarchical field theory (HFT). It encourages a more formal and consistent analysis of action and events between subjects and objects using Wilberian integral metatheory. HFT has the desirable feature of being able to incorporate a field-theoretic framework for a more dynamic use of Wilberian theory. HFT will be situated in some of the literature of field theories in the social sciences that have been used to analyze individual, organizational, and society change, particularly the strands that closely follow the field theory of Kurt Lewin. The objective of this article is to improve upon the internal consistency of Wilberian thought, thereby readying it for more appropriate use in analyzing multiple-holon interaction.

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Problems associated with Wilber's integral mathematics will be demonstrated and corrected using holarchical field theory.

Of particular concern here are the inconsistent uses of the subject-object, interior-exterior, and inside-outside dualities as well as person perspectives and pronouns in the Wilberian literature. Wilber (2002, 2006), Edwards (2003) and O'Connor (2008, 2010) all propose alternative uses of pronouns and person perspectives using Wilberian metatheory. Edwards' and O'Connor's critiques of Wilber's uses of pronouns and person perspectives show that these features of Wilber's approach need reconsideration. In light of HFT, however, Edwards' and O'Connor's alternative uses will be shown to suffer from a conflation of the dual definitions of the subjective-objective duality, one a philosophical definition, the other grammatical. This reductionism will be coined as the philosophical/grammatical conflation. This will demonstrate an advantage of having a clear differentiation of these dual meanings within the extended Wilberian framework of HFT.

Holarchical field theory (HFT) reconstituted integral theory such that *holarchical fields* became the fundamental component of reality. These fields integrate the two previous fundamental units of Wilberian theory: holons (Wilber 1995) and perspectives (Wilber 2002, 2006). Holons (as defined by Wilber, 1995 who followed Koestler, 1964) are (organisms, collectives, things or systems that are) simultaneously a whole in one context and a part in another. Holarchical fields include both holons in relation to one another and to their potential, as well as their interpenetrating forces engaged by their interaction. A component of HFT is integral scientific pluralism (ISP), which integrates Esbjorn-Hargens' (2010) integral ontological pluralism and integral epistemological pluralism into zones created by a fuller use of the dualities in Wilberian theory (Bowman, 2012a). HFT is a dynamic extension of integral scientific pluralism (Bowman, 2012b).

ISP and its extension into HFT are summarized in the next section of this article. I then situate HFT as a metatheory bridging Wilber's AQAL model and field theories in the social sciences. HFT is then used to spot and avoid some confusion within attempts to analyze action, events, and communication using Wilber's AQAL model. The subsequent section presents the alternative uses of perspectives and pronouns by Edwards (2003) and O'Connor (2008, 2010) as suffering from the philosophical/grammatical conflation. I then demonstrate how state versus action language can be classified within HFT. This section also shows that pronouns and first-, second-, and third-person perspectives cannot be reduced to particular AQAL or HFT realms without qualifications. This finding plus the specification of the philosophical/grammatical conflation helps one better understand the subtle meanings and inconsistent uses of dualities by Wilber in the next section. The subject-object integration in HFT is then used to weigh in on the recent dialogue between Ken Wilber and Roy Bhaskar, founder of critical realism, related to an epistemic fallacy in integral theory and an opposing ontic fallacy in critical realism. I then conclude. The appendix provides a new instructional example of two individuals communicating (a dynamic event) to illustrate the elements of HFT.

Summary of Integral Scientific Pluralism and Holarchical Field Theory

This section briefly summarizes first, integral scientific pluralism and then, its extension into holarchical field theory.²

Integral Scientific Pluralism and Modularity

Compared to Wilber's AQAL, integral scientific pluralism more formally includes the dualities of internal-external and health-pathology as well as the subject-action-object triad. I will clarify Wilber's use of the eight zones, which makes use of the internal-external duality. I will then divide each zone by the health-pathology duality and the subject-action-object triad. The division of each of the eight zones by the subject-action-object triad is justified by Wilber's notions of broad and good science. Broad science includes interior and exterior types (Wilber, 2000b). Good knowledge requires knowing the kosmic address of the perceiver (subject), perceived (object), and "what injunctions [methods as actions]...a perceiving subject must perform in order to be at a Kosmic address that can perceive the object" (2006, p. 267). Only the methods (actions of scientific inquiry) are formally included in Wilber's integral methodological pluralism. The proposed complements of integral ontological and epistemological pluralisms (the object and subject realms of scientific inquiry, respectively) will be formally included within integral scientific pluralism.

One benefit of adding the health-pathology duality is to aid in the examination of those things that contribute to or inhibit development. Edwards (2010) methodically and metatheoretically examined the metatheories of Ken Wilber (AQAL) and Bill Torbert (developmental action inquiry) (Torbert, 1976, 1991, 1999; Torbert et al., 2004) along with a thorough meta-study of the organizational transformation literature. Edwards specified the health-pathology, internal-external, and perspectives lenses as lenses that appear in the literature studied. They are also lenses that are used, but not formally, in AQAL (Edwards, 2010, p. 217). This provides additional justification to formally include them if logically supported and consistent.

The construction of integral scientific pluralism (ISP) begins with Ken Wilber's eight zones of integral methodological pluralism (IMP). For Wilber (2006), IMP uses the eight zones as eight different perspectives to view the four quadrants (pp. 36-40). For example, the individual-interiority of the upper left quadrant can be examined internally (as with the class of methodologies called phenomenology) or externally (with the structuralism class). In a later section, I will show that Wilber has not always consistently followed his own definitions of the internal-external or inside-outside dualities. Wilber (2002, Excerpt C) defines *internal* constituent parts of holons as following the agency of the holon while those that do not are *external*. Parts that are *inside* a holon are within its boundary. Items beyond its boundary are *outside* of the holon. Parasites or repressed thoughts are examples of items that are inside holons, but not internal to the holon.

² Here I will provide brief justification for the extensions. Citations will be provided for my earlier work and its more detailed arguments.

For HFT, I define the internal-external duality as Wilber defines the inside-outside duality (items separated by the holon's boundary). Thus, I can use internal-external the way Wilber uses inside-outside in the formation of the eight zones because I will also allow for positive (healthy) and negative (pathological) aspects which are internal or external. So a parasite or a repressed thought is a pathological internal item.

I use the term internal-external (instead of inside-outside) for the following two reasons. One is that internal and external aspects can be associated with the common dynamic terms of internalize and externalize as was done in Bowman (2009). We do not have verbs like insidize or outsidify. The second reason is that all the distinctions that Wilber makes can be fully accommodated when the health-pathology is crossed with what I am calling the internal-external duality.

I define healthy items as those that are capable of contributing to meaningful needs satisfaction (which would include items that aid in meaningful development). Pathological items are items that tend to be destructive and may inhibit meaningful needs fulfillment and development. This is consistent with Wilber's (1995, p. 78-79) discussion of healthy and pathological drives such as autonomy (healthy agency) versus dissociation (pathological agency).

To distinguish between healthy and pathological actions that emanate from healthy and pathological holonic aspects, respectively, I use the adjectives positive or negative. Thus positive externalization is a force that contributes to healthy expression, needs satisfaction, or development that moves beyond the border or a holon (as when the education of the mother benefits her child). Please note that internal-external is different from the interior-exterior duality. My thoughts and our mutual understanding are interior aspects while my brain processes and the interstate highway system our exterior items. My thoughts and my brain processes are both internal to me as an individual holon.³

I treat the eight zones as not only eight perspectives, but also eight distinct realms in which holons exist. Thus the phenomenologist examines individual-interior objects as they appear in the internal realm of the phenomenologist. The structuralist may ask questions of individuals to study their individual-interior as they appear in the test-subjects' external realm. This will aid in tracking the aspects of the subject that perceives versus the aspects of the object being perceived. Examining four-quadrant evolution or deciphering the relatively healthy choice in a given situation benefits by differentiating relevant internal and external items. For a generalized example within Wilber's stated four-quadrant correlations, two largely egocentric tribes cannot sustainably merge within a sociocentric empire and transform their culture up to that correlative level without a certain aspects that are internalized, like emergent capabilities (taking the role of other, sociocentric rules, etc.) while others are externalized (irreconcilable myths and procedures that oppose those of other tribes they may unite with).

³ The labels healthy and pathological internal and external are also more intuitive than relying on the definitions Wilber specifies for inside-outside and internal-external. The two dualities are easily confused without keeping careful track of the definitions.

Treating the eight zones in this manner then allows for them to be crossed by the subject-action-object triad such that each zone can be seen as an area from which a subject takes a perspective (subject) and interacts (action) with its environment (object). This is necessary to specify the scientist (subject in this example), his or her employment of methods (action) and the object of study (object). This creates 24 horizontal zones of each level of development. Crossing the realms further with the health-pathology duality makes the 48 horizontal realms of *integral scientific pluralism* as shown in Figure 1. This article will contribute to a view that a formal extension of AQAL to include the internal-external and health-pathology lenses is beneficial.




Figure 1. *Forty-eight horizontal realms of integral scientific pluralism.*
 Key: = the pathology of that realm; IMP = integral methodological pluralism; IOP = integral ontological pluralism; IEP = integral epistemological pluralism.
 Source: Bowman (2012a, p. 58).

With ISP, the eight classes of methodologies (IMP), when employed, can be seen as dynamic interactions between the subject scientist and, potentially, an eight-zonal object. This encourages a high degree of reflexivity of the subject scientist, which is an important focus of the metatheory of Edgar Morin (2001, 2004, 2006, 2007; Montuori, 2013). Given the fractal nature of ISP, all 24 horizontal realms, once mastered, become a new tool (a new method). An object of scientific inquiry can be examined as at the center of its own subject interacting with other objects. Taking a perspective then becomes a particular action from the subject realm to the object realm that can be mapped with this approach. Later sections will show that a more formal treatment of perspectives is needed in AQAL.

Esbjorn-Hargens (2010) began to postulate an integral ontological pluralism (IOP) and integral epistemological pluralism (IEP) to complement Wilber's IMP (within a Wilberian approach). Similarly, Esbjorn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009) organize their Wilberian metatheoretical study of ecology by the Who (subject or IEP), the How (action/method or IMP) and the What (object or IEP). Therefore, IEP, IMP, and IOP reside neatly within the ISP realms.

Consider how ISP informs its user of how scientific inquiry involves these ISP realms. For example, the scientist interprets data using his own interior-individual-internal symbols, translations, etc., and is constrained or empowered by his own psychograph (phenomenology). Ideally, he judges the correspondence of his thoughts to his written output and makes assumptions of the interior-individual receptivity of his readers or the interior-individual motivations of his test-subjects (structuralist). Whether or not he is scientific or not as a structuralist, he must work with his own thoughts. He views his objects of study through cultural understanding such as the accepted paradigm of his discipline (hermeneuticist). He must present novel findings that can have an impact in that paradigm (cultural anthropologist). His scientific endeavor is fostered in part by his individual biological skills such as his dexterity at manipulating scientific instruments and computer keyboards (autopoietic scientist). The social structures in which he is an internal member such as the persuasiveness of his academic appointment and his ability to obtain research funding also influence him. Those social aspects that are currently external to him, such as the carrot of tenure, other non-academic options, or a wider academic readership also drive and constrain him, consciously or unconsciously (social autopoietic scientist).

I distinguish between primary and secondary methodologies. Scientists tend to work within a certain strand or a few strands of established scientific inquiry. They present their findings from the accepted methodologies within these strands. These are the stated methodologies or *primary methods* within the paradigm. The other methodologies are *secondary*. They are methods used without scientific justification when evaluated according to the best scientific principles available across the broad sciences. They are used less consciously, less transparently, or less justifiably as when the dominant paradigms in economics and political science assume all agents to be atomistic and egoistic. The atomistic and egoist assumptions are not justified (without proper contextualization) from an ISP lens because it violates the roughly known distribution of agents found by structuralist and cultural anthropological sciences. Yet the assumption is accepted by precedence within positivist and empiricist schools of thought. So scientists do not merely take an exterior perspective (or what Wilber and Esbjorn-Hargens call a third-person perspective). All eight perspectives are taken together while the exterior perspective may be the

stated (primary) method. Understanding of the distortions from secondary methods, I argue, is an important ongoing project for Integral Theory and a key to the success of Wilber's integral reconstruction. His model does not heap together knowledge from across various disciplines, nor does it construct a scientific study controlling for all eight methodologies. Rather, it includes partial truths and removes partially invalid assumptions and results when they are examined in context with the other disciplines and wisdom traditions. This is a particular, skilled, and broad use of these eight methodological classes. This Wilberian, metatheoretical methodology I call *integral scientific modularity* (ISM) (Bowman, 2012a). With the aid of the formal constructs of AQAL (such as the many levels of the four quadrants), findings from one discipline are contextualized and integrated with findings from other disciplines.

ISM adds insight into Wilber's epistemology and methodology. It is consistent with, and bolsters Edwards' (2010) contention that "orienting generalization cannot be validated at the middle-range level because they are only fully articulated at the level of metatheory" (p. 89). Although I would prefer to state 'more fully articulated', Edwards' statement was in disagreement with Crittenden's (1997) assertion that Wilber's methodology began with orienting generalizations from various disciplines. ISM warns of the potential biases and distorted findings from fragmented modern and postmodern science, yet also provides some direction for an integral reconstruction.

Crossing the ISP realms with the health-pathology duality allows one to clearly see that there are degrees of health within each zone across the subject-action-object triad. In other words, there are healthy and unhealthy aspects within the capabilities and limitations of scientists (epistemologically), within the way they conduct their investigations (methodologically), and within their objects of study (ontologically). Scientific endeavors have revealed aspects of all forty-eight zones. For examples differentiated by epistemology, methodology, and ontology, see Bowman (2012a).

More generally, we can think of a subject and an object as each having healthy and pathological capabilities allowing for positive and negative interaction. Examples of healthy capabilities in particular subjects include well-adjusted individuals psychologically (upper-left), constructive moral codes (lower-left), well functioning body-brains (upper-right) and useful aspects of governance procedures (lower-right). We may be specifying them as internal to individual or collective subjects or in external holons relative to others. Unhealthy, items include individual neuroses (upper-left), physical ailments (upper-right), racist beliefs learned in the family (lower-left), and incentives in the political system that encourage corruption (lower-right) either in a particular subject or object (internal) or in subjects or objects that are related to other subjects or objects (external).

Many unproductive dialogues occur when agents implicitly disallow both healthy and unhealthy aspects to occur in a particular realm. Consider first an exterior-intensive object, the economic system. A Marxist economist and a neoclassical economist may not learn from each other if the Marxist only acknowledges unhealthy aspects of the capitalistic system and the neoclassical economist finds everything about capitalism to be natural and beneficial. For an interior-intensive example, a man and wife in a strained relationship may have trouble reconciling if they each think of the other person as approaching their relationship troubles

completely unhealthily psychologically while take no responsibility for their own individual-interior shortcomings as they apply to their difficulties.

When subjects and objects interact, healthy capabilities will tend to cause events that satisfy needs meaningfully while the unhealthy ones will inhibit meaningful needs satisfaction. To chart the various channels of interaction, it is helpful to cross the 16 object zones and 16 subject zones with the static-dynamic duality. This is explained in the next subsection.

Holarchical Fields and Holarchical Development

In order to summarize the holarchical field construct, it will be useful to first discuss Wilber's concept of kosmic address, which, in simplified form, is a holon's altitude (level of development in various lines) plus perspective.⁴ Altitude is a static capability or present potentiality while taking a perspective is a dynamic event. ISP makes clear distinctions between static capabilities and potentials of holons separate from their dynamic interactions. Potential implies various possibilities given one's capabilities in a given environment. The possibility may be routine or emergent. For an emergent action for an individual, consider Vygotsky's (1978) zone of proximal development. There is a leading edge for an individual that allows her to solve certain problems. The skills and capabilities in relative lines of development are stocks of development. Solving a problem is a dynamic task. Some, more complex problems are not quite, but closely within the individuals grasp, or within the zone of proximal development, if the individual is supported with someone with a greater, relevant skills set. The dynamic interaction between student and teacher can then build greater stocks of relevant skills for the student.

Since taking a perspective is a dynamic event, I have defined holarchical embeddedness as, essentially, kosmic address without the chosen perspective of a given moment. In ISP, the *holarchical embeddedness* of the subject and all relevant objects is their pre-existing statics (including needs, characteristics, capabilities, potentialities, occupation, incentives, social power differentials, and so on) and history with components of the environment. *Holarchical interaction* of subject and object includes their interrelated dynamic events (perceptions, analyses, active relations, choices, movement, communication, and so on). Empirical investigations would begin with a smaller subset of these distinctions, but theoretically, HFT begins broadly (as is the stated approach in field theory). And theoretically, a clear static-dynamic distinction is needed for a number of reasons. For one, the model can be used to help assess the relative health of stakeholder interactions relative to their potential so that prescriptions can be made to intervene and encourage healthier results. An integral national income accounting would also need the static-dynamic differentiation to specify stocks of assets (such as the levels of four-quadrant capital in the economy) and the holarchical needs satisfied from the production and consumption of goods and services from those assets in a given time period. Holarchically embedding the assets could significantly improve our understanding of economies, networked and otherwise.

The relationship between holarchical embeddedness and the dynamic events between subject and object are explored further with the extension of integral scientific pluralism. ISP can be

⁴ A more elaborate address will include the holon's typology, present state, etc.

linked with the dynamic drives of the *holarchical development* model (Bowman, 2009). In holarchical development, the eight zones (interior-exterior times individual-collective times internal-external) times the health-pathology duality are further crossed with the static-dynamic duality. Table 1 represents the relationship between the static realms in which holons exist, and their correlated dynamic action. For example, a holon exists in the four quadrants; that is, it has at any given point in time, intentional, behavior, cultural, and social capabilities and potentials. These aspects are relatively static in nature. The intentional items are described as existing in the individual-interior realm. On the other hand, the dynamic action of reading a profound book can build individual-interior capital for that agent. This would be a combination of positive interiorization and positive individuation.

Again, positive actions are defined as those that contribute to meaningful expression, needs satisfaction, or development. Negative drives detract from or inhibit meaningful expression, needs satisfaction, or development. Neutral drives neither promote nor inhibit meaningful expression, needs satisfaction, or development. In Kurt Lewin's (1951) field theory, drives are categorized as driving or restraining. Driving forces tend to propel individuals or groups towards a goal or certain action, while restraining forces tend to prevent certain behaviors.

Table 1. Holarchical Drives (Corresponding to the Static Dualities) and Examples of Their Corresponding Actions.

<i>Drives of the Interior- Exterior Duality (Times Health-Pathology)</i>	
Positive Interiorization Training or reading a book that expands one's understanding. <u>In a Subject Scientist:</u> An insight that solves a puzzle in the economics literature. <u>In/As the Object of Study:</u> The productivity improvements from a transformation of consciousness of the average worker over time.	Positive Exteriorization Putting into writing a brilliant idea; reproducing another machine part; forming muscle memory from practice.
Negative Interiorization Ignoring exterior causes from a belief that we can change <i>all</i> of our reality by recognizing the exterior as illusory; paranoid interpretations.	Negative Exteriorization Operating with limited intention because one thinks thoughts are only products of brain chemicals reacting to exterior stimuli; computer hacking a benevolent charity's website.
<i>Drives of the Individual-Collective Duality (Times Health-Pathology)</i>	
Positive Individuation Honoring individual choice; respecting the individual perspective for its partial truth.	Positive Collectivization Contributing to social value; learning the language of the collective; openness to learning from another person.
Negative Individuation Alienation from the collective; not honoring the partially-valid individual perspective.	Negative Collectivization Indiscriminately accepting all individual choices as equally valid; destructive herd behavior.
<i>Drives of the Internal-External Duality (Times Health-Pathology)</i>	
Positive Internalization For society, taxing gas to make drivers bear costs of pollution; taking responsibility for a mistake.	Positive Externalization Releasing limiting thoughts; firing an incompetent worker; the destruction of a virus by antibodies.
Negative Internalization Absorption of pollution by an innocent bystander; feeling guilt for what is beyond one's control.	Negative Externalization The loss of awareness from a peak experience; Projecting beyond oneself one's own repressed issues.

Drives of the Higher-Lower Duality (Times Health-Pathology)**Positive Ascension**

Releasing attachment to a literal notion that demons cause illness in order to open to the germ theory of disease; emergence of a higher capacity.

Negative Ascension

Denying an ability to attain higher awareness with transformative practice (rather, thinking only through death or by miracle can one go higher); blind obedience to higher-level authority when one knows better.

Positive Descension

Enjoying to eat healthier such that the lower hunger drive is satisfied with rational understanding of health; relativistic-level parents teaching traditional-level children to recycle.

Negative Descension

Denying greater potentials of the lower (e.g., one *must* abstain from sex to transcend lower expressions of it); a rational-level holon disallowing the expression of feelings.

Source: Adapted from Bowman (2009, p. 18).

Once one accepts the usefulness of making static and dynamic distinctions, the dynamic drives follow naturally from Wilber's writings as the examples in Table 1 convey. First I will focus on the horizontal realms and drives. Recall from above, the reference to healthy and pathological autonomy and communion (Wilber, 1995, p. 48-49). Their meanings clearly imply actions relating to the static duality of individual-collective. (See Bowman 2009 for a detailed discussion). A constant theme for Wilber is how AQAL aids the user to see reality in more of its dimensions thereby fostering a healthier and more balanced holarchical use of its realms (which are created by crossing dualities). Similarly, Edwards (2010, p. 7-8) argues that metatheory such as AQAL is capable of specifying strengths and weaknesses of the unit-level theories it integrates. Flatland reductionism to the exterior domains as in scientific areas dominated by positivism and empiricism (Wilber, 1995, p. 450) is contrasted with broad science (Wilber, 2000b, p. 74) that recognizes interior and exterior dimensions and scientific methodologies to appropriately access them. Since the internal-external duality is not as well integrated into AQAL, I draw on Pigou's (1932) seminal work on positive and negative externalities and internalities.⁵

Moving onto the vertical dimension, we see references to vertical drives and vertical levels in healthy and unhealthy manifestations. Wilber contrasts healthy agape or compassion in the descending direction versus unhealthy thanatos or repression in the descending direction. In the ascending direction, healthy eros is offset by pathological phobos (Wilber, 1995, p. 348-351). Regarding health and pathology by specific level, Wilber (1995) and Beck and Cowan (1996) discuss healthy or emergent capabilities at a given level in contrast with problems at a given level that may necessitate growth to a higher level to overcome. Edwards (2010) also describes new powers and problems associated with the various levels of organizational development.

One could provide an example per dynamic drive that relates to a particular subject and another for a related object. In Table 1, this is done for one drive for illustration, but only one drive for conciseness. For instance, an economist as a subject studying the economy may experience positive interiorization as she intuits a new insight that solves a difficult puzzle in the literature on labor market participation and wage rates (positive interiorization in the subject). Alternatively, the object of study may be the productivity improvements that result from a

⁵ See Bowman (2009) for more on the justification for these dynamic drives as correlated with Wilberian dualities. Included are some references to how others have also used them such as Carl Jung and Jean Piaget.

transformation in consciousness of the average worker over time (positive interiorization in the object). This example again brings out the fractal nature of working with this model. The object just mentioned is its own subject (the average worker making choices) that dynamically interacts (transforms) with objects (more productive machines). This subject-action-object triad is itself an object that is dynamically engaged by the subject economist during her study.

ISP (Figure 1) and the holarchical drives (Table 1) are linked with the static-dynamic duality. The dynamic dualities (interiorization-exteriorization, internalization-externalization, individuation-collectivization, positive-negative, ascension-descension, and subject-object interaction) correlate directly (and respectively) with the static dualities (interiority-exteriority, internality-externality, individuality-collectivity, health-pathology, height-depth, and subject-object embeddedness). Thus the dynamic dualities specify the action between subject and its object environment while embeddedness relates to one another the holarchical location of the subject and object that are interacting.

Holarchical field theory is the result of this linking ISP and the dynamic drives. For this branch of Wilberian metatheory that I have offered, no longer is the fundamental unit holons (Wilber, 1995), nor perspectives (Wilber, 2002, 2006), but instead holarchical fields formed by interpenetrating classes of drives between holarchically-embedded subject and its object environment. Notice that HFT does not merely embed the subject in on object environment in only a relative, otherwise ungrounded manner, as when a reader of literature is embedded in a culture by a postmodern analyst. Instead, both the subject and object are each holarchically embedded and as a result of their relative position in holarchical space (each can be described independent of each other). Their potential fields within this setting then provides certain probabilities of various actions, theoretically. The field construct transcends and includes the relatively static descriptor, holons, and one of their dynamic actions, perspective-taking. According to Smith and Smith (1996), a definition for a field that is applicable to all social and natural sciences was given by English and English (1958, p. 207): it “substitutes events for things having fixed properties, and sees events as totalities in which parts of the event are what they are, qualitatively and quantitatively, only in terms of the rest of the event.” Such an approach is needed to examine complex actions. The formal action examined thus far using Wilber’s integral mathematics has been limited to one holon taking a perspective, which discloses an aspect of an object.

Holarchical field theory can be used to distinguish and relate state versus action developmental theory. Holarchical embeddedness is described relatively intensely by state development theory, which focuses on the capabilities that develop in sequence in various lines of development. For examples, Piaget (1977) and Aurobindo (n.d.) studied cognition; Kohlberg (1981) and Gilligan (1982) morals; Graves (2005) and Beck and Cowan (1996) values; and Lenski (1970) and Marx (1977) techno-economic base. Action developmental theory describes relatively intensely the guiding strategies or action logics associated with different stages of individual or collective development. Examples include the action inquiry of Torbert’s (1976, 1991, 1999) and the action science of Argyris’ (1996; Argyris and Shon, 1996).

An increase in integral tendencies in culture (a transformational influence) could contribute potentially to a more meaningful and sustainable society for first-tier agents, not just integral-

stage agents. The full specification of dynamic drives fosters examination of these subtle differences in emphasis (translation, transcription, and translation). Integral agents could invest in their own skills to further develop (positive ascension), or they can invest in skills that can contribute to healthier actions of First-Tier agents (positive descension). The concept of *holarchical development* is intended for just such differentiations. It can be represented by Figure 2, which shows, roughly, a hypothetical case of balanced development. With balanced development, there is positive development in all holarchical directions. This follows Wilber's (2000a, p. 198) statement that nested pyramids could also represent his many-leveled, four-quadrant diagram. A deeper (North-South) pyramid is from positive individuation and collectivization. A wider (East-West) pyramid is from positive interiorization and exteriorization. A taller pyramid is from positive ascension, and a steeper slope is from positive descension. The process also involves positive internalization and externalization such that greater potential is realized within the boundaries of the pyramid and positive externalization where the obstacles that prevented that growth are eliminated or related external holons also benefit.

Balanced development, however, is not necessarily the case, nor is it even typical. The model must allow for developments that are intensive in the various holarchical directions as with the finding by Beck and Cowan (1996) that stages alternate in emphasis of autonomy (positive individuation) and communion (positive collectivization). Consider also Wilber's descriptions of the dignity and disaster of modernity. He writes that development at the rational stage has occurred disproportionately in the exterior realms with even pathological differentiation and atomistic conceptions of reality (development with a heavy combination of positive and negative exteriorization and individuation). Similarly, postmodernity contributed to development with an emphasis on the cultural quadrant, but has overplayed its significance such that hierarchical stage theories and logical analyses are deconstructed without reconstruction.⁶

⁶ See Bowman (2009) for a description of the partially valid critiques of Wilber's AQAL model, which can be grouped as the ascending-bias criticisms. There I describe how the dynamic drives can be derived from Wilber's writings to increase AQAL's internal consistency and better differentiate the vertical directions of development. This at least partially overcame AQAL's ascending bias without succumbing to the pre-post fallacy (that is, without elevating pre-conventional tendencies to post-conventional or reducing the post to pre).




Figure 2: *Balanced development in each holonic direction resulting in a larger pyramid.*

Source: Adapted from Bowman (2009, p. 4).

HFT as a Metatheory Bridging AQAL and Social Science Field Theory

Here I use Mark Edwards' (2010) metastudy of metatheories and his own metatheory to help orient holarchical field theory (HFT) within the metatheoretical literature. This also provides insight into HFT's extensions of AQAL, which builds bridges to field theories in the social sciences. I will focus on the field theory of Kurt Lewin (1939, 1951) and some of its more contemporary influences.

Overton (2007) distinguishes ordinary theory from the conceptually higher-level metatheory. Ordinary theory and methods use the empirical world as its subject matter, while metatheory and metamethods take the ordinary theories and methods themselves as the subject matter. Edwards (2010) worked on yet a higher conceptual level as he compared different metatheoretical models and methods including those classified as traditional meta-construction, the dialectical method, metatriangulation, metaparadigm inquiry, and metatheorizing in sociology. The traditional meta-scholarship relies on a theorist's broad reading across many related disciplines and his or her intellect and intuition to build a large theoretical framework. Although important connections and models can result, the method lacks transparency and repeatability.

The dialectical method (e.g., Marx, 1977) resolves opposing perspectives through rational dialogue. According to Paolucci (2003), Marx's method involved inquiry, conceptualization of core elements, case comparisons, deductive analysis and provisional abstractions, model building, evaluation, presentation, and continued inquiry.

Edwards concluded that only metatriangulation could claim to be a systematic research method for metatheory building. Its three phases are groundwork, data-analysis, and theory building as in the work of Lewis and Grimes (1999). For Edwards, multiparadigm inquiry (Lewis and Kelemen, 2002), with similarities to the approach of Ritzer (1991, 2001), is a complementary tool for comparing theories and metatheories given its comparisons of “underlying themes and key conceptual factors” (Edward, 2010, p. 85).

Edwards’ own metatheoretical method is an extension of the systematic metatriangulation method. Edwards’ extensions help overcome the inability of metatriangulation to widen the range of existing paradigms and lenses. Edwards found all four metatriangulation studies within his chosen domain (organizational transformation) to rely on the four paradigms (interpretive, functionalist, radical humanist, and radical structuralist) specified by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Saunder et al. (2003) also recognized the problem of the reproduction of existing paradigmatic relationships in studies using metatriangulation. Edwards’ resulting eight phases of his metamethod are groundwork, domain specification, design, multiparadigm review, multiparadigm analysis, metatheory building, implications, and evaluation.

Edwards places Ken Wilber’s method in the traditional category. Edwards adds transparency by pointing out the characteristics of the formal and informal aspects of the theory. Edwards recognized the four quadrants as a crossing of two dualities, a method used to synthesize various perspectives in other studies. Of course, in the case of AQAL’s four quadrants, individual-collective is crossed with interior-exterior to form four areas (the individual, interior quadrant; the individual, exterior quadrant; the collective, interior quadrant; and the collective, exterior quadrant). Thus the method of, and value from, using formal dualities that Edwards specified is consistent with the method of, and value from, what I specify as integral scientific modularity. ISM also improves upon the transparency of Wilber’s work and HFT by extension. Integral scientific modularity is a more generalized argument that includes the formal and informal aspects of AQAL. When used successfully, Wilber’s method of referencing claims across disciplines and methods contextualizes one another and do not necessarily require formalization, as Edwards uses the concept, in order to better judge the partially valid from the partially invalid conclusions. Judging by a broader survey of cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological studies helps one overcome results from unjustified assumptions while honoring those that result from state-of-the-art scientific inquiry. Furthermore, HFT formalization of what were informal relationships in AQAL by using the (bipolar, triadic, or spectral) crossing method is sanctioned by Edwards’ meta-analyses. The domains of HFT represent an unprecedented level of differentiation and integration as measured by the number of dualities, triads, and spectra simultaneously crossed with its results systematically described and theoretically supported. Improved internal consistency, as described in later sections, provides some confirmation of the appropriateness and fit of the HFT extensions of AQAL.

Recall that HFT formally includes some conceptual lenses that were used informally in AQAL (internal-external, health-pathology, and subject-action-object). We can add to this list the autonomy-communion duality (an added lens labeled as informal in AQAL by Edwards, 2010, p. 217). The static-dynamic formalization of HFT pairs the dynamic drives of autonomy and communion with the static realms of individual and collective thereby formally integrating the autonomy-communion duality.

The perspectives lens is also informal in AQAL according to Edwards. In HFT perspectives may be considered informal as well, yet they take on more detailed meaning. They are the subject views that result from certain field action in given object environs. This type of perspective talking (action) is a general use separate from first-, second-, and third-person perspective taking, which will be examined in later sections.

Also consider the other lenses listed by Edwards as informally used in AQAL: transformation-translation, inclusive emergence, exchange relations, transition process, and spirituality. Furthermore, consider conceptual lenses identified in Edwards' metastudy that are not included in AQAL formally or informally: social mediation, learning, system dynamics, alignment, stakeholder, decentering, evolutionary process, and governance hierarchy.

Comparing the lenses that are formally included in AQAL versus those that are informally or not included suggests that AQAL is more closely related to static developmental rather than dynamic developmental theory. The later more typically works with the omitted lenses (although not always formally). Interestingly, those dynamic developmental theories specified in the previous section (action inquiry and action science) share an important lineage going back to Kurt Lewin's field theory (Burnes, 2004). The action science of Argyris (1990) and organizational dynamics of Hirschhorn (1988) helped renew interest in field theory. O'Connor (2008, 2010) shares an interest in better incorporating insights from action science into the AQAL framework. He has correlated three types of organizational guiding strategies by level of development. So although many lenses are not formally included in HFT, many of them are more accessible with the field-theoretic approach of HFT.

Lewin is considered the father of social psychology and famously worked to reconcile a divide in psychology at the time between the influences of nature and nurture on behavior (Brown, 2011). Lewin (1951) conceptualized and empirically found behavior to be a function of the individual and his or her environment. For him it was necessary to include all relevant individual and environmental factors including psychological, biophysical, and socio-cultural (i.e., Wilber's four quadrants). Lewin (1951) also did important work in analyzing vertical development and regression with an emphasis on differentiation and integration. Field settings also bring out different aspects of an individual's personality. Perceptions, feelings, and actions of the individual were grounded in group membership (in family, work, church, school, etc.), norms, roles, socialization, interaction and change.

The group is a broader and more flexible unit in Lewin's field theory than in Wilber's AQAL. Wilber stresses same-level relational exchange where, for example, rational stage individuals tend to be associated with rational-stage collectives. For Lewin, it is not the similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but interdependence of fate. When there is interdependence in the goals of its members, group behavior can be cooperative or competitive potentially stimulating movement towards attaining goals. In his analyses, group atmosphere can vary in friendliness and group governance can range from laissez-faire to democratic to autocratic (Smith, 2001).

Goals, aspirations, and expectations are central to Lewin's approach to behavior at a time when those issues were considered non-scientifically accessible. Lewin's work on boundary

issues clarifies the need to formally include the internal-external boundary while specifying key relationships among holons. In ISP, it is essential to specify the subject's relevant object environment. The horizontal and vertical drives make connections between subjects and objects within and between levels of development and should not be limited to same level relational exchange. This approach better asks how an integral culture would better align the drives of agents and different first-tier stages for the health of the given holarchical life space.

Gold (2002) described Lewin's metatheoretical approach as, not technically a theory or method, but a set of rules for building sound theory. The rules are: i) create constructs, ii) include dynamic relations where a change effects each relevant component, iii) start with the situation as a whole (the field component), iv) assume contemporaneity (the past or future only affect a situation if they relate to a present specification), v) formalize if possible but it is not required if the theory is not mature enough in a given area, vi) use a psychological approach (perceptual and cognitive processes are related to outer events in the physical, psychological and social environment). Gold argues that Lewin's psychological side of the theory is more formal than the social side. For the psychological side, Lewin defines primitive terms, posits their axiomatic relations, and generates logical axiomatic combinations of the primitives. This approach is underdeveloped on the social side. A key to advancing the field approach is in the formalization of the boundary issues and holarchical field theory helps provide some insight. In Gold's writing, the boundary problem, or the "reciprocal influences between the individual and social environment," takes on the character of the individual-collective distinction. This implies that the linkages between psychological and behavioral events are more formally analyzed. Gold argued that more work is needed to expand on Lewin's social concepts (social space, gate keeper, group atmosphere) while incorporating probabilistic and stochastic collective facts.

HFT incorporates the internal-external duality requiring a specification of a boundary between holons in each quadrant (psychological, behavioral, cultural, and social). This and the related classes of drives is offered as a potential tool for organizing developments in modern field theories, action science, action inquiry, and complexity theory. Bion (1961) drew on Freudian and Lewinian theory in his influential work on unconscious aspects that often undermine group performance. Rummel (1975, 1976, 1981) developed a sophisticated field theory that drew on the field theories of Lewin, Sortkin (1969), and Ushenko (1946), among others. Rummel provided an updated philosophical grounding aimed at reconciling opposing philosophical approaches. He also expanded on the vector field approach conceptually and with updated empirical specifications.

Applying part of this approach to HFT, a holarchical vector field may be used to chart dynamic interactions among the subject and object environment. The dynamic drives are classes of holarchical vectors (which specify holarchical direction and magnitude). For example, interiorization is a holarchical direction through the interior holarchical realm. It is a class of drives, meaning that other individual, interior aspects of drives relating to aspiration, expectation, perception, thought, and so on, fall within the interiorization class. But they may be related to other realms. For example, a subject may aspire to know an idea or to acquire an object. The interior-individual aspiration is a drive that tends to propel the subject to action such as reading to learn the object idea or work to earn money to buy the object. Thus the object selected by the subject and method can be in different realms. (The example in the appendix brings out some

more of these issues). Those with highly developed interiority are capable of harnessing and controlling strong drives relating to the interior realm. More work is needed to formally tie together holarchical embeddedness in various basic and learning lines along with their related drives in various environments. For example, static cognitive developmental theory can describe *how* one tends to think at successive stages, now *what* one tends to think (Rosenberg, 2002). A dynamic, field approach is needed for better understanding of what one tends to think in various circumstances.

Complementary drives may amplify each other while opposing drives may dampen each other out. The 20 Tenets provides some theory about the actions that foster further development. Development may result from, for example, reconciliation of polar drives with a mutual orientation of their appropriate holarchical scope, including their partially valid parts while limiting their overstretched applications. This guides us to existing potentials that may be within a holon's zone of proximal development. For example, does the cultural drives in the group complement the individual's potential drives associated with satisfying his or her goals or needs? What barriers are involved in the various ISP realms? How can holarchical embeddedness of the relevant objects be best harnessed for mutually beneficial action? Can we better recognize and empower the complementary drives? What are the state-of-the-art methods that can empower tendencies into successful drives? How do we spot shadow elements as the root of negative drives?

Elrod and Tippet (2002) and Rosch (2002) see complex adaptive systems theory as an intellectual heir of Lewin's field theory. Argyris et al. (1985) and Shein (1988) have acknowledged the important influence Kurt Lewin has had on their own action science scholarship. Lewin, by the way, coined the term action research (Smith, 2001). In their work on organizational identity, Meyer et al. (2002) make use of Lewin's quasi-stationary equilibrium concept.⁷

Kurt Lewin's field theory and Ken Wilber's AQAL are better grounded in psychology as they ventured into collective realms. Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) field theory, in contrast, is grounded in the sociological tradition with special emphasis on power relations and the way field positions (including class differences) influence motivations, incentives, and power dynamics (Swartz, 1997). Sociologists Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) recent work in field theory is also firmly in the sociological tradition. Relative stakeholder positions, especially between incumbents and challengers, play key roles in the theory.

Perhaps HFT can provide conceptual tools and help further develop other efforts to utilize AQAL for dynamic analysis. In one such effort, I integrated the input-throughput-output triad by using a production function that converted four-quadrant capital into four-quadrant goods and services used to satisfy hierarchical needs (Bowman, 2008). Elsewhere, I made stakeholder

⁷ See Burnes (2004) for a discussion of Lewin as his field theory relates to modern strands of research on change dynamics such as organizational development, culture-excellence theory, processualism, punctuated equilibrium models, continuous transformation model, and the power-interaction model. Burnes (2004) and Rosch (2002) both argue that critics of Lewin's approach tend to mistakenly take his approach in a piecemeal fashion. Burnes (2004) and Rosch (2002) also see Lewin's critics as failing to acknowledge the role Lewin has played in influencing later work that expands on aspects of his work.

interaction an important part of my analysis of public economic policy (Bowman, 2010a, 2010b, and 2011). Various stakeholders (business groups, environmental groups, political parties, and average consumers and voters) were considered as influential on public economic policy based on their degree of health and development in the political-economic learning line (which consists of the conservative, liberal, and radical typologies). O'Connor (2008, 2010) made use of simple and higher-order learning modalities of organizations at three different levels of development in his unique use of AQAL. For researchers who have categorized disciplines or issues by quadrant, HFT encourages them to go deeper to disentangle and relate static and dynamic issues in different settings, and to use newly integrated theories in detailed analyses rather than stopping at topologically relating them.

The remaining sections use HFT to help spot and avoid inconsistencies in the Wilberian literature relating to perspectives, pronouns, and certain dualities. The confusion especially relates to attempts to formalize analysis of communication and action using AQAL (or variations of AQAL). The reader may be interested in reviewing the appendix section at this point or after concluding the article. It is an instructional example to demonstrate all the realms and drives that tend to be engaged during communication or action more generally. The complexity and consistency that is characterized by HFT analysis of action (in the appendix) is in contrast with narrower and problematic analyses of action in the Wilberian literature, which is examined in the remaining sections.

The Philosophical/Grammatical Conflation

O'Connor (2008, 2010) contributed to integral theory by pointing out what he calls Ken Wilber's triad/quad conflation. This conflation is the reduction of the triad perspectives (first-, second-, and third-person perspectives) to the four quadrants. With the upper-left (UL), individual-interior quadrant, Wilber correlates a first-person perspective and first-person language represented by the pronoun 'I'. A second-person perspective and the 'we' pronoun is correlated with the lower-left (LL), collective-interior quadrant. Lastly, a third-person ('it' and 'its') perspective is correlated with the exterior quadrants ('it' for the upper-right quadrant, UR, and 'its' for the lower-right, LR). Esbjorn-Hargens' (2006, pp. 88-89) follows this association by calling the two methodologies in the UL first-person methods, the two in the LL as second-person, and the four in the exterior quadrants as third-person.

Grammatically, 'I' is a first-person singular pronoun, but O'Connor points out that 'we' is a *first-person*, plural pronoun, not a *second-person*, plural pronoun because 'we' implies a perspective directly experienced by the speaker. To add to the confusion of Wilber's integral mathematics, Wilber (2006, p. 40) not only rigidly associates a first-person perspective with the interior realms, but also the inside realms, what I have defined identically as the internal realms.

I agree with O'Connor that there is confusion of quadrants and person perspectives. It makes integral mathematics very difficult to understand and use, as I will show in a later section. Yet there are still fundamental problems with O'Connor's alternative use of pronouns and person perspectives. He claims, through his version of integral semiotics, that there is a first-person perspective associated with each quadrant as seen in Table 2. There is a first-person singular subject ('I' of the UL), a first-person singular object ('me' of the upper-right, UR), first-person

plural subject ('we' of the LL), and a first-person plural object ('us' of the lower right, UR). Similarly, there are second-person and third-person perspectives in each quadrant (see Table 2). O'Connor also establishes the possessive pronouns that relate to each of the twelve realms created by what he calls the "triadic-quadratic" perspectives. These are shown in the parentheses of Table 2.

Table 2. O'Connor's Problematic Triadic-Quadratic Perspectives.

	<u>Interior or Subjective</u>	<u>Exterior or Objective</u>
<u>Individual or Singular</u>		
<u>3rd Person</u>	She/He/It (Her/His)	Her/Him/It (Hers/His)
<u>2nd Person</u>	You (Your)	You (Your)
<u>1st Person</u>	I (My)	Me (Mine)
<u>Collective or Plural</u>		
<u>3rd Person</u>	They/These (Their)	Them/Those (Theirs)
<u>2nd Person</u>	You (Your)	You (Yours)
<u>1st Person</u>	We (Our)	Us (Ours)

O'Connor conflates the philosophical subjective-objective duality as directly related to the grammatical subject-object duality. The subject pronouns are used as subjects of a sentence, the element that agrees with the verb (as with 'He' in the sentence 'He ate it' to denote that 'Bob ate a meal'). The object is the element that is not the subject but that which the verb selects or requires ('it' meaning 'a meal'). Thus, O'Connor is using subject-object in its *grammatical sense*.

In contrast to the grammatical subject, subjective in the *philosophical sense* is an understanding or statement that depends on one's own experience, as with the statement 'blueberries taste better than strawberries.' Objective understanding (philosophically) does not rely on personal experience, as with the statement 'the floor of my front porch is not completely level.'

Wilber is justified to suggest the interior realms relate to one's own experience or perspectives that are philosophically subjective (intentions, values, emotions, thoughts, and so on) or intersubjective (mutual intentions, mutual understanding, mutual values, etc.). The exterior realms are philosophically objective (behavioral capacities, cognitive processes, and so on) or interobjective (infrastructure systems, voting procedures, etc.). This does not imply, however, that one can link O'Connor's use of grammatical subject-object with the interior-exterior duality, which is critical to O'Connor's claim of reunifying Wilberian and Habermasian metatheories. O'Connor proposed the use of his triadic-quadratic perspectives with the guiding strategies of action science by level of development to analyze action, but without formally demonstrating how.

This erroneous, rigid correlation conflates the philosophical subjective and objective definitions (from above) with the grammatical definitions of subjective (of or relating to a grammatical subject) and objective (of or relating to a grammatical object). In my interpretation, Wilber's concepts of broad science (2000b) and integral methodological pluralism (2002, 2006) are used to differentiate the dual meanings of the subjective-objective duality. Interior ('philosophically subjective') phenomena can be studied as 'grammatical objects.' Established interior methodologies access 'philosophically subjective' states and then generate 'philosophically objective' data. For instance, the data may include written answers to sentence completion tests. Analysis and comparison of many individuals may reveal interior, sequential structures of development. Such tests have led to the conclusion that transformation to another stage can be described as making what was formerly the ('grammatical') subject of one's interior awareness a ('grammatical') object. Notice the 'grammatical' use of subject-object by Kegan (1994); he describes vertical transformation as "liberating ourselves from that in which we were embedded, making what was subject into object so that we can 'have it' rather than 'be had' by it" (p. 34).⁸ So for Kegan, interior elements can be grammatical subjects or objects.

In ISP and HFT, I follow Wilber in associating the philosophical subjective-objective duality with interior-exterior. But I have decoupled the grammatical subject-object duality from the interior-exterior one consistent with Wilber's "broad science" concept. The grammatical subject-action-object triad was crossed with the eight zones to form ISP. To rigidly link these dualities (as in Table 2) can be termed *the philosophical/grammatical conflation*.

Notice also that the scientist can be seen as an eight-zonal subject who 'does' science with potentially eight classes of methods to disclose scientific objects, potentially in eight zones. The method is the dynamic action, which *agrees with* the subject. The object of study is that which the subject *selects* with the method. Thus the subject-method-object triad relates directly to a grammatical interpretation, not a philosophical one. As shown in the next sections, this has important consequences for the use of pronouns and analysis of action in the integral literature which should help to channel the energy created by IMP while clearing the fog that Integral Mathematics (IM) simultaneously brought with Wilber's latest phase of AQAL theorizing.

Edwards (2003), the esteemed metatheorist I have relied on in the previous section, shared with O'Connor an attachment of 'me' and 'us' to the exterior while 'I' and 'we' are associated with the interior. He describes 'my behavior' as 'me,' for instance. But why can't my interiority be 'me'? I can see myself as someone who is reflexive on my good days and I hope my friends see 'me' this way at times too. Reflexivity is treated as an interior-individual object disclosed primarily by my employment of phenomenology in the case of me seeing myself this way since the object is internal to my awareness. In the case of my friends seeing me this way, it is an interior-individual object disclosed by my friends' informal structuralism, primarily, given that my reflexivity shows up in a realm external to me. This approach helps build a better understanding of complementary methods, which allow for mutual understanding in the lower-left quadrant.

⁸ Both articles by O'Connor that I have cited have won honors at the Integral Theory Conferences of 2008 and 2010 (see for example, Integral Theory Conference, 2008). I point this out merely to demonstrate the attention these articles have drawn in the integral community and therefore, some value in pointing out its errors.

One value in specifying person perspectives is to keep track of the multiple holons engaged in, or referenced in communication. Singular and plural pronouns do indicate, respectively, singular or collective holons, but verbs (whether they are state or action verbs) and other grammatical components can be critical for relating grammatical subjects and objects to the quadrants. Consider ‘My brain is wired poorly’ versus ‘Clarity expands my mind.’ The subject in the former sentence is a stated exteriority in integral theory, and the object of the latter sentence is a stated interiority. So grammatical subject cannot be reduced to the interior quadrants and again suggests a decoupling of grammatical subject-object from philosophical subjective-objective. To conflate them seems to reduce away needed subtleties in what O’Connor hopes to construct, an integral theory of action and communication.⁹

Wilber’s use of pronouns differs from O’Connor’s. Justification for Wilber’s association of ‘I’ with the UL, ‘we’ with the LL, ‘it’ with the UR, and ‘its’ with the LR is not entirely clear. Why does my use of ‘I’ and ‘we’ generally refer, respectively, to my and our interiority? Consider, for instance, the sentences ‘I intend to study’ versus ‘I need to smoke.’ The former sentence implies an interior intention of the subject and the latter a behavioral habit being performed by the subject. Who is doing the intending versus the habitual action? A holon who exists in all four quadrants (having an UL mind and an UR brain while being embedded in, and influenced by, various LL cultures and LR societies) and who acts in different instances with varying degrees of intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social influences.

Does Wilber mean that whenever one uses the term ‘I,’ it implies an interior awareness of something? This is an appropriate interpretation in ISP. When the realms of ISP refer to the speaker of the sentence who utters the word ‘I,’ then ‘I’ can represent a subject who is subjectively experiencing a phenomenon. Wilber is using the terms ‘I’ and ‘we’ less formally than I am here. Yet in keeping with the critiques of O’Connor and Edwards, integral theory may be better off taking a more formal approach. I will show in later sections that Wilber strictly correlates the first person to the interior and third person to the exterior in his use integral mathematics. Many problems result with his slide from an informal and loose correlation to a strict and formal correlation between perspectives and quadrants. So I shall continue with a formal approach to help the reader recognize and overcome such problems.

If I attempt to describe to you, your subjective experience of cooking last night, then this experience of cooking is a second-person perspective for me. The cooking experience is a first-person experience for you. Yet the objectification of it in my awareness is a first-person experience for me. To the extent we understand the experience, this understanding is a collective, interior, internal experience. Again, in a less formal approach, it appears that Wilber uses ‘we’ to indicate that we are aware of the same thing such that I can identify with your perspective, which is second person to me. Thus ‘I can take a second-person perspective.’ But these are particular, not general uses of how ‘we’ and ‘second-person perspectives’ are used. When I state to you that

⁹ The O’Connor pronouns in Table 2 can be appropriately presented as a crossing of two specific dualities [grammatical subject-object (not interior-exterior), and singular-plural or individual-collective] with the triadic person-perspectives (first-person, second-person, and third-person). The cells created, however, are not connected to Wilber’s four quadrants of intention (UL), behavior (UR), culture (LL), and society (LR) in the direct way O’Connor proposes. The next section describes how qualifications are needed if we use pronouns and perspectives in ISP realms.

‘We both jog along the lakefront’ or ‘I jog along the lakefront,’ the intension is for you to join me in my understanding of the sentence. The ‘we’ pronoun does not uniquely represent this in these two sentences. A simple reply of ‘yes’ by you in either case would indicate that ‘we both understand that we or I jog along the lakefront.’

Therefore, Wilber’s (2000b, p. 154) use of ‘we’ as a first-person plural pronoun and correlated with ‘you’ as a ‘second-person perspective’ to represent the LL means that the LL for ‘me’ can be thought of a perspective that ‘I’ (first-person) and ‘you’ (second-person) share (‘we’ share the perspective) if you and I can inhabit the same cultural space to allow for this shared understanding. Nonetheless, we need to clearly differentiate the internal and external aspects of these quadrants and avoid universalizing Wilber’s use of perspectives and pronouns to all uses of quadrants. This problem of overgeneralization becomes apparent in the next two sections.

Pronouns and Person Perspectives in ISP and HFT

Recall the earlier distinction between static and dynamic developmental theories where the former relates closely to holarchical embeddedness and the later to dynamic engagement of holons. Static and dynamic language can be similarly categorized. Static (or state) language is related relatively more to holarchical embeddedness and dynamic (or action) language to the dynamic interaction of engaged holons. State language is used to describe subjects or objects in a particular state (or relatively static point in time). In the sentence, ‘He is tall,’ ‘is’ is a state verb. It describes, in this case, the subject in a relatively static, physical state. ‘Ran’ on the other hand is an action verb. Action language includes action verbs, action adjectives, and so on.

This section further demonstrates that person perspectives and pronouns cannot be reduced to particular AQAL or HFT realms without qualifications. First I will choose specific subject-verb-object language that can represent the meaning attached to specific ISP realms. Then I will provide an example of language that would overlap multiple zones. In order to do this, I must decompose the internal-external dimension into three parts: internal, mesoternal, and external. *Mesoternal* is defined as a situation that may have internal and external relations. Therefore, a mesoternal situation can be described as subject and object sharing some internal and some external aspects.

From the subject’s perspective, we can associate the first-person perspective with the internal realm. For example, ‘I observe my thoughts’ is a sentence where all elements belong to the same zone, zone 1 of Figure 1 (the same slice of the ISP pie). The sentence suggests an interior awareness for the subject-verb agreement, and the object selected is also an individual, interior aspect internal to the individual. The subject, action, and object are first-person experiences to the speaker of the sentence. Now consider the sentence, ‘You intend your intentions.’ Here, mesoternal matches the second-person perspective. The subject-verb combination suggests interior action of the subject. The object selected also involves an interiority of the same individual. Yet, the individual having the experience of intending intensions is second person to (and therefore one step removed from) the speaker. The experience referenced applies to the second person, which means it is *external* to the speaker, yet the subject of the sentence and the speaker are *internal* to the conversation. Second person suggests external *and* internal aspects, which I called *mesoternal*. Figure 1 does not have slices for mesoternal. We could add a

mesoternal slice to represent the second-person perspective in each quadrant. I choose not to provide a figure given that language does not always fit neatly in these realms. This section is merely offered as an aid in avoiding using pronouns, dualities, and perspectives in a reductionist way when using Wilberian theory.

Relative to the subject speaker, the external realm is the location of the third-person perspective because the third person referenced and the perspective are both external to those conversing. An example from the external, collective, interior dimension could be the statement, 'They agree on their ethics.' The subject and object referents are external to the perspective of the speaker and external to those conversing (two perspectives removed from the speaker). An example of a sentence entirely within the internal, first-person, exterior zone is 'My brain processes information bits.'

I demonstrated that from the subject's perspective, one could associate the first-person perspective with the internal realm; second person is associated with mesoternal realm; and third person with external. The holonic boundary can slide, however, if we define it as including more members, such as those being talked about, but not talked to. Returning to the initial reference points, the association of first-, second-, and third-person with internal, mesoternal, and external will continue to be the case even when we do not rely on examples of sentences that have all of their elements within one zone (or slice). In other sentences, the object selected can fall into a different zone compared to the subject-verb agreement as with 'I observe his behavior.' This use of 'I observe' suggests the subject's interior interacting with an exteriority of a third-person, a person outside or external to the conversation. Thus the object, 'his behavior,' is in another zone. The observation, or the subject-verb of 'I observe,' was first-person to the speaker, but the object is third-person to those engaged in the conversation. Here, nonetheless, one can still see the consistency in attaching perspectives with the internal-external spectrum. From the speaker's perspective, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives can be directly associated with the internal, mesoternal, and external spectrum, respectively, when analyzing language. But one cannot reduce the person perspectives to the internal-mesoternal-external triad, because from another person's perspective, internal, mesoternal, and external will have different meanings. Also, one may choose to define the boundary of the holon differently.

Notice that if I stated, 'We share integral values,' then the subject of the sentence is a first-person, collective pronoun. The subject and verb are collective (plural), interior elements. But it is a first-person experience because it indicates my experience or view of us having integral values. The object selected is also in the interior, collective domain.¹⁰

Language incorporates the field aspect of subject-object relations or interactions engaged by the verb. (I use the word *engagement* here to indicate either state or action relations). Again, a

¹⁰ Here are other examples each coming from the three elements of a particular zone, but zones not yet represented. Zone 7 (from the perspective of the speaker): 'Our system constrains our physical interactions.' Zone 8: 'Their city fits their functions.' The mesoternal zone in the LR: 'Your buildings create your workspace.' Zone 2: 'She intends her thoughts.' Mesoternal zone of the LL: 'You (all) understand your values.' Mesoternal of the UR: 'Your habits repeat within your body.' Again, a subject-verb agreement can select an object from another zone. I provide one added example of this. In this case, the subject-verb comes from zone 4 and the object from zone 6: 'They agree on her physical handicap.'

static statement reflects holarchical embeddedness, yet we may still interpret a static sentence as a movement through time in a relatively fixed and stable manor. To maintain a state actually requires self-preservation drives of the holon in equilibrium with the drives of its environment. One can see that engagement can be described within or across zones (slices). This shows the range of engagement within or across certain holarchical boundaries given by the internal-mesoternal-external triad. Also, holarchical drives will cross from subject to object and from object to subject. In the example, 'My brain processes information bits,' the sentence indicates exteriorization from subject to object and from object to subject. The brain enacts the information and the information transmits to the brain. If I then add, "I conclude that the economy will contract over the next quarter," this implies interiorization from the brain to mind for analysis and prediction. There is also exteriorization of thoughts to words. Thus information was internalized and made into additional, individuated mental information and then externalized and collectivized for the group participating in the conversation. Where HFT would get interesting is by taking into account the various ways in which stakeholder groups or individuals interact by holarchical embeddedness. HFT can help the analyst conceptualize the obstacles and potentials for understanding and action.

In order for the language, however, to clearly signify interior and exterior aspects, I restricted the use of language to specific examples. Components of sentences may overlap these realms. If I say, "I am me," the object I am referring to may comprise interior and exterior elements. I may be referring to my height (an exteriority) or to my ability to make moral judgments (an interiority) or both.

Using Exterior, External, and Third Person Interchangeably and Improperly

Here I will use HFT to point out inconsistencies and errors in Ken Wilber's writings regarding the interior-exterior, internal-external, and perspectives lenses. The relation between subject and object is complex in Wilber's work. "Integral post-metaphysics replaces perceptions with perspectives" (Wilber, 2006, p. 42). "It is not that perspectives come first and actions or injunctions come later; they simultaneously co-arise (actually, tetra-arise). Perspectives simply locate the perceiving holon in AQAL space" (Wilber 2006, p. 34). "Each moment is not a subject prehending an object; it is a perspective prehending a perspective" (Wilber 2006, p. 42). This certainly allows for causally efficacious objects beyond those perceived by the subject, as in my use of HFT. Yet Wilber's examples of integral mathematics (IM) do not bring out these forces.

Wilber's uses of IM limits his view of action to something less than fields. IMP, when housed within ISP and HFT, encourages the formal analysis of primary and secondary methods, for example, that are employed in engagement along with the multi-directionality of interpenetrating drives between holons and their current and potential environments. Unacknowledged, secondary methods and hidden drives are often the source of modern and postmodern biases as was discussed in the summary section. In my view, this is key to Wilber's successful integral methodology, but absent in his use of IM.

The confusion with pronouns and person-perspectives adds to the difficulty in formalizing Wilber's successful, but opaque integral methodology. Wilber tends to use the first-person

perspective interchangeably with the internal and interior realms. Prior to examining his integral mathematics, I begin with a relatively simple example of mistaken interchangeability of internal-external and interior-exterior with Wilber's (2000b) integral politics [*italics are mine*]:

[W]hen it comes to the cause of human suffering, liberals tend to believe in *exterior* causes, whereas conservatives tend to believe in *interior* causes. That is, if an individual is suffering, the typical liberal tends to blame *external* social institutions (if you are poor it is because you are oppressed by society), whereas the typical conservative tends to blame *internal* factors (you are poor because you are lazy). (p. 84)

Generally he sees liberals as focusing on right-hand-quadrant causes of poverty while conservatives focus on left-hand-quadrant causes. Yet his examples use elements of two different dualities (for the horizontal axis); internal-external and interior-exterior. He even uses all four words (internal, external, interior, and exterior). I agree that religious and socially conservative types often fault the character of the poor for their problems. This does indeed imply a focus on the *interior* realms (values, intentional choices, etc.). Yet his example of liberal focus on problems beyond the poor's control does not imply a focus on *exteriorities*, but rather *externalities*. In contrast to *social-conservative* focus on interiorities, *pro-market conservatives* de-emphasize the problems with market *externalities*, not market exteriorities, which can lead to higher inequality of opportunity and income.

In my integral political-economy approach (Bowman, 2010a, 2010b, and 2011), I make consistent use of the interior-exterior, internal-external, higher-lower, individual-collective, and positive-negative dualities. In Bowman (2010a), one value in decomposing positive and negative internalities and externalities was to show that pro-market conservatives often emphasize positive market externalities (like trickle-down economics) and de-emphasize negative market externalities (like pollution or financial contamination from overly risky private leveraging). It is just the reverse for pro-government liberals. So the root disagreement may really be their well-known disagreement around the private-sector/public-sector duality.

Now moving to integral math, even by Wilber's own admission there are inconsistencies with IM.¹¹ In a footnote, Wilber (2006) writes:

Also, 'the inside and outside of the singular and plural' technically are not the same as 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-person approaches or combinations thereof, and some severe theoretical problems result if this equation is made. We sometimes use 1-p and 3-p to represent inside and outside views, but this is a concession to popular understanding and not the actual definitions. The quadrants (inside/outside x singular/plural) are much more fundamental and prior differentiations in Kosmogogenesis than are 123p (and, in fact, generate them). (p. 42)

¹¹ Integral mathematics is not a mathematical system; it is a notational system. At least as he specifies them, one cannot perform mathematical operations upon the elements of Wilber's abbreviated terms. Bowman (2008) presents an actual mathematical model for an integral approach to economic growth and development.

According to this article's previous section, first-person and third-person views do relate closely to inside and outside views (what I call internal and external views), but only from the perspective of the first-person. Wilber's inconsistent uses of interior-exterior as sometimes interchangeable with internal-external force him to write the imprecise qualification in the above passage. There, Wilber simultaneously refers to his standard quadrants (interior-exterior x individual-collective) and to an alternative quadrant set (internal-external x individual-collective) as interchangeable, which is inappropriate. Thus we do not really know what Wilber's use of a first-person perspective really means. Is it an internal or an interior perspective?

Apparently both. Consider the following (Wilber 2006):

Using shorthand of 1st person (for the inside in general) and 3rd person (for the outside in general), then introspection, let's say, which is a type of phenomenology (or zone-#1 activity), is when 'I look into my mind'-or, I have a 1st-person experience of my 1st-person awareness, which we would write as 1-p X 1p. (p. 40)

All of the "p's" relate to person perspectives. On the next page:

In integral math, when we use 3 terms, such as 1p X 1-p X 3p, those terms are usually: quadrant X quadrivium X domain (and "domain" can be a quadrant or a quadrivium). (p. 41)

Wilber (2006, p. 253) defines quadrant and quadrivia. "A quadrant is a subject's perspective; a quadrivium is the perspective the object is being looked at from." Not only do all the "p's" represent some kind of person perspective (first person = 1 and third person = 3), but fundamentally, every term in his IM (as initially presented in *Integral Spirituality*) is a person perspective without direct reference to a quadrant, quadrivium, or domain zone unless it can be gathered from a person perspective. What Wilber seems to mean in the (p. 40) passage above ("I look into my mind") is an internal view of an interior awareness, which are both described as first-person. How would he handle 'his look into his mind'? He would need to call this a third-person perspective, because it is external to the speaker and person spoken to. Yet he would also need to specify the view as 'interior to him' to differentiate it from an 'exterior aspect of him.' But Wilber always reduces third person to external *and* exterior.

I much prefer Wilber's notation, which omits person perspectives, and instead specifies Kosmic address concretely by quadrant, level, line, state, and type for subject and object. This is done much later (and much less frequently) in *Integral Spirituality* (pp. 264-266). This notation is the type that can be more readily updated with the insights from HFT (such as using eight zones rather than four quadrants for both the subject and the object, including relevant secondary methods from subject to object, and tracking bilateral drives between object to subject not necessarily consciously perceived by the subject).

The inconsistencies with these integral lenses seem to affect Wilber's choices of examples when describing IMP. With his first published introduction of IMP and IM, Wilber (2006, p.36) writes, "I can approach the 'I' from the outside, in a stance of an objective or 'scientific' observer." He then provides two examples of what he will call structuralism. "I can do so in my own awareness when I try to be 'objective' about myself, or try to 'see myself' as others see

me.” Call this *case A*. Wilber goes on, “and I can also do this with other ‘I’s’ as well, attempting to be scientific in my study of how people experience their ‘I.’” Call this *case B*. He then states, “the most famous of these scientific approaches to I-consciousness [cases A and B] have included systems theory and **structuralism**” (boldface is his, bracketed items are mine). So both examples, cases A and B, are meant to describe structuralism.

According to IMP as embedded in ISP, Case A would be categorized as phenomenology rather than structuralism. Notice that viewing *my ‘I,’* meaning the individual-interior, *from the outside of me* is not possible in ISP, because by definition, my individual-interior is internal to me as an individual holon, unless data is objectified *and* externalized such that it can be observable to the subject from the external source. Internal to me, however, I *can* view my individual-interior as an object rather than it only being the subject of my awareness. This is the scientific methodology of meditation and phenomenology (not structuralism). Wilber refers to structuralism as the “scientific study of how people experience their ‘I’s,’ which is described as follows (Wilber, 2006):

The basic research went essentially like this: Pose a series of questions to large groups of people. See if their responses fall into any classes. If so, follow those classes over time and see if they emerge in a sequential order of stages. If so, attempt to determine the structure or makeup of those stages. (p. 53)

Consistent with this description, but more specifically, structuralism in ISP is the study of interior-individual objects as they appear to the external scientist. *Phenomenology* is described by Wilber as “a 1st-person having a 1st-person experience.” The experience is indeed first-person to the one having the experience or describing their own experience. When contrasted with his structuralism examples, however, what Wilber is left to mean is an inside (internal) view of the (subjective) interior-individual where the awareness is not made an object (otherwise it would be his case A example of structuralism, which I have already reclassified as phenomenology, when “I try to be ‘objective’ about myself”). But in this example (“a 1st-person having a 1st-person experience”), awareness is not necessarily made an object by the subject experiencing it. Therefore, it does not qualify as a broad science because it may not be reproducible by an adequately embedded scientist who could perform an injunction that elicits the object in a detached form. The phenomenology class (including meditation, contemplation, and so on) provides procedures for one to attempt to examine individual-interior content internally and scientifically. If you want to witness your thoughts with a certain degree of control, you can perform meditative practices to train your state experiences, for instance. (According to ISP, Wilber’s case B example does properly match structuralism in his IMP classification system).

Clear differentiation of the integral lenses in ISP helped me spot or explain the inconsistencies or difficulties in Wilber’s IMP examples and in his use of integral mathematics. Wilber’s preference for subject to object views without genuine bilateral interaction relates to the Bhaskarian claim that integral theory suffers from the epistemic fallacy as described in the next section.

Epistemic and Ontic Fallacies

Epistemology is the study of knowing and justified belief. The eight subject realms of integral scientific pluralism represent an integral epistemological pluralism and provide eight different aspects of knowing or apprehending by level. Integral ontological pluralism is represented by the eight object realms, which are eight aspects of ontology (the study of the categories of things that exist or may exist in some domain). Lastly, the eight action realms provide an integral methodological pluralism with its eight classes of methodologies (where methodology is the study of methods applied within a discipline). This is one way of using the ISP realms. The fractal quality does not limit ISP realms, however, to placing only the scientist within the subject realms and his object of study in the object realms (recall that the object of study also has a subject view and ISP in its entirety is a new methodological tool).

A dialogue has begun between integral theorists and critical realists especially in the wake of the 2011 Integral Theory and Critical Realism Symposium. Marshall (2012) and Hedlund-de Witt (2012) both claim that integral theory suffers from what Bhaskar, the founder of critical realism, calls the epistemic fallacy. This is an erroneous belief that “statements about being can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of statements about knowledge” (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, p. 36). In defense of integral theory against this argument, Wilber (2013) argued that this improper charge derives from critical realism’s ontic fallacy, or the myth of the given, where ontology is privileged as real and epistemology is then derived from ontology. Hedlund-de Witt (2012), for example, states that critical realism “argues for a world composed of objects (generative mechanisms) existing *independently* of human knowledge, enactment, or discourse.” The implication is that objects exist independently of any non-human rudimentary form of knowing or enacting.

According to Wilber, ontology, methodology, and epistemology are three different, but intertwined aspects of reality and none can be privileged. Given that integral theory is panpsychic (or pan-interiorist, the term Wilber’s prefers), even prior to human conceptions of reality, reality is always co-created by the interiority of holons. The prehending (proto-knowing, proto-feeling, proto-conscious) atom, for example, in some way recognizes other atoms in order to interact with them. There is not a being (ontology) separate from a knowing (epistemology). The lack of privileging subject and object is embedded within integral scientific pluralism and holarchical field theory. Therefore, I side with Wilber on this point. Yet there is a difference I would like to make between Wilber’s integral theory in general, and his common applications as with his use of integral mathematics. Wilber’s use of integral mathematics does privilege the subject’s perspective in its enactment of the object. As described above, there is no analysis of drives emanating from object to subject. There is no causally efficacious effect on the subject from its environment separate from the perspective the subject takes. Holarchical field theory overcomes these problems and is truer to the interrelations of epistemology, methodology, and ontology. This is one reason why it is important to ground perspective taking within a broader array of action between holons within fields.

Conclusion

Holarchical field theory (HFT) was used in this article to clarify some applications of Wilber's integral mathematics, his first formal attempt at analyzing relations among holons. HFT helped to disclose and overcome inconsistencies or reductionisms involving the interior-external, internal-external, and subjective-objective dualities. These dualities all become more formally included in ISP and HFT while improving upon the internal consistency of the Wilberian literature. HFT therefore provides a particular response to Edwards' call to question the consistency and logic of a metatheory (2010, p. 81).

The specification of the philosophical/grammatical conflation, where theorists confuse the dual definitions of the subjective-objective duality was particularly useful for constructing, interpreting, and using HFT. This theory opens the realms of integral theory for easier dissections by other dualities, triads, and spectra in the future. In order for a new duality, for example, to be applied generally to HFT, one must cross the ISP realms with the duality and would need to convincingly show how the two poles consistently and logically show up in each of the existing realms. The distinctions should apply to the multiple levels in order for it to be generalizable like HFT. And static and dynamic elements per pole should be specified. Alternatively, one may find it useful to cross a new duality with a subset of the dualities, spectra or triads that currently exist in HFT without generalizing the result as far beyond the given use.

This article contributes to the topic of integral communication (Leonard, 2011) with the distinctions made between state and action language using HFT realms and drives along with the corrected uses of perspectives and pronouns. State language tends to be describing holarchical embeddedness of subjects and objects and action language tends to describe the dynamics in the interacting fields of subjects and objects. Person perspectives and pronouns cannot be reduced to AQAL or HFT realms without qualifications.

Integral scholars and trainers of Wilberian integral theory for integral consulting, integral life practice, and integral psychotherapy may benefit from analysis of themselves, students, clients, patients, or their objects of study as agents embedded in relations with their environment and potential within holarchical fields. Policy analysts using integral political economy and integral ecology, for examples, may also benefit from situating stakeholder groups or ecological units in dynamic exchange using HFT.

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Appendix: ISP and HFT Communication as an Instructional Example

In this section, I will use a new, elaborate example to illustrate the realms and drives of HFT as they relate to human interaction and communication. This may help the reader consider the complexity of interaction as described by HFT. This is in comparison to current, but narrow and problematic uses by integral theorists to characterize interaction of holons explained in the body of this article.

Consider my interaction with a colleague who is in another academic department at my college. We each can be analyzed as our own subject at the center of our own Figure 1. As humans, Americans, academics, and coworkers; we share certain, but not all, aspects that are initially internal. Say that we have a conversation and by the end, she and I both understand what she generally means by her excitement for an upcoming holiday break from her grueling semester to enjoy a barbeque gathering. This may imply that I understand her feeling of excitement (a zone 2 object to me since it is an individual interiority that is external to me) under cases in which she is physically worn (a zone 6 object to me because it is an individual exteriority external to me) because of my understanding of excitement (a zone 1 object to me) and because I have been worn or can imagine it to a degree from my experience or internalization of other's having similar difficulties (a zone 5 object). And I can relate to the systemic pressures that force her to work that hard (a zone 8 object) as I have been in that situation or internalized this issue from observation (zone 7). I also understand the cultural meaning she attaches to sharing a holiday barbeque with her friends (a zone 4 object) as I do too (a zone 3 object).

I understood these objects implying that they are disclosed and enacted into our subjective awareness during our conversation. I may be motivated by a desire to belong in a community

with my colleague. This need energizes me to engage the employed drives. Some of the methods used to disclose and enact them have been the use of the English language (a method from zones 7 and 8) intentional thinking, listening, speaking, symbol translation (methods of zones 1 and 2); physical hearing, talking, seeing (methods of zones 5 and 6); and clarifying questions for agreement on definitions or to disclose missing context (methods from zones 3 and 4).

Here, I will track the six general horizontal dynamic drives involved. I exteriorize my thoughts into words effectively because I choose words that allow her to understand my thoughts. Her ideas become internalized into my interior through her creation of vocalized words, which vibrate into my exterior ears. I meanwhile put in the effort to interiorize them into comprehensible thoughts. The collectivization drive was involved in choosing to engage each other. This drive and successfully communicating helped me, especially, to satisfy my belongingness need. My willingness to correct her misunderstanding of one of my comments includes the individuation drive to properly honor my individual perspective and the collectivization drive so that we understand each other.

Since we initially shared (epistemological) skills and employed our methodologies well enough, these objects (ontologies) are understood and can be held in the moment by her and me in our own subjective awareness. There is this overlap in our internal zones of each quadrant such that there is mutual understanding (a zone 3 object for both of us), the content of which relates to all eight ontological zones.

Notice that in this example we clearly differentiate subject, object, and method in each zone. For the analysis of dynamic interactions, the current state of integral theory fosters, at worst, ad hoc and confusing work; or, at best, skillful, but opaque means. The example of this section should help the reader see that there are alternatives to existing attempts to analyze action using Wilberian theory. The inconsistencies and difficulties of relying on AQAL in its current state are examined in the body of this article. These problems often stem from confusion among dualities, perspectives, and pronouns.

Beyond Social Exchange Theory: An Integrative Look at Transcendent Mental Models for Engagement

Latha Poonamallee and Sonia Goltz¹

Abstract: In this paper, we develop an integrative conceptual framework capturing the underlying mental models that guide engagement in relationships at work and elsewhere. Specifically, we are looking at mental models that go beyond egocentrism and social exchange, which have served as the basis for most frameworks found in research on organizations. The goal of this paper is to present a more complex picture of human cognition and behavior that suggests that egocentrism is not an exclusive motivator. We view this more integrative framework as a set of concentric circles of increasingly inclusive and expansive identities. Although the mental models used by individuals may be static over a shorter time frame, they are thought to be more dynamic over a relatively longer timeframe, in adaptive response to changing conditions. Movement between these mental models can be triggered by changes in cognitions as well as by events that arouse affect.

Keywords: mental models, cognition, positive organizational scholarship, transcendent spirituality

Introduction

Mental models are internal representations of reality held by individuals to guide interactions with external objects or systems (e.g., Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Rouse & Morris, 1986). This paper conceptualizes an integrative framework outlining the mental models that might underlie various forms of individual and organizational engagement, thereby presenting a more complex picture of human cognition and behavior than has been typical in existing research on behavior in organizations. Drawing on recent research on top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in emotion generation (Oschner, et al., 2009), we also describe the interplay between cognitive and affective processes that shape such mental models.

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The concept of mental models developed in large part in the literature on manual control in terms of psychomotor performance (e.g., Conant & Ashby, 1970) and was later adopted by cognitive psychologists, who conceptualized mental models as descriptions of a system's form, in terms of relationships among components, functioning, and dynamics (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2000). These descriptions are thought to allow individuals to form expectations for what is likely to occur next and decide what actions to take (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2000; Rouse & Morris, 1986). For example, teammates often share agreed upon mental models of important aspects such as the group task and team operations (e.g., Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Maynard & Gilson, 2013). Similar team mental models allow members to predict what their teammates will need and will be doing, facilitating coordination activities (Mathieu, et al, 2000), which then leads to improved performance (Lim & Klein, 2006).

However, mental models vary in accuracy and development, in part due to the experience of the individual with the system being described by the mental model, which might be too limited to completely portray a complex system (for discussions, see Rousseau, 2001 and Jones et al., 2013). Furthermore, our minds are full of conflicting mental models since we tend to maintain overlapping and inconsistent mental models (Lane, 1992). In part this is because these models are context-dependent and may change depending on the situation (Jones et al., 2011). Also, our mental models can be expected to be fairly resistant to change, given that individuals tend to focus on information that supports existing beliefs (e.g., Swann & Read, 1981). Individual mental models will change when individuals are motivated to more deeply process information that is discrepant with their models rather than stick with the tendency to superficially assess and discount it (e.g., Rousseau, 2001). Still, mental models tend to change slowly rather than suddenly (e.g., Welch Larson, 1994).

An example of a mental model guiding human behavior and interactions that has been slow to change is the assumption that much of human behavior is based on ego-centrism and social exchange. In fact, this model has served as the basis for most theoretical approaches found in research on organizations, given that much of our research on work behavior is based on models of social psychology. These models mostly view social exchange as an economic choice among alternatives in which individuals attempt to maximize their expected utility (Kahan & Rapaport, 1984; Sunahara & Pierce, 1982). Although these mental models have been useful in generating research on human behavior, these efforts may have reached maturity. Assuming human work behavior is primarily egocentric in nature, has the potential for missing behavior that is not egocentric. Atypical behaviors that do not fit neatly into the mental model of egocentricity are not likely to be examined or even noticed.

Therefore, in this paper, we consider mental models that are broader. Drawing on existing literature, we have built an integrative model of engagement, which we view as a set of concentric circles of increasingly inclusive and expansive identities, thereby extending the understanding of human cognition and behavior to include motivations beyond egocentric social exchange. The first or innermost circle is based on ego as one's identity and social exchange theory as the operating mental model for human interaction. In the second circle, we look at a mental model based on a group or tribal identity that shares interests, passions, and affective bonds including organizations, industries, and even virtual groups. The key feature of this circle is the suspension of the usual social exchange norms and extension of benevolence to those who

are part of the group. The third circle describes a transcendent mental model that involves moving from a primary concern for the tribe and temporary prosocial behaviors directed at outsiders to experiencing enduring changes in an individual's concern about others' welfare leading to a sense of oneness and a merging of self-other boundaries.

Specifically, this paper makes two contributions. First, by using the top-down and bottom-up approach to emotions, it broadens the scope of mental models to include the role of the 'affective' component in a mental model and describes the interplay between cognitive and affective processes that underlie a mental model. Second, by describing the mental models underlying the three circles and the mechanisms of movement between them, this paper illuminates how more expansive mental models can produce a more complex cognitive response to phenomena. By doing this, it also offers the beginnings of a blueprint for how to shift mental models at a collective level. It should be noted that, although researchers have worked on multi-level research (e.g., Rousseau, 1985), they have not explicated the mental models that individuals and organizations operate from in their interactions with each of these levels. For example, often individuals and organizations are completely unaware of and indifferent to factors at larger levels, such as social structures, that are affecting them, instead operating from a very local point of view. Their lack of awareness of and indifference to factors operating at larger and more complex levels negatively impacts their ability to solve problems directly affecting them.

We begin with a brief review of the literature on mental models. We also describe the key elements that go into the making of mental models and the relationship between the various elements. We then describe and discuss our integrative model for engagement and its three circles in detail and speculate how the various mental models may interact with each other.

Making of Mental Models

The key elements that we believe contribute to mental models of appropriate social behavior are cognitive framing (particularly social identity) and affective arousal. We have identified the two processes based on recent brain research (Ochsner, et al., 2009) that suggests that emotions can be generated through either cognitive constructions and interpretation that lead to emotions or through the experience of immediate affect which then can lead to cognitions. Poonamalle (2012) uses this framework to describe the role of socio-ecological values and the interplay between cognitive framing, and affective arousal elements in the rousing of compassion to strangers during disasters. In this paper, the author demonstrates how in the case of the Asian Tsunami, cognitive framing of the society and the affected populations as well as the emotional valence and portrayal of the disaster stories by the mass media (and by proxy, the society itself) influenced the construction of a collective identity, thus rousing compassion towards strangers.

We conceive of mental models as being generated either cognitively through top-down processing or affectively through bottom-up processing or through complex interactions between both systems. The particular triggers that affect which process occurs will be considered later. At this point, however, we simply wish to introduce the top-down and bottom-up components. Research suggests that individuals' interactions with others are affected by both cognitions and affect. For example, although some scholars view social identity as purely cognition based (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989), others have defined social identity as a part of self-concept derived

from both the knowledge of group membership as well as the emotional significance of that membership (e.g., Tajfel, 2010). Furthermore, research indicates that affect can be more predictive of group behavior than cognitions. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) found that affective injustice had stronger effects on collective action than non-affective injustice. It is thought that group-based affect helps link group cognitions to group action (e.g., Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Therefore, it is likely that mental models that are shared by a group, such as those concerning collective action, have both cognitive and affective components, with group affect sometimes influencing group cognitions and vice versa. For this reason, we expect that even group-based mental models that are influenced heavily by cognitions such as social identity can be strongly influenced by affective variables as well.

Top-down Mechanism: Cognitive Framing

We begin our discussion by considering the cognitive framing aspect of mental models. Although most mental models are probably fairly developed (although perhaps incomplete) representations of systems that allow one to interact appropriately with those systems, most probably took their initial forms with a basic view point, or frame, that served as a guideline for the construction of the mental model. Frames are cognitive structures that focus, articulate, and transform, which operate at both the individual and group levels (Snow, 2007). Frames are essentially central organizing ideas that can steer an audience by providing particular meanings, thus operating as interpretive mechanisms (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). They are influenced by reference points and carry this information (MacKenzie & Nelson, 2003). Campbell (2006) describes frames as: *“metaphors, symbols, and cognitive cues that cast issues in a particular light and suggest possible ways to respond to these issues. Framing involves the strategic creation and manipulation of shared understandings and interpretations of the world, its problems, and viable courses of action”* (Campbell, 2006, p. 48-49). Although some literature on framing includes the affective aspect, in this paper, we use Campbell’s definition of framing as a cognitive mechanism to distinguish it from the process of affective arousal.

Understanding the effect of framing has been useful in a variety of literatures. For example, framing perspectives in the social movement’s literature emerged in response to the void in exploring the relevance of interpretive processes for mobilization (Snow, 2007). It is also used by disaster researchers (Argoathy, 2003; Cottle, 2006; Hoiyer, 2004; Rodriguez, Trainor & Quarantelli, 2006; Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006). In this literature, frames are thought to both empower and limit reality and have the power to provide edited or fragmented versions of reality (Argoathy, 2003). Framing has also been examined in organization studies and management, such as with positive and negative framing in decision-making contexts (e.g., MacKenzie & Nelson, 2003) and in discussions of sense-making (Weick, 1995) and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipedi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005) processes. Additionally, decision framing has been applied to understand effects such as individual judgments about organizational justice. Positive frames, for example, are thought to reduce the need for sense-making of outcomes received, thereby reducing the importance of procedural justice (Brockner, Wisenfeld, & Martin, 1995). Additionally, it has been found that individuals make sense of procedural justice differently depending on whether they identify strongly or weakly with a particular group (Tyler, 1999).

A frame of particular importance to mental models for interaction and engagement is social identity. Framing processes play a critical role in the development and maintenance of individual and collective identities (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994). Social identity is that part of self-concept that is defined by membership within a group (Tajfel, 2010). People classify themselves and others into social categories, in part to be able to define and order the social environment and in part, to locate and define themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Turner, 2010). People seek to maintain a positive social identity to boost self-esteem, such as by making comparisons with out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social identity theory has helped explain in-group bias and out-group stereotyping among other group behaviors (Brown, 2000). But these identities can affect individual framing and behaviors as well. Identifying with a group leads to individual behaviors supporting the group's behaviors and its values and norms (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). For example, through perceptions of group-based deprivation, social identity can help mobilize people for collective action that benefits group members, which is unlikely to occur through egoistic (individual-based) deprivation (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). On the other hand, since social identity also can lead to major social conflicts between in-group and out-group members, it has been suggested that policies that redirect people to have more overlapping and inclusive identities are needed (Brown, 2000).

Bottom-up Mechanism: Affective Arousal

The second major element thought to affect the construction of mental models is affective in nature. The heart of emotion has also sometimes been called core affect, which refers to a primitive, universal and irreducible subjective experience consisting of both a pleasure-displeasure dimension and an arousal dimension (Russell, 2003). Emotions help guide goal-directed human behavior, allowing people to adjust to environmental changes because they signal when an important goal is threatened and needs attention (Kaufman, 1999). Among other things, emotional arousal is a key element that guides people's engagement with others, thanks in part to evolutionary processes, which helped create a central nervous system that responds to the complex social world of primates via emotional processes such as empathy (Brothers, 1990; Preston & de Waal, 2002). Empathy and trust, two essential elements in positive human interaction and interpersonal cooperation, consist of both affective and cognitive components (Brems, 1989; Duan Hill, 1996; McAllister, 1995). They are associated with a release in oxytocin (Barraza & Zak, 2009; Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2008), a hormone synthesized in the hypothalamus and released to areas associated with emotions and social behaviors.

One particular factor that can stimulate empathic emotions, an important component in the present analysis, is the presence of others who are in need or suffering in some way. Psychologists have noted that emotions can serve as two different types of motivators when others are in need or suffering: individuals can be motivated to reduce their own distress from viewing the distress of others or they can be focused on relieving the stress of others (Batson, 1991; Batson & Oleson, 1991). Empathy and distress appear to work against each other physiologically (Barraza & Zak, 2009) and research indicates that personal distress and prosocial behavior are negatively correlated whereas empathy and prosocial behavior are positively correlated (Batson, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). However, the relationship between

empathy and prosocial behavior has been moderate, indicating that there are several dispositional and situational moderators of the relationship (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg, 2000). Consistent with this, it has been found that individual responses to others who are in need are also based on the appraisal of the others' relevance to their own salient goals and values, their own self-definition, and the extent to which the others are seen as deserving of assistance based on these beliefs. For example, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas (2010) reported that an actor's compassion is aroused by the degree to which his or her own values and beliefs about the constitution of good character, positive meaning, human worth and humanitarian ideals are perceived as consistent with and/or signaled by the sufferer's characteristics, situation, and/or social make-up.

Top-down and Bottom-up Processing

We have based our conception of how mental models for human interactions are developed on brain research into emotions. Brain research indicates that emotions can be generated through either cognitive constructions and interpretation that lead to emotions or through the experience of immediate affect which then can lead to cognitions (Ochsner, et al., 2009). The former type of generation has been called top-down and triggers interactions between the prefrontal cortex areas involving working memory and information retrieval and the left amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2009). [The amygdalae have been found to be involved in responses to emotionally salient stimuli (Ledoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006).] The latter type has been called bottom-up and stimulates both the right and left amygdalae as well as the occipital, prefrontal, and parietal parts of the brain which are implicated in attentional processes and encoding into memory (Ochsner et al., 2009). Thus, top-down and bottom-up processes use distinct cortical networks (Ochsner et al., 2009). However, both types of processing are likely to be active in many situations (Ochsner et al., 2009). Top-down processing is thought to be semantic in nature, involving cognitive complexity that plays a role in emotional regulation whereas bottom-up processing is thought to be important for attention shifting in terms of detection of changes in the environment and potential threats (Ochsner et al., 2009). This is similar to the processes that Kahneman (2011) terms Systems 1 and 2 in the mind. System 1 operates on automaticity without any sense of voluntary control and System 2 involves effortful mental activities.

Bottom-up processing is more sensitive to changes in the environment than top-down processing, and top-down processing helps produce more long-term behavioral repertoires that are effective, but that can also be less sensitive to environmental changes, at least initially. Note for example, that much of human behavior is maintained by if-then rules describing contingencies rather than by the actual contingencies themselves since consequences for behavior are often delayed (see, for example, Malott, Shimamura, & Malott, 1992; Weatherly & Malott, 2008). However, the rules individuals follow can lead them to be insensitive to the actual contingencies operating in the organization, producing dysfunctional behavior (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). In fact, it has been suggested that top-down and bottom-up processing have implications for how to change dysfunctional behavior, with behaviors being generated by top-down processes being more responsive to cognitive methods that restructure interpretations of the situation and behaviors originating bottom-up being more responsive to behavioral reinforcement methods that reshape responses through desired and aversive stimuli (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2009; Quirk & Beer, 2006).

Considering that both top-down and bottom-up processing contribute to mental models used in human social interactions can help us reconcile what seem to be opposing theoretical viewpoints of behavior. For example, altruistic behavior has been conceptualized in a variety of ways by researchers. Hirschleifer (1983) takes an economic approach to post-disaster cooperative behaviors and describes a theory of post-disaster altruistic behavior as consistent with enlightened self-interest. This would be consistent with a top-down cognitively generated mental model of appropriate social behavior. However, it has also been suggested that prosocial behaviors may be triggered due to personal distress because people can see themselves as potential sufferers (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). This conceptual approach appears to describe a bottom-up affectively constructed mental model. More than likely, each theoretical approach accurately, but only partially, accounts for prosocial and altruistic behavior, and there are likely even other explanations of this behavior not yet elucidated that involved complex, reciprocal processing between cognitive and affective brain structures.

Following, we present the three circles found in the integrative framework.

The Integrative Framework

In our view, this framework has the potential for a multitude of applications in various social settings. For purposes of illustration however, we will focus on two management research areas that we believe could particularly benefit from the integrative framework, organizational justice and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Organizational actions in these two realms reflect underlying collective mental models about engagement and responsibility. CSR should concern multiple stakeholder groups beyond the immediate employees, including global organizational and inter-organizational initiatives with groups of people who may not directly interact otherwise, which falls in the circle three of our integrative model. However, organizations that have historically been concerned more with circle one and two themes may find CSR outside of these circles difficult. Similarly, the organizational justice literature usually has been concerned mostly with justice within an organization, falling squarely in circles one and two of our framework. However, there have been calls to extend the concept of organizational justice to stakeholders outside the organization, which the framework could help accomplish.

We conceive of the integrative framework as consisting of concentric circles of successively expanding identities that serve as the basis for mental models for engagement (see Figure 1). These circles are constructed with three dimensions: awareness of time-orientation, scope of impact, and directionality of relationships (see Table 1). We believe that movement between these circles occurs and depends to a large extent on the complex interplay of cognitions and emotions. We will discuss this more with respect to each circle in our framework. We will also speculate on the interactions between the mental models underlying the three circles.




Figure 1: Beyond Social Exchange Theory: Integrative Framework

Table 1: Awareness Dimensions

Circle/Dimension	Time Orientation	Scope of Impact	Directionality of Relationships
First Circle	Short-term	Self/Ego	Simple, One way: Me Vs the world
Second Circle	Short-term and Medium-term	Self and immediate and related others	Restricted two-way: Us Vs the world
Third Circle	Long term	Self, immediate/related others, and distant strangers/universe	Complex, inter-connected: Me in the world

First Circle: “Ego-centric”

Much of research on work behavior has been rooted in models of social psychology, many of which have been based on economic conceptualizations of choice. Economic conceptualizations often assume that individuals are motivated to pursue their own ends in a way that minimizes costs and maximizes profits, which has been called "instrumental rationality" (Weber, 1978). Human interactions are viewed as a set of exchanges with rewards and costs and individuals are thought to decide whom to interact with based on expectations of these rewards and costs (Kahan & Rapoport, 1984).

This circle can be viewed as being parallel to the first of the neo-Kohlbergian major stages of moral reasoning, in which the “personal interests schema” is used (Narvaez, 2005). In this type of thinking, a person uses the filter of how does this affect my personal interest, with no socio-centric perspective involved. Cooperation with others is at the very micro level of thinking, with personal advantage being seen as a virtue (Narvaez, 2005). We can see this emphasis on ego-centric social exchange in models of various work and organizational behavior, such as motivation, organizational justice, power, and psychological contracts. For example, the expectancy (e.g., Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) and equity (e.g., Garland, 1973; Vecchio, 1981) theories of motivation are directly based on the instrumental rationality model found in economics. Similarly, most conceptualizations of organizational justice (e.g., Fortin & Fellenz, 2008), are based on social exchange concepts derived from economic principles (e.g., Homans, 1974; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). So are most of the understandings about power (for a discussion see Goltz, 2011). Yet another example is the idea of psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1989), which in turn is viewed as central to the concept of organizational justice (Cropanzano & Prehar, 2001).

Certainly, the explanation of human work behavior as primarily being driven by ego concerns appears to be supported by empirical studies. For example, the literature is replete with data indicating that individuals treat the concept of fairness differently depending upon whether it is directed toward others or toward themselves. Individuals overestimate their own performance (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977), tend to attribute success to themselves and factors under their control and failures to external factors (e.g., see Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004 for a review), and tend to put less effort into creating equity after being overcompensated than after being undercompensated (see Campbell & Pritchard, 1976 and Greenberg, 1982 for reviews). Also, studies on power indicate that as power increases, power holders generally view others as little more than tools (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008) and are not as concerned with how others experience the world (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006).

On the other hand, it is also well known that studies using purely economic principles to make predictions about social behavior often have fallen short (for reviews, see Goeree & Holt, 2001; Kagel & Roth, 1995). For example, fair offers rather than self-interested ones are common in the ultimatum game (for recent discussions, see Chiang, 2008; Zollman, 2008). Additionally, the tendency of management researchers to take either an economic rationality approach to business or a humanistic one that focuses on emotions has been criticized for ignoring the spiritual aspects of existence (Gozdz, 2000). Similarly, the focus on instrumentality in descriptions of social power has been criticized for ignoring bases of power that stimulate transcendent responses based on the idea of connectedness with others (Goltz, 2011).

Furthermore, ego-centric based behavior can be ultimately self-limiting and it is precisely these atypical responses that may help resolve some of the current issues in organizations in the two management areas to which we apply our model in this paper. For example, in the area of organizational justice, Goltz (2010) found women who believed, despite their failed individual discrimination cases, that in the long run, individual attempts at change are important because many individual attempts will add up, resulting in slow, evolutionary change, and that it is one’s responsibility to be part of this process. Similarly, in the area of corporate social responsibility

and sustainability, Baets and Oldenboom (2010) suggest that individuals who act out of a consciousness of connectedness are more likely to be able to build sustainable organizations in part because they are more able to adapt to the complexity that exists in the world than are individuals who think more linearly. This ties back to the dimensions we have listed in Table 1. A mental model based on Circle 1 takes a short-term, narrow approach thus limiting understanding of relationships to a Me Vs Them viewpoint, which misses the complexity of the larger world.

Emotions signal when an important goal is threatened and since individual survival is one of those goals, we can certainly see bottom-up processing as frequently playing an important role in the development and application of an ego-centric mental model. Thus, regardless of which mental model they might normally use, we would expect individuals to operate egocentrically and justifiably so, when feeling fear from threats to individual survival, whether emotional or physical survival is threatened. (Note that this ability to move adaptively from one mental model to another depending on the situation distinguishes our framework from models of moral development in which individuals are thought to shift permanently.) However, individuals may also develop an egocentric mental model via more top-down processes. For example, individuals may reflect on past experience, present circumstances, and future goals and then make a conscious choice of a more egocentric strategy because it is seen as being effective for meeting their goals.

Second Circle: Tribal-Identity- centric

As discussed in the section on social identity, egocentric behavior can be replaced with behavior supporting the values and behaviors of a social group when the antecedents of social identity have occurred. We use the term 'tribal' to signify such forms of social identity. The word 'tribe' is borrowed from anthropology used to describe archaic societies that maintain social order through affective and non-rational bonds (Cova & Cova, 2002). This word still resonates in modern and post-modern societies and is used to signify any group that shares interests, passions, and affective bonds including organizations, industries, professional groups and even cyber tribes (Poster, 1998). Unlike the traditional tribes that were bound by kinship and dialect, post-modern tribes are connected through shared feelings and symbols (Cova & Cova, 2002). Organizational identification one such specific form of social identification (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) and fall in this circle.

Current research on positive emotions (Frederickson, 2001; Kanov, et al., 2002; Lilius, et al, 2008) and prosocial behaviors in the fields of management and organizational behavior (Grant & Francesca, 2010) has given us an insight into a mental model that operates in workplaces which foster a shared identity of compassionate and positive organizations. These studies (Kanov, et al., 2002; Lilius, et al., 2008) reveal the process by which individuals engage in compassionate acts within workplaces and how organizations can foster a compassionate culture that in turn legitimizes individual acts of compassion. These organizations encourage proactive social behaviors through a set of values, practices, and routines (Kanov, et al., 2002). For example, Grant's (2008) study looks at the role of relational job design that encourages and rewards prosocial behavior. This stream of research spans a spectrum from forgiveness (Bright, Fry, & Cooperrider, 2006), compassion (Kanov, et al., 2002; Lilius, et al., 2008), emotional resilience

(Powley, 2009), to virtues (Cameron & Caza, 2002). For an exhaustive review on this stream of research, please refer to Donaldson and Ko (2010).

To some extent, this circle parallels the *maintaining norms schema* found in the neo-Kohlbergian tradition of moral development. In this phase in the neo-Kohlbergian model, individuals have the awareness that people relate to each other through institutions and established practices and upholding social order is therefore viewed as being very important (Narvaez, 2005). For example, religious authoritarianism has been found to be related to this type of reasoning (Narvaez, 2005). However, in our framework, it is not the upholding of the norms and traditions that is so important, but rather the maintenance of connection to tribal identity that is key. It certainly is the case that upholding social norms is a way to maintain one's connection to tribal identity; thus, we see these frameworks as being conceptually parallel. However, we wish to emphasize here that we believe that the motivation to uphold social norms arises from tribal identity rather than the reverse.

In this circle, the sense of tribal identity, i.e. a sense of belongingness to a group, organization, team, family, or a local community, is fostered through regular interaction, which in turn fosters positive sentiment (Homans, 1974). For example, attachments that govern even economic behaviors embedded within networks of social relationships (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Larson, 1992) are thought to be a critical factor in these interactions (Seabright, Leventhal, & Fishman, 1992). Pressure for continuing these economic interactions often will occur even when the exchanges obtained from the relationships are no longer economically rational (Seabright, et al., 1992). Economic behavior based on emotional attachments rather than rational calculations would be an example of more bottom-up, emotional processing of the tribal mental model rather than top-down cognitive processing.

This form of identity is more inclusive than the egocentric one of the first circle. The tribal-centric mental model has an evolutionary basis in that individuals operating with this model have better survival chances than individuals operating alone. Analyses by anthropological archaeologists indicate that groups tend to develop when habitats become poorer or unstable and competition for resources increases such as due to overpopulation because groups can provide individuals with differential access to resources (e.g., Kennett, Winterholder, Bartruff, & Erlandson, 2009). Also, there is a propensity to be most loyal to one's own kin, known in evolutionary biology as Hamilton's Rule, which specifies the level of altruistic behavior among kin that maximizes the survival of one's genes (e.g., see Bergstrom, 1995). However, because the notion of benevolence is extended only to those who are part of the network, it is still restricted because of the dependency on the dynamic of interpersonal relationships within the context of a group organization. Also, the other side of a tribal-identity centric mental model maybe parochialism and a lack of inclusiveness. It may inadvertently lead to the sometimes toxic dynamic of in-groups and out-groups, such as through discrimination, bullying, shunning, and other behaviors. This may occur at a level that is difficult to detect but in a form that has great impact over time. Certainly, the research on discrimination, for example, indicates that individuals have unconscious biases towards minorities that can result in an accumulation of disadvantages over time (e.g., Agars, 2004; Fiske, 2002).

Further, just as how behaviors based on the ego-centric mental model can be self-limiting, in this case, a focus on the tribe can lead to a sort of prisoners' dilemma effect in that resources gained for the tribe at the expense of outsiders can ultimately have negative effects on all, both tribe members and non-members. This is illustrated by research that indicates that countries with social heterogeneity and large inequities, such as in the form of income inequality and economic discrimination among groups, have lower trust levels between economic agents and lower economic growth, creating a poverty trap (Zak & Knack, 2001). Therefore, while a tribal-centric view may be meaningful and productive in the short and medium term, its narrow awareness of scope of impact and related limited relational directionality which gets manifested as 'Us Vs Them' mentality is likely to be problematic in the long term, especially in complex situations and problems.

Although, as discussed, much of tribal behavior may result from emotional attachments or be genetically programmed as a result of evolution, when there is more of a choice, a cognitive, top-down processing could certainly lead to a mental model that belonging to a tribe may be more effective for survival than not belonging.

Third Circle: Interdependence-centric

Much of existing research on prosocial behavior that goes beyond the social exchange theory driven models is done on the second circle by the positive organizational researchers. However, much of this research is based on the assumptions of immediacy, proximity, interaction and a relational or caring ethic. In the third and final circle, we describe a transcendent mental model that is predicated upon the most expansive understanding of interconnectedness of all sentient beings in the web of life. In this circle, people have moved from situationally motivated prosocial or moral behavior to more enduring concern about others' welfare (Batson, et al. 1995) leading to a sense of oneness and a merging of self-other boundaries (Cialdini, et al. 1997). For such helping behavior based on a transcendent mental model, one needs to be objectively self-aware (Carson & Miller, 1987), possess emotionality (i.e. the tendency to experience emotions), and have a highly developed set of emotional regulatory processes (Eisenberg, 2000). This is in line with Oschner, et al.'s (2005) conclusion that cognitive capacities and emotional capacities go together.

We find two extremely different and seemingly opposed frameworks as helpful anchors for this circle: one based on an abstract and rational idea of humanity grounded in the enlightenment tradition of entitlement and rights, and the other grounded in spiritual and religious traditions of moral responsibility towards fellow creatures.

According to the first framework, this mental model is based a moral sensibility or concern for remote strangers from different continents, cultures, and societies (Hoijer, 2004) based on an abstract and rational idea of humanity (Sznajder, 1998) arising from democratization. It is a rights-based approach related to personal responsibility. Therefore, this model tends to distinguish between those who may be called 'deserving' and 'undeserving' of compassion. This is echoed in Skitka's (1999) finding that both liberals and conservatives were generally equally likely to ascribe more personal responsibility and blame to both communities and individuals that did not take adequate flood precautions than those that did while seeking federal disaster

assistance. Lerner and Simmons (1966) present evidence for the argument that whether observer reactions to the innocent victim take the form of compassion or rejection depend on the observer's need to believe in a just world and the belief that there is an appropriate fit between effort and outcome.

The second approach to such benevolence is grounded in spiritual and religious traditions. Haidt and Graham (2006) argue that community, authority, and the sacred are the sources of moral values across people and cultures. Both Eastern and Judeo Christian traditions have emphasized the role of compassion in salvation or wisdom. Sznajder (1998) describes the Christian principle of 'love thy neighbor' as a manifestation of God's *agape*, a spontaneous, unconditional and unmotivated by the value of the one who is loved. Similarly, according to Buddhism, compassion exists when one has the wisdom to see all sentient beings are very much interdependent, and therefore, the question of worthiness is not part of the picture in this approach. Compassion in this tradition flows out of the assumption that we are all connected in the tapestry of life by our own human spirituality and connectedness to the planet as a whole (Long, 1997). It is a set of deeply held values and beliefs that guide a particular community or society in their relationship with nature as a whole, which includes other human beings (Poonamallee, 2011a). In this model, compassion and wisdom go together because one operates from an understanding that all sentient beings are interconnected and operate as one and focuses on the ideal of unity.

Both the enlightenment and spiritual traditions that can serve to anchor behavior in this third circle would require a person to use a *postconventional schema*, in the words of the neo-Kohlbergian tradition of moral development (Narvaez, 2005). In this type of reasoning, social conventions are not inviolate; instead, principles and values are key. Moral obligations are based on sharable ideals rather than ethnocentric preference (Narvaez, 2005). This approach requires more cognitively complex thinking, which provides more flexibility. This flexibility in thinking comes from a greater exposure to various situations: research indicates that the more education and the richer one's social experience, including multi-cultural experience, the greater the development of postconventional thought (Narvaez, 2005). For example, in Kohlberg's (1969, 1971) postconventional phase, individuals recognize that compromises are sometimes needed because notions of what is just can differ since the distribution of resources and rewards can be based on a number of criteria, such as self-interest, physical characteristics, need, relationship ties, and behavior or productivity (e.g., Thomson & Jones, 2005). Therefore, post-conventional thinking is based on open scrutiny and debate (Narvaez, 2005).

This paper does not argue for either the humanistic or spiritual approach. But drawing on both frameworks, we argue that collectively held beliefs and values of any social group— be they grounded in traditions of spirituality or in enlightenment – have an impact on creating and sustaining a transcendent mental model for human interaction. In fact, there is sufficient evidence both faith and spirituality based groups and non-spiritually or religiously inclined radical rational humanist societies operate based on this transcendent mental model. Scandinavian and western European countries, among the least religious wealthy countries, are also most likely to contribute very generously to foreign nations. For example, the Norwegian government has the distinction of the highest per capita contribution to foreign aid (104 cents per

person) but is also among the least religious wealthy nations.² Similarly, Sweden and Denmark also rank among high contributors of foreign aid while falling among the least religious nations.³ Citizens of these countries also contribute towards providing a high quality of life for their own citizenry in terms of universal healthcare, education, environmentally friendly transportation etc. Common to both traditions is the transcendent mental model that suspends social exchange theory on a long-term basis.

Movement between the Circles

One of the primary ways in which our framework is different from Kohlberg's discussion of moral development (1969, 1971) is that in our view, movement between mental models is neither unidirectional nor does it arise solely from moral development. It is possible to move between circles triggered by either top-down/cognitive processes and/or bottom-up affective processes. To illustrate the various possibilities in terms of movement between the three circles, we constructed Table 2, which includes examples of movement that could be driven by top-down or bottom-up processing.

Table 2: Examples of Transition Types from Circle to Circle

Direction of Movement	Top-down Processing	Bottom-Up Processing
Outward	Organizational socialization into a compassionate culture (Circle 1 to 2) Regular meditation practice (Circle 2 to 3)	Pro-social behavior in terms of empathetic response to co-workers (Circle 1 to 2) Pro-social behavior in terms of empathetic response to strangers in crisis (Circle 2 to 3)
Inward	Protective response to ongoing survival pressures, e.g., immigration, competition (Circle 3 to 2 or 2 to 1)	Experience of sudden serious threats to own basic needs (Circle 3 or 2 to 1)

We have termed movement from a less inclusive to more inclusive circle 'outward movement' and the movement from an outer to an inner circle, 'inward movement'. Generally speaking, we view outward movement, in which the focus is beyond the ego concerns or even the tribe, to signal growth in an individual's, group's, or organization's mental model development. This is because the more expansive mental models represent more cognitively complex thinking, such as by taking into account how beings are interconnected and how they impact each other in complex ways. Thus, egoistic and tribal concerns are allowed for in the third circle, but they are put in their proper places. However, it should be noted that moving to a more self-focused mental model that excludes more expansive thinking may sometimes be called for in the situation and it is not necessarily the case that a narrowing focus represents regression.

² <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0930884.html>

³ <http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx>

There are instances when an egoistic focus is needed for self-protection or growth, for example, that then can allow for a later more permanent movement to a more expansive mental model.

Recall that research indicates that mental models are fairly resistant to change (e.g., Swann & Read, 1981), change primarily when individuals are motivated to more deeply process information that is discrepant with their models (e.g., Rousseau, 2001), and even then, usually change slowly (e.g., Welch Larson, 1994). Therefore, for movement to occur between circles and for mental models to change more permanently, we believe that some time must elapse during which cognitive restructuring is occurring in response to changing conditions. This could be exposure to different cultures, for example, as suggested by the research that indicates more cultural exposure is associated with more post-conventional thinking (Endicott, Bock, & Narvaez, 2003). However, it is also possible that bottom-up emotional processing will trigger movement between circles to broader inclusivity. In these cases, we expect the movement to be more immediate and short-term in nature and movement back to earlier, less inclusive, mental models will be likely at some point unless sufficient top-down processing occurs as well. For example, movement between the second and third circles may occur in response to the suffering of strangers during a disaster. But this can be transient if the response was driven solely bottom up or affectively driven without an accompanying top down cognitive reconstruction. This is equally applicable to any change in external stimuli. If organizations want to move beyond ego and social identity centric behavior, such as when trying to generate inclusiveness in the organization, they can use more affect-generating practices (e.g., how would you feel in this situation of discrimination), but these might be short-term in effectiveness. Cognitive practices that focus on oneness and interdependence might be more long-term. For example, the effect of an emotionally charged training program to change attitudes and behaviors may dissipate over time without sufficient cognitive restructuring to make it longer lasting.

Outward Movement

Outward movement is possible based on positive cognitive framing or emotional arousal. Top-down processing that leads to outward movement is more likely to take place over a longer period of time than bottom-up process that leads to outward movement and the effects are likely to be more permanent in nature. An example of movement from Circle 1 to 2 is the socialization of new members into organizational culture. A newcomer enters an organization on the basis of an individual employment and psychological contract with the employer, i.e. Circle 1 and moves towards Circle 2 through socialization. Organizations achieve this through a top-down mechanisms of clarification of roles and relationships (e.g., see Bauer, Bodner, Erdogan, Truxillo, & Tucker, 2007). This adoption by the newcomer of the mental model used by the organization may represent a movement from a more ego-centric mental model to a tribal one (first circle to second circle) and engender organizational citizenship behaviors thus moving the employee from an ego-driven individualistic identity to one of organizational identification.

An example of a top-down cognitive restructuring mechanism moving from Circle 2 to Circle 3 is regular meditation practice. The research literature on meditation suggests it stimulates movement from a circle two mental model to a circle three mental model, since its effects include non-judgmental acceptance, compassion, and an increased sense of connectedness with others (for a review, see Goltz, 2011). Meditative practices increase calmness and wellbeing

(Friedman & Coates, 2000) and result in an ability to respond non-habitually (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). In addition, the wisdom and spiritual-based reasoning that can arise from practices such as meditation emphasizes more collective and universal concerns, transcending concerns about self (e.g., Achenbach & Orwoll, 1991; Dehler & Welsh, 1994; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Pascual-Leone, 1990).

Outward movement can occur from bottom-up, affective processing as well. Disaster research as well as research on compassion towards strangers indicates that social exchange norms are suspended or relaxed during breaching moments such as large-scale natural disasters, and compassion and empathy is directed towards those with whom one does not share organizational or social identification and who might not be able to reciprocate the help (e.g., Comfort, 2006; Haidt & Graham, 2006; Hoijer, 2004; Nussbaum, 2001; Poonamallee 2012; Viscusi & Zekhauser, 2006; Weine, et al, 2002). For example, altruistic and prosocial behaviors in disaster contexts take the form of volunteerism (Taylor, 1970), donations (Argoathy, 2003), provision of emergency medical services to the victims (Quarantelli, 1983), search and rescue (Durkin, 1987), and sharing of knowledge and expertise to develop community psychosocial and civic infrastructure (Weine, et al. 2002). Prosocial behaviors are thought to be triggered due to personal distress (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) since people can see themselves as potential sufferers at some point, which can lead to an emotional arousal that moves them beyond both the first and second circles to the third one. However, this expansion of identity may not be sustained over periods of calm unless there is a cognitive reframing of some sort. The good news is that this behavior can be generated through top-down processes as well. For example, Douy's (1972) economic approach to post-disaster cooperative behaviors as consistent with enlightened self-interest is more cognitively based. So is Dynes' (1994) description of situational altruism, which emerges when the new victims' needs cannot be met by existing institutional resources. Prosocial behavior based on a more permanent third circle mental model is needed in an era of ecological overshoot that will depend on compassion and kindness, not only during disasters but continually (Cairns, Jr., 2005).

Inward Movement

As we have indicated, we expect that inward movement generally does not represent growth in cognitively complex thinking and so, outward movement is more desirable than inward movement. However, inward movement is expected to occur at times and these occurrences are likely to fall into one of two categories. First, as discussed, an increased focus on self or tribe to the exclusion of others outside those circles is likely to happen when the more inclusive mental model was achieved through bottom-up, rather than top-down processing. For example, after the worst of the disaster appears to be over, the mental model of helping strangers, even natural enemies that was stimulated through emotional arousal recedes into the background, and the tribal-centric model re-emerges.

Second, we expect that inward movement will commonly happen when the self or tribe is threatened in some ways in terms of the ability to meet basic needs. This threat could be processed either cognitively or emotionally. A sudden threat is likely to be processed affectively bottom-up and longer term, a slowly emerging threat is likely to be processed top-down. If the threat is sudden and emotionally processed, it is possible that upward movement to the previous

mental model will occur once the threat has been handled. If the threat has been more long term in nature, stimulating cognitive processing, then a return to the earlier, more inclusive mental model is unlikely unless additional cognitive restructuring occurs that stimulates that movement.

Implications for Theory and Practice

We believe this model is broadly applicable and can help significantly expand the focus of research on social interactions inside and outside organizations. For purposes of illustration and brevity, however, we focused two research areas that we believe could particularly benefit from the integrative framework: organizational justice and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We summarize them here and also discuss some aspects of our framework that could use additional development in future work.

Most explanations for the concept of organizational justice (e.g. Fortin & Feelenz, 2008) are based on instrumentality and equity (Kahan & Rapoport, 1984; Sunahara & Pierce, 1982). However, these two explanations are often at odds because sometimes equity seems to rule and sometimes instrumentality does (for reviews, see Goeree & Holt, 2001; Kagel & Rogh, 1995). Recall, for example, that fair offers rather than self-interested ones are common in the ultimatum game (Chiang, 2008; Zoolman, 2008). Our model could help account for these disparate findings. Equity and instrumentality may arise from two very different mental models: expectations of parity might be seen more in the tribal-centric circle and less so in the egocentric one, in which individual instrumentality would rule. However, our integrative framework also suggests that organizational justice research should be expanded beyond a reliance on economic and equity models of behavior because these models tend to neglect studying justice beyond immediate networks of dyadic social relationships and don't do well at examining justice across the tribe as well as with those outside the tribe.

Research in this area should begin to use broader models of justice that can more easily be applied beyond the dyadic social exchange, such as the fairness model based on the concept of groups as patches (Goltz, 2013), which recognizes that multiple levels are operating in terms of the exchange of resources and that groups simultaneously manage these multiple levels so that over the long term, equity is achieved across individuals. Still, the Goltz (2013) model seems more relevant to the second circle in our integrative framework and would need to be expanded to include a larger web of humanity and life to be truly what we mean by interdependence-centric.

Similarly, we believe that our integrative framework can help in moving CSR initiatives from the second tribal-centered circle to the third, i.e. the interdependence centric circle, which is a way to build an interconnected world. CSR as a research area has gone through multiple iterations (Frederick, 1987; Poonamallee, 2012; Waddock, 2004), starting from philanthropy and charity programs (CSR1), business benefits and bottom line impacts (CSR 2), legitimacy driven business ethics and voluntary compliance (CSR 3) and finally cosmos-centric corporations (CSR4). Although the cosmos-centric approach to CSR is a very appealing proposition, it is a normative model that is difficult to translate to practice. Part of the challenge is that unlike individuals, organizations cannot be considered to be moral actors (French, 1979; Goodpaster & Matthews, 1982; Ranken, 1987; Velasquez, 2003). Therefore, moral action must begin and end

with individuals. However, a cosmos-centric approach to CSR relies on other-oriented behaviors that are extended to external stakeholders including the larger community (Poonamallee & Joy, 2012). This is even more expansive than organizational citizenship behaviors and/or prosocial behaviors that are mostly looked at within an organization, i.e. the tribal centric engagement (circle two) in this model. Instead, it is more akin to circle three in our framework. For this transition from circle two to circle three to occur, there needs to be a shift in the shared mental models among the individuals. These organizations must develop a more expansive shared social identity that will encourage atypical behaviors that not solely governed by social exchange norms. The dominant conception of mental models guiding individual behaviors are based on an agency theory perspective (Battilana, 2006; Embiryaer & Mische, 1988; Garud & Kanoe, 2001), which in turn is based on motives of self-interest (Anderson & Hill, 2002; Coase, 1974; Hendry, 2005).

This paper contributes to this discourse by outlining mental models that are more inclusive than the traditional agency theory and social exchange theory perspectives. This paper describes how these mental models may be constructed through the use of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. This transition may be effected through the use of the mechanisms of framing and affective arousal. The cognitive/top-down process is necessary to create a mental model of an interdependent social identity. This type of expansive identity then encourages and even inspires individuals to engage in circle three type of activities. At this point, the top-down and bottom-up processing research is located in individual responses to external stimuli. Further research can explore this relationship at meso and macro levels. This approach is particularly suited to a mixed method approach combining qualitative, especially interpretive and action research approaches, along with traditional quantitative approaches.

Therefore, we believe that a framework that contains successively more expansive mental models could result in a better understanding of currently researched topics as well as stimulate new research streams. But we caution that our framework is a preliminary one meant to stimulate thought and therefore needs to be further developed.

One area that needs more examination is how this framework may differ depending on culture. Cross-cultural research posits collectivism and individualism as dimensions of national culture (Hofstede, 1980) which suggests that some countries and cultures may be prone to operating in the tribal circle than others who may be more prone to operating in the egocentric first circle. Therefore it is important to examine the role of national cultures in mental models to clearly identify the constraints of our proposed framework. It is also important to understand the effect of more local cultures. As an example, Orozco and Poonamallee (2013) discuss how the knowledge of indigenous populations, which is often based on ecological embeddedness—one's relationship with the environment, does not fit with the mental model of intellectual capital and intellectual property rights, which views knowledge as being "owned" and removes it from a sense of place. This difference in mental models creates a number of issues, such as the appropriation of indigenous knowledge. This example also illustrates that an emphasis on social exchanges as primarily based on ego-centric thinking becomes problematic as more and more business occurs across cultures which draw on different frameworks. Considering more expansive mental models than the egocentric would help in solving these cross-cultural dilemmas.

Another area in which more development is needed is in the specification of movement between circles. In our paper, we have offered some ideas of how this might occur, based on brain research. However, the framework could use more clarity on how earlier mental models (e.g., egocentric) are used, even during emotional stress, after higher mental models (interdependence centric) have been developed and routinely applied. Although we believe that individuals are adaptive and tend to use the mental model that best fits the situation once they have sufficiently developed the ability to use each mental model, it is also possible that these mental models not only follow a developmental progression, such as in the neo-Kohlbergian framework (Narvaez, 2005), but also that people who use more expansive mental models tend to disparage narrower ones, as has been found in research on moral development (e.g., Rest, 1973). Concepts from the hierarchical need theories of Maslow (1954) and Alderfer (1969) might be helpful for this analysis as well. Maslow (1954), for example, discussed the concept of the prepotency process, which indicates that lower order needs must be satisfied before upward progression occurs, which suggests that use of a more expansive mental model by an organization might not be possible if a tribal identity has not been well developed. Alderfer (1969) thought that different need states operated simultaneously and that individuals could operate at higher level needs without fulfillment of lower level ones, but he also indicated that individuals might, when frustrated by their attempt to meet higher level needs, put more emphasis on lower order ones. Certainly, Alderfer's frustration principle would be consistent with our belief that emotional triggers such as stress might sometimes stimulate the use of a more egocentric mental model. As can be seen, there is yet much to consider and explore in terms of the progression and the application of the mental models.

An additional limitation that we wish to acknowledge is that we have chosen to focus on three major types of mental models, but we also understand that one could readily identify subcircles within each of the three circles. For instance, in the second circle, family members no doubt generate a somewhat different mental model than friends, which are probably associated with a somewhat different mental model than tribal members that are acquaintances. Similarly, in the third circle, minerals, plants, animals, and humans are likely associated with different mental models for most people; for example, some of these generating a sense of connectedness more readily than others. Furthermore, we have chosen to stop at the socio-ecological in our framework, but it could be argued that mental models could be extended out further to include elements that exist beyond what we can perceive as being part of our environment. Therefore, future work in this area could both work on the more subtle layers of mental models as well as more extended ones.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have described an integrative model of engagement and the underlying mental models that govern various modes of engagement. The framework serves to extend our understanding of engagement in that it considers atypical behaviors that are not ego-centric and driven solely by social exchange norms. Specifically, it brings together research on tribal-centric prosocial behaviors, suffering-centric engagement focused on unknown others, and an interdependence-centric engagement based on traditions of spirituality and religion, and democracy, and enlightenment. This paper also draws on recent brain research on top-down and

bottom-mechanisms to explain the creation of mental models thereby extending the understanding of mental models to include both affective and cognitive mechanisms.

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A Developmental Behavioral Analysis of Dual Motives' Role in Political Economies of Corruption

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Abstract: This paper is a developmental meta-analysis of behaviors that contribute to political economies of corruption, deploying bioneurological dual motive and behavioral development theories. Together, these systems of analysis enable a developmental perspective to illustrate and analyze a progression of dual motives' variations as humans and their conditions change. The progression of examples indicates that there are multiple evolutions of political economies that vary in their complexity, with different behavioral features at each level. Dual motive theory helps in identifying and understanding the complex linkages and layers of socio-political and economic behaviors as they become more complex. Increasingly complex horizontal and vertical stacks of social networks, like lattice-works of dual motives, enable individuals and groups to develop and maintain sturdy yet adaptable social systems of patronage, brokerage, and clientelism. These so-often informally structured relationships underlie corruption-like transactions long before, and long after, they are regarded as the enduring institution of corruption.

Three hypotheses under gird the development of that thesis. The first is that dual motive theory facilitates meta-analyses of social networks' often hidden layers of complexity. A second hypothesis is that analyses using dual motive theory can explicate more complexity when the theory is integrated with developmental behavioral theory. The third hypothesis is that analyses made possible by that integration offer substantive contributions to understanding socio-political-economic behaviors, including multiple political economies of corruption. Three strategies are employed to develop the paper's thesis. First, the concepts of social ties, networks, reciprocity and dual motive theory are introduced to set the context. second, a behavioral task measurement theory is introduced: the model of hierarchical complexity. Scoped for this paper to introduce only the most common adult-level tasks, that model's orders of increasing complexity describe developmental differences in the performance of individuals' and social systems' behaviors. Third, a series of international examples shows the hierarchically different ways the behavioral tensions of dual motives manifest in human exchanges. The hierarchical complexity of the examples' settings is correlated with the hierarchical complexity of adults' behaviors in those settings.

The results of the analysis indicate that (a) individual and system behaviors are continuously shaped and constrained by complex interrelations that can be explained in terms of the hierarchical complexity of dual motives; (b) there are predictably difficult transitions and breaches when systems of different hierarchical complexity disrupt pre-

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existing systems for managing behavioral tensions. The application of dual motive theory indicates its analytical usefulness for interpreting social, political, and economic phenomena. Political economies of corruption can be more thoroughly understood as enduring institutions through a developmental behavioral application of dual motive theory.

Keywords: Bioneurological, brokerage, clientelism, corruption, dual motive theory, model of hierarchical complexity, political economies, patronage, reciprocity, social networks, systems

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a meta-analysis of corruption from a developmental behavioral perspective. A key goal is to illustrate the essential role of dual motive theory (Cory, 2006) for identifying and understanding complex linkages and layers of socio-political and economic behaviors in which individuals and systems collaborate. Another goal is to demonstrate analyses that integrate dual motive theory with the model of hierarchical complexity (Commons & Ross, 2008; Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998).

This introduction begins with some general background to serve as context for the purpose of this paper and its organization. The paper's origins lie in a previous project I undertook to study social networks, called patron-client systems, in developing countries. It soon became clear that developed countries are also laced with such systems, and there are intricate linkages across and within geographic boundaries. I found that actors in the systems have different kinds of social ties (e.g., ethnic, ideological, economic), use different currencies of exchange, and the systems in which they operate mutate as socio-political and economic conditions change. At certain points in development, these behaviors come to be called *corruption*—in some quarters, but not all. My study became that of a developmental trajectory that shed light on political economies of survival. They appear in different guises as they mutate through all levels of apparently all societies. Analyzing this trajectory suggested to me why, at some point, these political economies of survival are called corruption. This paper traces the evolution of corruption through its stages of behavioral development. It introduces a thesis about the roots of corruption in perennial human systems and why corruption may be expected to be an enduring institution throughout much of the 21st century.

Anthropologists, in particular, and some sociologists and political scientists have mapped much of the picture of patronage and clientelist social networks—which come to be called corruption—through indispensable ethnographies. Through such sources and others, and through my previous critical study of the democratization literature (e.g., Ross, 2002, 2003, 2007), I noticed patterns—even as they mutated—across various individual behaviors, cultures, and social, political, and economic systems. I found no behavioral explanations for the durable patterns. I began analyzing them through the lens of a behavioral development theory, the model of hierarchical complexity (Commons, et al., 1998). About the same time, Cory's (2004) work on the bioneurological architecture of the human brain was published; it is now entitled dual motive theory. Cory's model afforded vital explanations for the vertical social glue that makes social networks sturdy, adaptable, and sometimes corrupt. Integrated with the behavioral analyses afforded by the MHC, the individual and social patterns and their shape-shifting

trajectories painted a new, dynamically mixed but coherent landscape. That landscape enabled a different rendering of the political economies of corruption. It underlies the paper's thesis about the endurance of the institution.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. It begins with an overview of the concept of social ties and networks to introduce the concept of reciprocity. Next, a deeper explication of reciprocity briefly introduces dual motive theory, highlighting only several elements for this analysis. The next section briefly introduces the model of hierarchical complexity (MHC) by charting a limited range of its orders of complexity that are referred to in this paper. The introduction to that Model is brief and abstract because the next major section of the paper employs it in concrete examples. Such examples help to convey differences among individual and social behaviors at different developmental stages of hierarchical complexity. A series of international examples are presented to provide just enough "story" and analysis to convey dual motives' roles in social networks and institutions at different stages of development. Following those, the developmental features in different political economies are summarized to provide generalized contexts for the examples. A closing discussion suggests implications of the paper's developmental application of dual motive theory for understanding the endurance of the institution of corruption.

Social Ties, Networks, and Reciprocity

In any setting, it can be easy to overlook the role of social ties in shaping how individuals, groups, and societies function. By permeating life, they can be virtually invisible and escape reflection or analysis. The purpose of this first section is to give an overview of the evolving roles of social ties that are the focus of this paper. Such roles are more fully described in the paper's central section. The generic term, social ties, refers to social systems. These natural social systems exist because they meet the needs of people who participate in them. Those needs include basic physiological needs, physical safety, emotional safety of belonging, economic or financial security, and the safety, security, and comfort of self-esteem, among others. Each stage of human development is characterized by such basic needs, in Maslow's (1987/1954) terms. Social systems develop and endure because humans rely upon their vital functions. The primary function is to mediate the individual and group needs with the larger environment: a reciprocal relationship. All social systems are characterized by various forms of reciprocity.

Anthropologists have long identified reciprocity as a universal found in all human societies (Brown, 1991; Cory, 2004; Gouldner, 1977). It serves as a "cornerstone of morality, rational action, and group life...and *the assiduousness with which reciprocal action and reaction are watched* also suggest some degree of innateness" (Brown, 1991, p. 108, emphasis added). Reciprocity involves social *processes*. These evolve as individuals, groups, and their environments develop and change, giving rise to different forms and functions. As they become complex, they become whole systems of processes to maintain social ties. The innateness endures because it plays a major role in keeping social systems stable (Gouldner, 1977), an essential human need.

Early beginnings of reciprocity behaviors are apparent in various kinds of kinship groupings, where survival needs of the group result in the norm of reciprocity being embedded in the culture

of the group (e.g., Gouldner, 1977; Lutz, 1998/1988). They next evolve into a more self-interested form, for example in demographically homogenous peasant villages where social life is very stable and self-contained, with every adult pairing with numerous others to fulfill the range of social needs (Foster, 1977). This horizontal, dyadic latticework of social relations continues to operate even as vertical relations develop to compensate for deficits: the horizontal relations cannot meet expanding needs. When kinship and local ties become inadequate to “perform linkage functions between persons of low and high status, or between the community and the nation” (Powell, 1977, p. 149) to meet needs, vertical relations between patrons and their clients develop.

The less complex forms of social ties have three consistent characteristics. They take place between two parties of unequal social or economic status, they depend on reciprocity of goods and services, and they heavily depend on in-person contact to maintain the relationship (Powell, 1977). This structure is evident in the form of feudal (Bloch, 1961) and big-man societies (Johnson & Earle, 2002; Wolf, 1997/1982). Such social systems are not confined to historical eras; they are widespread in contemporary society, evident in gangs, tribal wars, insurgencies, and mafia operations. As social groupings enlarge with population growth and geographic expansion, information and influence become additional commodities. Brokering intermediaries, i.e., “the middle man,” facilitate and extend patrons’ power and reach. A broker increases the “height” of the vertical relation between a patron and his or her clients. Brokers enable expanded reach for the concrete, personal contacts required at every social level. In nation-states with centralized government—weak or strong, authoritarian or democratic—multiple layers of patron-broker-client systems develop to hand resources up and down the social-political-economic ladders. The networks extend all the way through societies’ apexes of power. From the national levels of government, across business and funding agency relations, and among elites that network through them all, the latticeworks of reciprocity operate in multiple guises. This paper shows how the dual motives that underlie the give and take of reciprocity construct the political economy of the world wide phenomenon called corruption. It illustrates that there is not one political economy of corruption, but many.

The foregoing concepts weave throughout this paper. They include the innate human need for social ties, the characteristic of reciprocity in enacting those ties and keeping social systems operating and stable, and functional roles, e.g., patron, broker, client. At less complex levels of social organization, all roles are played by individuals. As social systems develop more complexity, roles are accomplished by groups, organizations, and institutions, in addition to individuals. All of the roles, as described below, enact the universal pattern of reciprocity and are characterized by dual motives within each party to social transactions.

Dual Motive Theory

Although familiar connotations of reciprocity may suggest simple exchange between two actors (e.g., a gift prompts a thank-you note, a bribe prompts desired behavior), social processes of reciprocity become complex. They underlie why humans construct their not-so-simple social systems. Groups develop norms to ensure members of the groups will be able to meet predictable needs and have sufficient social stability to do so. The case examples given below illustrate the roles of various norms. Norms are often enacted unconsciously because they are embedded in the

culture of any group, rarely reflected upon all. They are “just the way things are done.” This implies *systems* of doing things: social systems. Reciprocity implies systems, even if they are subtle and embedded as norms. These systems are *how* humans meet their needs, survive, and manage social, economic, and political life.

Cory’s dual motive theory, based on the human brain’s bioneurological architecture, explains reciprocity in terms of balancing *behavioral tensions* within the individual human organism. It offers an expanded view of the complexity of managing social life. By contrast, the simplism of the term, reciprocity, masks the very complexity that needs to be understood. Cory’s concepts have more analytical power than *reciprocity* for understanding the complex layers of behaviors discussed in this paper. They alert one to the fact that these tensions play out in all human endeavors, including large social scales.

Whether informally or formally, the methods used to manage constant behavioral tensions become institutionalized as individuals and their levels of social organization evolve and adapt to changing conditions. The social sciences have coined terms to describe systems that both reflect and manage behavioral tensions. Here, the terms patron(age), broker(age), and client(elism) are used. It is noteworthy that each term has a form to refer to a particular role as well as to a *system* of roles. Dual motive theory, as applied in this paper, contributes to Gouldner’s agenda (1977, p. 37), that “a full analysis of the ways in which the whole *reciprocity complex* is involved in the maintenance of social systems would require consideration of the linkages between each of its various elements and their relation to other general properties of social systems” (emphasis added).

As the examples below explicate in increasing complexity, the concept of balancing behavioral tensions explains a seemingly paradoxical relationship. For example, despite what may appear to be individuals’ primary motives of self-deterministic “rational choice,” it makes it possible to see such individuals’ simultaneous comfort in lower ranks of power pyramids, other hierarchies, and in-groups that dictate behaviors, leaving little or no room for free agents’ self-determination. Behavioral tensions describe the ongoing dynamic of the human organism’s oscillations between self-interested ego and other-oriented empathy. Cory explicates a spectrum of decision-making oscillations that constantly move between two reciprocal poles at all scales from intra-personal to all social interactions.

1. Self-interested, egoistic behavior, because it lacks empathy to some degree, creates tension within us and between ourselves and others. The tension increases from low to high activity levels. And it increases as we move toward the extremes of ego. Within ourselves, the tension created by the tug of neglected empathy is experienced as a feeling of obligation to others or an expectation that they might wish to “even the score” with us. Within others, the tension created by our self-interested behavior is experienced as a feeling of imposition or hurt, accompanied by an urge to “even the score.”
2. Empathetic behavior, because it denies ego or self-interest to some degree, also creates tension within ourselves and others. This tension, likewise, increases as activity levels increase and as we move toward extremes of empathy. Within ourselves, the tension created by the tug of the neglected self-interest (ego) is experienced as a feeling that “others owe us one” and a growing need to “collect our due.” This tension, especially if

it continues over time, may be experienced as resentment at being exploited, taken for granted, not appreciated, or victimized by others. Within others, the tension created is experienced as a sense of obligation toward us.

The reactions that build in ourselves and others, again, are in proportion to the behavioral tension created. And again, the unmanaged, or excessive tension is experienced as behavioral stress. (Cory, 2004, p. 25)

Through case examples from others' research, this paper puts social flesh on the concept of dual motives. All living systems have a complex of internal modes of regulation so they do not spin out of control; social systems and the individual human are no exception. In short, they are feedback systems. Behavioral tensions are human and social regulators. When tensions increase, they deliver information to organisms and systems that things are moving further from a more stable-feeling, comfortable equilibrium. When tensions decrease, there is a sense of more stability and safety. Behaviors of individuals, social groups, and societies both manage and indicate these tensions through giving and receiving feedback.

Individual and social systems are laced with feedback processes. The latticeworks of vertical and horizontal social organization described in this paper are complexly layered feedback systems. They have been studied under the names of patronage, brokerage, and clientelism. On the surface, they may appear to deliver only the goods, services, information, and influence that are discussed in examples below. Beneath the surface, there is a universal bioneurological basis *for* the behavioral activity: reciprocal interactions to manage behavioral tensions. Each interaction delivers and elicits feedback about current and expected stability. The feedback offers a stimulus; if received, there is a response. The perception of stimuli and the responses to them depend upon the hierarchical complexity of the individual or social system involved.

Model of Hierarchical Complexity

The model of hierarchical complexity, originating from work in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Commons, & Richards, 1984) stands as a universal, cross-cultural, cross-species theory (see Commons & Ross, 2008). Its application is independent of context and content. As a behavioral task measurement theory, it distinguishes between stimuli (task) and response (performance), and distinguishes discontinuous, scorable orders of complexity that apply across any domain of activity (for examples and more discussion, see Commons, Rodriguez, Miller, Ross, Locicero, Goodheart, & Danaher-Gilpin, 2007). While it defines 14 orders of complexity, ranging from simple machine language to innovations of geniuses such as Einstein, only four orders apply to the stages of individual and social behaviors evident in the spectrum presented here. Those orders are introduced briefly in Table 1.

Table 1. Orders of Hierarchical Complexity Evident in Political Economies

Order or stage	Order or stage name	General descriptions of tasks performed
8	Concrete	<p>Carry out full arithmetic, form cliques, plan deals. Do long division, follow certain social rules, limited ability to take and coordinate perspective of other and self. Use variables of simple interrelations; talks about concrete events, e.g., social events, what happened among others; makes reasonable deals. Task: There are behaviors that order the simple arithmetic behaviors when multiplying a sum by a number. Such distributive behaviors require the simple arithmetic behavior as a prerequisite, not just a precursor.</p> $5(1 + 3) = 5(1) + 5(3) = 5 + 15 = 20$ <p>Also: Short time horizon, avoids shame,</p>
9	Abstract	<p>Discriminate variables such as stereotypes; use logical quantification; form variables out of finite classes; make and quantify propositions; use variable time, place, act, actor, state, type; uses quantifiers (all, none, some); make categorical assertions (e.g., AWe all die.@); Form a class based on an abstract feature. Task: All the forms of five in the five rows in the example are equivalent in value, $x = 5$.</p> <p>Also: Seeks group membership, status, and is loyal to in-group and dogma; places high value on saving face.</p>
10	Formal	<p>Argue using empirical or logical evidence; logic is linear, one-dimensional; use Boolean logic=s connectives (not, and, or, if, if and only if); solve problems with one unknown using algebra, logic, and empiricism; form relationships out of variables; use terms such as if . . . then, thus, therefore, because; favor correct scientific solutions. Task: The general left hand distributive relation is $x * (y + z) = (x * y) + (x * z)$</p> <p>Also: seeks causes and solves problems based on one input (causal) variable; reflects dogmatism; accepts feedback only from objectively acknowledged masters; uses longer-term thinking to achieve results.</p>
11	Systematic	<p>Construct multivariate systems and matrices, coordinate more than one variable as input; situate events and ideas in a larger context, i.e., considers relationships in contexts (e.g., present and historical); form or conceive systems out of relations: legal, societal, corporate, economic, national. Task: The right hand distribution law is not true for numbers but is true for proportions and sets.</p> $x + (y * z) = (x * y) + (x * z)$ $x \cup (y \cap z) = (x \cup y) \cap (x \cup z)$ <p><i>Symbols:</i> \cup = union (total elements); \cap = intersection (overlap, elements in common)</p> <p>Also: Constructs higher level abstractions (e.g., “transparency,” “accountability,” “legitimation”); exhibits relativism while juxtaposing multiple relations; inclines toward infrequent judgment of others; starts to recognize self as system.</p>

Note: From “Applying the model of hierarchical complexity” (pp. 61-62), M. L. Commons, J. A. Rodriguez, P. M. Miller, S. N. Ross, A. Locicero, E. A. Goodheart, and D. Danaher-Gilpin, 2007, Cambridge, MA: Dare Association, Inc. Copyright 1991-2007 by Dare Association, Inc. Adapted with permission.

A Developmental Trajectory of Examples

To provide tangible contexts for how dual motives manifest in social processes and systems, the examples below illustrate their developmental progressions of increasing hierarchical complexity. The first sections illustrate how dual motives play out in simple societies scored at the concrete stage. The next sections illustrate more complex behaviors and social systems, first at the abstract stage and then at the formal stage. The progression indicates what people and groups do to adapt and meet changing basic needs. Hierarchical complexity accounts for the differences in how the dual motives of self-interested ego and other-oriented empathy can be seen to play out in these social systems.

Figure 1 serves as an orienting framework for the progression to increasing social complexity covered in the examples, portraying both horizontal and vertical systems of social ties. The vertical layers indicate that patrons, themselves, are clients of the next higher layer. Figure 1 emphasizes this analytical insight because it is crucial for understanding political economies: dual motives manifest in the same person or entity *differently* because dual social roles are played. The vertical layers indicate that an intermediary brokerage role develops between patrons and their clients. As the examples narrated below become more complex, they are accompanied by more discussion to explain and highlight key features. Indicated but not discussed is the effect of squeezing lower level networks out of the mainstream (but see Ross, 2006). A summary of the most relevant analytic features is provided after the progressive presentation of examples is completed.

Key to Figure 1.




Figure 1. Evolution of social complexity: Latticeworks of Dual Motive Relationships

Survival and Safety: Concrete Behavioral Tasks Exhibit Ego and Empathy

A small family or tribal group or village society characterized by simple, sequential reasoning illustrates the roots of ego-empathy power relations and human tendencies to socially organize around meeting the demands of dual motives. Lutz's (1988/1998) ethnography of the Micronesian Ifaluk indicates that Ifaluk claims of *justifiable anger* are the real indicator of power relations and the core moral code of that society. Lutz's case shows how concrete stage reasoning balances ego-empathy behavioral tensions.

In Ifaluk society, where dangers are daily concerns, the norm of calm, nurturing behavior helps ensure that people (a) do not frighten one another, which would add stress to their already stressful subsistence conditions, (b) live the norm of caring for each other, and (c) feel secure in relationship-attachments that otherwise feel at risk of loss (Lutz, 1988/1998). While Ifaluk portrayed care and nurture as "mature and altruistic," Lutz had another observation: that care of the needy (e.g., those without kin) "allows for and legitimates control over the needy person..... [if denied] the opportunity of caring for others, they are unable to control others, and in being unable to do so, they cannot command respect, which has both socioemotional and more tangible rewards" (p. 142).

The script that plays out in everyday Ifaluk life when justifiable anger is expressed (Lutz, 1988/1998) reflects ego and empathy oscillations of dual motives. An objectionable action is performed by person 1, evoking expression of justifiable anger by person 2; thus chastised, person 1 is expected to become "fearful/anxious" (p. 175) and the expected conformity with harmony is restored with each person's status, at that time, clarified in the process. Person 2 demanded respect in reaction to the behavior and person 1 accommodated. Lutz observes that such daily occurrences are "like a red flag, marking the form of, and fissures in, Ifaluk sociopolitical structures" (p. 174); in Cory's terms, these are the behavioral tensions of daily life. Lutz reports that in most cases, such interchanges reflect the social hierarchy by the downward direction of the flow of justifiable anger from one who is older or otherwise of higher status to one who has lower status. Thus, the social system's equilibrium is under constant maintenance, in effect by every member in the system as he or she performs a norm-dictated role.

More Concrete Transactions: A Precursor Form of Patron-Client Systems

Various kinds of small social systems display the roots of later, more explicit forms of patronage. Anthropologists identify different social structures in lineage descent and bilateral kinship groups in peasant villages. A model for the social structure of the dyadic contract in peasant villages shows a precursor form of patronage.

Foster's (1977) model proposes that in societies with structural features similar to peasant villages such as Tzintzuntzan, Mexico, where residents share the same socio-economic status, that "every adult" develops informal but real contractual relationships with contacts beyond the immediate family (p. 16). Sometimes called *compadrazgo*, referring to god-parent (*compadre*) relationships in Catholicized areas, the dyadic relations go beyond the godparent role and can include siblings, neighbors, and friends. There are two distinct forms these contracts take, both based on reciprocal relations, and we can image them together as forming a social latticework

with both horizontal and vertical dimensions: this latticework appears throughout the remaining analyses here. Foster's analysis focuses specifically on the first of the two dynamics; later sections of this paper discuss forms of the second dynamic via separate cases.

The symmetrical contracts Foster examines most closely are made between socio-economic equals, whether of the same village or another. The reciprocal exchanges of goods and services are complementary by virtue of being basically the same over time, and are "continually exchanged" as the "glue that holds his [sic] society together and the grease that smoothes its running" (pp. 17-18). For the adult, these exchanges link the institutions of family, *compadrazgo*, and neighbors and friends into a coherent social world, and to the observer, that social world is a crisscrossed network of many linkages and many individual nodes. Foster found that "no two people have the same combination of *compadres*" (p. 22), as is the nature of dyads (Lande, 1977). A key characteristic of these contracts is that they represent the solidity of the relationship, and while they are in effect, they never balance out to zero. In bookkeeping terms,

A functional requirement of the system is that an exactly even balance between two partners never be struck. This would jeopardize the whole relationship...the contract would cease to exist....The dyadic contract is effective precisely because partners are never quite sure of their relative positions at a given moment. As long as they know that goods and services are flowing both ways in roughly equal amounts over time, they know their relationship is solidly based. (Foster, 1977, p. 23)

The overall social stability of such peasant villages is due to the thoroughly embedded symmetrical dyads. Because such communities' inhabitants share the same socio-economic status, there are no factions, no divisive dynamics. Foster explains that villagers tend to be distrustful, suspicious, and back-stabbing toward their neighbors, and attempt to diminish any who gets ahead. The result is that they are "reluctant to join in cooperative enterprises of any kind" (p. 20), and they resisted all previous "outside attempts to stimulate cooperative action for community improve[ment]. People consistently are reluctant to work with others toward group goals" (p. 27). Thus, when a society is so thoroughly constructed as a network of dyadic relations, where no two people have the same *compadres*, nothing concrete arises for people to set themselves for or against that would otherwise result in factions. Such communities are striking examples, then, of humans constructing very stable, resistant-to-change social systems, where subsistence, security, and social nurturing needs appear to be adequately met within the system. The village bickering and backstabbing, conflictual dynamics offer the behavioral tension-releasing side of the reciprocity-power relations dyad. This form of managing dual motives appears adequate to meet individuals' needs at the concrete operational level. It results in mild degrees of interior and exterior tension.

Since the remainder of this paper focuses primarily on the asymmetric and vertical patron-client relations, it is important to underscore that this horizontal lattice of social networking comprised of dyadic relations is concurrent and also serves the vertical relations in various ways, some of which will be highlighted. The first way it serves them, of course, is by being a prototype for the vertical contracts, and secondly, they form a broad firm base of reliance on the higher social layer of patrons and brokers. Such horizontal relationships are means by which humans survive when societies sever or do not construct a social contract with their members.

This is the underbelly of developed societies, and in Figure 1 is represented by those systems that have slid out from under—or been squeezed out of—the main social structures, to the fringes of society.

Early Forms of Patron-Client Systems: Big-Men, Chiefdom, and Feudal Societies

Asymmetrical contracts are qualitatively different because the two parties have different socio-economic statuses and exchange non-complementary goods and services that are different in nature from one party to the other (Auyero, 2000; Foster, 1977). These represent the patron-client relationship. The flow of exchanges always takes place over time as an inherent feature of the social structure, but “it is difficult and sometimes impossible to strike an equivalence in time and monetary value” (Foster, p. 17). This discussion combines several societal forms that develop from different trajectories, times, and places, because they derive from the same levels of hierarchical complexity and illustrate common functions and relationships—including those evident in the highest reaches of today’s advanced societies.

As societies become more complex, the layers of explicit stratification grow. Where the Ifaluk had two distinct layers, the people and the chiefs, more complex societies generally evidence four: the immediate household, a cluster of patrilinear households, clan, and local geographic group (Johnson & Earle, 2000). Now the social layers and scales appear clearly, each having horizontal and vertical networks that could be imaged as a four-dimensional social latticework that expands and evolves over time. From this village level of organization spring the dynamics of competition for leadership and status, and needs for representation with outsiders and early forms of political economy (Johnson & Earle, 2000).

In kinship groups the whole organization of society is oriented to the corporate group and maintaining exchange networks to furnish basic needs (Johnson & Earle, 2000). As circumstances and needs dictate that exchanges must be sought with outsiders, chiefs of kinship groups become the first patrons to study. The social systems and their assumptions generated by humans operating at this concrete stage of development will demonstrate, below, the progression to domination/submission as tensions between reciprocity and self-interest move further out of balance between the poles in dual motive theory’s algorithms. Through this focus on big men, chiefs, and feudal lords emerge stark looks at the patron’s needs and function, the development of factions, an introduction to the context of brokerage, and the needs of clients. These elements construct a picture like an x-ray by which to gaze at the skeleton of contemporary social structures, including those that support corruption.

Patrons by definition must have resources to provide their clients—the group—and those resources introduce new social classes of haves and have-nots. Such a chief needs to create the institution of political power that kinship groupings lack, a radical transformation of the societal structure involving new leader-follower and in-group, out-group classes (Johnson & Earle, 2000; Sahlins, 1977; Wolf, 1982/1997). He can do this only by developing “new political instruments of domination” that guarantee him “independent power over resources,” and the redirection of some of the social labor under his control is the mechanism available (Wolf, p. 99). The exploitation inherent in this mode of production is starkly evident as the big-man stockpiles a “fund of power” (Malinowski, as quoted in Sahlins, 1977, p. 223) and creates and exploits

relations to “give him leverage on other’s production and the ability to siphon off an excess product—or sometimes he can cut down their consumption in the interest of the siphon” (Sahlins, 1977, p. 223). Stemming from inhabited environment and whether a society is pastoral, horticultural, or coastal, the resources and surpluses that big-man leadership controls may be primarily defensive or economic in nature (Johnson & Earle, 2000) but the extraction dynamics that develop are found in those big-man polities that are “well delineated” (Sahlins, 1977, p. 224).

It has been observed that followers’ compliance is a result of relationship-specific motivations in connection with the leader (Pospisil, as cited in Sahlins, 1977). Sahlins takes the systemic analysis deeper, citing an inevitable contradiction embedded in the relationship. The *initial* reciprocal relationship between the leader and each of his factional followers (discussed below) has the general asymmetrical structure of patronage. As it becomes complicated by the demands of keeping resources flowing and of increasing power and renown, the structure begins to feed on itself to keep the cycle intact. This classic pattern merits Sahlins’ own words.

Here it is important that not merely his own status, but the standing and perhaps military security of his people depend on the big-men’s achievements in public distribution. Established at the head of a sizeable faction, a center-man comes under increasing pressure to extract goods from his followers, to delay reciprocities owing them, and to deflect incoming goods back into external circulation [rather than to immediate followers]. Success in competition with other big-men particularly undermines internal-factional reciprocities: such success is precisely measurable by the ability to give outsiders more than they can possibly reciprocate.... Some center-men appear more able than others to dam the inevitable tide of discontent that mounts within their factions.... But paradoxically the ultimate defense of the center-man’s position is some slackening of his drive to enlarge the funds of power. The alternative is much worse [and is illustrated by his subsequent list of sometimes gruesome consequences captured in the anthropological record]. (pp. 223-224)

In a similar way, feudal systems developed when kin group ties “proved inadequate” and were unequal rather than hierarchical structures, with “rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men” (Bloch, 1961, p. 443). Bloch traces how feudalism in Europe—which existed elsewhere, e.g., Japan—was the result of the “violent dissolution of older societies” (p. 443). The record suggests people in feudal times demonstrate the same concrete reasoning structures as other early social systems, which may be an integral, contributing factor in the violent dissolutions. Violent concrete stage behaviors are also observable in contemporary times, whether in Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, or in inner cities.

The tensions for the big-man, chief, and feudal lord systems arise from the conditions that gave rise to the structures themselves. As such leaders create and maintain a following, or faction, and engage their dealings with the environment outside that circle, they situate themselves in the tiny neck of an hourglass, with time and supplies always running out before the pole’s demands must be filled, often from the same source it just supplied. Sahlins (1977) likens this inherent pressure on such a “center-man” to “a kind of two-sidedness in authority...a division of the big-man’s field of influence into two distinct sectors” (p. 222). The smaller sector

is the internal one comprised of personal followers, which Sahlins reports can number up to 80 in, for example, Melanesia. This is about the maximum size for concrete stage leadership to manage (M. Commons, 2005, personal communication). Big-man collectivities can range in size from 20 to 800, and chiefdoms communities from 200 to 500 (Johnson & Earle, 2000). The latticeworks of social pyramids enable larger populations to be coordinated.

From the realm of internal power over followers there is a “qualitative change” as the big-man turns outward to the larger “tribal galaxy” where not power but “only fame and indirect influence” (p. 222) are his tools to compete against other such leaders. The evolutionary dynamic of leaders rising to powerful positions in control of resources includes public vertical relationships beyond those found in family groupings. Big-men factions in large communities faced a pragmatic demand of dual motives to serve the sorts of functions discussed next.

The Appearance of the Brokerage Function

Warfare, leaders’ extravagance, the exercise of powerful control, and new modes of production characterize these societies, but should not be a distraction from another important social structure that evolved as an integral part of those activities: brokerage rooted in the early factions that were the first public, vertical relationships. In both chiefdoms and feudal societies arise the early forms of brokerage, in the warrior elite (Johnson & Earle, 2000) of the former, and in the lords’ knights, vassals, and tenants (Bloch, 1961) of the latter. Regardless of setting, the function of brokerage is to extend the reciprocal reach, influence, control, and power of the patron. The personal contact required at the developmental stage of concrete operations appears consistently throughout these different societal contexts and evolves naturally from factions to brokerage.

The roots of this function originate in the core need met in dyadic relationships: the concrete, face-to-face contact with the other party to the agreement. This connective function is essential since, outside of periodic public performances, the leader cannot be everywhere at once and needs surrogate functions performed by his followers. The chain of vertical relationships can take the form of a pyramid, where each follower develops a layer of followers beneath him that extends his reach in passing resources up and down the social and economic ladder (e.g., Schmidt, 1977). At each layer, the face-to-face contact serves as the social glue. Brokers have a clientage relationship with their patron, and a patronage relationship with their clients, forming the basic building block of the pyramid structure in Figure 2: “Thus the patron-broker-client network pyramid is created by the stacking up and combining of many dyadic patron-client networks” (Schmidt, 1977, p. 306). Depending on population size and its needs, and the locus and distance of resources to meet those needs, the pyramid rises into higher social levels comprised of the same patron-broker-client building block.

Formal Government Program, Abstract Leadership, and Concrete Followership

Once brokerage’s systemic function became more widely studied through accruing case studies of more complex societies, the term *clientelism* developed as a general way to refer to the social structure of patron-broker-client (Scott, 1977). When this structure operates in the context

of political parties—as it seems to always do, although also in other contexts—it is called *political clientelism*. Auyero (2000) adopts the term “*personalized political mediation*” (p. 26, emphasis in the original) to highlight the functions of “problem-solving networks” among the poor, “the *microphysics of politics*” (p. 24, emphasis added). As this case indicates, that microphysics is thoroughly economic as well.

The barest essential features of this microphysics are: (1) the thorough embeddedness of clientelism in socio-political life; (2) how clientelism derives from concrete and abstract stage behaviors and affects individual and collective development; and, (3) how the norm of reciprocity manifests in the economic relations and transactions. These are organic system dynamics that illuminate ego-empathy behavioral tensions. The presentation of an Argentine shantytown case takes the form of a summary of the clientelist practices and graphic images of the complex networks of actors’ dual motives therein.

Before illustrating the clientelist structure Auyero describes, the narrative in this section sketches primary features of his network findings, with occasional bracketed supplements of my own.

1. Around each person in a leadership role there is an inner circle or faction characterized by intense, frequent personal relationships. Depending on the leader, family members may be active participants in the faction. Ties between the leader and members of the inner circle are thus fictive kinship if not blood kinship in nature. The leader of a faction has a dyadic patronage relationship with the clients—“personal satellites” (Sahlins, 1977, as quoted in Auyero, p. 91) —who are in this inner circle (and familial relationships may co-exist with it). The degree and nature of personal contact correlates with the leader’s influence. People performing top-of-the-pyramid functions have a circle of closer contacts than those performing mid- or bottom-of-the-pyramid functions with less intense but nonetheless face-to-face dyadic contacts. This core feature results in vertical networks of relationships. Members of a leader’s inner circle do not compete with each other unless their self-interests are at stake in a particular situation. Note that leaders of different factions on each socio-political scale of influence comprise an elite at each scale. This results in horizontal elite networks.
2. Each person in the inner circle depends in some way upon the leader’s patronage and serves the leader’s needs in degrees that depend on the leader’s span of influence and the nature of activities chosen to promote it. In order to serve the leader’s needs and (conscious or unconscious) self-interests that can be served by doing so, each factional member develops and maintains a factional inner circle of his/her own. Note that this results in an elite at a lower social scale, another horizontal network.
3. Means of being accessible to and attracting more clients are essential, and take various forms, because they serve as the infrastructure of the clientelist pyramid that conducts the flows of resources and services. Local base units (*Unidad Basica*, or UB, in Villa Paraiso; precinct or ward in the U.S.) provide physical location for face-to-face client contact, just as do regular visiting hours or soup kitchens conducted in a broker’s home.

The opening of new physical locations is a means of creating or expanding territory to increase a base of political power.

4. To gain and remain in a brokerage position, the two central functions of “gatekeeping and information hoarding” (p. 96) are essential. Since the flow of goods and services down to clients correlates directly with the volume of services received from clients, strategies include both obstructing and facilitating flows to certain constituencies. Public service and other information is funneled through elites to pass down to their followings; the more vital the information that is hoarded (e.g., dates for periodic distributions of specific food rations), the more dependency that is created.
5. Horizontal family and neighborhood networks reciprocate in serving poor persons’ survival needs. Members of these informal networks may be clients of different brokers (defined above as a patron from the client perspective). Additional horizontal networks develop and overlap among people at various social scales as high-level patrons’ diverse activities are furthered by numerous members of inner circles at the different social scales. These overlapping relationships at scales from bottom to top comprise multiple sets of dual motives’ problem-solving network, the structure of political clientelism.
6. There are gangs outside of the network that people in the networked system look down upon and are fearful of.

The clientelist system of problem solving is comprised of these core features, at minimum. Fractal-like, factional circles form around elites at each social scale, resulting in multiple pyramids of localized influence. Each node in the network strengthens both horizontal and vertical ties, which satisfy as many subjectively defined core needs as humans have been able to devise to do so. The following two graphic illustrations together portray the overlapping vertical and horizontal networks evident in this case. Figure 2 presents the pyramidal structure of the Para Vida program (which seems representative of state-level social welfare programs in general), and Figure 3 shows the functions for handing resources up and down the pyramidal structure in a depiction of the shantytown’s network of vertical relationships. These are comprised of roles for individuals and organized entities such as brokers’ community centers, indicated as “UBs.”

Key to Figures 2 and 3: The dual-colored circle is used to represent dual roles as patron and client within a larger system. The circle may stand for an individual, group, or organized entity that has dual roles. The green half is positioned in the figures to indicate the receiving role of a client in the network system. The orange half is positioned to indicate the delivering role of a patron in the network system.






Figure 2. A Partial Representation of the pyramidal structure of the Para Vida food




Figure 3. Villa Paraisio's Peronist Problem-Solving

Political Clientelism: Developmental Shape-Shifting

As living systems, humans' social system dynamics adapt organically to changes in the environment, while retaining earlier capabilities that may be important insurance if the environment reverts to previous conditions. When conditions make it feasible, it is more efficient, productive, and satisfying to adopt new ways of relating and conducting transactions that replace earlier modes. Komito (1985) investigated how Dublin residents manage to acquire needed resources, especially those available from state agencies, and "traced the exchanges between voter, politician, and bureaucrat that revolve around public needs" (p. vi). He found that information needs outweigh material needs, while also identifying where the state has failed the social contract to assure the poor's basic needs are met. He found that

Irish clientelism is no less significant for this lack of material exchange. Clientelism provides voters with a personal and moral link with the state and so maintains support for the existing political and administrative structure. It compensates for the relative impersonalism of universalistic values by infusing exchanges with personalistic qualities of trust and solidarity. Finally, this study shows the importance of information as a brokerage resource. The structures and procedures of the state bureaucracy prevent the public from having access to information about state benefits. This closed bureaucratic system makes information a valuable resource for politicians. (p. 163)

From the top to the bottom, "an Irish political party is a pyramid of patron-client links" (p. 62). The needs of the politicians at the apex of a party pyramid are concerned with recruiting and maintaining "allies" (p. 61) and clients to buffer threats from party conflict and competition at that level. Their patronage activity includes control of positions into which a lower level politician can be placed as a client that helps the senior member in various ways depending on the position (e.g., votes, interpersonal conflicts). The client's benefit is the acceleration in the climb through the party ranks. Each of the levels running from local up to national have characteristics of big-man societies in the cut-throat competition within each horizontal plane. At the local level the "zero-sum game" (p. 56) is characterized by such conflict.

The conflict within the local party arena goes on all the time and is the reason why politicians are always attending party branch meetings; they want to keep things under control. The basic question of constituency politics is "whose man are you?" and it is impossible not to be somebody's man. There is no way to avoid local factional conflicts; one must be aligned to someone. Local branch politics do not permit a person to be neutral; if he tried to be, he would simply be trusted by no one. (p. 58)

Brokering With the Public. Expectations of brokerage services are linked with socio-economic class *origin* rather than current status. He found "socialization has a lasting influence on *beliefs* regarding politicians' roles as brokers, which is not altered by subsequent changes in socio-economic circumstances... [to the contrary] current class status, rather than class origin, determines brokerage *strategies*" (p. 82, emphasis added). The personal contact that characterizes the local politician's dyadic relation with a citizen results in a patron-client relation at the dyadic level with a brokerage function at the systemic level. The politician's big-man party behavior transforms into that of a kindly, attentive, and patronly figure when nurturing relations with potential voters. In Dublin, the transaction *content* is that of information and services from

the patron role, rather than provisions of sustenance needs and other material goods, or personally hiring a client to obtain services from him/her. Further, the information and services are public in nature. Komito observes that “Irish politics appears dominated by the ‘privatization’ of public goods: politicians provide (or appear to provide) government services to voters who, in exchange, become their clients” (p. 103).

However, politicians assume that many clients shop around for the best bargain available among nearby politicians, and further, they have no way of knowing if a client actually casts a vote for them. Their attempts to cultivate connections with individuals are designed to “create the aura of a special personal relationship [that will] engender a sense of moral obligation on the part of the voter, who will reciprocate at election day” (p. 102).

The Role of Bureaucracy. Since there is no guarantee of payoff from helping clients, politicians use their knowledge of the system and social programs to write to or contact appropriate officials, often impressing clients with their ability to get results: “They exaggerate their influence over state services in order to make a greater moral claim on voters’ support. [They] encourage voters’ dependency, and make little attempt to disabuse them of their beliefs in the efficacy of brokerage” (Komito, 1985, p. 112). Those beliefs play a role in the endurance of brokerage. In behavior analysis, the delivery of reinforcement independent of behavior produces extremely strong responding. The fact of the non-contingent nature makes the behavior quite independent of the consequences; this fosters superstition (M. Commons, personal communication, June 2005).

A multi-leveled look at the Irish bureaucracy’s entrenchment as a barrier of “distrust and anonymity” (p. 147) between its servants and the public indicates that the “administrative system operates to restrict information to a very few people” and results in giving politicians “control over these resources of access, information, and influence” (p. 114), thus, “instead of reciprocal rights and duties, the welfare scheme becomes authoritarian; the official makes any decision he wants and the applicant is dependent on his magnanimity” (p. 115).

The Abstract/Formal Mixture of Dublin Clientelism. The Dublin study describes a stable social system operating at a level above that of traditional clientelist forms that meet daily subsistence needs. It provides an important look at the interacting dimensions of culture, structure, and individual needs and capacities that make Dublin clientelism, at the time of the study, a durable, closed system. Clientelist behaviors are integral to the lives of a significant portion of the population. At the core of the system are its institutionalized structural supports. At this abstract/formal stage mixture of social development, the presence of an impersonal, inefficiently layered bureaucratic structure both makes possible the social contract constituents need and also blocks not only access to its benefits but also their continuing need for concrete, dyadic personal contacts as they navigate their lives. The hierarchically rigid, procedural-bound civil service is the perfect environment for the conventional, abstract reasoning of the career bureaucrats trained into the system. In their isolation, the only needs that are concrete to them are their own and that of preserving the status quo.

In this system, politicians “are forced” (p. 106) to create as many personal links as possible to get votes to beat intra-party competition. Politicians’ efforts to build wide horizontal networks through their close followers and community clients are required by the pyramidal patronage

form and function of the party that forces them into the community and its needed brokerage roles to survive as politicians. The civil service and party structures are both products and agents of the cultures that shape them and the different actors' needs within and without.

Komito mentions only tangentially a crucial dimension in socio-economic behavior analysis: those citizens whose status or capacities result in low levels of contact with government services. When they need services, they rely more upon their contacts with family, friends, neighbors who are officials, and occasionally politicians, because the system does not "work" for them, either. Political clientelism operates at a social level beyond the very poor's daily subsistence needs.

To some extent, clientelism is a formalized preference for dealing with friends. Personal contacts are formalized throughout Irish society.... There is, in Ireland, a "tendency to operate through personal contacts rather than through organizational procedures" (Pyne, 1974: 34) but the resource of "personal contacts" is unevenly distributed throughout the population. It is the unequal distribution of such contacts, due to economic and social differences, that is relevant. (p. 161)

Developmental Spectrum of Patronage and Clientelism in the U.S. System

U.S. cases provide a look at patronage and clientelism in political parties and Congress. These dynamics constitute the overall system. Periodic uproars over such unveilings as the Abramoff scandal and more recently, the U.S. Justice Department's firing of prosecutors suggest only the tips of ongoing patronage systems few seem to assume endure. Freedman (1994) acknowledges that, in the U.S., patronage is considered by many to be a largely bygone institution that no longer plays a meaningful role in U.S. politics. Her own and others' suspicions are that

patronage is still a feature of the American political landscape. Unfortunately, with few exceptions, those who are in the know don't want to talk. Patronage has gone underground. No one wants to admit to a practice that bears the taint of corrupt machine politics. And, now that many forms of patronage have become illegal as a result of a series of laws and Supreme Court decisions, openly discussing patronage has become even more foolhardy. Probably because of the obstacles involved, the [U.S.] literature on patronage is quite sparse. (p. vii)

Whether or not patronage is viewed as tainted is a matter of perspective in the US and elsewhere. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court's majority ruled in the Rutan case that patronage, in the form of politically based hiring, was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent that patronage is a "venerable and accepted tradition" and "bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic" (Scalia, 1990, as quoted in Freedman, 1994, p. 8). The Rutan case and Freedman's usage of the term confine patronage to the rewarding of supporters with appointments to government jobs for partisan reasons. Indicative quotes below indicate the role of dual motives in the practice U.S. patronage.

"You can't keep an organization together without patronage. Men ain't in politics for nothin'. They want to get somethin' out of it." (Plunkitt, Tammany Hall leader, in Riordon, 1963, as quoted in Freedman, p. 15)

“You’ve got to have people in government who are politically smart. ... This means they have to understand that part of politics is the art of obligation.” (Lindsay, late-60s New York mayor, in Tolchin & Tolchin, 1972, as quoted in Freedman, p. 25)

“If we can’t have fun by getting our side in, we shouldn’t be a party to begin with I don’t need the hassle of politics if I can’t get my friends and children jobs.” (Indiana politico, in 1990 *Indianapolis Star*, as quoted by Freedman, p. 82)

Clientelist structures enable dual motives to develop new forms of exchange for meeting new needs. As the environment allows some individuals’ basic in-group identity and rule-bound (and thereby security) needs to be met sufficiently, ego needs for self-determination emerge as a natural course of development, and their reasoning gradually develops the strategic capacities that reflect a formal, linear logic stage of hierarchical complexity. The time horizons incorporated into strategies become longer than could be considered earlier, and transactions can be conceived of as exchanges with a less concrete nature than jobs, although jobs continue to be a currency of exchange. While “individualist” is a label frequently applied to behaviors at this stage of hierarchical complexity, it emphasizes the ego-pole, masking the deeper needs still operating beneath the surface toward the empathy-pole. The empathy side is evidenced in behaviors that are still highly conventional, with the individuals attached to their identity with in-groups that may now be chosen for strategic purposes. The vertical patron-broker-client pyramid is a comfortably familiar structure where they know the ropes and the rules of the game and can enact their hero’s journey” up the organizational ladders and across the horizontal networks of the political and business playing fields. At this stage, there is no desire to change the structure; rather, due to its familiarity, it can be “worked” to advantage. At this stage, there is savvy aplenty to launder the transactions by whichever currency of exchange will seal the deal.

In all too frequent error, the individualistic side of the human coin at this stage is mistaken *as* the coin. This may be the chief reason that the scale of systemic patronage and clientelism in the higher reaches of U.S. and other Western institutions go mostly unrecognized for what they really are. And too often, the *corruption* label artificially detaches acts and their actors from the systemic cord that traverses an entire network of exchanges, like the Peronist problem-solving network represented in Figures 2 and 3 that suggest the hierarchical skeleton of social structures that are innate at several levels of human development.

Based on humans’ evolutionary trajectory to date, it is evident that they have a “predisposition for hierarchically structured social and political systems” (Somit & Peterson, 1997, as cited in Cory, 2004, p. 26). Most social structures are the linear ones inherent in hierarchical organization. This tendency can be accounted for in a number of ways; for simplicity here, I select three related factors. The socio-cultural evolutionary path traced in this paper demonstrates that humans build on and modify their social systems in the course of adapting to changes in the environment, retaining successful ways of relating and creating new ones. Thus, ancient patterns are carried forward as long as they continue to work the way the user needs them to work. From the developmental perspective, the imaginative and logical capacity available to create new ways of relating is limited (and conversely, expanded) by the structures of reasoning people have managed to develop in their socio-cultural context. Finally, the bioneurological dimension plays a dynamic role in how humans interact within the social systems they create.

An integration of these three dimensions can explicate the polarity of ego and empathy in the widespread strategic-individualistic stage of hierarchical complexity, the formal logic of rational choice agents. The idea of the rational choice agent appears not only in political science but also in economics. Cory's critique of prevailing economic theory is at the same time a critique of this prevailing idea, because economic assumptions have been based on it. He explicates the "logical fallacy" (p. 80) and its shortfalls, essential in understanding political economies of corruption.

The confounding of *self-reference* with *self-interest* is, in fact, a fundamental fallacy of the entire traditional economic approach. The fallacy allows the subsuming of all motives under the rubric of self-interest and obscures the roughly equal role of empathy. Taking the individual as the starting point, microeconomic theory [and often, political theory] mistakenly *transforms* this individual or self-referential *perspective* into an all-inclusive *motive* of self-interest. From this logically unwarranted transformation any other motive is, thus, obscured or swallowed up in self-interest. Therefore empathy—and its derivatives of cooperation and altruism, even love—cannot be considered true motives. They must, therefore, be trivialized as tastes or preferences indistinguishable in significance from such banalities as coffee, tea, or milk. But as we saw . . . under the sweeping searchlight of the social brain dynamic, the hidden duality of ego and empathy is revealed in every demand curve [domination] and supply curve [submission], especially when both are combined to show price [social-political] equilibrium. The dual roles are always present implicitly if not explicitly. The supplier performs the empathetic role; the demander performs the egoistic role. (p. 80)

One pitfall of such assumptions is misapprehending the real nature of human transactions. However, it is possible to develop a more realistic understanding of agents' behaviors. For example, the transaction between a client and broker can look like power/ego in the broker prevailing over powerless-need/empathy in the client. The lens can simultaneously view the supply/empathy in the broker and the demand/ego in the client. Herein may lie the secret of the social system's stability, stable as long as it "feeds the balance" of each transaction-party's poles in sufficient degrees to keep them in the system. And they are locked in the system, from their perspective, when no alternative exists.

A hierarchical structure affords a comfortable operating environment for many individualistic persons because it supplies the demands of both ego and empathy poles in an extremely stable fashion. Especially initially, the goals and challenges such persons set for themselves in work and social environments tend to stretch the ego's confidence as it launches out on its own. There is ballast, though, in the in-group(s) of chosen association, like a safe harbor to return to, and this anchoring in a preferred group is characteristic of these individuals. As confidence and experience grow, such people are often viewed as being in their prime, taking leadership roles of various kinds, strategizing and making deals that make things happen in the orbit they have constructed for themselves within the larger system, whatever it is.

In relating with a patron, the individualistic client both supplies the patron with service of some kind (empathy) and demands from the patron an exchange of some kind (ego). The reverse is true for the patron. Later, when that client operates in a patron (or boss) role toward his or her own client(s) (or subordinates), the donned ego role of patron can directly balance the donned empathy role of client the person plays with his or her own patron. The system acts as an

external and internal stabilizer as humans meet their diverse needs. The human actors' interactions are the homeostatic regulator in the social system. Finally, the needs of the strongly individualistic person are "weighted" on the ego side of the spectrum *because* the developmental challenge at that stage *is* to strengthen the ego beyond its conventional operations. Yet, as Cory asserts, there are inherent balancing dynamics with empathy, and the foregoing suggest the diverse ways that an individualistic person can perform within a hierarchical system, such as the U.S. Congress, to which this discussion now turns.

The Tribes on the Hill

Weatherford (1985) initially expected that this anthropological study would enable him to do comparative analyses between Congress and such legislatures as Germany's Bundestag, Iceland's Althing, or the then-USSR's Supreme Soviet. He found that modern parliaments had little comparative basis with Congress. Instead, he realized the daily congressional activity was "better explained by the practices" of tribes in Venezuela, the Amazon Basin, or New Guinea, and he "saw more parallels, contrasts, and analogies with the ancient Aztecs, the Byzantines, or the Pygmies" than with those other parliaments he'd hoped to compare (p. xiii). The Congress does not fit a feudal model because the power pyramid is not fixed and stable, but shifts with the results of elections, parties and leaders in power at different times. The veneer of democracy lends itself to masking the institutionalization of nondemocratic practices in the halls of power. Further, climbing the ladder of success and power in Congress is not based on a bureaucratic seniority sequence, but "depends more on the individual initiative, skill, and plain luck of the politician." ... "Yet the hallowed principle of seniority still plays a significant, if not determining, part in the process" (p. 26).

Once a member of Congress has succeeded in the clan-building process, the parent clan sends its offspring into the spaghetti-weave, through the institutions beyond Congress to solidify the political base. Such subclans "enhance the daily operational power of the parent clan on the Hill, but at the same time they offer a long-term insurance against sudden death and destruction to the parent clan in times of political plague" (p. 86). The array of subclans belonging to parents under the roof of Congress "form the network base around which government operates ... [by] crosscutting the formal organization of government departments, political parties, and lobbies" (p. 86). Infiltrating the bureaucracy is a prime objective, and patronage networks facilitate getting subclan staff hired, who gain tenure and power in those civil service roles.

The bureaucracy's pyramids shift in power in ways similar to that of Congress, since congressional big-men reorganize departments when they take over from the previous party or big-man. Also responsible for reorganization are presidential appointees: the President has a total "patronage universe" of about 6,000 positions (Patterson, 1988, as quoted in Freedman, 1994, p. 21). Weatherford's study of the federal bureaucracy led him to the conclusion that the redundancy of bureaucratic operations is attributable to the congressional big-men's fetishes to be patrons of all possibly desired services for their constituencies.

Even though Congress as a whole and congressmen as a group may exercise very little day-to-day power over the operation of the bureaucracy, individual congressmen do exercise that power through their private bureaucracies, their clans. Each Big Man runs his own separate part of the government as a sovereign, independent chief, but because Big

Men do not interfere with the clan operations of other Big Men, and because the junior Congress members lack the power to interfere, the Congress as a whole has little means at its disposal to oversee the government. (p. 102)

Nor do congressional big-men want to incur debt to other big-men; the ego pole resists shifting too perilously close to that of a client. Weatherford studied how lobbyists come into use as brokers between big-men and their staffers, and the roles they play as “political surrogates” (p. 122) while big-men remain above the dirty fray. Lobbyists are, therefore, also clients of big-men, particularly when as ex-staffers they become lobbyists, only one of the mechanisms of clientelist politics in the U.S. Congress.

Apexes of Pyramidal Social Structures

From tracing dual motives to and beyond the national Congress level, the next step is to extend the horizon to higher-level institutions, formal and informal. From Mills’ (1956) exposition to current events, it is evident that the horizon encompasses and integrates social, political, economic, and military domains, with dual motives’ often incestuous relations among their elites via personal and institutional transactions. One cannot study any country’s internal and external behaviors without encountering the myriad social systems that reflect dual motives at every scale. Parastatals, national governments, transnational corporations, and international institutions weave the same patterns across the international arena. Public-private partnerships rooted in meeting their parties’ dual motives play out in such debacles as the United Nations Oil for Food program, U.S.-Halliburton et al.-Iraq (non)reconstruction, and the disappearance of billions of international development aid monies to governments worldwide. The social, political, and economic power wielded at these scales generally reflects strategic behaviors based on linear, formal logics of the tenth stage of hierarchical complexity.

As indicated in Table 1, formal logics develop from processing one input variable at a time, and arrive at well-justified conclusions based on the logic employed. The limitation of this order of complexity is that agents are unaware that there are multiple input variables to coordinate in any social, political, or economic transaction or decision. Generically, it can be said that the multiple other input variables are invisible at the formal stage, although they are omnipresent conditions in every social system in which transactions take place. As Guastello (2007) suggests, sensitivity to initial conditions influences decision paths and decision-making’s results. Behaviors at the tenth order of hierarchical complexity are inherently less sensitive to initial conditions because it requires the next order of complexity, systematic stage reasoning, to develop matrices of relations.

Formal logic, as a structure of reasoning in an individual and as a characteristic of an organized system, reflects a sturdy equilibrium that is difficult to affect or change. The logics, though partial, are experienced as solid, hard-to-refute truths (in individuals) and “best practices” (in organized structures). Thus, there is an institutionalized equilibrium that represents a fundamental challenge for addressing such economic behaviors as corruption. Mills (1956) was convinced that “for every epoch and for every social structure, we must work out an answer to the question of the power of the elite” (p. 23). And to do that, we need to include the entire pyramidal structure on which they depend. From the elite top to the subsistence bottom, sturdy

latticeworks of behavioral tensions ensure durable social systems that meet multileveled needs of many actors while ignoring the needs of many others.

Features in Political Economies of Corruption

A complete developmental analysis of political economies of corruption needs to include the intersection of individuals and groups with their institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements include the stages of development evident in forms of government and other governance entities, political parties, ethnic relations, the formal and informal economies, rural-urban interfaces, historical trajectory, status of education, natural and other resources, influences of international players, e.g., structural adjustment policies—in other words, the meta-system comprised of numerous subsystems. With their emphasis on introducing a developmental application of dual motive theory, the foregoing examples omit discussion of many elements that would be necessary for a complete analysis. The following summary includes key features abstracted from the presented developmental progression of political economies at various stages of hierarchical complexity. It includes additional categories of hierarchical complexity (HC) of form of government and balance between formal/informal economy to flesh out features the examples could not develop (but see Ross & Commons, 2008; Ross, 2005, 2007).

Concrete Stage

Behaviors of social groupings dominated by subsistence concerns tend to be at the concrete stage. Concerns have short time horizons, accordingly. Reciprocal exchanges are concrete goods and services, and their timelines for performance may be immediate or considerably longer to keep the relationship active for future transactions. Leaders are either personally known or known of, and followership is based on patronage ties. Even where formal government has been introduced, its purpose or function is vague. In such cases, specific officials (e.g., a president or minister) essentially “are” the government. Roles are not distinguishable from the individuals who have roles. “Democracy” may mean getting a job, rather than have anything to do with government or elections. If election processes are introduced, the abstract concept of political party is meaningless; voters favor their tribal or ethnic group’s endorsee, their patrons, or their patrons’ patrons. Manual labor in the informal market is customary (agriculture, sewing/weaving, crafts and repairs, machine operation, drugs, arms, and slave trades). Poverty is common in subsistence-based social groupings, as are low levels of education. There are no concepts of formal contracts or title to goods; physical possession equals ownership. Social ties often dictate customers and vertical ties to brokers or patrons are common means to secure a place in the local market. As social complexity increases, people who perform at the concrete-stage tend to remain on the lowest levels (see Figure 1).

Abstract Stage

Leadership roles in concrete-stage social groupings tend to be held by those who can function at the abstract stage, usually due to having some education or native ability. Brokerage functions can be performed at the abstract stage, as can basic clerical tasks. Loyalties to leaders, parties, ethnic groups, and belief systems are strong. It is the norm to identify with and not question the group. There is an ability to manage multiple reciprocal relationships (i.e., a patron and multiple

clients; associate with peer elites (a distinct group) even if they are from competing groups). Low level jobs in the formal economy or civil service are common at the abstract stage; labor unions and associations form at this stage. With structure and procedures provided, abstract stage includes loyal bureaucrats and teachers. Reciprocal exchanges are for concrete goods and services, with either immediate or deferred payoffs. In non-Western settings, abstract stage individuals are likely to associate with concrete-stage persons, often their clients, but abstract stage *groups* are more likely to become an elite class, distanced from concrete-stage groups. Simple abstract concepts become accessible at this stage. For example, the concept of *role* is learned, such that people understand different individuals may fill and later leave the same role (e.g., boss, local priest, teacher, president). Abstract concepts cannot be compared or coordinated, however. Individual rules can be conceived of to accomplish a desired end, but the method to implement the rule cannot be conceived (although punishments for breaking rules come easily). A rule can be explained and followed. But any contradiction with a different rule or norm is not noticed. For example, a bureaucrat may be as faithful to the norm of charging bribes because that is the way things get done everywhere, as to the rule to be honest and give constituents fair and equal service. The legal purposes of government and elections are vague; simple concepts at this stage are “like” concrete things, unsupported assertions characterize speech, and there is no self-reflection.

Formal Stage

Characteristics of formal stage behaviors are apparent in individuals who are competent entrepreneurs and managers; they are more likely to be the population who enter the formal economy in non-Western settings. In Western settings, formal stage behaviors characterize a large majority, but they are minority behaviors in non-Western settings. Western structures of government or business derive from formal logic’s reasoning. When they are imported to non-Western countries, there are few formal stage persons to understand how procedures are supposed to work or their underlying logic (e.g., separation of legal powers or separation of administrative duties). The new forms of government or business procedure provide new facades to which conventional behaviors of patronage and clientelism adapt and persist, usually more effectively because access to new resources is available. For example, the formal concept of employees on payroll is used to pass to clients, often as “ghost employees” who do not work for the government or business employer (e.g., see Figure 3). Bureaucracies grow huge when formal institutions and their resources are used “like” the tools of patrons and brokers in servicing clients’ needs. Formal logics successfully develop formal roles and responsibilities. It can distinguish between a role in an employment setting, such as financial manager, and roles in non-employment settings (e.g., union member, family member). Because in-group ties are strong, it is often less successful distinguishing employment role from political party role. This is particularly true in the widespread practice of patronistic political appointments, where party loyalty can trump formal role responsibility. Formal stage logic successfully develops rules and methods to enforce them. People who use formal logic are very good at using rules to find or create loopholes that help them implement their strategies. Formal logic’s focus on one linear sequence at a time means that it is not successful at foreseeing unintended consequences that are not already evident to it. For example, it is clever at “cooking the books” to hide bribes or the true nature of investments. It can manipulate a developing counties’ lack of procedures for checks and balances to funnel cash to brokerage clients, loyal party supporters, and militants to

buy services. But it is unable to imagine the perspectives of people who are not in the in-group or foresee the repercussions of actions taken on a wider band of society or the environment—or know why it should care. The tendency to favor the ego-pole in managing behavioral tensions leads to formal stage behaviors that do not coordinate ethics concerns in every self-serving equation. This contributes to double-standard behaviors or rationalizations that judge others for wrong behaviors even when the judge has done likewise. However, formal logic is the origin of concepts of rights, duties, corruption, equal protection, checks and balances, and other foundations that structure modern societies. Formal education through decent secondary schooling is usually the minimum requirement for development of formal stage reasoning.

Systematic Stage

The ability to coordinate multiple disparate relations among factors at this order of hierarchical complexity led to the development of higher level abstract concepts such as transparency, accountability, social justice, and sustainability. While such concepts have entered some mainstream vocabularies, these concepts do not mean the same thing to abstract and formal stage reasoning as they mean at the systematic stage. Systematic reasoning is more likely to develop during graduate school education, if then. It is not wide spread in any society. With respect to corruption, systematic reasoning can consider a combination of such factors as the rule of law, fear of exposure, preservation of image, methods of reporting, and market pressure, for example, to conceive a system of transparency to reduce corrupt practices. Systematic reasoning can also conceive of a system to skirt efforts to enforce transparency. What it cannot do is consider multiple social, economic, and political systems, such as those described in this paper. It can neither succeed in entirely escaping transparency measures nor eliminate efforts to sabotage efforts to institutionalize transparent practices and reduce corruption.

These orders of hierarchical complexity have been summarized separately to distinguish them. However, complex social systems are comprised of individuals operating at several of these stages. Similarly—and a major point in this paper—the social systems themselves reflect concurrent operations of several different orders of complexity. There are no clean-cut divisions but rather many overlapping systems and relationships among different people and entities.

Implications and Conclusion

A major implication for understanding the political economies of corruption is that not only are there multiple kinds of political economies but also that they are interdependent and mutually supportive. Figures 2 and 3 are fair representations of the most prevalent social network structures operating around the world, for the most part needing adjustments only for the names of roles and entities and to show the multiple additional such structures operating simultaneously. *Corrupt* practices, by definition, emerge in a society only when a rule of law has been adopted that identifies them as law-breaking. Passage of a law does not change the hierarchy of needs experienced by a society's members. Passage of a law does not dismantle the time-tested social systems for meeting those needs. Patron, broker, and client roles are embedded in social systems at each of the orders of hierarchical complexity described above because they serve essential roles in meeting needs along the entire spectrum of ego-empathy motives. As societies develop, patron and broker roles are performed by corporate employers and

governments for some of the population, and by individuals and groups for others in the population. Complex mixtures of social arrangements that adapt with changing conditions are the norm.

Individuals and institutions across the planet have been dedicated to “fighting” the corruption that attends human interactions from local police behavior to transactions within international corporations and development funders. For many, corruption is a starting point and the presenting problem, and there are numerous justifications for that. I suggest a prerequisite for addressing corruption is a grasp of its underlying developmentally-different social structures, which perform patron, broker, and client roles, and the larger social, economic, and political contexts that support them. The ethics and repercussions of destroying a social system without replacing its functions need to be seriously examined.

Societies at different stages of development have different apexes of power that correspond to their social, economic, and political structures. Much of the corruption literature suggests that efforts based on some of their assumptions may prove to be as destabilizing and inappropriate in many of the same ways as democratization efforts are (Ross, 2007). Rose-Ackerman (1999) however, has a keen insight into the dynamics that are predictably inevitable when mis-matched institutions are introduced. She writes “societies based on strong interpersonal relations may have little notion of formal agency-principal relations and the obligations they impose on agents. The idea...may seem strange and unnatural.... The introduction of new institutions that fit poorly with underlying norms can produce pathologies...” (pp. 106-107). From the developmental perspective introduced here, it may be seen that the ideas and practices of formal stage institutions will not only seem strange and unnatural but that they will not even “compute” to concrete and abstract stage social systems and actors. Her explanation includes how and why such policies actually increase the undesired “corrupt” behavior, and it is related to a premise of this paper: social systems arise organically to meet otherwise unmet needs. Komito’s *Whose man are you?* and *It is impossible not to be somebody’s man* should be internal mantras in every analysis so entire networks are recognized. Powell (1977) views the understanding of clientelist politics as having “profound importance” as “an heuristic device for the understanding of a wide range of political behavior which political scientists, in the main, consider to be either pathological, deviant, or of minor import” (p. 147). Understanding this device, Scott’s (2002) phases of transition dynamics suggests the kinds of gradual, planned shifts in relational ties that need to be provided at all levels. Most often, attention placed on corruption starts at the wrong end of the system, the patron-laden apex, and new instabilities and social and economic costs result. The entire complex—social, economic, and political systems, the functions and roles they perform, and dual motives of the actors that perform them throughout the horizontal and vertical latticeworks—needs to be addressed as the stable, coherent whole that it is.

Anomie is a useful concept in connection with systemic change efforts. The dictionary defines this as the social instability that results from a breakdown of—or, I would add, a radical change in—standards and values, and also as the personal unrest, alienation, and/or uncertainty that can result from a lack of purpose or ideals. Poorly conceived interventions can, and do, all too easily destroy solid social systems that reflect those often taken for granted social glues of meeting diverse needs. Radical, non-indigenous change tends to catalyze social instability (e.g., structural

adjustment policies, outlawing the Baath party in Iraq, imposing or importing Western models and requirements).

This developmental behavioral analysis of dual motives' role in political economies of corruption indicates that the roots of corruption lie in both the bioneurological architecture of humans' functioning and the social systems developed to balance behavioral tensions in the process of meeting evolving needs. The bioneurological basis of dual motives shaping society, politics, and economics is supported throughout this analysis. The trajectory of social systems' development presented here indicates that political economy is mostly synonymous with the term, social system. The reciprocal relationships that characterize what we call corruption are clearly deeply rooted in humans' social nature and survival as a species. The reciprocity complex explained by dual motive theory is very much in evidence once there is a systematic method to recognize the guises and systemic dynamics through which it manifests. The model of hierarchical complexity provides such a method.

Because humans are living, whole systems, their behaviors, and therefore psychology, are intimately and inherently related to their bioneurological architecture. It will require new methods to adequately address needs of diverse people who populate entire social systems via comprehensive alternative systems before new norms of behavior and more complex behaviors are developed widely. Failing that level of ingenuity, it is unlikely that policies will cut short the life of the institution of corruption in our lifetimes.

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A Brief Overview of Developmental Theory, or What I Learned in the FOLA Course

Jonathan Reams¹

Abstract: This article describes the history and development of developmental theory from a lay person perspective. It covers some of the main strands of how developmental theory has grown, focusing on ego stage theories and dynamic skill theory as the main examples of soft and hard stage models. It also touches on how measures of these models relate to the theories. Reflections on the relative merits of each strand are considered, as well as implications for broadening the scope of awareness of developmental theory among the larger population of integrally informed practitioners.

Keywords: Developmental theory, dynamic skill theory, ego development, metrics.

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Introduction

I was first exposed to developmental theory in 1996, in a course on leadership and imagination in the master in organizational leadership program I took at Gonzaga University, where we read Hall and Thompson's (1980) *Leadership Through Values*. Fast forward 17 years, and in the fall of 2013 I took the Foundations of Lectical Assessment (FOLA) course from Lectica.² Up until this time my range of knowledge about developmental theory had been primarily shaped by my exposure to Wilber's *Integral Psychology* (2000) and likes of Kegan, Torbert, Cook-Greuter and such. While I had examined the eleven pages of comparative tables Wilber did to show the range of work in the field, I had not looked into many of them with any seriousness. The FOLA course expanded my range of familiarity and exposure to developmental theory and theorists, and deepened my appreciation for the complexity and nuances alive in the field.

In this article my aim is to give a lay person's overview of what I now consider to be salient points along the history of developmental theory. In a sense, I will construct a story, based on my sorting and sifting through the myriad of material available to draw on, selected according to my sense of what will paint a sufficiently accurate and informative tale for a range of readers who might benefit from it.³ While this aspect provides the bulk of what I will describe here, I also wish to use this opportunity to offer some perspectives on what I consider to be important questions to consider in the sometimes problematic use of developmental theories in a more casual manner. I also aim to offer some views on how the various approaches to development might be utilized to give a more comprehensive picture of human experience.

The Roots of Developmental Theory

To understand how and why developmental theory has come to the place it has, it can be useful to review the historical context from which the current diversity has grown. What we will soon see is that the developmental view has deep roots in psychology. It has evolved from a theoretical basis, through early work to develop an understanding of the processes involved in development and methods for its study, to a rich and diverse set of empirically grounded models and metrics for supporting how we can look at human experience.

Baldwin

While many look to Freud as the father of modern psychology, concurrently in America people like William James, John Dewey and James Mark Baldwin were also developing

² This course is the main introduction and orientation to the work of Lectica, whose mission is to change the way testing is done in education. It was taught by Zak Stein, with support from Zachary Van Rossum, online using pre-recorded video lectures and asynchronous video meeting technology for class discussions. It contained a significant body of literature as the foundation for the curriculum. The majority of this article is drawn from that literature, with additional material for some sections.

³ I would like to express my gratitude for the significant feedback I received from Thomas Jordan, Zakary Stein and Theo Dawson. They helped clear up a number of details and misunderstandings I had along the way, and added valuable insights that furthered my learning. Remaining mistakes are my own.

foundational ideas that would have a major influence on the field’s development. In particular, Baldwin’s (1895, 1906) ideas were seminal in how development was understood and his works have had wide ranging impact, most notably by heavily influencing the works of Piaget and Vygotsky. Although he is a relatively unknown figure today, an examination of Baldwin’s work can help us see the deep roots that a developmental approach has in the field of psychology.

Baldwin taught psychology at Princeton (1893-1903) and John Hopkins (1903-1908), served as president of the American Psychological Association (1897), and was co-founder of the journal *Psychological Review* in 1894. When a scandal forced him to move to Paris in 1908, editorship of the journal went to John B. Watson, who shifted the focus from developmental psychology to behaviorism, driving developmental perspectives underground for decades.

While in Paris (until his death in 1934) he influenced the young Piaget, and the marks of this influence are clear in Piaget’s work. He also shared a more dynamic process-oriented view of stage development with Alfred Binet. Another example of his influence can be found in how his concept of imitation evolved into Albert Bandura’s concept of modeling.

In terms of his ideas, he had a very specific stage model of development (see figure 1) and used the concept of “subject object theory” explicitly (long before Kegan’s use of it, which is much more familiar today). His stage model broke from reductionistic views at that time. It was influenced by evolutionary biology and took an organismic approach to development, using the term genetic epistemology to indicate the *genesis*, or developmental orientation. He also showed how apparent foundational acts can be more basic steps and stages that have gone through their own developmental process. Baldwin also moved away from the contemporary convention of judging child/infant consciousness purely from the vantage point of adult consciousness. The complexity and foresight of Baldwin’s conception of stages of development is shown in this table from an article he published in 1904.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, VOL. XI., 1904, PLATE III.
(Baldwin, *Genetic Progression of Psychic Objects.*)
TABLE I.

Psychic Progressions.			Mixed (psychic-psycholog.) Progressions.				
i. Objective.	ii. Logical.	MODES. iii. Individuation.	iv. Reality.	v. Interest.	vi. Attention.	MODES. vii. Control (psychic).	viii. Control (psychological).
1 Objects of Sense.	1 } [Pre-logical.]	1 Cognition } of object.	1 } Reality-feeling of 1. The Present.	1 } A-telic	1 } Att = A	1 } Involuntary. { Sense Coef.	1 } External.
2 Objects of Memory.	2 }	2 Recognition.	2 } 2. The Persisting.	2 }	2 }	2 } { Unvoluntary. { Mem. Coef.	2 } Organic.
3 Fancy Objects. (inner-outer)	3 }	3 } { Unity { Difference. { Psychic Group.	3 } { Unreality-feeling { Existence (inner-outer). { Semblance of 1. Inner Imitation.	3 }	3 }	3 } Novel.	3 } Fortuitous.
5 Substantive Objects. (mini-body)	5 } Quasi-logical.	5 } { Class, Group, Con- crete Plurality.	5 } 'Prac. Judgment.'	5 } Practical	5 } Att = A + a	5 } { 'Prac. Judg.'	5 } { Real Kinds.
6 Content Objects. (self-notself)	6 }	6 } { Recog. of Gen. Meaning or Intent. { Personal. { Social.	6 } Belief.	6 } { (T)elic	6 } { a { a' { a''	6 } { Means to ends. { Belief coef.	6 } { Real Worlds. { Social Tests.
7 Judged (Thought) (Theoret.)	7 Logical.	7 } { Recog. of (General (concept). { Log. Individual. { Recog. of Theoret. Universal.	7 } Doubt.	7 } Theoretical	7 } either or	7 } { 'Workableness.' { Laws of Thought.	7 } { Logical Criteria.
8 Moral Objects.	8 Extra-logical.	8 } { Recog. of (Gen. Self. { Moral Individual. { Recog. of Pract. Universal. { Pract.	8 } Ought-feeling.	8 } Contem- plative.	8 } both { (t)elic	8 } { Moral Coef. { Duty. { Moral Ideal (self). { Syn-nomic.	8 } Right.
9 Aesthetic Objects.	9 Hyper-logical.	9 } Recog. of Universal	9 } Semblance of Intuition (Art).	9 } (Pantelic)	9 } Alternative.	9 } Aesthetic Coefficient.	9 } Beauty.

Figure 1. Table of developmental stages from Baldwin (1904).⁴

⁴ This table can best be understood by thinking of it in a similar manner to Wilber’s (2000) tables in Integral Psychology. Here, given that there were not other researchers and theorists in the field to

Piaget

We can see that the core ideas of developmental psychology were laid out by Baldwin over 100 years ago. What remained was to find a way to apply an appropriate method for research in this area. Thus we move on to Piaget (1932, 1954, 1970) who, influenced by Baldwin's ideas of stage development, took up research on ideas about genetic epistemology. He was inspired by working with Binet on intelligence testing, and adapted Freud's use of clinical interviews in psychoanalysis to develop the method of semi-structured interviews to study how epistemological structures evolved. Thus his unit of analysis was epistemic structures, not individuals. What he actually did to apply this was to talk to kids about playing marbles.

Piaget demonstrated how to look for and discover the structural properties of linguistic performances that are indicative of development. ... [T]he radical innovation here was the careful and systematic classification of performances in terms of their developmental level. Piaget ... built a hierarchical taxonomy of cognitive-structure types for classificatory purposes. (Stein & Heikkinen, 2009, p. 11)

Observations of how young boys in his town in Switzerland played the game of marbles (and hide and seek among girls) provided the setting for examining how epistemological reasoning develops. As an example, I will examine how Piaget began to make distinctions between how children adapt to or practice rules, and how they become conscious of them. For Piaget practice began at the stage of motor skills, with children repetitively going over certain actions to learn specific motor skills. This motor skill practice led to the adoption of habits that are quickly made into schemas and reproduced as a "game." This egocentric practice comes from receiving rules from the outside (parent, older kids) that the child imitates while still playing alone, even if in the presence of others. The next step is cooperation, where some mutuality, with awareness and consideration of others entering the picture. This is eventually followed by the codification of rules, with mutuality engaged more in discussing the rules than the actual motor skills of playing marbles. Breaches of the rules were considered to be in the domain of application rather than about the rules themselves.

While Piaget's focus on development was around its processes, he also described stages he observed. For example, he identified three stages for how consciousness of rules develops. Rules start as unconscious in the first stage. They then become sacred, received from external or transcendent sources. In the third stage, they arise from mutual consent. He explored the movement from concrete reasoning to more subjective and principled reasoning, as well as the movement from obeying external authority to notions of fairness and justice among peers. Understanding these processes led to the creation of learning sequences. The core processes derived from these observations were; assimilation, accommodation, equilibration and reflective abstraction.

In the end, Piaget actually contributed much more about the process of the development of epistemological structures than the stages of child development he is so well known for. What

compare, Baldwin laid out what he perceived as the various facets of development and how they related across stages.

Piaget considered as the “American problem,” had to do with Americans’ focus on the stages themselves, and a fascination with finding how to speed up progression through the stages.⁵ This focus on stages did however help to lay foundations for pedagogical sequences in K-12 contexts in America. Yet in reality, stages for Piaget were only symptoms. His deeper interests were in the processes that enabled epistemological structures to develop.

Transition to the Neo-Piagetian World: The Development of Diverse Streams of Thought

As various people picked up Piaget’s work, diverse approaches and strands of developmental theory began to appear. These were also the result of researchers being influenced by a variety of themes going on in psychology at any given time. Subsequently, more recent researchers have taken up different threads and mixed them in different ways. From this the trails of influence on research become broader and more diverse, leading to a less fixed and direct sense of lineage from one researcher to the next. It is not possible in the scope and context of this article to attempt to do justice to all of these strands. What I will do is follow the development of some of the players in what I consider to be two main strands which can be described as Neo-Piagetian, in that they build in various ways upon Piaget and Baldwin’s seminal work.

The directions these different strands followed has led to what has been loosely characterized as “soft” and “hard” stage models of development. Another descriptive distinction could be between ego development theories, domain specific theories, and domain general theories. Ego development theories have roots in the work of Jane Loevinger (who built upon the work of Harry Stack Sullivan), and is built upon by Robert Kegan and Susanne Cook-Greuter among others. These models contribute significantly to our self-understanding, or how we function as a self. The second strand of hard, or domain specific theories, follows from Kohlberg and the work of a number of students and researchers he influenced. This will also lead us to examining the notion of a common core metric and model of development that shows how all the domain specific research on development is actually based on a common core structure of development. As well, there are what Lawrence Kohlberg termed functional stage models from Erik Erikson and Harry Stack Sullivan that have been influential in the field. I will address these briefly even though they are not “developmental” in a strict sense.⁶

What we can see upon first glance is that ego stage models tend towards describing a center of gravity, a structure of self-understanding and meaning making that is relatively stable with periodic transformations, and within which variability happens, but is harder to account for. Fischer’s dynamic skill theory, on the other hand, starts from two different sets of empirical findings. One is that variability is central to performance, understanding etc. and that this

⁵ Evidence of this focus can be seen in the current Wilberian integral community’s near obsession with accelerating processes of development, especially to so called “second tier” or integral stages.

⁶ This use of the term *functional* stage models is derived from Kohlberg et al.’s (1984) review of the current (at that time) state of the field. In the FOLA course, these were described simply as soft and hard stage models. Erikson was seen to meet some of the stage criteria in a soft way, and Sullivan was a direct influence on Loevinger. This is discussed more later in this article.

variability is both moment to moment within an individual and across individuals.⁷ Thus statistical norming or establishing a center of gravity is not in focus. The other is that the unit of analysis is the skill being performed and the hierarchical complexity of it, not an individual ego and its stage of development. Individuals are simply the means through which we can observe these structures.

Context of the Transition

As I examined the larger context behind how the field has evolved, I came across writing by Robbie Case (1987a), who noted that conceptions of stages and structures had come under intense scrutiny, critique and disfavor in academic discourse and research, especially in North America in the period after Piaget's initial influence. As a new generation of Neo-Piagetian researchers took up the task of rehabilitating developmental understandings of psychology, they attempted to address a number of issues (noted below) arising from these critiques.

Case (1987b) also deeply analyzed the deeper historical roots and trajectories of three major intellectual traditions that have influenced the study of development in psychology; empiricist (coming from Locke and Hume), rationalist (coming from Kant) and historico-cultural (coming from Goethe, Hegel and Marx). The empiricist influence is seen most clearly in behaviorist and neo-behaviorist theories of learning, as well as information processing theories. They share epistemological assumptions that lead to a view of learning and development as essentially equivalent. The rationalist tradition encompasses assumptions about intellectual development as being rooted in how order is generated from structures that children come equipped with and that change with age. (Case notes that Baldwin and Piaget are in this category). The historico-cultural tradition emphasizes the unique cultural circumstances of a social group and how knowledge acquisition is grounded in these circumstances and the tools developed for coping with them. (Vygotsky is an example here).

In this context, Case (1987a) has also presented an overview of the specific challenges facing Neo-Piagetian research in sorting out what was essential to retain from Piaget's work and how to best move the field forward. It was commonly accepted that the strength worth keeping was the theories' ability to explain what were considered as universal structural features of cognitive development. This can be seen in the eventual discovery and description of common core structures that can be measured with great accuracy. Specifically, Case listed general agreement around there being three or four structural levels, that the higher levels include the lower ones, and that there is a characteristic age range for the acquisition of these levels. It was also agreed that there is a cyclical recursion of sublevels within each level. As the further research of neo-Piagetians was included, Case observed agreement around domain specificity in the rate and content of structural growth, the presence of inter- and intra-individual differences (variability) and the discovery of a wide range of domains of application of developmental models.

What were considered not worth keeping were the aspects that were not universal. This led to "more dissimilarities among the new theories than there are similarities" (Case, 1987a, p. 773). These can be summarized as questions about what the criteria are for distinguishing stages and

⁷ Piaget and Kohlberg both explicitly denied variability.

how to distinguish sub-stages from them, as well as the nature of the basic structural units (i.e. are they schemes, skills, conceptual frameworks etc.).

As well, there were areas of agreement and disagreement around the transformational processes involved in development. Agreement focused around each structure being assembled independently, the importance of cultural and environmental factors in the process, and common constraints imposed by working memory. Disagreement centered around identifying the process which produces long term structural changes and the processes which produce changes in processing capacity. This divergence has manifested in the numerous domain specific models and metrics of development. I will now turn to examining some distinctions among these strands.

An Examination of Stage Criteria: Functional, Soft and Hard Stages

Above I noted different strands being distinguished according to criteria for functional, soft and hard stage models. In this section I will examine how these distinctions arose. In particular, I will draw on Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1984), who set out to address a number of criticisms of Kohlberg's work and in this process engaged in clarification of criteria for what constitutes a stage model. They talk about a "differentiation between 'soft' developmental models of social and moral reflection and 'hard' Piagetian operative stages of reasoning" (p. 212). There is also a third distinction they make of functional stages, which is outside of the main focus of our discussion here but worth mentioning.

Four general criteria, coming from Piaget, have been used to classify the range of developmental models, with the functional stage models meeting the fewest criteria, and the hard stage models meeting all of them to qualify. The soft stage models are then seen as somewhere in the middle of this continuum. The first criterion is that models display a qualitative difference in the structures being used. The second criterion is that these structures have an invariant sequence. Third is that they form a structural whole, or an underlying organization of thought. The fourth criterion is that these stages are hierarchical integrations, taking in previous stages while also increasing differentiation.

Thus the stages laid out by Erikson (1982) and Sullivan (1968) do not meet these criteria in that they are; culturally relative, not strictly hierarchical, and organized around responses to typical life situations at different ages in western culture. In this way they are at one end of the spectrum of developmental models. They do have stages⁸ but the way these stages are constructed, as noted above, mean that their focus is not on the same level of rigor around these criteria. This does not mean that they do not have value or influence, as we have seen, just that if we wish to look deeply into the core structures of human development, we need to turn our attention to the latter two distinctions.

⁸ I am mindful that the term stages is a broad one, most often used in casual discourse with assumed common meaning. Within this literature various theorists use the term in much more specific and varied ways. I have chosen not to get into the work of making my own definition of the term, as that would go beyond the scope and intentions of this article. I recommend readers simply be aware not to project assumed meaning into this and other terms like structure, cognition etc. I do however go into more detail around these terms in relation to some of the theorists covered.

Kohlberg et al. (1984), in their discussion of the current formulation of the theory (as of the time of writing in 1984), noted that there were many areas of agreement between their primary examples of soft and hard stages; that is, Loevinger and Kohlberg. These were noted as; claims for structured wholeness, invariant sequence and hierarchical integration. Yet a closer examination revealed important differences.

This entailed going deeper into specific definitions and distinctions around how stages are conceived and understood. “For Piaget (1970), a structure is a system of transformational laws that organize and govern reasoning operations. This formalized governing system is reflected or manifested in individuals' actual responses to conflicts or problems” (Kohlberg et al., p. 242). In addition, there is a need to add distinctions between content and structure, as well as competency and performance, in order to use the Kohlberg’s scoring methodology in identifying structures.

Kohlberg et al. (1984) described how they perceived a number of these issues. “Loevinger's scheme considers structure less as a form of thinking and more in terms of fairly stable personality functions and contents” (p. 242). Structure is hypothetically derived as an underlying construct, inferred from signs taken from the categories of content in the sentence completion data, which are mixtures of content with structure. Looked at this way, the classifications for each stage are an ideal type based on the theoretical representation of the stage. “Loevinger defines her stages partly in terms of structures, but also partly in terms of functions and motives pertaining to the whole self and its enhancement and defense” (p. 243). Thus while soft stages like Loevinger’s do appear to have stages with qualitatively different organizations, they are arrived at by a more indirect means. They note that while soft stages also have Piagetian structural qualities, they also include “elements of affective or reflective characteristics of persons” (p. 237). Soft stages are also characterized as existential or self-reflective stages involving an ego making meaning for and about itself. This self is a kind of totality; a system of meaning and characteristics that then encounters and engages the world outside itself, including other egos.

In contrast to these holistic models of the self, the hard stage approach requires the division into discrete domains of what self or ego experiences as unified within itself (such as acquisition of specific physical, emotional or cognitive skills). “What hard structures gain by this is precision in their articulation of a structural logic of stages that will survive the ever changing growth of psychological knowledge about the self, its functions and its development” (Kohlberg et al., 1984, p. 238). In addition, they “define structures in a way consistent with the Piagetian construction of structure, that is, as an organization of manifest thought operations” (p. 244). Thus hard stages are considered to relate to empirically observable and measurable actions in direct ways.

Another difference between soft and hard stages worth discussing is one of normativity.⁹ This arises from examining how each approach deals with the criterion of hierarchical integration.

⁹ The use of the term normativity here is related to the distinction between describing what is, or saying what ought to be. The nuances of this distinction are beyond the scope of this article. It is however interesting to note that Kohlberg’s sense of what the endpoint of moral development should be can be seen as the genesis of the “growth to goodness” issue I comment on in my concluding reflections. (Dawson, personal correspondence, March 2, 2014).

The criterion requires each new stage to transform the functioning of the previous stage. This invokes a normative end point “based on a conception of human rationality” (Kohlberg et al., p. 246) where “each stage in the hierarchy represents an increase in correspondence with the end point or highest stage” (p. 246). Piaget and Kohlberg both have this normative conception in how the stages develop.

In contrast, Loevinger is clear that she does not claim any normativity in her model of ego stages. Each stage is seen to add new aspects to the previous stage which makes for a more cumulative model than a transformational one, and she does not claim that higher or later stages are necessarily better. “Soft stage development depends neither on the emergence of new functions nor on the performance of new tasks. Instead, soft stage development depends on formal reflection” (Kohlberg et al., p. 249). Thus the differences in this point can be seen to impact how stages are seen to evolve.

For all of the debate and fine grained distinctions that went on in the above analysis of distinctions between soft and hard stage models, one of the reflections arising from this was to see a possible need to go beyond Piaget when it comes to adult development, and grant value to the soft stage, or ego development models.

The strict Piagetian stage construction may need to be abandoned in the study of adult development, but the idea of soft stages of development in adulthood should not be. ... Soft stage models present a new way of doing research in the subject area of adult development, a way that has emerged from the Piagetian paradigm. (Kohlberg et al., p. 249)

This quote points to the need to find good ways to integrate the findings of both soft and hard stage models.¹⁰

Following the above work to lay out the distinctions that emerged in the early post-Piagetian era, I will now lay out brief descriptions of exemplars of the functional, soft and hard models. I will start with the work of Erikson and Sullivan, describe aspects of Loevinger’s work, and finally move on to Kohlberg’s work.

Functional Models: Erikson and Sullivan

Erik Erickson’s (1982) developmental model has had a very visible influence on the field of psychology with his life span stages and the identity development and crises associated with them. These are “functional stages” according to Kohlberg’s criteria, and are focused on a psychodynamic view of the self-system. The idea is that the self-system navigates its way through a series of crises resulting from the interface between the personality and socio-cultural environment. As each crisis is passed or resolved, (there can be different levels of “success” in terms of how well these are resolved and implications for how the next and subsequent stages

¹⁰ While making fine distinctions has a utility in terms of clarification of issues in the field, it can also distract and divide us into favorite theoretical camps. In the end, I find this to be of less use than finding ways to integrate theory and research for the sake of better applications and methods for supporting healthy development.

play out based on that), a new stage of ego development appears that is considered to be more mature and have a more complex and integrated self-system. The following figure illustrates Erikson's stages.

integrity vs. despair	“Is it OK to have been me?” (65-death)
generativity vs. stagnation	“Can I make my life count?” (25-64)
intimacy vs. isolation	“Can I love?” (20-24)
identity vs. role confusion	“Who am I? What can I become?” (13-19)
industry vs. inferiority	“Can I make it in the world of people and things?” (5-12)
initiative vs. guilt	“Is it okay for me to do, move, and act?” (4-5)
autonomy vs. shame & doubt	“is it OK to be me?” (2-4)
trust vs. mistrust	“Can I trust the world?” (0-2)

Figure 2. Erikson's stages of development. From Stein (2012). Used with permission.

This model of stages meets some of Kohlberg's criteria for a stage model in that factors such as transcend and include are there, (mostly through his way of talking about how later stages go back and revisit or re-conceptualize the issues of the earlier stages) and that sequentialness is explicit. It also appears that Erikson is viewing cognitive development from a psychosocial dynamic lens.

Harry Stack Sullivan (1968) was one of the neo-Freudians who worked from a psychodynamic framework to develop a better understanding of the individual as being based in a network of relationships. The notion of a self-system was central to his work. This self-system was seen to develop through factors such as social relationships, the psychodynamics of need satisfaction and motivation, and emotional self-regulation in social-cultural and biological contexts. Sullivan's work on interpersonal relationships became the foundation of interpersonal psychoanalysis, a school of psychoanalytic theory and treatment that stresses the detailed exploration of the nuances of patients' patterns of interacting with others. Sullivan proposed four levels of interpersonal maturity and integration; impulsive, conformist, conscientious, and autonomous.

While he published very little, (a series of lectures he gave was posthumously edited to capture the essential content of his work), his influence was significant. Jane Loevinger, Abraham Maslow, Ken Wilber and Kurt Fischer all drew on his ideas in the development of their thinking.

Soft Models: Loevinger

Jane Loevinger (1976) began her academic career by doing research on women's experiences in the post-world war two period in America, becoming one of the first psychologists to focus on the problems facing women and mothers. Her early work in women's attitudes towards family produced results that resisted analysis by traditional methods. Loevinger then drew on Sullivan's (1968) description of levels of interpersonal maturity. She moved into the area of ego development, where she built upon Sullivan's four stage model to create a more nuanced model including eight sequential stages, each of which represents a progressively more complex way of perceiving oneself in relation to the world. In contrast to her predecessors, Loevinger relied heavily on psychometric modeling in the definition and validation of these levels.

Loevinger's model of ego development describes personality in terms of cognitive, affective and behavioral components. It "assumes that all human beings evolve toward greater complexity, coherence and integration" (Cook-Greuter, 1999, p. 33). Ego is considered not as a function or thing, but as a process; "the organizing or synthetic function is not just another thing the ego does, it is what the ego is" (Loevinger, 1976, p. 5). Ego development is seen to represent the development of "structures" in the cognitive developmental sense of "an inner logic to the stages and their sequence" (p. 11). Further, "it is a process, a *structure*, *social* in origin, functioning as a *whole*, and guided by *purpose* and *meaning*" (p. 67. Italics in the original). The essence of ego development "is the search for coherent meaning in experience" (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970, p. 8)

Loevinger's (1976) model of ego development was grounded in her creation of a method for measuring differences in how people respond to a set of sentence stems. The tool she created for her work on measuring ego development was the Washington University Sentence Completion Test (WUSCT) (Hy & Loevinger, 1996; Loevinger & Wessler, 1970). Loevinger used a bootstrapping method (as described by Kohlberg) for iteratively developing a method for scoring data and building a theory in parallel. The assessment instrument enabled her and other researchers to empirically identify and validate these stages. Stein & Heikkinen (2009) note that Loevinger "aimed to devise a metric for looking at ego-development. Specifically, she was looking to build a calibrated measure. By merging quantitative methods with qualitative ones and adhering to strict psychometric parameters, she constructed a scale of sentence-stem response-types" (p. 9). The terms Loevinger gave to the stages were; pre-social, impulsive, self-protective, conformist, conscientious-conformist (later changed to self-aware), conscientious, individualistic, and autonomous and integrated.

The WUSCT uses written linguistic performance based on responses to 36 sentence stems. Shifts in this kind of performance are noted as something that people can intuitively order or rank along a developmental continuum. Cook-Greuter (1999) notes that the WUSCT "measures performance, unlike Kohlberg's instrument, which indicates competence" (p. 25). She also comments on the use of language in these assessments. "The centrality of language or 'verbal behavior' as a medium through which we manifest our conception of reality is the basis of any verbal projective test" (p. 26). The issue with language as a means for assessment of cognitive functioning is noted by Cook-Greuter (1999) as having to do with such assessments being "heavily derived from empirical evidence and based on a probabilistic rationale for data [which]

is prone to specific problems. It cannot account for data that come from the extremes of the scale (lack of evidence) or are ‘novel’ in other ways” (p. 29).

Criticism over this approach has focused on two main areas. One is this dependence on linguistic articulation as the only means of being able to assess an individual with this measure. In addition, it is a written response, not allowing for inquiry and clarification of meaning that other forms of assessment enable. A second critique has been one that is in common with critiques of Kohlberg and other researchers’ work; that it confuses content with structure. (This issue will be explored more fully later on). There has also been criticism about the lack of a logic that can explain why one stage is higher or more mature than another.

From looking at Loevinger’s ego development model we take away some key points. One is that personality structures can evolve¹¹ (Dweck, 2011; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) and that this is affected by social dimensions. Emotion and how it motivates learning also evolves in ways that have pedagogical impact. Thus unresolved personality issues from earlier stages can impact how we relate to environments designed for learning. The implication of this is the need to create safe holding environments (McClure, 2005; Winnicott, 1965) and support through scaffolding for dealing with emotional issues.

Hard Models: Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg (1975, 1984) integrated Piaget’s developmental stage model with philosopher John Rawls’ (1971) work in moral philosophy, building on Piaget’s methodology to bring more rigor in assessing the domain of moral development. “Kohlberg’s fusion of Piaget and Rawls excited many researchers because of its interdisciplinary approach” (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000, p. 381). He used Piaget’s two stage notion of moral development (heteronomous and autonomous) and refined it, developing a model of moral development with six stages that has been extensively tested across cultures.

Kohlberg also identified the gap between reasoning and action along with multiple sources or factors influencing it. He examined the relations between cognition, affect and conduct in social development, thus broadening the scope of influences on moral development (compared to how moral development had been examined previously). This led him to propose that cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for moral development, and to explore ways in which cognitive and moral development relate. His theoretical perspective can be described as phenomenalist, structuralist and constructivist.

One of Kohlberg’s major contributions was to take Piaget’s methodology and his notion of stages, and adapt them to develop a systematic methodology for scoring stages of moral judgment. The evolution of the scoring manual, from the 1958 first edition which focused on

¹¹ There is still debate over this point. There is significant evidence that for the majority of people, ego structures do not evolve after reaching adulthood in their mid-twenties. Yet adult cognitive development theory is based on a body of evidence that for some adults, these ego structures do evolve. This leads some theorists to believe that it is possible for everyone to develop into later stages, yet how much of this development is due to favorable circumstances such as intentional support, or to some latent or even inheritable characteristics is as yet unknown. (Jordan, personal correspondence, February 16, 2014).

“holding together all normative content by stage and inferring structure as an ideal type from this content” (Kohlberg et al., 1984, p. 245), through two iterations, led to a system where form and norms are differentiated to better distinguish between content and structure (Kohlberg et al., 1984).¹² Issues are understood as mostly external and moral values. Elements are principled reasons for these moral judgments. The manual also distinguishes between modal and value elements. Modal elements affirm norms without deeper reasoning. Value elements are final justifications of such modalities. Kohlberg began to make better distinctions (that evolved through the iterations of his scoring manual) between content and structure. He did longitudinal studies (with notable limitations in his sample) and did Piagetian style interviews around specific moral dilemmas with standard probes. While for Piaget stages were secondary to his focus on process, Kohlberg made stages important through the codification of what a stage meant. His stages came in three basic categories (with two levels within each category), pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional.

Pedagogical implications of Kohlberg’s work included recognizing the need to pay attention to the structure and environment as well as the moral atmosphere of educational environments. From Dewey (1997) he also highlighted the need to combine action or experience and reflection. He had a good deal of involvement in various educational experiments to implement his ideas. Kohlberg’s influence was tremendous, with his stages of moral development entering into use or conversation in schools, prisons, the military and even politics. His students rank among the most influential neo-Piagetian, who together, building on Kohlberg’s work, helped to build much more robust understandings of development (e.g. Selman, Armon, Gilligan, Case, Fowler, Commons, Fischer).

Later Neo-Piagetians

The above description of the works of Kohlberg and Loevinger can be considered as the early neo-Piagetians, building on Piaget’s seminal research and extending it in various directions. Also coming out of this milieu were a number of other researchers who have carried on work in this tradition. In the following section, I will give a brief mention to a few of the many researchers contributing to the expansion of Neo-Piagetian developmental research.

William Perry (1970, 1981) made extensive studies of epistemological growth in college students that generated a stage model that went from absolutist perspectives of truth being a form of right or wrong, to relativist perspectives where conflicting versions of “truth” can be seen to represent legitimate alternatives and a nuanced perspective of right and wrong. In a way similar to how Loevinger began her research, Perry’s original intent was “a purely descriptive formulation of students’ experience,” rather than a “prescriptive program intended to ‘get’ students to develop” (Perry, 1981, p. 107). His work has been further extended in the domain of student services work by Marcia Baxter Magolda (1999, 2001, 2009) who focused on how

¹² An important point to make about the manual is that although Kohlberg claimed his system captured structure, his manual requires, to at least some extent, a concept matching strategy, which is problematic because of the limited nature of the construction sample used to create the manual (Dawson, personal communication, March 2, 2014).

educational environments and experiences could be conducive to growth into self-authoring epistemologies.

A student of Kohlberg, Cheryl Armon (1984) wrote her dissertation on *Ideas of the Good Life: A Longitudinal/Cross-Sectional Study of Evaluating Reasoning in Children and Adults*. In this research she was able to apply the Piagetian standards for structural stage models to evaluative reasoning about notions of the good life. She developed a scoring manual for this domain which, like Kohlberg's, distinguished between structure and content. Her participants ranged from 5-72 years of age, and correlations between stages and age were found to be strong among children and less so among adults.

Later research on moral development in adults (Armon & Dawson, 1997) helped to confirm and extend the focus of Kohlberg's work further into adulthood. Armon (1998) also used a training intervention to close a gap that was found between levels of reasoning and active engagement with social issues. In this, the "emphases on intense affective experience and personal relationships took precedence over enhanced justice reasoning per se" (p. 345). This points to the importance of emotion in learning and development, which will be addressed later.

Robert Selman has conducted extensive research on social role taking (Selman & Byrne, 1974). He focused on this in relation to Kohlberg's work on the development of moral judgment in children (Selman, 1971a) and to role taking in early childhood, where he identified a significant correlation between levels of role taking and age, linking it to stages of socio-cognitive skill in role taking (Selman, 1971b). Reflections from his research led Selman to describe something I found important about the nature of the research process in the field of human development.¹³

The process of discovery is particularly exciting in the field of personality development. Anyone who works in this field learns not only about the phenomena at hand but about the self. Seldom, however, does theoretical work in this area spring from new discovery. It is more often rediscovery, gaining insight into what others may already know, but which one must discover for oneself. (Selman, 1993, p. 49)

Rest (1973, 1980; Rest et al., 2000) modified Kohlberg's approach, using ideas like schema theory from cognitive science to develop a model of moral schemas that could address many of the criticisms of Kohlberg's work. He took a more flexible notion of stage with development seen as "a matter of changes in the frequency of usage, moving from the less to the more complex" (Rest et al., 2000, p. 384).

Carol Gilligan (2005a) is most famous for her work investigating how moral issues are experienced by girls and women. Her (1982) *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* generated a strong feminist paradigm shift in understanding how female development proceeds. While her work critiques many aspects of existing developmental theories, based on their use of primarily male subjects and their interpretation of female responses in light of them, she shows clear stages of development for women as well.

¹³ I included this quote, although it is somewhat tangential, as I find many students doing master thesis research encounter this phenomenon. Thus I hope that it can clarify this aspect of the research process.

In examining the failure of modern developmental psychology to take into account the perspectives of women, Gilligan (2005b) commented, about Freud, that his “difficulty in fitting the logic of his theory to women’s experience leads him in the end to set women apart, marking their relationships, like their sexual life, as ‘a dark continent’ for psychology” (p. 693). She aimed similar criticisms to Kohlberg, whose construction sample was comprised exclusively of men.

King and Kitchener (1994, 2004) built on Piaget and Kohlberg to examine how reflective judgment evolves. This is perceived as especially important and relevant to higher education, as critical thinking is closely tied to reflective judgment. Reflective judgment arises when a person encounters an ill-structured problem (Churchman, 1971), or adaptive challenge (Heifetz, 1994) which “cannot be defined with a high degree of completeness, and that they cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty” (King & Kitchener, 2004, p. 5). Their three broad levels are pre-reflective, quasi-reflective and reflective judgments are broken into seven stages, which were found to significantly overlap with other developmental stage models. Reflective judgment goes from assuming that knowledge is certain, to recognizing that knowledge creation involves uncertainty, to using evidence and an understanding of context to support judgments.

Their work criticized two major assumptions underlying “simple stage” models. One was that people were believed to operate at one specific stage at any given time. The second critique was that these stages were cross culturally valid. Focusing on the first assumption, they aligned their work with Fischer’s skill theory model, (1980) and did research to understand and confirm developmental variability. This was framed in terms of Fischer’s notions of functional and optimal performance.¹⁴ They also discussed domain specificity, which can be seen in contrast to ego stage models where development can be perceived as a more central, cross cutting stage applied to all domains, with their notion that performance levels are domain specific (which also fits with Fischer).

Robert Case (1985, 1993) took up Piaget’s work and its application in education, and devised experiments that used one tightly controlled and designed activity to investigate precise steps in infant and child development. He developed models with very clear sub-stages for each main developmental stage. He also helped to develop concepts around “chunking”¹⁵ of skills as part of the process of developing higher order skills.

James Fowler (1981, 2001, 2004) built on Erikson and Kohlberg’s work, as well as drawing on theological sources, by applying a stage development model to meaning making in relation to religious faith. His seven stage model moved from primal or undifferentiated faith, through intuitive-projective, mythical-literal, synthetic-conventional, individuating-reflective and conjunctive, to universalizing faith. One can imagine going from naïve belief in Christian Sunday school stories from the bible to constellations of faith such as Unity church, where a cross cutting mix of narratives and ideas are woven into a more complex theology. He noted Kohlberg’s rationalistic orientation and his turn away from incorporating emotions into his research, making for a missed opportunity to incorporate Mead’s (1934) social interactionist

¹⁴ See the section on Fischer below for descriptions of these terms.

¹⁵ Chunking refers to taking a number of skills at a given level and grouping them into one higher order skill or representation.

view of the self. It is these issues, the need to address the role of emotion in development, and the role of the environment, as well as a move away from universalizing to studying variation that finds its nexus in the works of Kurt Fischer, whose work I will examine shortly.

This brief overview of a few of the many researchers in developmental theory can only highlight a few interesting points of interest in the field. For a broader overview of the field, I recommend Oliver Robinson's (2013) *Development though Adulthood: An Integrative Sourcebook*.

Cook-Greuter

In addition to the above mentioned researchers, I want to spend a brief time describing my understanding of the work of two figures familiar to many in this field; Susanne Cook-Greuter and Robert Kegan. Their work also falls into the category of Neo-Piagetian, with Cook-Greuter building specifically on the work of Loevinger, and Kegan building on Piaget and Kohlberg. In this way, examining their work could be seen as a continuation of the focus on these early figures as described above.

Suanne Cook-Greuter (1999, 2010) is an independent scholar who, following many years working with the WUSCT, noticed a set of results she perceived as being able to illustrate distinctions within the last stage of Loevinger's model. She, along with others (Kohlberg & Armon, 1984), noted that Loevinger's last two stages were not sufficiently differentiated. She also had collected examples of sentence stems that neither fit the scoring manual nor the upper range of existing ego development theory.¹⁶

These observations led to refinements in the WUSCT (Cook-Greuter, 1999) and collaboration with Bill Torbert (2004) in developing what became the Leadership Development Framework (LDF) and Leadership Maturity Profile (MAP), which examine stages of cognitive and ego development among managers. Research on manager's stages of development revealed the dominance of conventional stages in that population, in contrast to literature stating that modern organizational complexity requires more post-conventional stages.

In Cook-Greuter's dissertation (1999) she discussed the possibility of stages beyond Loevinger's autonomous stage. She took 1800 late stage protocols gathered over many years and replaced Loevinger's integrated stage with the two new categories, construct aware and universal or unitive, as a way of "striving for a theoretically coherent and plausible explanation of SCT data" (p. 32). This focus on later stages led to an understanding that "one way of looking at postconventional ego development is to suggest that it is characterized by an increasing awareness of the constructed nature of knowledge, and a concomitant, step-wise deconstruction of the assumptions undergirding conventional views of reality" (p. 31).

A fundamental principle used in the scoring of these assessments is to determine what a person can take a perspective on. Perspective taking is seen here as a central component of ego

¹⁶ Given that the field of integral studies often concerns itself with later structures of ego development and meaning making, this work has become of great interest for many.

development (in contrast to how it is seen in Dawson's work – to be discussed later) and evolves in taking what one is subject to and making it an object of reflection. Perspective taking evolves from a purely first person perspective, through second and third person perspective taking and on into fourth and fifth person perspective taking capacities, following this subject object progression. The highest stages in Cook-Greuter's model includes the notion of construct aware consciousness, which has been of interest to researchers in various fields, including myself (Reams & Caspari, 2012). At the same time, it is noted that there are many misconceptions about these later stages (Cook-Greuter, 2010).

Kegan

Robert Kegan (1982, 1994) built on the foundations that Piaget and Kohlberg, among others established, and articulated a sophisticated model of how the self evolves through a series of “evolutionary truces” or orders of consciousness. His work integrated three major intellectual strands; the humanistic and existential humanistic work of people like Rogers, Buber, Maslow and May, the neo-psychoanalytical tradition from Anna Freud, Erickson, Winnicott and Bowlby, and finally the constructivist developmental approach we have been describing here.

The core mechanism behind development involves the tension between challenge and support. Challenge comes from encountering environmental contexts in which the complexity of the task demand is beyond that of current meaning making. Support comes in the form of a holding environment (drawing on Winnicott's (1965) use of the term) that provides safety and security for taking risks and experimenting with untried and unknown forms of meaning making and subsequent action. Kegan, along with colleagues, developed a more interactive¹⁷ method of assessing these orders of consciousness, described as the subject object interview (Lahey, Souvaine, Kegan, Goodman, & Felix, 1988). This method does not rely solely on written responses, but engages people in a dialog in which they are encouraged to reveal the structure of their meaning making by explaining their responses to specific probes. This semi-structured interview format is similar to those of Piaget and Kohlberg.

Kegan (1994) also has examined the perceived implicit expectations of modern life in a wide range of domains (e.g. parenting, diversity, teaching, psychotherapy and leadership) in relation to these orders of consciousness, finding that these demands place the majority of people “in over their heads.” Subsequent work with longtime colleague Lisa Laskow Lahey led to the development of a process for revealing a person's “immunity to change” (Kegan & Lahey, 2001; 2009). This process focuses on helping people perceive the hidden values and commitments driving unwanted behavior, making it difficult to change. By being able to make visible (i.e. take a perspective on what has someone has previously been subject to) and test out the assumptions behind such commitments, progress can be made towards evolving a more adequate and complex meaning making system.

Kegan's orders of consciousness are systematically organized by a series of hierarchically integrated sets of subject object transformations. These are; impulsive, imperial, interpersonal, institutional and finally inter-individual. Focusing on the adult development stages, Kegan has

¹⁷ Relative to assessment methods utilizing only textual responses to prompts.

also called the last three of these the socialized mind, the self-authoring mind, and the self-transforming mind. Much of the focus of the immunity to change work is on helping the majority of the population who are operating from the socialized mind and enabling them to engage in the journey of moving towards the self-authoring mind. In this way the immunity to change process functions as scaffolding that provides a structured way to gain perspective on what one has previously been subject to. (You can read more about this in Reams (2009)).

Kurt Fischer and Dynamic Skill Theory

Thus far we have reviewed the early roots of developmental theory, its divergence in the post Piagetian period along lines of soft and hard stage models, as well as a diversity of domain specific models and measures. We now look to focus on Kurt Fischer's work on dynamic skill theory to go deeper into a specific hard stage model that also begins to move beyond a domain specific focus. This will also set the stage for the evolution of a common core metric for measuring stage development independent of specific domains as well as generating domain specific learning sequences.

Kurt Fischer (1980; Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010; Rose, Rouhani, & Fischer, 2013) was a student of Kohlberg's, and looked to build on his and Piaget's work by better understanding the dynamic relationship between organism and environment. This helped to integrate many cognitive development theories' emphasis on the self with behaviorists' (Skinner, 1938, 1969) understanding of the role of operant conditioning from the environment on development. In order to do this, he began with the core concept of skill. "Skill theory provides an abstract representation of the structures of skills that emerge in cognitive development, together with a set of transformation rules that relate these structures to each other" (Fischer, 1980, p. 479). Like Piaget, who used epistemological structures as his unit of analysis, Fischer uses psychological structures as his unit of analysis. "We define integrative psychological structures as a basic unit of conceptual and empirical analysis"(Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 150).

This model is not explicitly about a self or ego like some of the other developmental theorists described above, and in fact Fischer never uses the term ego in his work. It is a very interactive model, taking biology, structure of mind, social relationships and environmental influences all into account, to develop a general model of development that can be applied in any domain or context.

To speak of the development of psychological structures is not the same as speaking of the development of a person. There are no general or "all purpose" psychological structures. Although they undergo massive development over the life span, psychological structures consist of localized skills that are tied to particular situational demands, psychological domains, and social contexts. (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 155)

There are four key aspects of dynamic skill theory that we will examine here; the conception of skills, the role and place of variability, the role of emotion in development, and five transformation rules.

Skills

Fischer’s conception of skills is that they are “the capacity to act in an organized way in a specific context. Skills are thus action-based and context specific” (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 321). He “assumes that cognitive skills can be described effectively and precisely in terms of elementary intuitive set theory” of which “the general definition of a set is a collection of things” (Fischer, 1980, p. 481). He explains that “When people control sources of variation in what they do or think, each such source is a collection, or set, since it is a class of variation” (p. 481).




Figure 3. Fischer’s Levels of cognitive development. From Fischer & Bidell (2006). Used with permission.

Fischer (1980) links this to his definition of cognition within skill theory as “the process by which the organism exercises operant control ... over sources of variation in its own behavior. More specifically, a person can modulate or govern sources of variation in what he or she does or thinks” (p. 481). Exercising control is an action, always acting on an object, or set (described below). This cognition also adapts to the object or specific thing being acted on. Fischer links thought with action




Figure 4. Fischer’s set transformations. From Fischer (1980). Used with Permission.

or behavior by showing how abstract or representational thought is built on complex sets of sensory motor cognitions. These levels move in iterative tiers, from sensory-motor, to representational, to abstractions, to principles (see figure 3).

The labels for these levels are designed to represent psychological structures. Decades of research, across different domain specific models has also identified approximate ages at which each stage usually appears. It is also known that the correlation between age and stage lowers at later stages. Fischer then built an iterative model of four repeating processes that form these tiers of sensory motor, representational and abstract skills (see figure 4).

Variability

The development of psychological structures is significantly influenced by context. “Psychological structures are the products of individual adaptation to particular social and environmental demands” (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 159) and they “consist of dynamic integrations of motive-relevant meaning, feeling, and motor action as they emerge within particular behavioral domains and contexts” (p. 150). While this description of what skills are

and a map of how they develop give us abroad outline of development according to skill theory, the picture is in reality much more complex. Central to Fischer's understanding is that statistical averages, the broad generalizations that are the norm in many models of development and psychology, and that lead to static notions of stages, can mislead us into marginalizing, or rationalizing away data about variability. We know from experience that our performance on any given task can fluctuate from moment to moment.

The conception of psychological structures mentioned above is the central unit of analysis in skill theory. However it can be easy to misunderstand how Fischer uses the term. For him, a psychological structure is conceived of as different from a form. "Structure refers to the system of relations by which complex entities such as biological organisms and psychological activities are organized" (Fischer & Bidell, 2006, p. 314). Fischer and Bidell note that a lack of distinction between form and structure has been at the root of major issues in stage theories. Conceptions of static forms, as an "abstraction from structure" (p. 315), have contributed to expectations of "patterns of thought and action to conform to an independent existing form, such as a stage, cognitive competence, or core knowledge" (p. 315). Understanding this issue leads them to foreground the notion of dynamic structuralism to describe how people construct dynamic systems of thought and action. "Psychological structures consist of dynamic integrations of motive-relevant meaning, feeling, and motor action as they emerge within particular behavioral domains and contexts" (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 150).

Fischer and his colleagues see psychological structures as having their origins in action and clarify how this is to be understood.

Although the term action is often used as a synonym for 'overt behavior' or movement, the concept of action transcends the distinction between inner and outer movement. The concept of action implies some capacity for agency or control. ... Psychological structure is mediated by meaning and experience; meaning and experience are aspects or forms of action. (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 151)

Thus action becomes a fundamental unit to observe and even measure. It is also emphasized that actions always occur in relation to contexts. Contexts can provide varying degrees of support, and from this you get distinctions between functional and optimal performance levels. Skill performance can fluctuate over a short period of time. Fischer and colleagues make a distinction between high and low support from scaffolding, another degree of contextual support, which allows another to "help" or perform part of a given task along with the person.¹⁸ This enables an intermediate position between simple modeling and observation and learning by doing alone. They also talk about emotional scaffolding and coaching as domains where scaffolding can occur.

This complex set of conceptions leads into the metaphor of development as a web. This is distinguished in 6 ways from the commonly used ladder metaphors.¹⁹ Fischer and colleagues include the concept of developmental pathways which are dependent upon distinct circumstances, context etc., as well as variations within the individual and the choices they make.

¹⁸ It is worth noting here the influence of Vygotsky (1978) here.

¹⁹ For example, see Wilber (1996).

They also discuss how the web can represent both variation within an individual as well as different pathways taken by different groups of people.

It is not appropriate to say that an individual functions at a single developmental level – even for a particular skill. Instead, it is more appropriate to say that an individual’s skills function at a range of levels depending on context, domain, time of day, emotional state, and other variables. (Fischer & Bidell, 2006, p. 163)




Figure 5. Fischer’s web of development. From Fischer & Bidell (2006). Used with permission.

such as co-participation from someone with more skill. The sequence of skill acquisition varies according to many factors (Fischer & Bidell, 2006), one of which involves the role of emotion in development.

Emotion

Emotion is seen to have an essential role in dynamic skill theory. In this section I will draw heavily on the detailed description of emotion in Mascolo and Fischer (2010) to provide a view of how comprehensive the research in this area is. To begin, “any action necessarily involves an integration of cognitive, connotative, and emotional processes” (Mascolo & Fischer, 2010, p. 152). Emotions are determined to involve three classes of components; appraisals, feeling tone, and motive action tendencies. Appraisal processes run unconsciously and are ongoing, and “affect amplifies, organizes and selects these same appraisals for conscious attention. ... With development, appraisals become increasingly mediated by higher order meanings” (p. 153). The use of scripts that are programmed responses to changes in environment shows how emotions drive cognition. “Affective changes thereupon select, organize, and amplify one’s motive-relevant appraisal for conscious awareness whereas simultaneously activating broad classes of adaptive action” (p. 153). It becomes apparent that emotion is very active in the development of habits of thought and choice that become the basis for action. “With development, through such interconnected circuitry, emotional reactions come to be mediated by increasingly higher order

meanings and vent appraisals, whereas implicitly active affective processes continue to organize higher order thought and action” (p. 155).

Next, feeling tone is about the phenomenal or subject experience of emotional states. They are most often described in terms of circumstances prompting the feeling, or as metaphors. Motive action tendencies “consist of voluntary, involuntary, and communicative actions that function in the service of the appraisals involved in the emotional experience” (Mascolo & Fischer, p. 153). These are functional, in that they operationalize the motives, whether they are desired, espoused or actual habits of behavior.

Mascolo and Fischer discuss how all this is integrated, and how higher order cortical control is organized by the lower order processes like emotion/affect which generally function outside of conscious awareness.²⁰ They also link this to the notion of a triune brain; reptilian, limbic and cortex (Maclean, 1990). The organization of higher order control processes by emotional processes shows the tremendous influence of the earlier formed limbic brain structure.

Transformation Rules

We have thus far looked at cognition, emotion and action, and now we will examine how patterns of organization among them are developed through transformation processes. A simple example of this would be how a young child learns a number of specific sensory motor skills at a systems level. At some point, things like putting on pajamas, brushing teeth, getting into bed and so on go from a system of such skills to being represented under the concept of bedtime. For Fischer, developmental change is “defined in terms of structural transformation in patterns of thinking, feeling, and action within particular domains and context” (Mascolo & Fischer, p. 168). The nature of the transformational processes themselves can be seen as a set of rules. While the levels of development themselves describe the macro developmental process, transformation rules can provide micro, or within level descriptions. They “specify how a skill is transformed into a new, more advanced skill” (Fischer, 1980, p. 497). Fischer lists these as; intercoordination, compounding, focusing, substitution, and differentiation. Differentiation, substitution, compounding and focusing are micro-developmental skills leading and contributing to the macro-developmental transformation of intercoordination.

Differentiation is where what was a single set becomes separated into distinct subsets. The process can occur at either a micro or macro developmental level. This process can be useful when encountering a new task at a level of complexity where one already has skill in a related domain, but can benefit from breaking the task down into subsets at an earlier skill level where there is a more functional level of performance readily available. Substitution involves the transference of a skill from one task to another. The environmental condition best supporting this process is one where all the other variables are held steady and only the specific task itself varies.

²⁰ A very interesting facet of this research has shown that it is possible for negative emotional experiences to skew development in relation to what are normally positive biases. This skewing can lead to more sophisticated cognition about negative situations than positive ones, and has significant implications for understanding behavior.

Compounding is the combination of two or more skills at the same level of complexity. Again, the presence of some environmental factor is required to induce this process. The difference from intercoordination is that the skills operate within a given level of complexity rather than involving a jump to a higher level of coordination. However this kind of compounding process is an important precursor to intercoordination.

Focusing on moment to moment behavior is an even finer grained microdevelopmental process. It is commonly understood as attention. In relation to a given domain of tasks, a person will have a specific set of skills available. Only one of these can be held in the foreground of attention at any one moment. The ability to control a shift in focus can enable a person to move between skills at a given level and contribute to the process of compounding them or even intercoordinating them.

Intercoordination, or reciprocal coordination, is about how a person combines skills to move from one level to the next, much like how we envision atoms with specific properties combining to form molecules with entirely new properties. This process utilizes the micro-developmental skills described above and is dependent on a dynamic interplay between the organism and the environment. As such it cannot be viewed as a purely intentional act of will, but conditions at the boundary interface of the two.

This description of some of the main elements of Fischer's dynamic skill theory highlights his complex view of development. While there is also complexity in the ego stage theories, and they contribute something vitally important to understanding ourselves, my perception is that they end up needing various refinements or add ons to address some of the core issues that become starting places in dynamic skill theory. Starting from a different unit of analysis and set of premises enables a different picture to emerge about human development. What is yet to be done, in my view, is to truly integrate how these strands of soft, or ego oriented theories and hard or domain specific theories exemplified by Fischer's dynamic skill theory can together provide a more integral understanding.²¹

Coalescing Around a Common Core Metric

Next, building on the strand of work Fischer and colleagues (and others not described here) have done, I will now focus on the development of metrics related to this conception of development. It was noted that earlier researchers like Loevinger and Kohlberg built their theories together with assessment methods to measure stages. In this section I will examine work done to develop a metric aligned with Fischer's domain specific model.

²¹ While this is the view and interests that I have come to at my current understanding of the field, it has been noted that in various academic circles this discussion was ongoing in the 1980s. Currently there is more focus on the distinction between stagnant models, with metrics whose level definitions are content laden and reified, and dynamic models, with metrics that are built to continuously accommodate new knowledge about learning and development. (Dawson, personal communication, March 2, 2014).

Commons

Michael Commons was also one of the students of Kohlberg who perceived the need for a domain independent measure of the complexity of tasks. He developed a model of hierarchical complexity and the Hierarchical Complexity Scoring System (HCSS) (Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998) as a way of organizing the complexity required to complete any task or to solve any problem. This model is focused on core structures of stages rather than content or surface structures, and has a mathematical focus. It uses an internally consistent mathematically based understanding of hierarchical complexity, a model that follows the same logics of differentiation through the entire spectrum of development. It uses a mathematical tool called Rasch analysis to assess coherence in responses. Commons (2006) describes what makes his model distinct by noting that:

First, hierarchical complexity of tasks forms an absolute scale rather than one based on norms, or content. Second, it is formulated in a manner similar to other measures from measurement theory Third, it separates the empirical stage of performance from the largely analytic hierarchical complexity of tasks. Fourth, rather than basing stage on some inferred mental or logical operations; stage becomes the performances on tasks of a specified hierarchical complexity that are accomplished. (p. 88)

Commons even later applied this to a cross species perspective (2006), showing how the concept could be applied to tasks of any kind.

Dawson

Theo Dawson's research has

focused on refining our understanding of the construct that underlies all longitudinally bootstrapped developmental scales (Piaget, Fischer, Kohlberg, K&K, Armon) and, with reference to the domain independent theories and metrics of Commons, Case, Fischer, and Piaget, translated these insights into a refined content-independent developmental assessment system and a set of methods that are used to describe detailed learning sequences in any domain of knowledge. (Dawson, personal communication, March 2, 2014)

This led to a calibrated metric that could be used to assess individual performance. This approach, arising from critiques that noted shortcomings in models that were bootstrapped from conceptual content based on a group of researchers' initial input, focuses on universal properties underlying developmental stages, derived from empirical work and model building. In this section I will attempt to outline the major steps and components in this work, as it provides a way of assessing development in relation to how Fischer and colleagues have modeled it.

Dawson began with a number of studies that examined the relationship and distinctions between existing metrics for assessing stage development. Dawson (2002) is a study comparing SISS, GLSS (Good Life Scoring System) and HCSS. She examined scores from 209 participants between the ages of 5 to 86 and found that all three scoring systems "to a remarkable extent,

assess the same dimension of performance” (p. 169). Further work on this was done in another study by Dawson, Xie, and Wilson (2003). In it, 378 moral judgment scores from SISS were also scored with the HCSS. The emphasis here was on separating conceptual content as a scoring element from using hierarchical complexity. The article points to the advantages of a domain general scoring system over systems connected to specific domains and dependent on content for making stage distinctions.

Dawson (2001) also developed a distinction between core structure, surface structure and conceptual content. She noted high levels of inter-rater agreement among different scoring systems and explains this “by positing that core structural features influence stage ratings in all three systems, whether or not these principles are made explicit in a given scoring system” (p. 12). This distinction between core structure, surface structure and conceptual content becomes essential for the development of a common core metric across what were previously researched as domain specific development. The following explains this distinction in more detail.

The conceptual content layer is the layer referenced when a stage score is awarded based on the explicit presence or absence of a specific conceptualization without reference to any formal criteria. ... The surface structure layer is referenced when a particular conceptual content is said to represent a more general principle or concept that is associated in a given scoring scheme with a particular stage. ... The layer representing the core structure is referenced when form, organization or relations are in the foreground and particular conceptual content is seen only as indicative of a particular hierarchical order of abstraction. (pp. 9-10)

Dawson, Commons, and Wilson (2005) continued to develop this work and looked at the “shape” of cognitive development. They addressed the debate over whether development is continuous or discontinuous, as it could appear both ways. The result of this analysis was a clear picture of development as a series of spurts and plateaus, supporting the conception of stages of development as discontinuous.

Application

All of the work to support good developmental assessments has been aimed at offering a better way to do testing in education than the current high stakes system. (This is in relation to both K-12 and higher or adult education). Dawson and Stein (2011) talk about fundamental aspects of testing and its impact on students and learning. Questions like what is worth measuring and how it is measured are examined to make a case for shifting how testing is done. By building on Fischer’s Dynamic Skill Theory, Dawson aims to provide “methods for building empirically grounded learning sequences in a variety of domains” (p. 9).

As part of this emphasis on education, Dawson (2004), in *A Good Education is ...*, examined developmental concepts of education, focusing on epistemological structures. She examined a variety of phenomenological research on education, identifying five qualitatively different conceptions or types of learning. This led to detailed descriptions of how “learning” is conceived at each different level of complexity, and a map of conceptions of a good education at each level. Currently, Lectica (the company developing and administering Lectical assessments) has a

number of assessments designed for specific purposes and all built from this common core metric.²²

The development of these assessments has followed a process of;

- establishing collaboration with other researchers, clients, content experts and end users,
- identifying assessment goals and specific target constructs,
- continuing to work with clients and end users,
- using the LAS to score performances and starting to develop learning sequences,
- organizing these results into rubrics,
- do early releases for field testing, and
- iterate continuously based on data and feedback from users.²³

A goal of these assessments is for everyone involved to learn – test takers, teachers, analysts and test designers. This helps foster a dynamic assessment system that continually upgrades and incorporates what is learned in the system.

In a commentary on the broader field of developmental assessments in general, Stein & Heikkinen, (2009), noted the issue of how assessments developed with one purpose in mind gain widespread usage for other ends. It appears that not much attention has gone into this issue within the larger integral community of practitioners. The principle of how casual uses of formal theories can lead to misuse of those theories has been explored earlier by Ross (2008).

Reflections

Here I wish to step back and make some observations that have arisen from this journey through developmental theory. First of all I am glad that I invested the time and energy to become more familiar with this broader range of research and theories that taking the FOLA course exposed me to. It has enabled me to see connections between ideas I had encountered in other domains with developmental theory. As well, questions, nuances and limitations arising from the earlier range of theories I had encountered were addressed in ways that make it clearer to me that as a whole, the field of developmental theory has a good grasp on the nature of human growth.

That said, I also recognize that I now am more sensitive to some issues I notice being prevalent in the larger integral community (primarily Wilberian, as I am not as well versed in the discourses of other integrally oriented communities). I will start with one of the more technical issues that can arise. This is a need to clarify the difference between metrics and models. We

²² I have recently had the opportunity to use two of the Letical assessments, the LSUA (on self-understanding) and the LDMA (on decision making). In addition, as part of the FOLA course, I took the LDPA (a pedagogical skill assessment) twice. I learned a tremendous amount from taking the assessment, reviewing the client assessments, and engaging in a debrief with the clients. The clients all found the reports insightful and useful in offering ways to further reflect on their performance and self-images and undertake specific means for growth.

²³ A more detailed description can be found at https://dts.lectica.org/_about/devmaieutics.php.

often use metrics for different purposes than intended, or conflate the tools of measurement with the descriptive models associated with them. (See Stein & Heikkinen (2009) for a thorough discussion of this). Many practitioners use models and metric interchangeably without understanding the importance of the distinction.

As well, the desire to make use of the powerful lens that developmental theory offers can blind us to other lenses that may be more appropriate to understanding a given situation (Edwards, 2010). As well, the pragmatically oriented application of developmental theory and assessments by practitioners who newly encounter the field can lead to misrepresentations, reductionistic application and possible damage to clients. I know how hard it can be to avoid evaluating people and situations with this lens, yet there are more important things in life, (such as character, integrity, love) and we miss out when our vision is skewed by becoming overly enamored with it.

Next, I believe it is important to focus on normative issues in the use of developmental theory. One of the most visible ways this shows up was noted in the section on Piaget, with the (mostly American) tendency to almost obsessively at times pursue vertical developmental growth (which Piaget himself abhorred). While I will be one of the first to stand up in favor of the advantages such growth can bring, I also have begun to emphasize the importance of other considerations such as integrity (Reams & Caspari, 2012) and domain specific skill acquisition (Fischer, 1980; Reams, Gunnlaugson, & Reams, in press). The rush to cultivate vertical development could have an unintended consequence of leaving less than thorough foundations at a given level, or lead to more sophisticated means of justifying self-deception. The notion that such growth is good, and that “integral” stages of consciousness are inherently “good,” thus making it desirable to focus on fostering such growth, can be seen as problematic (Stein, 2010). I am now clearer that the study of human development needs to include a much broader range of intelligences in order to be truly integral and healthy.

At a much more basic level, I have encountered, (and been prone to myself at times), falling prey to the tendency to reify the complexities of human existence into simplistic notions. A favorite is to use Spiral Dynamics (Beck & Cowan, 1996) color language to describe someone as if it was a personality type. This type of reification and reductionism is not limited to developmental stage theory terminology, but can be particularly problematic when it is. One of my aims for this article is that it would make it harder to fall prey to this kind of use of language.

Another issue I find important is the need to better understand the distinction between soft and hard stage models. (See footnote 21 above for a comment on this). I have pointed out above that I feel both of these have significant contributions to make to our understanding of human nature. The first step for me has been to better understand the differences, in both methods and starting places, of each approach. There is something fundamental operating inside each of us that somehow organizes and makes meaning out of human experience. The value of understanding how that evolves is critically important, especially as we aim to move into challenges of leadership in today’s world and see the need for development in adults to more sophisticated and mature ways of engaging the world.

At the same time, our embodiment in this world is through specific experiences that are tremendously diverse. Our tendency to reduce the complexity of this diversity into simple generalizations often misleads us into limited understandings of people and situations. The understanding possible through dynamic skill theory can counter this, and give us a lens for looking in a finer grained manner at individual variation in the diverse contexts in which it occurs.

What I have gained from this journey is primarily a much more nuanced perception and understanding of the huge range of possible ways in which we grow as people. These preliminary observations about the value of and need for integrating these two main stands (ego and domain specific, or soft and hard stage theories) of developmental theory require work to flesh out. (I'm well aware that others may have already begun or done this work, but I've confessed to being a relative beginner at this up front). They are also only one step in a longer term process I aim to engage in. This has more to do with examining and reframing some of fundamental assumptions around the nature of human existence and then seeing what implications this has for the above reflections. Always more to do.

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An Exploration of the Meaning-making of Vehement Hardliners in Controversial Social Issues: Reactions to Youth Unrest in Suburbs of Gothenburg Sweden

Thomas Jordan¹

Introduction

The solution, as I see it, is first to impose a curfew for those under 18 years and after 6 pm. Then those who are caught in the act should be sent to a correctional institution, no pampering and nice dinners, there should be water and bread. Then parents and children with a foreign background should be expelled from the country for an undetermined time, with immediate effectuation. Only then the authority has done its job. If the hooligans come to my street, there will be a blood bath!

[Reader comment on a newspaper forum, no. 49]

During the last few years there have been a number of incidents in suburbs of in my own hometown, Gothenburg, Sweden, involving groups of young people who have set fire to cars and attacked police and rescue service personnel with stones. The events have not really been comparable to major riots involving large numbers of people, like in Paris or large UK cities. The number of participants in the disturbances has been relatively small, with less than 50 participants in most cases. As in many other cities, the disturbances have taken place in suburbs characterized by low-income residents, high unemployment rates, especially among youth, and a high proportion of immigrants from the Middle East, the Balkans, Somalia and many other countries. Since such incidents have occurred repeatedly over at least a decade, the general impression is that no effective strategies exist to stop the violence to people and material belongings.

This article does not focus on the troubles in the suburbs as such, but rather on the reactions to them. I am interested in a better understanding of the part of the population that advocate very harsh, radical actions in response to the troubles, and hold contemptuous opinions about the youth involved. The purpose of the article is rather modest. I will report on an explorative effort to pinpoint the properties of the meaning-making of "vehement hardliners" (explained below) and outline a tentative framework that might provide a point of departure for further, more comprehensive, investigations of the role that complexity awareness plays in the formation of views on controversial societal issues. At this stage, no efforts have been made to review

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previous research on related issues, present a stringent analytical framework or conduct more penetrating analyses.

Cars set on Fire in Gothenburg Suburbs

The car burnings and ensuing violence occur in periods. One such period with a lot of incidents occurred during August and the beginning of September 2009. On Friday night, 5 September, cars were set to fire in two different suburbs. On Saturday, the morning newspaper of Gothenburg, Göteborgs-Posten (GP), published several articles about the events, one reporting on what happened in the night before, another with a chronology of incidents during the past month. On the website of GP, a reader forum was opened on Saturday morning shortly before 9 a.m. The headline of the reader forum was: When will it stop? How should the police deal with the young? Website readers started to write comments. In the 2 hours and 45 minutes the forum remained open, 147 comments were posted in the forum.

I happened to see this reader forum while surfing a couple of news websites at about 11 a.m. I got very interested, for reasons I will explain further down, and started to download one page after another of the comments. However, I had just arrived at the most recent comments when the forum suddenly was unavailable. I wrote a mail to the editor in charge and asked for the reason, and got the following response:

We shut down the commentating, because the posts didn't keep in line with the topic question, but got more and more racist. "Put them in a cage in the Borås Zoo" etc.

Indeed. This kind of reader forum is filled with scornful, aggressive, often openly racist opinions, and the actions the commentators advocate are often violent or at least very harsh.

Discussion Forums on the Internet

During the last 4 years, I have spent many, many hours reading posts on open discussion forums on the internet. I have been a reader of two different kinds of forums. One is the aforementioned reader forums of Swedish newspapers. These reader forums are only opened in connection with some articles, presumably when the news reported can be expected to trigger different reactions among readers. Such a forum is usually open only for a limited time, usually a day or a couple of days. However, the number of posts can become large (several hundred) in a short time, as readers comment on a topic they have opinions about. Usually there is a starting question formulated by the website editor, but readers don't feel very obliged to keep their comments focused on answering this question. The threshold to participate is low, participants do not have to register in order to post comments. I have downloaded and read more than 15 such reader forums on various topics, most of them related to events involving violence in public spaces.

The other type of forum is permanent open discussion forums, where anyone who registers a user account can start a discussion thread. The particular forum I have read almost daily for four years is called Flashback (www.flashback.org). Flashback is a Swedish language forum with a large numbers of sections on various topics. There is one section called Aktuella brott och

kriminalfall, which would translate something like Current crime cases. As soon as media report a new murder or other crime of general interest, someone starts a thread about the case and invites other forum participants to join in the discussion. The basic idea is to find out, through collective effort, what happened and why. Such threads can continue for months and even years, and a single thread can come to comprise tens of thousands of posts. I have, over the last four years, read far more than a hundred thousand such posts on the Flashback forum.

One of my motives for doing this is that the internet forums offer me as a researcher a fascinating insight into how (some) people think and feel about issues of societal significance. Since the mid-1980s, I have been deeply interested in the field of adult development. I have in various ways, informally and in formal research, studied the variability in adult meaning-making regarding socially relevant issues, in particular in terms of complexity awareness (see e.g. Jordan, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2011; Jordan & Lundin, 2001; Jordan, Andersson & Ringnér, 2013). This interest is not merely academic: I do believe that understanding and working with the structures of awareness of individuals and collectives constitutes significant opportunities to contribute to a society with less suffering, more dignity and better lives for human beings. Reading internet discussion forums with a mind trained in discerning patterns of meaning-making of course leads to a spontaneous process of recognizing certain patterns and generating hypotheses about underlying structures.

This article focusses one particular reader forum, which I have studied in a more systematical way in order to pinpoint the properties of the reasoning and develop a hypothetical explanatory framework. However, the background for this case study is a comprehensive familiarity with a very large volume of similar material.

”Internet hate”

Anyone who has been reading internet forum comments on controversial topics has encountered a particular kind of statements. In the Swedish public debate, there is a name for this category of comments: *näthatet*, the net hate. Participants pour contempt over certain categories of people, who are described in stereotypical, often racist, terms. The tone is judgmental, aggressive and completely devoid of empathy. The posters advocate simple, harsh (often very violent and radical) measures. The messages take the form of firm assertions: what is to be thought of and done about the issue is presented as self-evident. There are no signs of a willingness to inquire into causes and alternative courses of action. On the one hand, we should be careful not to make the same mistakes as these people do, to bundle individuals with different patterns of reasoning into one category, assuming that if they show one of the characteristics, they also have all the other. On the other hand, there really seems to be a recognizable pattern, with many people expressing opinions that do show several of the characteristics described above. For lack of a better term, I will call people who advocate this kind of views vehement hardliners. The term is really meant to be descriptive, rather than evaluative.

I am interested in exploring the structural properties of the meaning-making that engenders (or at least allows) judgmental, simple and undifferentiated views on problematic societal issues. I think that we can safely assume that this kind of meaning-making is an important causal component in many serious societal conflicts and other violent actions.

General Properties of the Data Set

The setting has some salient characteristics that have to be kept in mind when interpreting the data. Participants in a newspaper reader forum are anonymous to each other. They chose a signature when they post and I have in no case seen that real full names have been used. The comments are made spontaneously, without much deliberation, since the forum is open only for a limited time. It is likely that many comments are written on the spur of the moment, perhaps in a state of being upset about a piece of news or by a comment from another participant. We cannot know what the poster would say about the issue in another kind of situation, e.g. when being face to face with other people with different views. We also do not know whether the opinions voiced in a reader forum are indicative of how a person would actually behave in decision-making situations, e.g. when voting in elections or when participating in a neighbourhood meeting. However, there are people who quite consistently advocate the same kind of harsh measures that a lot of forum participants propose. Some of them organize in political parties reflecting these kinds of views, of which some draw enough votes in elections to get represented in political assemblies.

As research material, reader forums of newspapers have the limitation that posts mostly are rather short and that most participants only write one comment. We cannot explore, whether by going through more statements from particular individuals, nor by asking questions, the wider pattern of meaning-making. We only get glimpses of the narratives and perspectives behind the rather brief statements made in the comments. On the other hand, I believe that the kind of views expressed by many of the forum participants are actually representative for the views some people hold on to, but they are views that are, so to speak, fragile if talked about in an research interview situation. In other words, it is probably difficult to get people with this kind of views to speak their mind in a straight-forward way if interviewed by a researcher with recording equipment running.

The limitation is, of course, a major one if we want to arrive at more solid conclusions about structures of meaning-making. However, I believe that this kind of data is useful for explorative studies that can lead to the formulation of empirically grounded hypotheses. Such hypotheses would then have to be tested using richer sets of empirical data, such as interviews, participatory observation or action research (such as engaging people in online discussions).

Quantitative Description of the Data Set

During the 2 hours and 45 minutes the forum was open, 147 comments were posted by 112 signatures. I have, when reporting numbers below, assumed that there is a 1–1 correspondence between signatures used and individuals. That is, I assume that the same individual has not posted with different signatures, nor that different individuals has used the same signature.²

Most participants, 90, only wrote a single post. 15 participants wrote 2 posts, 5 wrote 3 posts, 1 wrote 5 posts and 1 wrote 7 posts.

² It is possible that one individual posts with different signatures, of course, but not very likely.

I made a content analysis in order to identify different categories of content in the posts. I identified five more common categories:

- 74 posts (by 63 different signatures) contained suggestions about what action ought to be taken; measures.
- 42 posts contained critical comments, generally negative value judgements, about certain categories of people: the perpetrators, politicians, journalists, the police or parents.
- 34 posts contained general comments about immigration policies or other aspects of societal conditions and trends.
- 12 posts contained critical comments about other posts.
- 11 posts contained some idea about causes of the disturbances.

Of course one and the same post may contain statements belonging to several of these categories. A few posts did not contain any of these categories of statements. One post was difficult to make sense of, probably the poster was critical of the website editor. One post demanded that the forum should be closed, because of the racist comments. One stated doubt that the perpetrators really were local young people, another asked other posters what they believe about future developments.³ One poster just expressed personal strong reactions to the events.

A Closer Look at Proposed Measures

As mentioned above, 63 of the 112 participants advocated some type of measures. I have sorted the proposed measures into categories (Table 1). Some posters have offered more than one type of measure, then each is counted into the appropriate category below. In the cases where the same person proposed the same type of measures in more than one post, it was counted only once.

Table 1: Different types of proposed measures

Number of posters who advocated different types of measures	
a. Harsh measures towards perpetrators*	33
b. Deportation of perpetrators (sometimes also their parents)	21
c. Punishment of parents (including deportation)	12
d. General repressive measures in affected suburbs (curfew)	7
e. Increased patrolling (police and others)	6
f. Dialogue with young people and residents	6
g. Parents must take more responsibility	5
h. Residents should strike back (e.g. vigilance committees)	4
i. More restrictive immigration policies	4
j. Young people should be put to work	2
k. More collaboration between different actors	1
l. Increase support in war-torn areas rather than receive refugees	1

* Not counting "deportation of perpetrators," since this is reported separately.

³ "Will it come to civil war? What do you believe? Who will win? The Swedes, or immigrants who are used to war?"

I count the categories a, b, c, d, h, and i as expressions of "vehement hardliner" positions. Of course, the advocacy of measures that include painful consequences for perpetrators of violence is not in itself an indication that a person also has a contemptuous attitude, but there seem to be a pattern among many forum participants comprised of a combination of the above-mentioned properties. Of the 63 persons who advocated at least one type of measure, 50 were classified as "vehement hardliners."⁴ Several of the remaining 13 also used formulations that indicated similar feelings, but they did not actually mention any of the measures classified as "hardliner."

Again, we should be careful not to assume that advocating one of the six "hardliner" measures mean that the person also would endorse all the others. For example, advocating harsh punishments for perpetrators does not necessarily mean that one would also like whole families to be deported.

Many of the commentators who did not advocate any specific type of measures, but commented on, for example, another participant's comment or general political issues, could also qualify as "vehement hardliners." Some of them are strongly sarcastic or bitterly critical of Swedish immigration policies, for example.

Let us now look at what forum participants actually say.⁵ I have chosen posts that offer examples of the six types of hardliner measures listed above. Many of the posts illustrate several different characteristics of "vehement hardliner" attitudes and positions, as will be discussed later on.

Harsh Measures

What is here counted as "harsh measures" are statements about what ought to be done that go well beyond current practices within the legal system. Some posters advocate violent actions against the perpetrators, others call for harsher measures within the framework of the judicial apparatus. Some statements are not very specific about exactly what should be done, but are emphatic about the need to "stop pampering." Here are four examples, illustrative of somewhat different flavours:

The police should be police

The police ought to do as in the home countries of the youngsters. Beat the shit to pieces and there will be no stone-throwing. [11]

Get rid of them

Send the rubbish to a deserted island in the Atlantic and let them finish off each other!!! Our tax money goes to these vermin when it could be used for children with cancer in our hospitals. Damn it, mankind is so damaged. [99]

⁴ 26 persons mentioned one of the types of "hardliner" measures; 18 persons mentioned two types; 5 persons mentioned three types; and 1 person mentioned four of the types (see the quoted post in the beginning of this article).

⁵ The posts were numbered in chronological order. They were translated from Swedish by the author as close to the original text as possible in terms of style (including lack of punctuation, for example), connotations and substance. All examples given are the full text of the respective post, they have not been edited. The title of each post is the poster's own.

Hard measures

It is time that we show that we don't accept this any longer. Whether Swedish or immigrants. That they complain about not having a job isn't surprising. They don't give a damn about working in school and believe that everything will be served to them on a silver platter. I live in Hisingen and I see how all the children don't give shit about anything. This isn't about hating immigrants, they don't give a damn about conducting themselves. It is really high time to get tough. No more pampering. The police should arrest the rabble!! [115]

Change of law is needed

Change the law so that the police can use its resources to suppress the rioting. Curfew in the evenings and detention camps in Lappland for an indefinite time for the vandals who are caught.

Reprisals against parents to youth who have not reached the age of criminal responsibility, e.g. deportation. [38]

Deportation of Perpetrators

21 participants, a third of those who suggested measures, advocated deportation of perpetrators. These posters took, seemingly, for granted that the perpetrators have an immigrant background (which in many cases is probably true, but since few perpetrators have been identified by the police, this is not an established fact). Several of the comments in this category explicitly stated that the solution to the problem is simple: if Sweden starts to deport perpetrators, the unrest will stop. Here are three representative examples:

Deportation

...if it now is this way that immigrants and their children is the problem, the regulations ought to be changed so that even 2nd generation immigrants can be deported to the home country of their parents so that they get to know how good they had it in Sweden. Simply deport those who don't behave. [47]

Military

I think one should reward them with a journey to the Middle East! ONE-WAY ticket, we can afford that and we get a whole lot of free apartments for youth who behave themselves. Simple, cheap solution? [134]

Bye Bye

Send those who can't adjust home, it's in fact rather simple. What would have happened if we had behaved as they do if we went to their home countries. Well, we would probably have been stoned or assassinated in some other barbarian way! [121]

Punishment of Parents

12 participants included suggestions to punish the parents of perpetrators in their comments, mostly in conjunction with other measures (see e.g. post 38 quoted above). Below is one example where punishment of parents is a prominent ingredient.

The police should get tough

Hooligans think it is great to tease the police - and other citizens who behave themselves. Give them a lesson, deport when possible to prison terms in the home countries. We shouldn't pay for their rehabilitation (?) [question mark in original] in the prisons here. Make the parents liable for paying the costs – or put them in prison, preferably in their home countries. The problems cannot be talked away – talk doesn't work on criminals. [12]

General Repressive Measures in Affected Suburbs

Some participants suggested increased patrolling by the police or others. Such proposals were not counted as "repressive measures" if not accompanied with harsher conceptions, such as a general curfew or using military for surveillance. The first example included below is particularly belligerent, suggesting that perpetrators should be shot if they don't comply with orders.

Martial law

Impose martial law and curfew after 11 pm. Politicians of the region should actively participate with the police and rescue services to secure all areas.

If disturbances continue, warning shots should be fired and then effective fire on those individuals who don't understand anything else.

Since some don't adopt the customs of the places they go to, we have to start using the customs they are familiar with. [97]

I think

1. Impose CURFEW in affected areas after 8 p.m. until the rioting has ended. 2. Use military and the Home Guard to patrol the streets. 3. Arrest the suspects. [2]

The police ought to retreat one step...

... and send in the military and the Home Guard. Those who destroy their own areas don't want the police there, and also no human rights. So impose a curfew and arrest everyone who doesn't comply. If the parents cannot account for where their children are, arrest them too. They should feel it PROPERLY now! There will be no end otherwise. The police should not use their resources for this kind of nonsense! They should be able to focus on "real people" and "real crime." [104]

Residents Should Strike Back

Four participants advocated that residents in the suburbs should get tough and use violence to stop the young rioters.

Response to JAhman

But since these youth themselves burn down youth centers, for example, and other things the society has fixed for them and the fact that they have frightened away night wandering adults, who cooperate with the authorities, proves that the society makes efforts. But these individuals show their gratitude by destroying it.

If they don't want police and order in the suburbs, I suggest that we outlaw these youth, then vigilance committees are free to beat them up royally without penalty. Pay them back in kind! [72]

Take back

Lock them up and throw away the key. Demand responsibility of the parents, those who can't look after their children and teenagers (up to 19 years, responsibility) should be punished, if they cannot manage they should turn to the social services. People who get children should raise them and not blame the society. Youngsters and vandals who burn cars and throw stones at policemen, fire trucks and trams and blame it on their being terrorized and being outsiders in the society? Vigilance committees soon, COUNTERATTACK! [5]

More restrictive Immigration Policies

Of the participants who explicitly advocated some kind of measure, just four pointed out a restriction of immigration as a key measure. However, quite a few other posters made general comments about how the unrest in the suburbs is a consequence of too liberal immigration policies, or that they would now vote for Sverigedemokraterna, a populist party whose main mission is to radically restrict immigration. Below is a particularly emphatic statement of this sentiment, which I believe most would label racist:

The reason for this is the immigration of moslems.

The solution to this problem is effectuated as follows: 1. Stop the immigration of moslems. 2. Start a repatriation program for moslems. 3. Prosecute the moslem parents who have children of minor age who terrorize in the streets. 4. Educate about the doctrine of Islam so ordinary people understand what it is. [146]

A Further Observation

As can be seen in the examples above, quite a few participants use sweeping, undifferentiated formulations about perpetrators, parents and immigrants. In a few cases, this tendency to treat people as an undifferentiated collective goes one step further:

Reinforce the police

More police, maybe military to these areas. But NO ambulances or fire trucks. If somebody gets hurt they have to fend for themselves, if they start fires let it burn down. I think an earlier post was good with water bombs with colour :) [81]

Re henke

Youth centre are you kidding now, or what? if there is anyplace where they have invested a lot of money on youth like in rosengård they built a new youth centre there it was only 1 month or 2 then it was burnt down no this is something completely different like hate of Swedes [125; lack of punctuation in original]

These two posters seem to perceive the perpetrators (and even the suburb residents in general) as a monolithic collective. There seems to be no awareness of the heterogeneity of the people

involved, that the perpetrators is actually a very, very small number both of residents in general and of the local youth.

About Proposed Measures

In order to unpack the properties of the meaning-making structure common to the statements I will be using two angles: (1) to find descriptors for the actual content of the statements, i.e. what is present; and (2) to look for what is conspicuously absent in the statements (but might be highly relevant to the issue at hand). One reason for proceeding in this way is the hypothesis that people think and act as they do partly because they have not considered various elements of the complex web of causes, conditions and potential consequences in which a particular issue is embedded. Only through being oblivious to certain considerations, it could be argued, is it possible to uphold some of the hardliner opinions.

Characteristics of Contents

Four characteristics of the statements made

I believe it is fair to describe the character of the statements of the vehement hardliners in terms of four elements:

- Problem and solution are seen as simple (in the sense of uncomplicated, unifactorial)
- Categories of people are treated in undifferentiated terms
- There is a belief that harsh measures will be effective
- The affective tone is contemptuous and vehement

Problem and Solution are seen as Simple (Unifactorial)

The discourse in the posts is characterized by simple statements about the problem and what ought to be done about it. There is seldom any consideration of underlying causes for the unrest. When vehement hardliners at all mention causes, they mostly blame too liberal immigration policies. Explicitly or implicitly immigrants (often specified as moslems) are seen as people with fixed characteristics, and those fixed characteristics is the explanation of their destructive behaviour. The measures proposed are also simple in the sense that only one or a few uncomplicated actions are proposed as solutions to the problem. Several posters explicitly assert that the problem and its solution are simple (see post 47, 121, 134 above for examples): either people should just stop their destructive behaviour, or harsh punishments or deportations will stop the problem.

Some posters comment on alternative suggestions referring to contributing causes for the troubles and explicitly reject, sometimes with a sarcastic tone, explanations other than the inherent badness of immigrants. For example, a suggestion that a lack of youth centers may be part of the explanation for the unrest is ridiculed by a couple of posters.

Vehement hardliners seem to think that it is an easy thing for people to stop acting in antisocial ways and start behaving differently. There is no mention of any conditions that might

constitute an obstacle to such a shift in behaviour. The immigrant youth simply ought to understand that even if they are used to other conditions in their native countries, they should conform to Swedish laws and mores when in Sweden.

Categories of People are Treated in Undifferentiated Terms

Youth, immigrants, residents of suburbs and sometimes other categories of people (such as police, politicians) are talked about as if they all share the same characteristics. Vehement hardliners don't seem to feel a need to make differentiations, e.g. by pointing out that their comments only apply to certain subgroups. Statements that can be viewed as blatantly racist, in the sense of attributing collective negative fixed characteristics to ethnic or religious categories of people, are relatively common. A few posts advocate using radical measures, like deportation or harsh punishments indiscriminately towards these collectives (see post 146 above for an example).

There is a Belief that Harsh Measures will be Effective

The strong emphasis on using (only) harsh measures to deal with the problem seems closely related to the simpleness of the meaning-making. Proposals about what ought to be done seem to assume that causality is simple: pain will, if it is strong enough, force perpetrators to change their behaviour. Reasoning about causality is linear and only proceeds in one step. There are no efforts to seek further explanations of the destructive behaviour, nor any concerns about possible negative consequences of the remedies proposed.

The Affective Tone is Contemptuous and Vehement

Many of the statements are permeated by contempt, vehemence and disparagement. Strongly sarcastic comments about various categories of people are common, not only of perpetrators and immigrants, but also about politicians, journalists and other representatives of a society that, according to the vehement hardliners, are naïve, concerned with political correctness and cowardly.

Conspicuous Absences

When comparing the statements of the vehement hardliners with other views on similar events and problems, it is obvious that certain types of thoughts and lines of reasoning are conspicuous by their absence among vehement hardliners. Some such absences are the following:

- Explanations that point to societal conditions, such as marginalization, unemployment, barriers to the labour market for young immigrants, residential segregation, poverty. Consequently there are no proposals for measures targeting systemic conditions.
- Explanations that point to social mechanisms, like lack of appropriate socialization conditions in families with a history of fleeing from war-torn areas and being marked by traumatic experiences, torn social relationships and a loss of customary norm and identity systems. Consequently there are no proposals for measures that aim at remediating the shortcomings of the social conditions close to the perpetrators.

- Conceptions about internal psychological structures and processes among the perpetrators that might both explain self-images and behaviour, and constitute obstacles to development of socially adjusted identities and life trajectories. Consequently there are no proposals for measures that might scaffold development of ego structures and of constructive self-images and skills.
- Reflections about possible negative short- and long-term consequences of harsh measures (such as a escalating antagonism, stigmatization, bitterness, possible loss of legal rights of individuals and the general climate in the society). Consequently there is no reasoning about how such consequences might be prevented or managed.
- Considerations about the difficulties involved in identifying and seize perpetrators and bring them to court.
- Considerations about the possibility of actually carrying out some of the more radical suggestions, such as mass deportation of Moslems, in relation to, for example, Sweden's obligations to international law and conventions.
- Empathy with and benevolence in relation to people in unfavourable life circumstances (which is just the opposite side of the contemptuous and vehement affective tone mentioned above).

I will summarize these absences into four categories:

- Systemic measures: Absence of measures that address societal conditions in general and social conditions in the immediate environment of the perpetrators.
- Measures to scaffold individual development: Absence of measures that would scaffold development of skills and self-images of youth with established anti-social behaviour.
- Problematization of implementation: Absence of consideration of difficulties in implementation and problematic consequences of harsh measures.
- Empathy: Absence of empathy and benevolence in relation to perpetrators and other parties concerned.

Eight Properties Calling for Explanation

According to the interpretation of the data made in the two preceding sections, there are eight properties of the meaning-making patterns of vehement hardliners that call for explanation: Statements are simple, undifferentiated, harsh and contemptuous, and there is an absence of systemic measures, measures to scaffold individual development, problematization of implementation and empathy.

As has been evident from the discussion above, I believe that one part of an explanation for the existence of the "vehement hardliner" views is to be sought in properties of the subjects' meaning-making structures, in particular in the failure of the vehement hardliners to notice and consider causes, conditions and potential consequences of the whole issue complex. Of course a perspective that focusses patterns of individual cognition is only one part of an explanation of the phenomenon of vehement hardliners. Many other explanatory perspectives would be needed for a more complete understanding of the phenomenon, for example consideration of individual emotional biographies (such as attachment types), social constructions of self and others, effects of the properties of online communication technologies, development of socio-economic patterns

in the society, media practices regarding reporting of crime, failures of the educational system, and so on. However, a deeper understanding of the internal operations of the meaning-making that leads to vehement hardliner views seems to be a significant contribution to this rather disturbing societal phenomenon.

In an earlier Integral Review article (Jordan, 2011), I outlined a conceptual framework for analysing structures of meaning-making in the context of grappling with complex societal issues. A key concept for me is complexity awareness, which in short points to the degree of awareness a person has of the possibility that issues may be embedded in complex webs of complex causal relationships and conditions (such as being conditioned by properties of the system they are embedded in). An important aspect of the concept is that it points to the expectation (or "pre-understanding") that things may be complex in a way that warrants attention, rather than manifested knowledge about actual complex patterns.

In figure 1, I suggest a tentative explanatory model based on the hypothesis that "weak complexity awareness" is a major contributing factor for explaining the eight properties described above. The basic argument is that vehement hardliner views are only sustainable when complexity awareness is weak. The data set used in this exploratory study is too limited to allow testing to what extent the connections outlined in figure 1 are meaningful as ways to understand and explain the views of vehement hardliners.



Figure 1: A tentative explanatory framework for vehement hardliner views

I expect that a more thorough study of the properties of meaning-making structures among vehement hardliners, in particular if based on interviews or participatory research (actually engaging vehement hardliners in discussions about their views), would show that the model in figure 1 is too simplified to accurately explain the inner workings of vehement hardliner reasoning. However, I do believe a study designed to critically explore to what extent the

connective patterns outlined in figure 1 are valid would yield useful and highly meaningful insights into a the nature of political meaning-making among groups of people who actually say they want to use violence and other very harsh methods for dealing with societal problems. Societal tensions and conflicts may escalate to become serious threats to the possibilities to manage our societies in constructive ways. When this happens, we need knowledge that allows us to develop skillful strategies to deal with destructive political views and actions.

On Spiritual Books and their Readers: A Review of *Radical Kabbalah*

Gafni, Marc. (2012). *Radical Kaballah 2 Volume Set*. Integral Publisher, LLC

Reviewed by Zachary Stein¹

As a philosopher of education I worry about what people read, and that there are so many of them reading so much. The mass production and circulation of reading materials pre-dates television in demonstrating the breathtaking impact of industrialization on education. Since World War II, more books have been published than in the whole of prior human history, and more people read those books than have ever read anything before. From one perspective the *book* has been a triumph, allowing for profound changes in how people come to gain access to the knowledge they use to understand themselves and the world. But the book is a fundamentally flawed educational technology. For most of their existence books were so difficult to publish that only the most important were printed. This is no longer the case, which is why the design flaws inherent in the book are becoming more and more obvious.

Books are too authoritative, for one. There is no arguing with a book, let alone having it explain something some other way. Books are monovocal and monological, not to mention linear, un-dialectical, and non-dialogical. They are not good teachers because they simply tell you how it is. Even the best book cannot clarify itself, except in so far as it references other books. And, of course, books are notoriously prone to misinterpretation. Consider the mass hermeneutic turbulence produced by our contemporary overabundance of texts: with tens of thousands of books hitting the shelves each month and the overall literacy level stuck at around 8th grade, that's millions of misinterpretations a day, at least. This is especially problematic when it comes to spiritual books. These books are the top sellers, and given their popularity and the broad swaths of the public they attract, *who knows* how the ideas they express are fitting into the conceptual ecologies of readers. Ever since the spiritual counter culture started founding publishing houses in the 1960s, the American mind has been relentlessly disequibrated by an ever-expanding universe of discourse about the religious and spiritual.

Post-modern spiritual books and their readers are important because they are yet another indicator of major recent reconfigurations of religious authority in America. In 2010, I wrote a paper for the *Journal of Integral Theory and Practice*, called "On spiritual teachers and teachings" (Stein, 2010). In this paper I took a socio-philosophical look at the predicament of authority faced by 21st century spiritual teachers. I was concerned with characterizing the dynamics of teacherly authority and the varieties of educational configurations that surround what Habermas (2002 p. 52) has called "the new de-institutionalized forms of religiosity." I offered a set of nor-

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mative distinctions intended to help clarify the value and validity of emerging spiritual teachings and teachers. That is, I offered some ideas about how to separate the "California clap trap" from the forms of religious language and practice that make a legitimate claim as "vehicles for possible truth contents" —again quoting Habermas (2008 p.152). After building a philosophical model for distinguishing between different types of religious educational configurations, I contrasted two educational organizations with illustratively different teachings and teacher-student authority dynamics. Andrew Cohen's EnlighteNext and Dr. Marc Gafni's Center for Integral Wisdom served as foils, allowing me to demonstrate the differences and similarities between these versions of 21st century religious educational authority. Part of the contrast consisted in their differing theoretical orientations, while another contrast centered around the dynamics of teacherly authority and teacherly practice.

A neglected theme in my discussion was the role of religious scholarship and scholarly lineage as an aspect of teacherly authority. That is, I failed to discuss the respective *books* related to each educational organization—and books have always been a critical component of all religious educational configurations. Gafni's books, especially his newest, *Radical Kabbalah* (2012) and *Your Unique Self* (2012a), are texts that belong in a fundamentally different scholarly discourse than most contemporary paperbacks sold by spiritual teachers. Many popular spiritual books, such as Cohen's (2011) *Evolutionary Enlightenment* (or any number of others, such as *The Power of Now* or those by Byron Katie) are texts that stand outside religious traditions and lineages. These are non-lineage texts, without scholarly depth or reference. They are not engaged with any particular religious tradition, although they may reference them and their authors may have practiced with teachers from traditions. It has been clear to me for some time that this divorce from lineage and tradition leads both to a new fangled form of post-modern guru worshiping (where personal charisma makes up for the poor quality of the text) and to a retreat into *ad hominem* arguments against specific teachings (where personal attacks take the place of reasoned debate). So it is that these books draw much of their power from their non-denominational character, their "spiritual but not religious" flavor, and the personal revelations and insights of their authors.

Gafni's books are both like this and not at all like this.

Beyond Popular or Academic: Mystical Hermeneutics and Ecstatic Scholarship

On the one hand Gafni offers books that are post-traditional in that they speak to a broad swath of the public who are either not located at all or not exclusively identified within any particular spiritual or religious tradition. On the other hand they make fundamentally different moves than other books in the genre, moves that require an admirable breadth and depth of scholarship. These texts differentiate from the great traditions but they do not disassociate. Virtually all the other books in this genre fail to make this move and wind up disassociating from the great lineages without being able to generate any comparable source of breadth and depth. Gafni's books aspire to advance sophisticated scholarship in a specific religious tradition, reconfirming the relevance and power of rigorous scholarship, while moving beyond a merely academic impetus and impact.

To use a well-worn trope from Wilber's Integral Theory, Gafni's books *transcend but include* the rigors of academic scholarship and religious tradition. Whereas most spiritual books are not rigorous enough to pass as a dissertation project, Gafni's work is at the leading edge of a rigorous tradition of scholarship. The evaluative issues here cut both ways, as the standards of the academy are irrelevant to the motives and impact of many spiritual books. Yet, by transcending and including these standards, Gafni brings his work back into the marketplace of ideas and out of the minutia and irrelevance that can bog down academic writing. The ideas have a richness and profundity that is informed by a rare hybrid of profound scholarship and lineage mastery that comes from engaging and evolving a great tradition. Gafni's scholarship serves as a model, not only in articulating a new framework of spiritual thought which I will discuss below, but in creating a new genre of book that offers a distinct intellectual strategy for developing and delivering ideas. At the heart of this approach is a dimension of engagement with the traditions that has already been noticed by integral theorist Sean Esbjörn-Hargens (2012), who deployed Jeffery Kripal's terms in describing Gafni's work as a form of "mystical hermeneutics and ecstatic scholarship." This is a key observation, as Gafni is not only a significant third person scholar of his native tradition of Kabbalah, he is also an advanced first and second person adept within the tradition, possessed of realization received from the lineage.

In the Introduction to *Radical Kabbalah* Gafni tips his hand and reveals some of his complex agenda. He calls the book an esoteric transmission, which hides appropriately under the fig leaf of the academic structure and rigor of the work. This is the only section of the two volumes where Gafni drops the academic veneer:

I am in love with these teachings, awed by their subtlety and profundity, moved by their commitment and depth and enchanted by their possibility. In the book before you however, I have remained faithful to the academy in deploying the tools of scholarship, in seeking to uncover Rabbi Lainer's [the lineage master whose works are the focus of *Radical Kabbalah*] teaching exclusively, without entangling it, explicitly or subtly with my own. None the less the initiated reader must remember that this is an esoteric work, one which in understated tones, intends to lay down a revolutionary, evolutionary set of spiritual principles which will be recognized as such by those with a pure heart and a clarified self. (Gafni, 2012, p. li)

The casual reader passes over these sentences without much attention, but the more careful observer notes words like *initiated*, *clarified*, *transmission* and realizes that something not *less* but *more* rigorous than traditional scholarship is afoot. Gafni also describes his own approach to the text beyond the classic canons of scholarship:

In approaching the master and his text... I followed the three-stage path of textual reading implied by the Baal Shem Tov. First, in a state of what the Baal Shem calls *hahna'ah*, reverential submission to what one is learning, I read every passage again and again, praying that I might realize Lainer's deeper intention and receive his transmission. Second, I moved from submission to what the Baal Shem calls *havdalah*, separation. In this stage of *havdalah*, I deployed a method of analysis, which involved two basic steps. As I read, I made a list of key topics, words and texts in Lainer. I subsequently gathered every reference to that text, theme or image, searching for the underlying pattern. At the same time I

studied... many of the original Zoharic sources that would have influenced *Mei Hashiloah*, to get a sense of how he was reading the tradition, what he changed in his interpretation, and why. Eventually, stage two yielded to stage three, which the Baal Shem Tov calls *hamtakah*, sweetening. *Hamtakah* involves an erotic ‘non-dual’ merger with the text, which occurs when the reader and that which is read become one. It is at this stage that the deeper intention of the Lainer’s Torah became startlingly clear, delightful, and beautiful, and the entire teaching opened up with radical clarity and joy. (Gafni, 2012, p. 1)

This form of scholarship is both rigorous and mystical—producing a set of books that reward carefully and repeated study. But aside from their distinct position in the scholarly landscape, what is so important about these books, and why as a philosopher of education would I prefer to see them read over than others?

Unique Self: Reclaiming the Personal and Democratizing Enlightenment

To my mind the core value of these books is that they reconfirm (in a compelling scholarly fashion) some of the most central ethical tenants of Western Civilization. Moreover, they do so by reminding us that the Judeo-Christian tradition contains a radical Enlightenment teaching, with a message about the collective Awakening of *everyone everywhere*. Gafni calls this the democratization of Enlightenment. This is a theological metaphysics justifying the reign of an Absolute Democracy, in which each must live so that all have the ability and dignity to be heard, known, and counted. The mystical core of the great democratic political revolutions can be found in the cipher of ancient texts, reinterpreted in each age, and again today, in order to enliven the struggle to create a world-order conducive to human liberation. As Habermas has stressed, there is currently no replacement for the world-disclosing power of religious language, especially in its capacity to give voice to the profound vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and potentialities of human social life.

The core theoretical innovation enabling the democratization of Enlightenment is what Gafni calls, *the reclaiming of the personal*. This idea is presented most clearly where he offers a comparison between two models of Self, his own model of Unique Self and Andrew Cohen’s Authentic Self or Evolutionary Self (a comparison undertaken in detail in Gafni’s forthcoming book *Two Models of Self and Why They Matter*). He notes that in classic Enlightenment teachings from the East the key move is from the personal to the impersonal. For example, Cohen’s community was for many years called the Impersonal Enlightenment Fellowship. This is the classic understanding of enlightenment, which finds expression in many Eastern schools of thought, including Buddhist and Advaita Vedanta. In Cohen’s book *Evolutionary Enlightenment*, for example, the word ‘personal’ is used dozens of times throughout the text, but always with a negative and pejorative connotation. The personal is not to be embraced; it is to be transcended. “Leave your story behind” has become virtually the clarion call of Enlightenment teaching in the Western adaption of most Eastern models.

Gafni (2012a, Ch. 7) points out that the conflation of the *personal* with the conditioned *personality* is a confusion that needs to be corrected. In Gafni’s model an essential distinction is posited between the personal before realization (of non-dual radically impersonal Emptiness or

God) and the personal that re-emerges after this realization. The former he terms separate self and the latter Unique Self. Unique Self is thus likened to a structure-stage of consciousness suggesting that to confuse the personal before realization with the personal that manifest post-realization is to fall into what Wilber terms a pre-trans fallacy. No less serious a mistake in Gafni's reading is to denigrate the personal in favor of an impersonal process, such as cosmic evolution, without distinguishing which level of the personal is being addressed. True enough, cosmic evolution (conceived as a panentheistic unfolding) is hierarchically beyond the pre-realization conditioned personality, but it doesn't efface the irreducible dignity of the post-realized personal, i.e. the Unique Self; in fact it find its expression in an infinite variety of uniquely personal forms. This is a lesson that cannot be stressed enough, especially in a context of discourse where an evolutionary ethic has emerged that turns a blind eye toward the tragedy of injustices that resulted from the enthusiasms of previous generations of evolutionary thinkers, from Dialectical Materialism to Eugenics.

Gafni's reclaiming of the personal is the ground of his non-dual humanism and sourced deep in the lineage upon which he draws. The following passage from the Introduction to *Radical Kabbalah* engages this point and is worth quoting at length:²

.....It is in this sense that we can begin to understand Lainer's provocative idea that the Torah was given by a Moses who is merged with God—not in the voice of God, but in the voice of Moses.... Lainer uses the Zoharic phrase 'The *Shekhinah* speaks through the voice of Moses' as a foundation for his position. This Zoharic phrase, describing the authorship of Deuteronomy, was understood in two very different ways. The theocentric understanding, reflected in most Hasidic works, is that Moses was so completely effaced that he became a kind of channel for the divine voice. For Lainer this is only the first instrumental level of enlightenment. The second possible understanding of the phrase 'the *Shekhinah* speaks through the voice of Moses', corresponding to the higher level of enlightenment in Lainer, is almost the opposite: Moses is not effaced, but is rather so completely present that his voice and the voice of the *Shekhinah* become one. Moses' unique persona, his voice and personality, incarnate the *Shekhinah*; through radical uniqueness, he participates in ontic unity with God....the *Shekhinah* speaking comes through the *intensification of individuality*, rather than through its effacement. Because the human is a part of God, the principle of acosmism does not negate but rather empowers the individual. The divine voice finds expression in the voice of the unique spirit, modeled by the prophet who manifests God's voice through the clear prism of his unique individuality. This is the core of Lainer's non-dual humanism. Lainer argues, both explicitly and implicitly, that the unique individual is the portal through which comes the revelation of the unmediated divine will, the new Torah that can override the law of Sinai. In various writings I have called this pivot in Lainer's thought 'sacred autobiography' or 'unique self.' (Gafni, 2012, p. liii-liv)

Now what is especially critical is that this capacity to "incarnate the *Shekhinah*" is understood in Gafni's writing, emergent from all of his sources, not as the domain of the elite but as an innate capacity available to every human being. He adduces relevant texts to overturn the dominant reading of Lainer's model as only referring to the elite and asserts, in Lainer's name, what he

² The term *Shekhinah* is one of the Hebrew names of God, connoting the Divine Presence in the world, often associated with the feminine or embodied existence of God.

terms “the democratization of Enlightenment.” Again, from the Introduction to *Radical Kabbalah*:

The goal of Lainer’s teaching is no less than the full democratization of enlightenment. He implicitly identifies and distinguishes between two forms of enlightened consciousness. The first is what we might call the instrumental level. At this stage of realization, the person is an instrument, like a flute or shofar, played by the divine. Images describing this stage of illumination were replete in the Hasidic teachings and writings which constituted Lainer’s intellectual framework. This is the level of utter surrender to the divine. As one internalizes this level and transcends it, one comes to another level, which Lainer associates with Temple energy and the Judah archetype. At this level, God does not move through the person as an external force animating and filling the person’s voice, but rather God is incarnate within the person, who achieves a radical identity with the divine. Lainer makes clear that this enlightenment is a possibility for every member of the community. Every human being has the potential of Moses. (Gafni, 2012, p.lii)

This teaching principle of democratization is a pivotal focus in the more popular and accessible companion to *Radical Kabbalah*, entitled *Your Unique Self*. It is the one the defining characteristics of Gafni’s work which seeks not only the evolution of the leading edge but the articulation of a world spirituality that can potentially become a shared spiritual language for large swaths of the mainstream. This language revolves around the idea of “higher individuation beyond ego,” tracing its roots to an enlightenment lineage which places *sacred autobiography* at the center of the awakening realization. Again from *Radical Kabbalah*:³

For Lainer, one who has become fully clarified becomes both the source of revelation and the incarnation of the *Shekhinah*.... Unlike most of the earlier sources, the kabbalist is not an empty vessel channeling the divine. Rather, the unique consciousness of the purified person, and even their unique unconscious, is divine. This implies that the *Shekhinah* that is one’s essence speaks *naturally* from within the enlightened individual. For Lainer, the self of the mystic becomes so conscious as to become transparent to his divine self. Erotic merger with the *Shekhinah* yields not the hermeneutics of sacred text but the hermeneutics of sacred autobiography. In this way, Lainer extends the erotic motif beyond traditional hermeneutics and applies it to reading the ‘text’ of the person’s unique self. This allows the individual to recover the personal revelation of divine will which is addressed uniquely to him. This revelation comes through the unmediated embrace of the *Shekhinah*, which is antinomian in a way in that is clearly different than any previous sources. Lainer’s incarnational *Shekhinah* theology is both empowering and limned with humanistic undertones.” (Gafni, 2012, p. xviii)

Or in a later passage:

Sacred autobiography...is itself a sacred text. It is the book of life. This is Lainer’s implicit reading of the old Kabbalistic teaching from Safed that every person has their own ‘letter

³ I’m talking so often from the Introduction because it is in essence a 60 page summary of the whole work, and beyond this I found that the main body of the text is too closely reasoned and tightly linked up with primary sources to allow for an easy lifting of synoptic quotes.

in the Torah.' Sacred autobiography both interacts with and, occasionally, even trumps sacred text, superseding one's obligation to the written canon. The initiate will understand that, far from giving easy license to one's desires, this path requires extraordinary discipline. According to Lainer, one can only access this revelation through the identification and embrace of one's uniqueness. Lainer makes a strong distinction between the sense of specialness or uniqueness at an egoic level, which needs to be purified, and uniqueness at the enlightened level of Judah-consciousness, which is both the expression of and the path to full realization. This level of enlightenment may be achieved consistently or even just for a time in an individual's life. It is through the depths of one's unique individuality, one's unique self, rather than in the transcendence of individuality, that one hears the voice of the infinite God in the *lehishah*, the whisper of personal revelation.... (Gafni, 2012, p. lxiii)

This notion of Unique Self changes the fundamental way we think about Enlightenment. Gafni's overarching point is that what is commonly referred to as Enlightenment or Awakening is available to every human being. This move towards the democratization of enlightenment is a core structure not of Eastern but classic Judeo-Christian thought. Gafni points out that a failure to understand the true nature of Enlightenment has kept it from having its critically needed impact as a legitimate modern belief, which would serve as an evolutionary strange attractor for human motivation and aspiration. Gafni redefines Enlightenment in its most basic terms as *sanity*. Once you understand Enlightenment as sanity then the democratization of sanity (aka Enlightenment) becomes a self-evident requirement. What stands in the way is the incorrect conflation of uniqueness and separateness (or personal with personality) which moves Enlightenment teachers to reject uniqueness; this in turn moves the mainstream population, who intuit personal uniqueness to be a critical source of human dignity, to reject Enlightenment.

The importance of these contrasting views of Enlightenment was brought home most vividly for me in two passages from Rabbi Lainer. Gafni explains the context for the passage, which makes reference to a section of the Talmud in which Moses takes the first census of the tribe while it wanders in the wilderness: "The census of Israel in the desert is an affirmation of the radical uniqueness of every individual. *Mispar* [the Hebrew word for] 'number' is not a technical means of identification but rather a badge of each individual's metaphysical uniqueness. For Lainer, the census in the desert is not aimed at yielding population statistics, that is to say, the final number of the community; rather, it is focused on the act of numbering every individual as the revelation of their uniqueness. Lainer states:

The idea of "lifting up of the head" (taking census) is in accordance with the Talmud (bBer, 58a): 'One person's mind is not similar to another person's mind.' For God apportioned goodness and life to each one in particular, and no one is similar to anyone else. It is therefore written, 'Lift up the head.' That is, every person should be in the place belonging to them. (Gafni, 2012, p 7)

Again, Gafni contextualizes another passage from Lainer on the same theme: "Lainer moves from a language of providence... to a language of the mystique of participation. Uniqueness is rooted in an acosmic metaphysics in which the human being is not merely subject to divine providence but actually participates in divinity. The result of this ontology is the daring, yet obvious-

ly necessary, assertion made by Lainer that if one unique soul, *nefesh biferat*, were to be missing, then divinity itself would be lacking. Lainer interprets the phrase "this shall be the number" (Hos. 2:1) as meaning that:

Everyone will be needed, for from all of the people of Israel God's greatness can be seen. And if one person is missing... then "the goblet would be lacking wine" (Cant, 7:2). Just as when the portrait of the king is drawn on many thousands of tiles—if one of them is lost, the portrait of the king would be lacking. (Gafni, 2012, p. 22)

This image brings to mind contemporary montages in which hundreds of thousands of photos are combined via computer to make one face—the uniqueness of each face unquestionably maintained, while the overall pattern of a single face is also distinctly clear. This is a powerful, if simple, encapsulation of the *acosmic humanism* that is the central scholarly contribution of these books. The theme is encapsulated in the mystical idea that each individual has a unique letter in the Torah—that each person is a unique word in an endless sentence spoken by God, whose illocutionary goal is total self-expression.

These kinds of theological and philosophical arguments for inviolable uniqueness and individual dignity pile up until a fundamentally new image of divinity and awakening dawns on the reader. It is not through the extinguishing of personality or the self that awakening unfolds. The goal of spiritual practice is not to merge one's personal uniqueness into some vast impersonal process. Instead, the goal of the religiosity argued for by Gafni is to become, to borrow his nomenclature, "outrageously sane," to be so "*fully human*," so fully *yourself*, that you liberate the powers needed to actualize the stunning uniqueness of your life. That is, the goal is to lift up your head and be counted, to affirm your irreducible individual dignity, and be empowered to participate as only you can in the evolution of humanity.

Toward a New Language of Liberation and Social Emancipation

This is all very different from lowering your head to look at your navel in meditation. Why be counted when you are really *nobody*? Why work to build a world that affirms the dignity of each and every person's *illusory* self? The radical teachings in Gafni's books expose the a-political, apathetic, and defeatist underbelly of so much of Western Buddhism, where the teaching of meditation is combined with affluence and liberal values to create an insular and self-affirming escape from the obligations of uniqueness. Who is left to stand up for the inviolable rights of individuals when everyone is sitting down, counting their breaths, and spending a small fortune on retreats from the world? There is no better ideological lubricant to grease our decline into a global corporate dystopia than a form of religiosity that denigrates the individual, promotes quiescence, and calls for a personal disappearance into some larger structure or process.

As early as the 1970's Habermas (1970 p. 27) identified Western Buddhism as a "sedative—an orientation that channels outwardly directed protest into apolitical paths...". Decades later, the critical theorist Žižek (2001) would announce even more provocatively that:

Western Buddhism is establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism...presenting itself as the remedy against the stressful tension of the capitalist dynam-

ics, allowing us to uncouple and retain inner peace...it actually functions as its perfect ideological supplement.... Rather than trying to cope with the accelerating rhythm of technological progress and social changes, one should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain control over what goes on, rejecting it as the expression of the modern logic of domination—one should instead, “let oneself go,” to drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance of this accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances.... The “Western Buddhist” meditative stance is arguably the most efficient way for to fully participate in the capitalist dynamic while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. (pp. 12-13)

The point here is not to critique Buddhism as a whole (some of my best friends are Buddhists) but rather just to point out that the most rapidly spreading religion in the Western world (Buddhism) is not a form of spirituality that has been leading its adherents to perpetrate disruptive social change in the name of social justice. The last time that happened on a large scale in this country it was a movement firmly rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition, under the leadership of a reverend with a dream about the dignity of each individual, the inviolability of human rights regardless of race, and the unique expression of humanity represented by African Americans. Today our enthusiasms for Eastern spiritual imports are leading us away from the discourse about individual rights and democracy leveraged so eloquently by Dr. King, which has served as the most powerful catalyst of social change in history. This language of liberation that is our heritage is being replaced by a language of liberation that is predominantly about the qualities of our own minds and emotional states and which includes the remarkable idea that by sitting for an hour a day on our \$90 buckwheat meditation cushion we are somehow helping to change the world. There is perhaps no more iconic representation of the new American post-modern spiritual landscape than a room full of homogenized white people sitting on sets of standardized cushions facing the wall.

In recent decades we have become increasingly homogenized and standardized, as individuals' lives have been forced into a matrix of techno-economic and political institutions of unprecedented reach and invasiveness. Counterintuitively, reported increases in individualism, narcissism, and entitlement reflect exactly these trends marking “the twilight of the individual.” The post-modern narcissist or entitled millennial are in fact suffering from radical doubt about their own self-worth and unbearable uncertainty about the value of their contributions to the world. As Kohut (1971) and other self-psychologists have taught us, the narcissistic personality is in fact an extremely fragile self-system, one almost totally dependent upon the affirmations of others. Conspicuous displays of self through social media, self-aggrandizing do-gooding, demands for special treatment and attention—these are not signs of the a self blown out of proportion, they are signs of a self desperate to be *seen*, a self needing to be *counted* among the worthy, needing to be *affirmed in its unique worth*.

The cure for the dysfunctions of post-modern identity formation is not a spiritual teaching that tells individuals to look through the illusions of their unique personal essence and beyond the unique time and place in which they live. In fact, the post-modern reader of spiritual books is already tenuously connected to their unique gifts (as opposed to the gifts the media leads them to wish they had) and the unique responsibilities of their time and place (as opposed to those di-

rected toward a world represented through social media). Most spiritual books offer a weak balm for the stinging anonymity and de-personalization of mass-customized lifestyles and post-historical consciousness. These books tell us that our particular personalities and places are to be devalued in favor of some abstract Universal (be it Evolution, Big-Mind, or The Great Perfection), leaving the reader confirmed in their suspicion that their unique life has no special value.

As a way of bringing this point home and as a kind of poetic closing it is worth quoting at length a teaching delivered by Gafni at Esalen Institute in 2012:

Your Unique Self is your irreducibly unique perspective which fosters your unique insight which creates your unique gift which engenders your unique responsibility to address the unique needs in your circle of intimacy and influence. Are you willing [as a seeker of Enlightenment] to play a larger game? Let me state the core premise clearly. We live in a world of outrageous pain. The only response to outrageous pain is outrageous love. Why can we not access the outrageous love necessary to engage in the evolutionary healing and transformation of ourselves and our reality? Because we shut our hearts to the unbearable pain of the world. Not merely because, as the classic Enlightenment teachers reprimand us, we are stuck in ego. Rather because the gap between our ability to feel and our ability to heal has become too great. It simply hurts too much. Through the virtues of the virtual media we are almost omniscient. We are aware today of a level of suffering that only God was aware of a hundred years ago. But unlike the classic vision of an omniscient but also omnipotent God, we are largely impotent to heal the suffering. Because the gap between our ability to feel and our ability to heal has become too great we shut our hearts and turn inwards in varying mixtures of overt narcissism and more subtle spiritual materialism in the form of soothing meditations and various pseudo-realizations of oneness and enlightenment. This is in marked distinction to the realization of Unique Self that closes the gap between the ability to feel and the ability to heal.... We now come back to our core premise. We live in a world of outrageous pain. The only response to outrageous pain is outrageous love. What does an outrageous lover do? She commits outrageous acts of love. Which outrageous acts of love? Those acts of love that are a function of her Unique Self. In this way the Enlightened Unique Self who is the incarnation of all that is, living in her as her and through her, intimately addresses the unique needs in her circle of intimacy and influence. In doing so she reclaims her potent power—the power of the *Shekhinah*—the power to heal and transform. The gap between the ability to feel and heal is closed. The heart opens once again and a sacred activism sourced in outrageous love perfumes all of reality. (Gafni, 2012b)

Gafni's work is a dramatic evolution of the languages of liberation that constitute the profound dignity of our Western traditions—languages of liberation that allow us to understand Enlightenment as a potent force for social transformation. This is why I argue for reading some books instead of others. It is in books that we find the images that catalyze our transformation and the words that we use to remind ourselves of who we are and what we are about. Gafni's books are unrivaled in their provision of a profoundly new language of liberation. These are teachings for our time, which is a time to practice spirituality in the world, fearlessly, with eyes open, and to participate in a planet needing to be transformed by the power justice and love. So I will do something out of character and say: *read these books*. You will be compelled by the rigor

and depth of the scholarship, while at the same time swooning from the depth of the ideas. Works like this come along once in a generation.

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Business Secrets of the Trappist Monks: One CEO's Quest for Meaning and Authenticity

August Turak (2013) New York: Columbia University Press.

Review by Jonathan Reams¹

Why I Wrote this Review

I do not tend to bother reviewing books that I am not inspired by. When I am inspired, I want to offer others the opportunity to be inspired as well, so sharing my impressions becomes a way of offering this opportunity. Twelve years ago I had the opportunity to meet August Turak (or Augie) at a conference called Inward Bound. It was hosted by the Self Knowledge Symposium (SKS) a group of students in the Raleigh North Carolina area committed to self-knowledge and development. Turak had inspired the group's formation, and was a keynote speaker at the conference. Subsequent opportunities to connect with Turak came shortly afterwards, and I recall listening to him tell the story of Brother John, which later won him the Templeton Foundation's Power of Purpose essay contest. The story was inspiring and touched on core values that I have always held dear.

Then this past summer Turak's long awaited book project was finally released. I found the book to be a great combination of principles and stories, both from the monks at Mepkin Abbey, and from Turak's extensive business life. While not of the genre of leadership books that I normally read, my personal experience with Turak made it an easy choice. *Business Secret of the Trappist Monks* is not a how-to book nor a research based book. It is not really a case study, although there are many stories and we do get to follow parts of Turak's own company's story. It is certainly not an academic treatise. Instead I see it as Turak's attempt to transmit to the reader the ineffable qualities of leadership and success he has seen and gained from being able to learn from masters of the art.

In what follows, my aim is to provide a Readers Digest version of the book. Just enough to pique your interest and give a feel for the message it contains, but not so much you feel you have gotten your fill. Turak is a great storyteller, and you would miss much limiting yourself to my short overview. I go chapter by chapter, weaving description with commentary, hoping to hint at the sense of the deeper purpose and meaning behind both Turak and the monks' way of engaging in the world of business.

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Chapter 1

Any good book needs to grab the reader with its opening, to somehow convey the essence of its message immediately. Turak does this by telling a story of Father Malachy and his death. After the funeral, walking with another monk and reflecting on how he died comforting others, he hears that “Everyone wants to die like a Trappist. No one wants to live like one” (p. 4). We are met with this image of the core principle of selfless service sustaining itself even in the face of death. What must it be like to live with this kind of grace at the core of our being? How can this way of being apply to our business life?

It is this very point that Turak sets out to prove: that the perceived dichotomy between success in capitalism and selfless service are not at odds, but are actually fundamentally inseparable. He notes examples of other Trappist monasteries renowned for their beer or preserves. Part of this comes from the view of human nature that Turak puts forward; that we all aim to transcend the selfishness of our early experiences of being human, that we all long for a transformation of being to enable us to go beyond ourselves. Why are people like Gandhi and Mandela so often used as models of great leaders? Their lives were examples of this journey of self-transcendence, to a life of surrender to service to others and to something greater than themselves. So how can we mere mortals live such a life?

Chapter 2

So then what is this transcendence we wish to have and experience? We can read, talk and imagine all we want as the means available to us for approaching it. Yet as Turak describes in one of his visits to his spiritual advisor, the 90 year old Father Christian, the gulf between all of the worldly learning and the experience of transcendence itself is “infinite.” Turak confronts the hard questions of the impact that the “success” of capitalism has had on our society; high depression rates, lack of happiness etc. as signs of a lack of this transformation. If we are treating the goals of capitalistic business as ends in themselves rather than simply means, we get lost in mistaking the nature of the transformation we are longing for.

This mistaken pursuit is shown in terms of three types of transformation; that of our condition, our circumstances and our being. He goes into how we “vote” to show what we really want by our behaviors, i.e. how we spend our money – dollar votes. What we spend a lot of money on is stories, whether books or movies or other forms, we spend billions on stories, and the ones that touch us most are the ones that exemplify the hero’s journey. The stages of this journey are briefly laid out and linked not only to examples from well-known movies, but also to business examples. What all of this points to is that our search for transformation cannot be done by proxy – we must undertake it for ourselves. As well, we see countless examples of the most common mistake or shortcut people try to take. For example, believing that we will be transformed by using power to make people treat us differently. Or worse yet, that by transforming others’ opinions about us, we will somehow be transformed. The energy that people expend on these illusory shortcuts are also illustrated in classic themes in storytelling, of turning to the dark side of trying to make ourselves bigger through others. Transformation is an inside job in the end, a renunciation or letting go of self rather than an abuse of self to change others.

Chapter 3

The seeking of this transformation is often latent in us at an early age, misplaced in various ways. Turak tells of a front row seat at a Rolling Stones concert in 1972 which left him feeling disappointed for weeks after. He looks back and sees that he was expecting some transformation of being to occur there, and when the transitory transformation of his condition that the concert provided was over, he did not know how much he linked it to a desire for the deeper, more stable transformation of being, thus his disappointment. This is also linked to noting that we experience self-consciousness as a painful thing, yet long to lose ourselves in a task, forget ourselves in moments of service, revealing our longing for selflessness.

Part of the early training Turak had was spending a year as an apprentice to Louis Mobley, one of the creators of IBM's executive leadership school in the 1950's. There he learned about the importance of mission and purpose, and to "aim past the target." This led to a teleocratic management or leadership model, where service and selflessness are the mission.

One of the joys of reading this book comes from the personal stories Turak tells to show how he has learned many of these principles. As a consultant to a startup, working to help scale a rapidly growing business with a young sales force, he encountered an arrogant young man who resisted all attempts to coach him. A mistake by Turak in cutting off a young woman during a training session led to unease in himself and an inability to make it right. He finally found himself asking this resistant young salesman for help, which led to an opening to coach him and a transformation of his character. He learned many lessons from this, especially the need to go first and be vulnerable.

Chapter 4

In this chapter we learn about "goat rodeos." Stories of the early days of Microsoft were not about the millionaires made through stock options, but about being part of a team that would pull off an impossible task with an impossible deadline. This leads into a description of transformational organizations, both conscious and unconscious. Many startups take off and attract people willing to put themselves into full engagement mode to be able to experience the kind of transformation of being that comes from doing something greater than you ever thought you were possible of, over and over again. Yet if this culture remains unconscious, it often fades.

Turak uses three organizations as examples of how a conscious orientation to transformation of being can enable sustainable commitment and engagement. AA, monasteries, and the US Marine Corps, as different as their domains of activity are, all use methods aligned with consciously creating this transformation of being. They also all aim past the target. For example, AA does not aim to simply get people to stop drinking. This is a byproduct of the transformation of being essential to sobriety. These organizations also all depend on service, whether to God, country or helping someone else stay sober.

Turak talks about the challenge of going through the desert of transformation, or the dark nights of the soul as part of the necessary journey. Shortcuts to avoid this desert fuel sales in the self-help industry, exemplified by the instant, microwave, have it all now, weekend

enlightenment seminars. He returns to the story of the movie *The Devil Wears Prada* to show how dedication to the process and perseverance get you through the desert, and enable the transformation necessary to move forward on the other side. Turak's own version of this is told in his early adventures as a carpet layer. Later, he describes how his own software company got a chance to have their own goat rodeos when Microsoft would call with an impossible request that needed to be done the same day.

Chapter 5

After laying the groundwork about why a mission of transformation of being through service and selflessness is essential to business success, Turak now turns to the how. How can we enact these lofty ideals in our everyday lives? The first example is a regional credit union that has as its mission to enhance the quality of life of its members. Turak takes what could be perceived as a touchy feely business philosophy and shows how it has enabled this financial institution to guide its decisions and grow even in the recent economic crisis.

He then describes some of the story of how the Trappist movement began with Gethsemani in Kentucky, how Thomas Merton was involved, and those who left to found Mepkin Abbey. This brings him to Father Francis Kline, the abbot during the time of his visits. He uses the word holy as the only way he could describe Father Francis, and my own brief opportunity to meet him allows me to have had a taste of the quality of presence Turak alludes to.

Turak goes on to tell of the founding of SKS, the Self Knowledge Symposium at three Raleigh North Carolina universities and how his commitment to meet once a week with these kids led him to turn down a dream job opportunity. This principle of keeping his word ended up paying off far more handsomely than the potential dream job (the company ended up bankrupt). Through this he learned what his Zen master said about it being more what he didn't do than what he did that made a difference on his journey – he never sold out.

Chapter 6

This chapter looks at how selflessness is tied to community. We will do for others what we will not do for ourselves. We can build culture and community through this by inviting a kind of infectious feeling of the delight in doing good for others. Stories of some of the monks at Mepkin illustrate this. Turak notes his own early experience there effortlessly turning his attitude and actions from selfish to selfless. This results in seeing that the peer pressure a communal team working towards a common mission generates can make it easy to have a culture of selflessness that is infectious.

Chapter 7

This chapter is about excellence for the sake of excellence. Turak links this to the experience of sacrifice and suffering. What motivates this drive to excel is a sense of calling or vocation. While many people think that this is reserved for the few, one of the monks at Mepkin told Turak that “everyone is called to something bigger than themselves. Those who say they're not just never learned to listen” (p. 92). The notion of sacrifice is illustrated in this chapter by various

stories. What stood out for me is how the SKS students took on inviting Father Francis to do an organ recital at Duke University's chapel (he had left Julliard and turned down a lucrative recording contract to become a Trappist monk). The faculty sponsor of the SKS group at Duke and also dean of the chapel told the students not to get their hopes up, that free admission to an organ recital might draw 50 people. Instead, the students charged \$20 a ticket and created their own "goat rodeo" with a fierceness and passion to make the event excellent.

The event brought in around 2000 attendees, had television film crews present and it became a scene you might expect at a rock concert rather than an organ recital. The money went to charity, and the kids got much more than the experience of the event itself, which was amazing enough. They came away with having accomplished the impossible by learning how to engage their passion and holding themselves accountable for everything they committed to.

This creation of a culture of excellence for the sake of excellence is described as being behind the turnaround Jack Welch accomplished at GE. A case study from Turak's own experience as a vice-president for sales in a company describes how he got the sales team to want to succeed and be excellent. When he asked one of the sales team why the sudden change (this person had gone from having the worst results in sales to the best) he was told "Once you know what it feels like to be your best, you never, *ever* want to go back" (p. 108). This leads to a list of the ways to enact the principles of service and selflessness in a culture of excellence that gives the abstract principles a method.

Chapter 8

This is a chapter about ethics. Questions concerning ethical behavior are not especially concerned with "bad people doing bad things," but with situations that lead to "good people doing bad things from fear and anxiety" (p. 118). In this business model of service and selflessness, the source of ethical behavior is seen to be rooted in three things: having a long term attitude, detachment, and aiming past the target. The long term attitude is not simply something that we can choose. It comes from a sense of timelessness that pervades one's consciousness. Stories of the monk's way of life and view of time illustrate this. It is also seen that an ability to delay gratification comes along with this sense of timelessness.

Detachment was mentioned before, as being the opposite of identification. It is about being rooted in something bigger than one's self that enables a person to change the things in their lives without feeling they are changing their identity. Aiming past the target again comes up. Then all this is illustrated with the story of how Turak's company, Raleigh Group International, was sold to an Israeli company that had been a large client. The process of creating stock options for employees almost delayed the deal past the deadline, (which would have led to calling it off), but was a commitment the owners would not let go of.

Chapter 9

This chapter is on faith, which is viewed as "trusting the process" in a dynamic model of faithfulness rather than a static faith in a belief about some doctrine or dogma. This is then drawn out into the business realm, with the story of how PETA made a protest about the monk's

chicken farming and raised a lot of media attention. Despite tremendous support the monks received from their community of customers and others, they decided to shut down the chicken business, eventually going into exotic mushrooms. They were able to do this because their “business” was not eggs, but service and selflessness, and thus the outer form of this could change because they were detached, or non-identified with the form of their enterprise.

Throughout this story, the phrase trust the process was used, and Turak illustrates this further with the story of how his company was finally doing well financially, then the success of the companies they were selling products for led to them being sold, and RGI appeared to be about to lose all their business. This led to a personal time in the desert, of wanting to give up. The story of how Turak kept faith with his commitment to his partners and friends, and the ultimate greater success this brought, generated a feeling of being inspired to be connected with something so worth doing that it would inspire the same commitment and faith in me.

Chapter 10

This one is about trust, where the ever present mantra “trust the process” appears yet again. The first example to illustrate this comes from Turak fracturing his ankle while skydiving and a subsequent deep sense of depression that came over him. This led to his first visit to Mepkin Abbey, where he learned to trust the monastic process, even when at first it did not appear clear how the outer forms of prayer and work would take him through the necessary personal transformation, or “great trial” process. After the long journey through this personal desert, all that was left was a sense of immense gratitude to the monks for them modeling and supporting the process.

The theme of trust in business can be found almost everywhere. Turak talks about this in terms of becoming trustworthy and how the road to this is actually detachment. In more tangible terms, this means letting go of a pride and self-centered identification with a role or territory. He illustrates this with a story of becoming the head of a sales department in a company needing help due to intense infighting and low performance. Seizing up the situation, Turak described how he went around to all the other department heads and asked how his sales department could make their lives better. He then implemented these to demonstrate trustworthiness to the other departments, leading to a turnaround and increase in morale and performance.

The degree that trust is a personal brand is nicely illustrated when Turak received a speeding ticket about 100 miles away from Mepkin Abbey. The judge, upon hearing where Turak was going, said that if he said he wasn’t speeding, then he trusted his word, simply because of the trusted reputation the monks had and how far it spread its influence.

Chapter 11

Authenticity and self-knowledge are the core of what it takes to become trustworthy. The process of gaining these is part of the processes described throughout this book. Here, how one monk’s self-disclosure of his personal journey of facing himself in the desert made a deep impact on Turak. This is then brought out in describing how Louis Mobley created the IBM executive leadership program. After hiring ETS (Education Testing Services) to find the skills and

knowledge of great executives, Mobley found that such people were always outliers on the bell curve of any trait, skill or knowledge. What was in common to them was that they had certain values and attitudes, and that these were not the product of training but a certain kind of journey of self-discovery.

From this insight, the IBM program was set up to give executives opportunities to strip away facades about morality, intelligence and so on, to arrive at a greater place of understanding of themselves. This led to executive's ability to help group and team processes of refining a common sense of mission and purpose in terms of the deeper notions described earlier. The personal business narrative from Turak follows the acquisition of RGI and how their core product, which Turak received personal benefit from, was marginalized in favor of the new CEO's business plan. A meeting between them, the new CEO was confounded by why Turak would not fight for his plan and his personal interest, which allowed Turak to say "It's a product, and I have no plans to put the logo on my tombstone" (p. 165).

Chapter 12

Reading the last chapter, on living the life, explicitly named all the things I have also come to know in my own life as essential. One has to commit to the process, and each and every day, in each situation life brings to test us, maintain that commitment. No matter how inspirational reading this or any other book is, Turak is clear that "It is only through the long, slow process of living the life that the living waters of spirit permeate our rock-hard heads, until they finally reach our hearts" (p. 174).

The example here in this chapter touches my own heart, as I came close to part of the narrative. Turak described how Father Francis faced an incurable form of lymphoma that required chemo at a certain point to delay the inevitable. During the period before his chemo he spoke at an event hosted by the SKS group, Inward Bound, and told of his condition and how he was facing it to a group of 220 college students. That evening after his talk, I recall standing with him and Turak watching evening celebrations of ice cream, drumming and dancing in a tent on the lawn outside the campus buildings where the event was held. The simple presence and witnessing the joy of the students was permeated with an aura that lasted long after the event was over and we flew home.

Concluding Reflections

The thing that is hardest to describe writing this over/review is the feeling that reading through the stories of this book evoke in me. Something inside me is touched, and I see my own struggles to come to terms with my life, what I have created and the challenge to take full responsibility for it. At the same time, this feeling opens up a sense of freedom that is both anxious and exhilarating. There is something of this ineffable essence of life that transmits itself between the lines in the book, calling one to follow the path revealing itself before you.

The business secrets of the Trappist monks are not to be found in the usual formulas, even the principles Turak uses to convey these secrets. Nor are they found in the stories of heroic leaders. These secrets are to be discovered in the process of understanding business as a forum for our

own and others' hero's journey, the passages of life that we encounter to give us the gift of knowing ourselves, and through this being able to transcend ourselves and serve others. The depth of this realization came through in the words of Father Francis, when telling Turak about his cancer. "“What I could've never imaged' he finished softly, 'is that my cancer is the answer to a lifetime of prayer’” (p. 172).

Born in the Middle: The Soteriological Streams of Integral Theory and Meta-Reality

Bonnitta Roy¹

Introduction

At the 2011 Integral Theory-Critical Realism symposium convened at JFK University, Roy Bhaskar noted that both his philosophy of meta-Reality and Ken Wilber's Integral Theory, were both "serious" in that their concerns were to facilitate personal liberation and realize social emancipation. While both philosophers agree that the personal and social domains are inextricably interwoven, the cosmological narratives which underlay their views differ quite dramatically.

Throughout his later works, *From Science to Emancipation*, *From East to West*, and *Reflections on Meta-Reality*, Bhaskar is clear that he believes that the natural state of humans, their ground state (which is co-present with the ground state of all beings and entities as the cosmic envelope) is an ever-present reality which is occluded by error, illusion, and structures of un-freedom, and that the way back to freedom, to the alethic truth, and to one's ground state is through the shedding of obstructions. For Bhaskar, the ground state is ever-present and the alethic truth is always operating, but humans have been disenchanting from their god-li-ness, by the nature of human self-consciousness, which has been separated from the ground of its being (from its own god-li-ness) by the occasion of its self-awaring.

Wilber's cosmology rests on the perennial philosophy's notion of enfolded levels of Spirit, unfolding as discrete levels of being through the cosmological force which simultaneously transcends (eros) and includes (agape) prior forms creating a richly textured holarchy of perspectives which arise under 4 simultaneous aspects: subjective interiors, objective exteriors, singular wholes, and plural parts. For Wilber, the ground state of being, is the ever-present primordial perspective, I-I, or original face, which has been "forgotten" so that Spirit can self-accompany in exquisite cosmological play, the impulse of which culminates in Spirit's becoming

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self-aware in the highest states and stages of human consciousness. Is it possible to see these streams in a wider cosmological river where the imperative of the one stream to clear away obstructions, and the impulse of the other to ignite the clear light of awareness can be viewed as a generative system of awakening?

Integrating Structures

The states and stages transcend and include each other, which is to say that each higher level of both states and stages build upon the lower levels developmentally. Lower levels are related to higher levels as parts of greater wholes; and all parts are themselves wholes to smaller parts. Growth-to-goodness is interrupted, obstructed, or pathologized when eros and agape are not balanced or integrated. This can happen in two ways: 1) in the process of developing to a new stage or transcending to a higher state, some portions of the lower level are excluded, shunned, denied, or repressed, or 2) in the attempt toward transcendence, the developmental trajectory is stunted, denied, or oppressed. Because state transformation and stage transitions are de-coupled, it is crucial to nurture both state and stage growth to achieve healthy development. For example, spiritual practices which emphasize and accelerate access to higher states often produce "grossly deformed individuals" due to the lack of adequate nurturing of the other lines, levels and capacities which comprise the stage-structures of the developed self.

Because all development must occur within the quadrant matrix, many models of development that have come from integral theory suggest that the upward trajectory of development is actually more like a spiraling process due to the effect of the dipolar structuration of the elemental categories or deep quadratic structure. For example, ego development is construed to be driven in general by the dialectic between individual agency (UL quadrant) and collective communion (LL quadrant), and in specific, by the dialectic between emergent polarities that arise at different stages.² Likewise, psychological self-development (in the individual case) and social development (in the collective case) are both construed as being driven through a dialectic between interior dimensions of growth (intentionality, communicative action) and external dimensions (bio-neural-physical aspects of self, political-economic aspects of society). Integral theory therefore, embraces the dualistic structuration of reality, as essential components of development through states as well as through stages, where the dipolar vectors (or drivers) are eros and agape in the macrocosmic story, and the 4-quadrant matrix structure in the microcosmic story.

Shedding Structures

In contrast to integral theory's developmental "growth-to-goodness" model, critical realism considers growth, development and progress in the conventional sense primarily as obstacles, errors, and illusions accumulated in the fragmented, stratified and dualistic world. Whereas integral theory formulates salvation as additive or multiplicative (freedom + fullness, depth x span), for critical realism, the path to salvation is primarily a process of subtraction or absencing conditions or structures that occlude, hide, distort, or otherwise prevent us from accessing our innate and always-present state of original grace.

² See www.cook-greuter.com

I think it is important to say here very specifically what we have to lose to become enlightened or realized. First we have to lose our ego, because, being in our ground state, we would see that our freedoms were indivisible. Secondly, we need to be intellectually more generally mentally clear, that is have no fixations, no prejudices, no preconceptions; in a way everything that we know in-built into our being, so that our minds are as free, clear, empty, flexible and creative as possible. Thirdly, we have to be emotionally clear...; So no ego, a clear mind, a pure heart, and then fourthly, a healthy and energized body; that is, we need to be as healthy and energized as we can. But there's a fifth condition, we need our "psychic being" to be clear too, that is, free of all traces and residues of the past, which includes karma from our past in this life and, if we believe in them, our past lives; but also our past in the form of the residues or scars of our experience buried in our unconscious--we need to transform our unconsciousness into consciousness, and, like our karma, clear it, release it, let go of it, get totally free of our past. (Bhaskar, 2002b, p.263)

According to the philosophy of meta-Reality, reality is stratified and fragmented on the macroscopic scale – and dualism and other modes of fragmentation are responsible for the enculturated, indoctrinated and karmically inherited conditions of unfreedom that comprise the realm of the actual. Conventionally, we go about our lives confined to the world of the actual, unaware of our deeper nature (our ground state) and unknowing of deeper, more total and holistic truths. Spiritual intuition, existential angst, and scientific inquiry are all activities which bring us to the edges of a greater understanding through the force of the alethic truth which is always pointing us towards our ground state of being. Human beings experience the "pulse of freedom" as the dialectic between this realm of the actual, and our primary state or natural state of freedom as beings participating in the realm of the real by virtue of being rooted in the cosmic envelope through our individualized ground states.

What does Development Look Like?

For integral theory, development happens in both stage and state processes. Stage development occurs throughout one's lifetime, and is progressive. State changes are transitional and occur as temporary episodes of deep transformative experiences here and there over the course of one's life. There are several neo-Piagetian theories of stage development that fit into the AQAL model. Integral theory's primary focus is on the levels of ego-development that trace the progression of psycho-cognitive development and the set of work, life-style, semantic, and behavioral values that together compose a values system or world-view. Integral theory commonly refers these levels as "colors in the spiral of development."

Individual development entails the accumulation of increasing capacities for navigating an increasingly complex world, including the ability to take multiple perspectives, capacities for double and triple loop thinking, development from concrete to abstract operations, to systems of abstractions and then to meta-systems (or systems of systems) of abstractions, to paradigmatic and then cross-paradigmatic thinking; from pre-dialectical to trans-dialectical (paradoxical) reasoning; from tribal identification to institutional identification to autonomy, and then onto post-autonomous identities; from the rule-based self-identity, to narrative, constructed and/or relativized versions; from ego-centric to ethno-centric to world-centric to eco-centric concerns.

Contrast this with the sequence of "improvements" that matter most to meta-Reality:

When you do all the negations, when you say no system, no organization, no leaders, no fixed dogma, no fixed thought, no papal thought, no priestly thought, no spiritual authorities, no fixed emotional make-up, nothing, then what do you get when you have stripped all those things away, what do you get? It is not nothing; it is not only just nothing. When you strip away everything that we impose, everything that, heteronomously, we impose on human beings, we get free, creative, loving, spontaneous, energetic, intelligent, right-acting human beings – left to ourselves in what I would call our innermost nature. Technically what I would call our ground state. We are free, creative, loving. We are also right-acting, we will do the right thing and we will love it when we allow it. (Bhaskar, 2002b, 322)

This brings us to two important questions:

1. For integral theory: What drives the need for increasing complexity?
2. For meta-Reality: What gets in the way?

1. On the macrocosmic level for integral theory, the forces Eros and Agape work together as two divine hands of creation, driving the forms toward transcendence by way of inclusion, which is responsible for the complexity we see throughout the cosmos. According to this formula, forms "move forward" (evolve) toward increasing complexity because they "take along" with them all the prior forms as parts in an ever-enlarging whole. On the microcosmic level, development "moves forward" through the prior stages and therefore already conditioned by the prior structures, such that present (present self) is always in relation to both the past (self) as well as the future (self) – an additive, accretionary, iterative and fractal relation wherein the prior forms are enfolded as parts in the present form which will itself be enfolded as a partial whole within the next future, complexified whole.

2. With respect to meta-Reality, thought, a certain aberration of thinking, gets in the way. Bhaskar writes:

Thinking, naming, judging impedes creativity, loving, right-acting human nature. They drain our energy and they set up repetitive patterns of behavior. They bind our energy. ... We cannot even think by thought. Similarly, when we think about doing something loving, we are already taking the love away. When we are being loving, we just love. Thinking about loving is putting a condition on it. For if we do not pay attention to our thoughts, and we do not understand the limits of thought itself, then we will get stuck into this ideology of thought. (Bhaskar, 2002b, pp. 324-326)

Thought, is thinking turned onto itself, by quitting the activity of thinking and mis-taking it as an object. On a macrocosmic scale, this is the underlying mis-take, what Whitehead calls misplaced concreteness, which fragments the world of the actual (what Heidegger would call the ontic representation) from within the realm of the real (the ontological, processural continuum). On the microcosmic scale, this is the error which is called the epistemic fallacy – confusing what we construe to be true for what is really true.

For Integral Theory, epistemic sophistication, which grows through stages of differentiation, complexification and integration, represents a kind of spiritual *progress* because it fills (fulfills) fullness. This is precisely *not the case* with meta-Reality where, under the conditions of the master-slave relationship, people are driven to higher and higher levels of epistemic sophistication as they creatively feed the very mechanisms of oppression they are in pain to escape. Therefore it would be no surprise, in the information age of the era of late-stage capitalism, where *cognitive and conceptual complexity* proves to be the most powerful means of mass indoctrination, domestication and force over others (human and non-human), and where social, political, legal economic, and technological complexity offers the first-ever possibility of *global* control, that meta-Realists would critique Integral Theory's "fullness as epistemic sophistication" as a kind of spiritual sophistry.

On the other hand, meta-Reality has to account for the origin of dualism, and its products – separation and oppression. Dualism may be a product of "captured thinking" – the *thought* that separates consciousness from its ground state, and we, in turn, may be "captivated by thoughts" through a process of forgetfulness or amnesia, and thereafter go about confusing the solidified matrix of opposing perspectives for the fluid ground of becoming – but this merely begs the question: *Where does the ontogeny of "thought-filled forgetfulness" flow forth from in the first place, if not from the non-dual ground where Spirit abides?*³

Born in the Middle

We are born *in the middle* – unaware of our own beginnings and endings. By the time a child has learned to name herself, her reality has already been deeply conditioned by the ways of her parents and the language she was born into. The different levels of agency she experiences in her world – from the ability to move her body, the ability to affect her parents' behavior, the ability to manipulate other objects, including small animals and smaller siblings – demonstrate to her that the world is a rigidly stratified place. Objects persist long after their appearances are gone, and people compete for having things the way *they* want them to be. The process of naming things and using language to make sharper distinctions and shape new realities, exaggerates the thing-like nature of reality and weakens the sense of interconnectedness and inter-being. Events and happenings – the feelings of participation – slowly give way to things and their causes. The conventions of life become a matter of utility and instrumentality.

By the time we are old enough to begin to ask questions about our own beginnings and the nature of reality outside of conventional discourse (post-conventional inquiry), our way of reasoning and going about inquiring are already encumbered by layers of pre-conditioned meaning and the pre-constituted self. These include 1) a metaphysical framework primarily fixated with static things, 2) a permanent use of figure-ground contrast to organize reality, 3) conceptual metaphors that are constrained by the rules which govern the physical and gross embodied experience, 4) the implicit laws of reality that are transmitted by the structure of language, especially the subject-object (noun-verb) construction 5) cognitive biases of all types, including the split mind, 6) a privileged perspective based on a limited life experience 7) a

³ Wilber addresses this question with a kind of parable that Spirit creates form because it is lonely all by itself; and then "plays by forgetting."

diminished perspective based on repression of cultural bias and stereotype, 8) the effects of shadow material at the levels of self, culture, species, and biotic community, 9) primacy of operations in 3-dimensional rather than n-dimensional space and 10) an inflexible apperception of time.

Only the post-conventional mind can begin to deconstruct all these implicit biases and blind spots. Slowly through inquiry and practices such as mindfulness training, we begin to receive insights. Peeking through some of the biases and releasing some of the conditioned structures of ordinary experience, we begin to experience non-ordinary states. We are shown that the subject-object or mind-body quality of experience can drop away; or that the sense of spatial separation can disappear; or how the mind, starved of stimulus, can manufacture its own hallucinogenic reality. We begin to experience expansions and contractions of time, and space spreads out and becomes self-luminous. We begin to notice and take note of the conditioned pattern that *is the self* participating in a patterned-upon-patterned world at scales all the way up and all the way down. In other words, we begin to experience the sense of our own beginnings through the deconstruction of the apparatus of existence into the deep phenomenon of pattern. When we are ready to begin again, *from that place we interpret as origin*, the place of elemental principles and primitives out of which we are born – something curious happens. We find we will need to become more and more sophisticated, cognitively, to sufficiently de-couple ourselves from all those conditioned patterns in order to witness them as objects in awareness. We find that we need to create higher and higher levels of abstractions and meta-abstractions to get at the deeper and deeper kernels of reality. In the process we may discover an underlying rule of the dialectically reasoning mind – the deeper the ontological immanence, the higher the epistemological transcendence.⁴ By making this distinction, we can see that while meta-Reality is reaching downward, toward an ultimate ontological immanence, Integral Theory is primarily concerned with tracking upward toward increasing epistemological transcendence. Having been born in the middle—we are at risk of splitting apart!

Stratified Reality

In order to make sense of all this, we need to take a look at how Wilber and Bhaskar think about what is real, and how we gain access to truth.

Both Wilber and Bhaskar see “reality” as being stratified or divided among different types of worldviews which have ontological and epistemological components. Both philosophers remind us “the real” is not something “out there” waiting to be known, nor is it something that can be contained inside human perspectives – rather, “the real” is a complex *process* of mutual unfolding of knower and known; and that it is important to see both reality as well as the knower as agents in this unfolding.

Wilber’s AQAL theory says the ontological and epistemological components arise mutually and simultaneously to form a single “Kosmic address” which locates both the subject and the world that is disclosed. For Wilber, the real is an enactment. He consistently argues against an ontological dimension that exists independent of an epistemological perspective. Certainly

⁴ This is one of Bhaskar’s insights.

Wilber is not saying that there is no aspect of reality that is independent of human perspective. What he is saying is that there is no aspect of reality that is *independent of perspective*. In other words, there are perspectival worlds that are independent of humans – fish worlds, frog worlds, horse worlds, dog worlds, lion worlds, spider & butterfly worlds, amoeba worlds, plant, algae, plankton and coral worlds, molecule worlds, and atom worlds – Umwelts, as Jacob von Uexküll called them – entire worlds composed from the semiosphere of subjective and proto-subjective en-actors in the center of a semiotic enactment triad of mutual agency: the signifier (perspectival agent), the sign (meaning-bearing agent) and the signified (world-bearing agent).⁵ Interwoven this way, Wilber’s theory says *what is real and what is true* are derived together, and are relative to other *reality-truths* in a hierarchically structured developmental process whereby lower or more primitive *reality-truths* are transcended and include by higher or more evolutionary complex *reality-truths*. Furthermore, because for Wilber, “truth” entails a hermeneutic circle or a nexus of shared signs and signifiers, *reality-truths* become more true and hence more real, through the process of becoming more sharable and more shared. Because the process is never-ending, all *reality-truths* are partial. But the “missing pieces” that make them partial cannot be found except through the enactment process described above. Therefore, we can assume that what *drives the evolution of new, more encompassing reality truths, is the partiality itself—what Bhaskar would call “absence.”* In other words, because any given *reality-truth* cannot itself be in relation to “missing pieces outside itself”, then “partialness” itself must be an evolutionary driver. Early on, Wilber used the phrase “IOU to the universe” as an expression of this dynamic instability of all *reality-truths*.⁶

In order to make sense of Bhaskar’s way of thinking, I have drawn the following which illustrates the various ways Bhaskar distinguishes between different types of realities.

⁵ Over the past 18 months Wilber and people close to him have intimated that he will soon publish a complete semiotic model of his work. For more than 20 years I have been following the progression of his writings. I see Wilber as continuing to move from Pierce to Whitehead and now back to Pierce (which resonates more with a Habermasian view) without incorporating the important revisions of Hartshorne and Kakol. Whether I have given an adequate account of what might be forthcoming, or not, remains to be seen.

⁶ This phrase “IOU to the universe” always reminded me of the kind of radiation that Stephen Hawkins discovered coming from black holes. Nothing can escape a black hole, so it is paradoxical that radiation of any kind would emanate from them. It is as if when a particle enters a black hole, it enters another universe, demonstrating the partiality of this universe, and hence, the need to issue an IOU. My own interpretation of this “coincidence” is not that the universe works in the way that Wilber’s theory works, but that the existing physics—the epistemological framework of the existing physics—that we use to explain black hole radiation is true, but partial. Hence, it has this same key feature of Wilber’s theory. In other words, I am suggesting that this is not so much a key feature of the universe, but a key feature of our epistemic tools at this stage in human consciousness. Wilber himself, of course, does not need to make this distinction, since he relies on the argument that what is *most real about the universe* is what is *true for our human consciousness* since humans represent the leading edge of evolution.




Figure 1: An illustrative interpretation of Bashkar's stratified reality.

In the ontological realm, Bhaskar distinguishes the domain of the Alethic Truth from the domain of “the Real.” The Alethic Truth does not depend upon human systems or human knowing. It can only be inferred because, although unknown, it is causally effective. We experience the effects of the alethic truth in the many ways our theories go wrong and our predictions fail. We experience it in the deep unsolved mysteries of science and the profound unpredictability of human systems.⁷

The next part of the illustration labelled “the Real” is that part of reality which unfolds through the mutual interpenetration of the ontological realm and human processes of inquiry and knowing. This domain of “the Real” most closely represents Wilber’s notion of the mutual dependence of the ontological and the epistemological domains. But for Wilber, it is human development which constantly adjudicates and improves the adequacy or accuracy of “the Real” and therefore every perspective (every “real world that arises) is true, but partial. On the other hand, for Bhaskar, it is the Alethic Truth which exerts a continuous evolutionary pressure on human knowledge systems toward more adequate or accurate understanding, and so “the Real evolves the capacity to express more and more of the Alethic Truth.

Moving to the right, the diagram illustrates the domain that Bhaskar calls “the demi-Real.” The demi-real is the world of confusion, illusion, error and make-believe. The demi-Real is maintained by human social convention, habits of language, unexamined assumptions,

⁷ There is no place for this realm in AQAL theory. In fact Wilber has described the realm of Alethic Truth as “a particular Turquoise perspective” – demonstrating once again his insistence that there is no reality that is not coupled with human epistemes. For Wilber, humans are always subject of worlds, never subject to them.

institutionalized processes of reification, propaganda, advertising, mechanisms of domination and control, narratives and ideologies of all sorts, mythological thinking, wives tales, and cognitive biases of all sorts. The “demi-Real” is the world of consensual pretense. One of Bhaskar’s significant insights is that the realm of the demi-real *is also causally effective!* When we mistake the rope for a snake – we jump back! Human illusions become self-fulfilled prophecies over time.⁸ When, as the Buddhist say “on the path we mistake the rope for a snake” and then maintain that illusion through stories which are made demi-real by conventional social behaviors, we begin to live in the demi-real:

The path to the rope is taboo, because a snake lives there.

We prove that there is a snake at the end of the path because no one goes there.

By the time we send an expedition to go there, we discover the snake has gone elsewhere.

We look for “elsewhere” the snake has gone.

Each one of these “translations”⁹ contribute to establish a *known* world Bhaskar calls “the actual.” The “actual” is divided into a proper realm and an “improper” realm. The proper realm builds knowledge through the scientific methods which continually expand the contexts upon which knowledge is built—by revealing the conditions of partiality, for example, or by making explicit the boundary conditions under which the derived facts are “true.” Proper knowledge is derived by assigning manifest facts to their ever widening contexts. The improper realm is the realm of methods such as empiricism, and what Bhaskar calls “actualism” where systems are founded on error, illusion, falsehood or pretense.¹⁰ These systems can *actually* be confirmed through certain scientific and quasi-scientific methods or community-specific practices such that the experimental set up (or injunctions) are interpreted through methodologies that are validated by hermeneutic circles, to enact (bring forth, maintain) “their actual” world.¹¹ Still, “this improper actual” world is a false world, and the role of philosophy, is to identify the structures in the “demi-Real” and the improper methodologies that are responsible. For example, at one point in history we could “prove” that boys are innately smarter than girls, by random testing of boys and girls, men and women. Of course, this leaves out the structures of society that privileged the schooling of boys over girls.

Now we can see the basis of meta-Reality’s critique of AQAL theory. When the foundations for the perspectives are maintained by methods of inquiry that are steeped in structures of the demi-real, or derived from empirical methods, those perspectives or worldviews are not “merely partial” but rather, *mostly if not entirely false*. Even still, these false views can be maintained by, complexified, and reified into “actual worlds” through human knowledge building processes. A worldview based on apartheid, is a human system that self-maintains a human construction that is false. For meta-Reality, perspectives and worldviews, are *falsifiable*. And therefore we can establish ethical criteria (values) based on factual ones.

⁸ There are too many examples to list. One being, the belief that boys are born smarter than girls sets up a system of causes and effects in society where boys are educated differently and grow up to be smarter than girls.

⁹ As Bruno Latour would call them.

¹⁰ Students of Buddhist scholastics will recognize this partition as between conventionally valid and conventionally invalid truths.

¹¹ You can see that Wilber’s enactment theory is subject to a strong critique from Critical Realist theory.

What makes this “actual” world “demi-real” is that all the “realness” is constrained within the human semiosphere and not in “the world” where the Alethic truth lives. Founded on human error or confusion, realized by human-to-human injunction, enacted through knowledge-building structures and institutions that are anthropocentric and culturally conditioned, and sustained by power structures that are deeply vested in the existing interpretations of reality – the realm of the “actual” becomes increasingly divergent from the real and the true, and therefore, Bhaskar would argue, increasingly distanced from the good.¹²

The Soteriological Streams

I started this paper by introducing the *soteriological streams* of AQAL theory and meta-Reality. A soteriological approach must have something significant to say about *the good*. AQAL theory separates “the big three” – the True, the Beautiful and the Good—in a way that makes them individual and irreducible. The often used tenet in integral circles “you can’t derive values from facts” points to the paradoxical kind of exclusivity of the domains, wherein values (derived from upper left-hand conditions and methodologies) and facts (derived from right-hand conditions and methodologies) do not relate. For meta-Reality however, the deepest “facts” are Alethic truths, and Alethic truths are universal “goods.” When science and philosophy mine the deepest truths, they move us toward the greater goods. For meta-Reality, this is the ultimate validation of pairing philosophy as the handmaiden of science – where the role of philosophy is to “underlabor” for science, by examining and revealing the errors, illusions, mistakes, limiting assumptions, implicit ontologies and hidden metaphysics of the scientific frame(s) of mind, in order to “steer” the scientific enterprise toward the deeper truths and greater goods. But how does this underlaboring happen? What are the key features of practicing this way of philosophy?

In a surprising way, Bhaskar’s Critical Realism sparked a new generation of Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) just as Bhaskar himself was turning toward the more spiritual concerns of meta-Reality.¹³ By reducing the notion of “truth” to that of “fact” OOO philosophers mistake the map (of facts) that science makes for the territory that “resides” in or “abides as” Alethic Truth. As a result they create a world of demi-real which says “truth” and “goodness” reside “in the objects themselves.” This is clearly a step backwards.

¹² A strong critical realist critique sees the developmental stages popularized as colors in Spiral Dynamics and AQAL theory, not as deep evolutionary structures of “the real” but as a taxonomy of “actual” structures derived from the “demi-real” structures of late-stage capitalism. This strong critique would argue that the competitive and rivalous nature of capitalist economy “drives” the complex adaptive system “human” through higher and higher levels of complexity – a process Bhaskar refers to as “the continual creativity of the slaves.” Therefore, for critical realists, the only way “out” is not “further up the spiral,” as Wilber claims, but starts with the complete deconstruction of capitalist ideology and the complete decomposition its socio-cultural structures.

¹³ Bhaskar’s move toward a spiritually informed Critical Realism caused a major rift in the Critical Realist community worldwide, where much of his work on meta-Reality has been outright rejected, including Bhaskar’s interest in integral theory.

A Gnostic Revival

A way forward would be to reclaim the notion of *alethic truth* from the dialectics of philosophical meta-discourse, and situate it inside a kind of revival of Gnosticism. In philosophical discourse we are confronted with the categories “epistemology” and “ontology” – which relate to knowledge and reality. These are the kind of categories that the synthesizing mind of Aristotle was comfortable with. Valid knowledge is simply “truth,” and valid realities are simply, “real.” Yet the Greeks made the distinction between these kinds of categories which appeal to the dialectically reasoning mind, and the gnostic terms which the dialectically reasoning mind cannot capture.

From this view we realize that *alethic truth* is neither an ontological term nor an epistemological term in the philosophical sense. Similarly, the Greek word *gnosis*, which is usually translated as “knowledge” is neither an epistemological term nor an ontological term. Gnosticism is a kind of knowing that does not depend on the relation of epistemological and ontological categories, nor their mutual dependence, nor their interpenetration. Similarly from a Gnostic view, *alethic truth* is a kind of truth that does not depend on the relation of epistemological and ontological categories, nor their mutual dependence, nor their interpenetration. As long as the soteriological program sticks with the meta-discourse of dualistic, dialectical mind, our theories will continue to drive us apart.

Looking, Seeing

John Whitney Petit’s (2002) book *Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty*, stands out as one of the most important and clearest exegesis of the complex map-territory (epistemology-ontology) problem. Petit is clearly immersed in philosophy’s soteriological streams:

If philosophy is understood as a process of historical development without a specifiable goal, or as a deconstructing meta-discourse that parasitizes the naïve speculations of earlier ages, the classical Indian understanding of philosophy’s purpose might seem impoverished. As the handmaiden of religion, philosophy might not function as a transforming process, but as the rigid armor of dogma. However, the neglect of a critical philosophy in a soteriological context tends to result in the degeneration of religious and philosophical traditions into partisan insularities. This was a major concern for Buddhist philosophers. Philosophy imbued with the spirit of *moksa*¹⁴ is more likely to draw people together than drive them apart. (p. 104)

In these few pages, Petit makes some key distinctions. For instance, he notes that philosophy based on *aletheia* is similar to Bhaskar’s subtractive approach—“a method for removing ignorant misconceptions about the nature of things.

¹⁴ *Moksa or Moksha* (Sanskrit) means emancipation, liberation or release. In eschatological sense it connotes freedom from *samsara*, the cycle of death and rebirth. In epistemological and psychological sense, *moksa(h)a* connotes freedom, self-realization and self-knowledge. *Moksa* carries the same meaning as my term *view* (see Roy, 2006)

Petit introduces the important difference between the verbs “looking for” and “seeing.” When the function of theoretical meta-discourse, is properly understood as a process of “looking for,” it is no surprise that the process is never-ending. As the familiar joke goes “why do I always find the thing I am looking for in the last place I look?” When the content of our philosophical discourse is abstract formulation, we are involved in the *activity of looking for* rather than in the *direct experience of seeing*: “When one is attempting to fathom the nature of things through the medium of abstractions, it is as though one were looking for something” (p. 105). It is in this sense of “seeing” that *gnosis* refers to a *direct perception* not a perspective.¹⁵ As “seeing,” Petit writes, “philosophy is conducive to gnostic vision.”

Guidelines

In attempting some kind of conclusion, I would like to propose some guidelines of a gnostic view of soteriological philosophy, employing Petit’s useful terminology.

First, from this view we see that epistemology is the domain of the human experience of “looking for.” This impulse of “looking for” drives the knowledge-building systems of human thought in science and philosophy. Epistemology refers to the plethora of outcomes, including theories and methodologies that result from this impulse. Because perspectives are shaped by “looking for” as distinguished from the perception of “seeing”, they too are part of the epistemological domain and are subject to persistent error, illusion and confusion and thus, persistently advance into higher and higher orders of complexity.

Secondly, the “looking for” impulse is intersubjectively maintained through philosophical and scientific discourse and methodology. This is the purpose of the hermeneutic circle—the collectively held responsibility of “looking for” shared in the spirit of *moksa*.

Thirdly, this collectively held responsibility requires interpretation, and interpretation builds what Petit calls “contingencies of culture and history.” This is the situation described as structures in Bhaskar’s “demi-reality.” These structures are “real” to the extent that they participate in the collectively-held project of “looking for;” yet they are not real to the extent that they limit, by abstraction and complexification, the experience of “seeing” as direct perception. When the activity of “looking for” gives way to the reductive and reifying “scientific” project of replacing the “looking for” with a false sense of “seeing that,” the realm of the actual takes us further into meta-discourse that “parasitizes the spirit of *moska*” and farther away from the processes of self-transformation.

Fourth: Petit writes: “When one sees something as opposed to looking for or at it, one participates profoundly in the seen¹⁶” and “Unless the experience of freedom in personal realization is integrated with philosophical discourse, however, it is difficult if not impossible to share that realization with others.” This is where the deconstructive sense of *aletheia* comes into

¹⁵ The reader should note whereas a “perspective” is either an epistemological term, an ontological term or both, depending on the philosophical meta-discourse being applied, a “direct perception” is neither an epistemological term, nor an ontological term, nor a relata between them.

¹⁶ See Appendix II

play as the proper methodology for theorizing which “conveys a destination”, or “orients others in the right direction.” If the “destination of looking for” is the “seeing,” then the destination in the “seeing” becomes an impulse to share this realization with others. Those theories that conclude or worse, preclude, the “looking for” by offering a set of conditioned propositions to “look at”, betray the soteriological impulse. For philosophical theories with soteriological intentions, the moral implications of this are profound. Only through a shared experience of “seeing” can the moral imperative be satisfied.

Together, these four prescribe the right view of a soteriological philosophy: 1) perspectival diversity and conventional knowledge are outcomes of “looking for” which 2) is an intersubjectively shared and hermeneutically maintained aspect of the collective human condition, which 3) is partially conditioned by error and confusion, and as such tends to parasitize the spirit of *moska* and therefore 4) the valid theory is one which a) deconstructs the error and confusion that arises, b) orients others toward knowing-as-direct perception, and c) sets the conditions for a shared experience of gnostic vision.¹⁷

We now have an answer to the first question: For integral theory, what drives the need for increasing complexity? Answer: The human project of “looking for.”

This in turn brings us to our second question. How is it that we are for most of us for most of our lives, “looking for” instead of “seeing?” For meta-Reality: “What gets in the way?”

Cultivating View

The capacity for direct perception is an innate faculty of all beings—in this sense, “direct perception” is similar to Whitehead’s notions of “prehension.” If we consider all “things” as *prehending beings*, directly perceiving each other, we enter into the view which has been called *pan-experientialism* – where reality is constituted by every “one” experiencing every “one.” As a theory, pan-experientialism describes the processural continuum comprised of the participation of all beings. And yet, we do not always experience reality this way. Unlike direct perception or direct participation, *view* entails relative degrees of “correctness” or “freedom.” The senses perceive “what is” directly. But experience is constituted by perception *and* context.¹⁸ Furthermore, the context or interpretation is limited by *view*, which metaphorically can be thought of as a “viewfinder.” The degrees of freedom in one’s *view* determines how much of the context enters into the experience. In this sense, *view* is a capacity for allowing in more and more of reality into one’s experience of it. Alternately, *view* describes the capacity for experiencing more and more of one’s *participation* with all others. When our immediate experience of reality includes a direct perception of our participation with all beings, we have realized the *correct view*.¹⁹

¹⁷ People who are familiar with my work will recognize that “collective insight practices” includes the deconstructive movement as well as orients us toward a direct perception, (he ah ha! moment) and a realization that is collectively shared.

¹⁸ We can say that perception and context = perspective.

¹⁹ I attempted to describe this *view* in my paper presented at the 2013 Integral Theory Conference:

To participate, means to enjoy movement and reciprocity within the generative ground of our universalized becoming and the foregrounding of our being. To participate means to act and to be

Let's go back to the story of the rope that is mistaken for a snake. The senses perceive "what is." If all of the reality enters in as context, then the person will experience the rope as a rope. If, however, the context is limited to a memory of a snake that once bit a dog, then the person is most likely to experience the rope as a snake. When the villagers hear her story, even though their senses perceive the words directly, if the context is limited to this story, then their experience will be one of limited participation, and they too will mistake the rope for a snake.

Our existential situation is such that neither our sensory faculties nor our capacity of view are fully developed at birth. We are born in the middle – with the sensory faculties of a child which begin to develop mostly inside the context of a ready-made adult world, partially conditioned by error, illusion and confusion. Because both direct perception and participation *as well as* context are shaping our experience, we begin to suffer from a kind of existential dissonance, and begin the long process of "looking for." A "good" theory orients us toward the direction of a correct *view*, where direct perception arises with the experience of an adequate participation with reality. When the correct view is cultivated to perfection, we enter into a state of complete freedom and full participation. If Integral Theory and meta-Reality are concerned with an adequate soteriological philosophy, it would be important for practitioners to examine their claims in the context of this notion of *view*.

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acted upon, to affect and effect, to mediate both spatial and temporal extension in infinite directions and dimensions. To participate means to be "in the soup", not somehow above, beneath, behind the action, through the veil of transcendence, assumption of objectivity or inference of subjectivity. To participate means to lose track of cause and effect, agent and object, knower and known, actor and script. To participate requires a pre-conceptual or post-dialectical orientation to reality as "a movement, a happening, a transformation ... as events that are constantly transformed." (Oliver & Gershman, 1989) To participate means, as Whitehead would have it, is to be in a relationship of feeling among a society of all other entities, human and nonhuman, biotic and a-biotic, within a nexus of shared history.

Appendix I

The diagram below illustrates the major philosophical streams originating in the pre-dialect “oceanic” era of the past and branching into three distinct dialectical philosophical streams where it situates Wilber in the perspectival (toward the hermeneutic and epistemological), and Bhaskar in the dialectical (toward the empirical and ontological). The third stream represents a transitional form between the soteriological philosophies inherited from Buddhist scholastics, and western process metaphysics evolving toward a true, post-dialectic “onto-logics.”²⁰




Figure 2. Philosophical Streams.

Appendix II

The phrase “direct perception” carries some ontological baggage for the dialectically primed mind, since the question in the background is always “direct perception of *what*” – which leads the dialectically constructed mind to posit an ontological reality that is being perceived. This leads to the false dualism of subjective agent as perceiver and objective (non-agentic) object as perceived. This is the same problem with the semiotic triangle. The term “participation” is more appropriate to a modern gnostic vision, in which all aspects of reality are actively “participating” with all others, such that the phrase “direct perception” actually refers to full participation of all

²⁰ See http://alderloreinsightcenter.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/roy_suny_aqal2210.pdf

reality in all reality. As such, “knowing” is a kind of participation, but we can and do participate without knowing, which can, from the view of “direct perception” be experienced as an obstruction, whereas from the view of participation, it is not. However, knowing as meta-discourse can parasitize *awareness of participation* by creating a false sense of somehow being “above the soup and out of the fray” as it were.²¹

²¹ For more on direct perception as participation and feel see
http://alderloreinsightcenter.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/roy_presenter-paper-itc-2013.pdf